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1I INTRODUCTION
The thesis is concerned with the appropriateness of the existing jurisdictional divide in 
the application of Community and national laws to mergers.
The thesis uses the word ‘merger* or ‘concentration* in a broad sense, embracing the 
wide variety o f legal arrangements that may fall within different systems of merger 
control legislation. Nevertheless, a more precise and technical definition of 
‘concentration* is provided below with specific regard to the application o f the 
European Merger Regulation.
Jurisdiction is concerned with a State's right of regulation,1 2or the right 'to apply the 
law to the acts o f m en f That regulation incorporates the prescription or 
implementation of legal rules, which designates a State's international right to make 
legal rules, and the enforcement of legal rules (or prerogative jurisdiction), involving 
the right of a State to give effect to its legal rules in a given case3.
The European Merger Regulation was implemented on 21 September 1990.4 
According to Article 21(1) MR, the European Commission had an exclusive 
competence to apply the Regulation to all those concentrations that fell within its 
jurisdictional scope. Thereby, these concentrations would not be assessed under the 
relevant national provisions.5
The jurisdictional scope of the Merger Regulation (that is, the extent to which it is 
enforced) is determined according to two separate conditions: first, it must be 
established that the transaction in question constitutes a ‘concentration* within the 
m eaning of Article 3 MR; secondly, that concentration must have a ‘Community 
Dimension’ within the meaning of Article 1 MR.
1 Mann, F., The Doctrine o f  Jurisdiction in International Law' in: 'Recueil des Cours\ 
Academie de Droit International, 1964 Vol. 1 at p.13.
2 Wedding v Meyler, 192 US 573, 584 (1904); Central Railroad v Jersey City 209 US 473, 
479 (1908).
3 See Mann, F., ibid, 1964.
4 Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 o f 21 December 1989 on the Control o f Concentrations 
between Undertakings, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 o f  30 June 1997.
5 Article 21(2) M R
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It is this second criterion that is traditionally seen as the ‘jurisdictional trigger’ of the 
Merger Regulation, that directly  determines the jurisdictional divide in the application 
o f national law and the Merger Regulation to mergers.
The appropriate definition and interpretation of Article 1 MR has been, and continues 
to be, a matter of significant controversy. It was by far the most controversial issue 
during the negotiations that took place within the Council of Ministers in die drafting 
of the Regulation.6 This was reflected by the final terms o f the Merger Regulation, that 
included a provision for the revision of the jurisdictional trigger before the end of the 
fourth year after the adoption o f  the Regulation.7 The criterion has in fact been the 
subject of three subsequent Reviews. A Review in 1993 determined that while there 
was some concern about concentrations with a cross-border effect not falling within 
the scope of the Regulation, this was not sufficient to convince the Member States and 
European industry that an amendment to the jurisdictional thresholds was necessary.8 
In 1996, the Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation 
proposed a first and a second choice amendment to the jurisdictional trigger.9 The 
second of these proposals - aimed at the problem of multiple filing o f single 
concentrations - was implemented in 1998. However, the Commission deemed a 
further review of the operation o f the jurisdictional trigger o f the Merger Regulation to 
be necessary, and a Report was to be made to the Council before 1 July 2000. In the 
event, this Report proved to be inconclusive. The Commission undertook to make a 
second more in-depth Report before the end o f the year 2001.10
If the issue of an appropriate jurisdictional trigger for the Merger Regulation remains 
unresolved in practice, the continued review and debate surrounding the subject 
determines that at least the elements of controversy are well defined. The debate
6 See eg., Ehlermann, C-D, In Bruessel gibt es keine Industriepolitischen Intrigen, sondem nur 
andere Aujfassungen vom Wettbewerb, Handelsblatt, 25 November 1992; Broberg, M., The 
European Commission’s  Jurisdiction to Scrutinise Mergers, 1998, Kluwer International at p.3; 
Broberg, The European Commission's Jurisdiction under the Merger Control Regulation, 
Nordic Law Journal, 1994, p.18; Bos, P.-V., Styuck and Wytinck, P. Concentration Control in 
the EEC, 1992, pp 4 and 18-26; Woolcock, S., European Mergers: National or Community 
Controls? , The Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 1989, pp.20-31; Bulmer, S., 
Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: the Case o f  Merger Control, 
Public Administration, 1994.
7 Article 1(3) MR.
8 Report from the Commission to the Council on the Implementation o f the Merger Regulation, 
COM(93) 385 final, Brussels, 28 July 1993.
9 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, COM (96) 0019-C4 - 
0106/96, 1996, Brussels.
3concerns issues of political sovereignty of the Member States. It concerns Community 
competition policy and the reasons for the implementation of a system of Community 
merger control. It concerns rational economics. It also concerns regulatory efficiency 
and legal certainty for business.
The thesis aims to examine the extent to which the existing scope of application of the 
Merger Regulation fulfils each of these elements according to its existing jurisdictional 
criterion, Article 1 MR. The thesis considers the operation of Article 1 MR as it was 
originally implemented and as amended, as well as in conjunction with the so-called 
fine-tuning provisions of Articles 9 and 22(3) MR.
There is however a broader context that the diesis identifies as vital in any analysis of 
the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation, yet that has been to date largely 
ignored in analyses carried out by the European Commission and in the literature. This 
concerns the fact that the jurisdictional trigger of the EC Merger Regulation must be 
recognised as being set within the context of a provision of secondary Community 
law. The thesis therefore considers that it is imperative to determine whether there was 
a structure of primary Community law that pre-dated the implementation o f the EC 
Merger Regulation, delineating a specific scope of application of Community law to 
mergers. It is trite law that the Merger Regulation, as a provision of secondary 
Community law based upon primary Community law, should have been - and should 
continue to be - consistent with any such pre-existing scope.
Furthermore, as a provision that has been implemented upon the basis o f the EC 
Treaty, the significance of the legal principle o f subsidiarity must be considered for the 
Merger Regulation. While it may be shown that the Commission is correct to deny the 
application of that principle directly to the text of the Merger Regulation itself in its 
on-going reviews o f the jurisdictional issue, a broader analysis considering the legal 
bases according to which the Merger Regulation was implemented gives subsidiarity a 
vital role. Indeed, the principle may be seen to provide the framework within which the 
legal analysis of the jurisdictional issue must be discussed and considered.
As a starting point therefore, the thesis considers the origin of merger control policy 
within the Community. Thereby, it is necessary to analyse Community competition 10
10 Report from the Commission to the Council on the application o f the Merger Regulation 
thresholds, CQM(2000) 399, Brussels 28/06/2000.
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policy in its early years in general terms and to demonstrate why the Treaty did not 
contain a specific provision for the control of mergers. Subsequently, it may be shown 
how, as Community competition policy developed, the European Commission and the 
European Parliament came to consider that a specific system of merger control at the 
Community level was an imperative. In the face o f continued resistance by the 
Member States to a specific Regulation to control mergers however, the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice turned to existing provisions of the EC 
Treaty to control mergers at the Community level.
By the time the Member States had been finally persuaded that the implementation of 
a Community Merger Regulation was a necessity, there was already therefore an 
outstanding Community competence to assess mergers according to Articles 81 and 82 
EC. What is the relationship between this existing competence of the Community and 
the competence afforded the Commission under the terms of the Merger Regulation? 
To what extent is there an overlap of control? To what extent should the competence 
o f the Commission to apply the EC Merger Regulation have been predetermined by 
the pre-existing competence under Articles 81 and 82 EC? These are questions that 
die thesis considers in detail.
Thereby, it is determined that the operation o f the legal bases according to which the 
Merger Regulation was implemented required a specific jurisdictional criterion to be 
used whose operation does not reflect the operation o f the original or existing legal 
text (as amended) of Article 1 MR (in conjunction with Articles 9 and 22(3) MR). 
Rather, other factors and issues were deemed more persuasive in the drafting o f Article 
1 MR. The thesis considers the legal consequences of this fact for the legitimacy of the 
EC Merger Regulation as a whole. It further considers the implications for the 
Community competition policy that is pursued in the application of the competition 
law provisions laid down by the Treaty.
In conclusion, the actual possibility of implementing a more appropriate jurisdictional 
criterion must be considered. How would it interrelate with those other pressing 
elements that would ideally combine to represent an appropriate jurisdictional 
criterion? Is there, in effect, a jurisdictional criterion that represents a ‘perfect fit’ for 
the EC Merger Regulation?
5II COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW FOR PRIVATE 
UNDERTAKINGS - THE PROVISIONS OF THE EC 
TREATY
A THE ISSUE
The issue of an appropriate legal scope for Community law to apply to concentrations 
is clearly aided by a consideration of the original reasons for the introduction of a 
Community concentration control into Community law per se. In order to understand 
these reasons to their fullest extent, it is imperative to be clear about the role 
competition law plays in the Community legal system in general. This includes 
analysis of the role that was originally defined for competition policy in its initial 
inclusion in the provisions of the Rome Treaty, and an examination of any changes in 
that role that may have occurred in view of the on-going development of the 
Community.
B ORIGINS OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY 
COMPETITION LAW - HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
I The General Aims Behind the Creation of the European Community
In signing the Rome Treaty, the original six Member States expressed a determination 
not simply to extend the provisions of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(1951)11 to other areas of the industry, but to create a Common Market in specific 
sectors. Thereby, apart from an intention to replace historical military conflict with 
economic co-operation, they hoped to increase European competitiveness on the 
global scale and to compete effectively with, in particular, the trading bloc of the 
United States. European business should be enabled to specialise, to engage in mass 
production and to enjoy economies of scale in the wider Community markets.12 What 
was not clear between the different Member States from the outset of the negotiations 
leading to the signing of the Treaty was the appropriate way to achieve those aims.
II Treaty of Paris, 18 April 1951
12 In detail on this, see eg., Milward, A., ‘The Reconstruction o f Europe - 1945-51 (London, 
Methuen 1984); Mayne, R., ‘The Recovery o f Europe: 1945-1973 ' New York, Harper Row 
1970; Kuesters, H.J.; ‘Fondements de la Communauté Économique Européenne
61.1 The Spaak Report
The Treaty negotiations were based upon a preliminary study - the Spaak Report.13 
The Report championed the idea of a Common Market based upon free competition, 
which would lead to increased competitiveness of European firms and a reallocation 
of the means of production. The required structure of free competition would flow 
from the creation of a Common Market in which trading conditions were equal for all 
firms across its territorial scope. Thereby, the Report pinpointed not only the 
significance of existing public restrictions on free trans-national trade and 
competition (which at that time hindered the establishment of a Common Market 
system), but also the significance of distortions which may be caused by private 
undertakings intent on re-partitioning the markets. Thus, even where public barriers 
may be removed, conditions of free competition as a direct result of the existence of 
the Common Market may nevertheless be impeded by private undertakings re­
erecting those barriers to trade. For a Common Market regulatory system based upon 
free competition there arose a concomitant need for Treaty provisions directed at the 
conduct of private undertakings.14
The Spaak Report therefore considered that competition provisions were necessary to 
prevent partitioning of national markets in order that free competition was 
maintained within the Common Market. The Common Market was to be based on a 
system of free competition, which would derive from the very existence of the 
Common Market. Rather than an essential means to protect competition directly, 
competition regulations were envisaged primarily as a means to protect the Common 
Market itself.
1.2 The Member States* Approach
If this was the economic and political approach adopted by the Spaak Report, that is 
not to say that it was an approach unreservedly embraced by all the Member States in 
the negotiations leading to the signing of the Rome Treaty. While the Member States 
were unanimous in their wish to increase European competitiveness, they were not
Luxembourg, Office de Publication Officielle des Communautés Européenne’; Kitzinger, 
U.W., ‘The Politics and Economies o f  European Integration 1961, pp .21-5 9.
The Spaak Report, Comité Intergovernmental C réé par la Conference de Messine, 21 
April 1956, Brussels. The final version of the Rome Treaty embodied the greater part of the 
content o f the Spaak Report, see Goyder, D., EEC Competition Law, 1993 at p.23-4.
14 See, The Spaak Report, ibid at p.16.
7naturally in agreement about the best political and economic method to promote this. 
Free competition as the regulating tool for the economy was coherent with the 
German economic model,15 but it was far from the French and Italian more dirigiste 
economic systems.16 German enthusiasm for a Common Market based upon a system 
of free competition during negotiations leading to the Treaty is as equally well 
documented as French and Italian reluctance.17
Recognition of the outcome of the negotiations and the fact that the Rome Treaty 
included provisions of competition law within its text reveals however that it was the 
German position (and the proposals of the Spaak Report) that would ultimately hold 
sway in the final negotiations.18
It is necessary to analyse the provisions of Community competition law which were 
implemented in the Rome Treaty more closely, as well as their relationship to the 
other Treaty provisions.
15 The German approach was heavily influenced by Ordoliberal thought, emphasising the need 
for a constitutional framework for economic policy. The Ordoliberals advocated a restriction of 
power in private hands, fearing the public links that may be made and the potential political 
consequences. See on this eg., Gerber, D.J., 'Constitutionalisms the Economy: German Neo- 
Liberalism, Competition Law and the ‘New’ Europe’, 41 American Journal of Competition 
Law 1994; Peacock, A.T. and Willgerodt, H., (eds), 'German Neo-Liberals and the Social 
Market Economy ' 1989.
16 They had a tradition of allowing governmental agencies to play major roles in directing the 
economy. Their conception of competition policy was based upon political and industrial 
planning. See on this eg., Gerber, D.J., ‘Law and the Abuse o f Economic Power in Europe’, 
Tulane Law Review, (1987), 62 at pp. 64-66; Aujac, H., 'An Introduction to French Industrial 
Policy in: Adams, W. and Stoffaes, C. (eds), ‘French Industrial Policy’, 1986.
17 See, eg., Kuesters, H.-J., ‘Fondements de la communauté économique européenne’, 
Luxembourg, Office des Publications Officielles des Communautés Européenne, 1990; 
Kuesters, H.J. ‘Die Gruendung der Europaeischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft1982, pp. 364- 
369; Gerber, D. 'Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law 
and the “New" Europe’, (1994), 42, American Journal o f Comparative Law, 25-84; von der 
Groeben, H. 'Die Europaeische Gemeinschaji und die Herausforderungen unserer Zeit; 
Ausaetze und Reden 1967-1987’, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987; Griffiths, 
R. ‘Agricultural pressure groups and the origins o f  the Common Agricultural Policy’, (1995) 3 
European Review, 233-242 at 238; Wesseling, R., Constitutional Developments in EC 
Antitrust Law - The Transformation o f  Community Antitrust Law and its Implications’, Diss., 
Florence, 1999 at pp. 19-21.
18 Thereby, it is considered that the French were compensated through the exception of the
agricultural sector from the competition rules, and the adoption of a common agricultural 
policy. See eg., Kuesters, H.-J., Fondements de la Communauté Européenne’ (Luxembourg, 
Office des Publications Officielles des Communautés Européennes’, 1990). But against this, 
see Griffiths, ibid. "'*■
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2 The Substantive Provisions of EC Competition Law and their 
relationship to other Treaty Provisions
The competition law provisions of the EC were originally envisaged as a means to 
pursue specific objectives within the context of the establishment of the Common 
Market.19 Thus, they were ancillary to the overall aims of the Community.
The competition law provisions Articles 81 and 82 EC were to be interpreted within 
the context of Articles 2 and 3 EC.
2.1 Article 2 EC
Article 2 of the Rome Treaty expressed the tasks and objectives of the Community. 
This was to establish the Common Market and to approximate the economic policies 
of the Member States in order to promote the harmonious development of economic 
activities within the Community.20
What was this goal of establishing a Common Market specifically?
In general terms, it can be understood to constitute the integration of the individual 
markets of the Member States through the removal of non-tariff barriers between the 
Member States, in tandem with substantive Community provisions on free trade and 
non-discrimination.21 The broad principles of free-trade and non-discrimination 
represented by these provisions aimed above all to ensure that competition was fair 
throughout the territory of the Community.22 There should be a level playing field for 
undertakings active within the Community.
The establishment of the Common Market between the Member States was not 
however insular in its goals. It included both the success of internal integration and
19 The Commission expressly stated that the rules of Community competition law were to be 
read in conjunction with the other Treaty provisions as one of the basic principles in their 
interpretation in: Premier Rapport Général sur Vactivité de la Communauté Économique 
Europ éenne, ( 195 8) p.61.
20 Before the amendments implemented by the Treaty of Maastricht, Article G(2).
21 In particular, Articles 3, 12, 23-31, 39-61, 70-80 90-93 EC. For a useful summary of the 
relevant provisions of Community law, see Nicolaides, P., ‘The Role o f Competition Policy in 
Economic In tegra tion in: Nicolaides, P. and van der Klugt, A., ibid, at pp.9-17.
22 Nicolaides, P., 'The Role o f  Competition Policy in Economic Integration \  in: Nicolaides, P. 
and van der Klugt, A., ibid, at p.10.
nmfJimWJilUUlKlMMMWHH*1f H m m w f u m w « ;
9the success of that integrated market on the external (global) market (‘external 
integration’). Thus, the Commission stated in its First Report on Competition Policy:
‘...the Commission particularly encourages co-operative efforts between small and medium­
sized enterprises to establish themselves in markets other than their own’. 23
The tendency of the Commission to emphasise the importance of co-operative 
behaviour within Community industry in order to achieve a globally competitive size 
has not disappeared. It has however shifted in perspective, and although the 
potentially beneficial effects of co-operative behaviour are recognised, they must now 
be consistent with an approach that regards undistorted competition structures as a 
primary goal.24 This general dichotomy in approach to co-operation within the 
Community - and its shift in emphasis over time - was fundamental in the reasons for 
the original omission, and the eventual inclusion, of a system of European 
concentration control.25
2.2 Article 3 EC
Article 3 EC meanwhile provides some of the means to create internal integration, 
and to derive economic, social and political benefits from that process. Thereby, 
competition was to be protected under Article 3g EC26 as a means of pursuing the 
goal of Single Market integration.27
23 See also eg.: Commission Memorandum 1966 on Concentrations in the Community at p7; 
Commission White Paper ‘Completing the Internal Market’ (CEC, 1981, paragraph 1).
24 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council on the Implementation 
of the Concentration Regulation, COM (93) 382, Brussels, 28 July 1993, at p.5; Recitals 3-5 of 
the Merger Regulation; Van Miert, K. in: Amato, G. and Van Miert, K., The Importance o f  
Competition Policy for the Future o f  European Integration, Paul-Henri Spaak Foundation, 
Brussels 1997 p.23; Lord Leon Brittan, European Competition Policy - Keeping the Playing 
Field Level, CEPS, Brassey’s, London at p.7 and p.29.
In the literature, see eg., Alexander, W., *The EC Rules o f  Competition’, (1973) at p. I l l ;  
Krimphove, D., 'Europaeische Fusionskontrolle\ 1992, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, at pp. 96- 
98; de Richemont, J., ‘Les concentrations d ’entreprises et la position dominante', Paris, 1971, 
pp. 262-717.
For a criticism of the emphasis o f ‘external integration* in terms of economics, see Kay, W., 
‘Mergers, Acquisitions and the Completion o f the Internal Market'. pp.I61~I80 and Kay, N., 
Concentrations, acquisitions and the internal market, in: Hughes, K, European 
Competiveness, 1993, Cambridge.
25 See below.
26 Article 3g EC states that the activities of the Community include ‘a system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted’.
27 There has been some academic dispute about whether the legal concepts of Common Market 
and the Single Market are synonymous or different. Some consider the single market to be 
narrower, see eg, Pescatore, P., 'Die Einheitliche Europaeische Akte, Eine Emste Gefahr fuer 
den Cemeinsamen Markx\ Europarecht 21, 1986 Heft 2 p. 117; Zacker, C., 'Binnenmarkt und
10
3 The Specific Provisions of Competition Law in the Treaty
There are two broad areas of private conduct that are regulated under the provisions 
of competition law contained in the Rome Treaty: cartel agreements and concerted 
practices by undertakings under Article 81 EC and the abuse of a dominant position 
by an undertaking under Article 82 EC. These Articles have both been expanded and 
refined by subsequent secondary legislation and judicial interpretation.28
It is vital to note at this point that Articles 81 and 82 EC are aimed at anti-competitive 
conduct by private undertakings. This is explained by the reason for their inclusion, 
as initially expressed in the Spaak Report - that is, to prevent firms from re-erecting 
barriers to free trade through private conduct.29 There was no direct control of 
competition structures30; there was no system of concentration control within the 
Rome Treaty. On the contrary, mergers were seen as potentially beneficial to the 
process of integration - the embodiment of the type of industrial co-operation and 
restructuring that was actively encouraged in the early years as ‘external 
integration’.31
If the purpose of the inclusion of Articles 81 and 82 EC within the Rome Treaty was 
clear, there remains the question of how they were actually applied.
Gemeinsamer Markt' Recht der Intemationalen Wirtschaft, 35, 1989, Heft 6 p,489. Others see 
the two terms as synonymous, see eg, Grabitz, E., ’Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag\ 
Loseblattsammlung, 2.Edition, Muenchen 1990, Art. 8a Nr. 3. A third theory considers the 
single market concept to render the goals involved in the realisation of the Common Market 
more specific, perhaps even extending those relevant elements, see eg, Everling, U., Der 
Beitrag des Europaeischen Gerichtshofs zur Weiterentwicklung des Wettbewerbsrechts der 
Gemeinschaft’, in:FIW-Schriftenreihe, Heft 134, Koeln/Berlin/Bonn/Muenchen 1989 p. 1160; 
Ehlermann, C.D., ’Der Beitrag der Wettbewerbspolitik zum Europaeischen Binnenmarkt’, 
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 42, 1992, Heft 1 p.369.
These academic arguments will not be considered further here. The thesis adopts the approach 
that the two terms are synonymous, as indeed they appear to be treated by the ECJ, see eg., 
Hugin Kassaregister AB  v Commission Case 22/78 (1979) ECR 1829, at paragraph 17.
28 Details are to be found in all the main text books on EC competition law.
29 See above p.6.
30 Although, in the approach adopted by the Community institutions (to promote integration), 
the provisions were effectively used in relation to the structure of the Common Market, see 
below.
31 See in more detail below p.40.
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C COMPETITION POLICY
1 Competition Policy -  In General
1.1 A General Definition
Clearly, the protection of competition is the guiding principle and common 
denominator of all competition policies. The decision by any specific government to 
implement a competition policy has followed a political choice that the active 
protection of competition is the appropriate means to achieve a specific goal.32 3In the 
most general of terms, it may therefore be stated that competition policies ‘allow for 
the development of a regulatory framework within which governments can maintain 
or encourage competition. ' They can and do however serve a multitude of much 
more wide-ranging goals. Thereby, a distinction has been made between ultimate 
goals and intermediate (operational or direct) objectives of competition policy.34 
Intermediate goals are understood to be the goals that are pursued directly in the 
actual decision-making process involved in the application of specific provisions of 
competition law. Ultimate goals meanwhile extend beyond these more ‘immediate* 
goals to embrace the more generalised political and economic development within a 
given jurisdiction. Clearly however the two types of goals are interdependent, in 
particular to the extent that the intermediate goals will normally be aimed at 
engendering those larger more fundamental aims, normally as the ultimate by-product 
of the application of competition law.
Within the context of the intermediate goals pursued in the application of competition 
law however, the protection of competition itself should not necessarily be taken as 
inviolable: economic co-operation and collaboration may even be encouraged in the
32 See on this in general, van Mourik, Aad, 'The Role o f  Competition Policy in a Market 
Economy \  in: Nicolaides, P. and van der Klugt, A., ‘Competition Policy o f the European 
C o m m u n ity1994, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht.
With specific reference to the Community’s position, see below pp 13-30.
33 Cini, M. and McGowan, L., ‘Competition Policy in the European Union’, 1998, New York 
at p.3.
There are a number of different regulatory frameworks which may be implemented to pursue 
these goals, including the regulation of both private and state conduct. As will become clear 
from the description of the evolution of concentration control in the Community, there is no 
unanimous agreement about what types of control the general bracket o f competition policy 
should include.
34 Ehlermann, C-D and Laudatti, L. (Eds), European Competition Law Annual 1997: 
Objectives o f  Competition Policy, European University Institute, Hart Publishing 1998, at p.ix.
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pursuit of particular ends.35 Therefore, differing -  and at times, incompatible -  
objectives may be pursued by one and the same system of competition law.36
The content of the objectives of competition policy varies enormously between 
different individual systems of competition law. The differing motivations and 
objectives that an individual competition policy may serve are in fact founded upon 
different political, economic and social ideologies.37 Furthermore, the pursuit and 
fulfilment of an individual and established competition policy may in practice be 
affected by the institutional dynamics at the core of its implementation.38
A general definition of competition policy covering all systems of competition law is 
therefore not possible. It may be stated that:
'...competition policy has been introduced into a variety o f national settings, with varying 
motivations and at varying time periods...Hence, although there are common concerns, there is 
no ambiguous and universal ‘core’ of policy.’39
1,2 An Overriding A pproach
If it is not possible to define competition policy in general as involving the pursuit of 
any particular intermediate goals, it is however possible in the specific to identify the 
overriding (or dominant) approach of individual systems of competition regulation. 
The description of such an overriding approach does not attempt to pinpoint 
exhaustively all the aims and objectives pursued by a system of competition law, nor 
does it attempt to consider in detail differences there may be in the specific 
approaches of individual institutions within that system.40 Rather it is an account 
which acknowledges that there is usually a dominant intermediate objective in the
35 See above concerning the early Community encouragement of ‘external’ integration and its 
attitude towards concentrations.
36 See eg., Frazer, T., for an account of the different types of competition policy model which 
might have been suited for the single market (post-SEA 1982), ibid at pp.621-623.
37 Extensively on this, see Amato, G., 'Antitrust and the Bounds o f Power’, (1997) Hart 
Publishing. Also, Wilks, S. and Cini, M., ‘Competition Policy * a research prospectus’, 
RUSEL Working Paper, 1991, University of Exeter at pp.1-5; Wilks, S. and McGowan, L., 
‘The First Supranational Policy in the EU: Competition Policy \  European Journal of Policy 
Research, 1995 28 pp. 141-169.
See in particular on this Wilks, S., 'The Metamorphosis o f  European Competition Policy’, 
RUSEL Working Paper, 1992, University of Exeter.
39 Wilks, S. and Cini, M., ‘Competition Policy - a research prospectus’, RUSEL Working 
Paper, 1991, University o f Exeter at p.2.
40 Here, the possible different approaches taken by the Commission and the European Court of 
Justice.
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implementation of a system of competition law by a specific institution (or system of 
related institutions) which stands out over and above all the other variables. 
Consistency with this overriding goal influences the way that most cases will be 
decided and most reforms or amendments to the system of regulation will be effected.
The Community system of competition law is no exception in this regard. An 
overriding goal can be traced within the implementation of the Community 
competition law from the very beginning. If this goal has not always been strictly 
static, it has never ceased in pertinence. Appreciation of this overriding goal is 
essential, first, in order to explain the absence of a system of concentration control 
within the text of the Treaty of Rome and, secondly, the final decision to implement 
the European Concentration Regulation 4064/89 in 1990 (following successive 
proposals by the European Commission).
2 Competition Policy in the European Community
The Community’s position with regard to the need for provisions of Community 
competition law (as a political choice) found its expression in the Commission’s First 
Report on Competition Policy:
‘Competition is the best stimulant of economic activity since it guarantees the widest possible 
freedom of action to all. An active competition policy pursued in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaties establishing the Communities makes it easier for the supply and 
demand structures continually to adjust to technological development...competition enables 
enterprises continuously to improve their efficiency, which is the sine qua non for a steady 
improvement in living standards and employment prospects within the countries of the 
Community. From this point of view, competition policy is an essential means for satisfying to 
a great extent the individual and collective needs of our society.’41
Once provisions of competition law had been implemented within the Rome Treaty, 
there arose the second question: how were those provisions to be applied.
41 Commission First Report on Competition Policy, 1972, at p .l 1.
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2.1 The Implementation of Articles 81 and 82 EC and the Integration Paradigm 
The Commission and the Court of Justice might have relied upon the literal wording 
of the provisions to protect generic competition42 directly (as a means to establish the 
Common Market, within the meaning of Article 3g EC).43 Instead, they chose to 
interpret Articles 81 and 82 EC teleologically and to directly pursue the integration 
paradigm in their application.44 This approach was more evident in the application of 
Article 81 EC than Article 82 EC. This was for the reason that Article 82 EC, by the 
very nature of its substantive condition, involves extensive analysis of the effect of 
the conduct on competition structures.45
42 The true definition of ‘competition’ is notably controversial. The Treaty of Rome offers no 
definition. Economists have traditionally explored the concept by referring to two models that 
describe two extreme sets of conditions: perfect monopoly and perfect competition.
In acknowledgement that either model is an unattainable ideal in real markets, some economists 
have proposed the concept of ‘workable competition’, eg., Clark, ‘Toward a Concept o f  
Workable C om petition (1940) 30 American Economic Review, 241-256; Sosnick, ‘A Critique 
o f  Concepts o f Workable Competition (1958) 72 Qu J Ec 380-423. In Metro, the Court of 
Justice invoked the concept, defining it in the following terms:
'...workable competition, that is to say the degree o f competition necessary to ensure the 
observance o f the basic requirements and the attainment o f  the objectives o f the Treaty, in 
particular the creation o f  the single market achieving conditions similar to those o f  a domestic 
market. In accordance with this requirement, the nature and intensiveness o f  competition may 
vary to an extent dictated by the products or services in question and the economic structure o f  
the relevant market sectors. ’ Metro SB-Grossmaerkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission Case 
26/76 (1977) ECR 1875, para. 20.
It is ‘workable competition’ that the thesis refers to when it refers to ‘competition’ with in the 
context o f Community competition policy. It should be highlighted however that the true 
definition of workable competition is not uncontroversial: see eg., Asch, ‘Industrial 
Organisation and Antitrust Policy’, (1983) pp. 100-104; Goyder, 1993 ibid, pp. 10-11. For the 
purposes o f the thesis however, it is not necessary to analyse the definition o f ‘workable 
competition’ in theoretical terms any further.
43 Article 81(1) EC prohibits 'all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
o f undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion o f competition 
within the Common Market. '
Article 82 EC prohibits ‘any abuse by one or more undertakings o f  a dominant position within 
the Common Market or a substantial part o f  it...in so fa r  as it may affect trade between 
Member States. ’
According to the literal text however factors other than ‘pure’ competition can be of overriding 
importance. Article 81 (3) for example provides an exemption for an agreement falling within 
Article 81 (1) EC if it promotes ‘technical and economic progress’ and allows consumers a 
fair share of the benefits which the agreement brings.
44 For a discussion of ‘teleology’ in the competition law context, see eg, Schwartz, E., ‘Politics 
as Usual: The History o f  European Community Concentration Control’, Yale Journal of 
International Law 18 (1993) 607.
References concerning this emphasis of integration in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC 
are numerous: eg,, Gerber, D.J., ibid, 1994 p.98; Hawk, B., ‘Antitrust in the EEC - The First 
Decade’, 41 Fordham Law Review, 229, 231 (1972); Whish, ibid, pp.10; Bellamy and Child, 
ibid, at p.34; Korah, V., ibid, at pp.5-6 ; Goyder, ibid, at p.44.
45 The analysis of a dominant position, for example, involves a detailed examination of the 
relevant market.
Furthermore, the Commission in any case proved rather reluctant to apply Article 82 EC until 
the early 1970’s. For the reasons, see Gerber, 1994, ibid at p .l 13.
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Close analysis of Article 81 EC reveals that the approach was not actually contrary to 
the literal wording of Article 81(1) EC. Article 81 (l)(a) to (e) EC provided examples 
of agreements covered by Article 81 (1) EC. Therein, Article 81 (l)(c) includes 
'agreements to share markets*. Therefore the approach of the Commission and the 
Court of Justice constituted an emphasis of the integration goal over the other goals 
(in particular, over competition), within the literal wording of Article 81(1) EC
The pursuit of integration as the overriding goal of Community competition policy 
was evident in both the practice of the Commission and the Court of Justice and in the 
Commissions statements of competition policy.
2.1.1 The Practice of the Court of Justice and the Commission
The approach was clear in many cases. Typical is the Court of Justice’s statement in
Italy v. Council and Commission46, that Article 81 EC:
..should be read in the context of the provisions o f the Preamble to the Treaty which clarify 
it and reference should particularly be made to those relating to 'the elimination of barriers’ 
and to ‘fair competition’ both of which are necessary for bringing about a single market.”
Therefore, the Court of Justice and the Commission were anxious to promote and 
maintain a level playing field for undertakings active within the Community. Direct 
integration arguments even prevailed over the encouragement of efficient production 
and distribution within the Common Market in case decisions by both the Court of 
Justice and the Commission.47 The essential question in the substantive assessment of
46 Case 32/65 (1966) ECR 389 at 405, (1969) CMLR 39. See also eg., Consten and Grundig v 
Commission Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 (1966) ECR 299, p.340; Hugin Kassaregister AB  v 
Commission Case 22/78 (1979) ECR 1829.
47 The classic example is Consten/Grundig v. Commission Cases 56 and 58/64 (1966) ECR 
341, (1966) CMLR 418 See also, eg., Soda Ash Commission Decision of 19 Dec. 1990, OJ 
1991, L152; Omega, Commission Decision of 28 October 1970, OJ (1970) L 242/22.
There are numerous academic references. See eg., Gerber, D. J-, ''The Transformation o f  
European Community Competition Law?’, Harvard International Law Journal 35 (1994) 97- 
147; Hawk, B. 'Antitrust in the EC  - The First Decade ' 41 Fordham Law Review (1979) 229 
at p. 231; Whish, R., ibid (1993) at p. 28; Massey, P., ’Reform o f EC Competition Law: 
Substance and Procedure and Institutions' iiv. Hawk, B., 'Fordham Corporate Law Review', 
1996 at p.91; Van Bergh, 'Modem Industrial Organisation versus old-fashioned European 
Competition Law', (1996) 2 ECLR at p. 75; Temple Lang, J., 'European Community 
Constitutional Law and the Enforcement o f Community Antitrust Law', in: Hawk, B. Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute 1993 at p. 587; Waelbroeck, 'Competition, Integration and Economic 
Efficiency in the EC from the Point o f  View o f  the Private Firm \  in: The Art of Governance, 
Festschrift zu Ehren von Eric Stein (Michigan Law Review Association, 1987), pp. 301-308.
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the conduct of private firms under Article 81 EC was whether the agreements 
contained restrictions on the parties’ freedom to trade across borders.48 Thereby, 
Community competition law focused upon vertical relationships between firms, 
which, by their nature, were apt to be used by manufacturers and distributors to 
protect national markets 49
This emphasis of the potential harm caused by vertical relationships was at the 
expense of the potential harm caused by horizontal agreements, which are by their 
nature more likely to restrict competition. 50 With regard to horizontal agreements, the 
Commission tended to concentrate its efforts on large firms.51 Not only was this 
because of the lesser significance horizontal cartels played for the role of integration, 
but also it was in line with the expressed policy of the Commission to allow firms to 
expand to compete effectively on the global markets.52 Those co-operation 
agreements between smaller firms which might fall within Article 81(1) EC generally 
obtained exemptions as long as there remained some competition within the Common 
Market.53
2.1.2 The Commission’s Statements of Policy
The emphasis of the integration paradigm in the application of Community 
competition policy was also explicitly expressed in policy statements made by the
48 It is noted that the Court of Justice has been more erratic in following this principle than has 
the Commission. This stems from STM v Maschinenbau Ulm Case 56/65 (1966) ECR 235, in 
which the Court found that where the object of the agreement was not clearly and intentionally 
damaging competition, its market consequences must be analysed to determine its actual or 
potential effect on competition. The Court has therefore sometimes found it difficult to 
reconcile this reasoning with the principle that absolute territorial protection should 
automatically breach Article 81 EC (as stated in the Grundig case). Compare eg., Miller 
International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission Case 19/77 (1978) ECR 131 where an 
automatic breach was found because of a restriction of exports with eg., Voelk v 
Establissements Vervaecke Case 5/69 (1969) ECR 295, where exclusive dealing escaped 
prohibition following market analysis.
Generally however, if the Courts reasoning was more economic, its overriding goal was the 
same as the Commission - integration.
49 This was an expressed policy of the Commission, see Action Programme for the Second 
Stage o f the Community, November 1962, as cited in Goyder, 1993 ibid at p.44.
50 In particular recognising this emphasis, see eg., Goyder, 1993 ibid at p.44; Hawk, B., 
'United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide', 1990, 
pp.403-573; Gerber, 1994 ibid, p i 11-112; Frazer, T., Competition Policy after 1992: the Next 
Step *, 53 Modem Law Review, 609, pp.618-20 (1990).
51 Hawk, B. Antitrust in the EC - The First Decade, 1979 ibid at pp.249-65; Gerber, 0 .J., The 
Transformation o f EC Competition Law, 1994, ibid at p.112.
52 Gerber, D.J., The Transformation o f EC Competition Law?, ibid at p.112. See above 
regarding this policy.
53 See eg., Transocean Marine Paint I, Commission Decision OJ (1967) 163/10.
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Com mission. For example, in its  F irst Commission R eport on Com petition Policy the 
Com m ission stated:
it is evident that the competition policy of the Community must be directed towards the 
creation and proper operation of the Common Market...’54
and again that:
‘...the Community’s policy must, in the first place, prevent governmental restrictions and 
barriers which have been abolished from being replaced by similar measures of a private 
nature.*55
It was further acknowledged by Ehlermann, the then Director-General o f DGIV : 
‘...most of the decisions have... the specific aim of promoting integration*.56 
Similarly, the then Commissioner for competition, Van Miert:
‘Let me say very clearly that competition policy has never been strange to the idea of European 
integration. For the last 40 years, competition policy has played a key role both in the 
modernisation of the European economy and in the creation o f the Single Market.*57 58
2.2 The Pursuit of Competition Ancillary to the Integration Goal 
If Article 81 EC (as a provision aimed at market conduct) was used primarily to 
regulate and control the structure of the Common Market in the promotion (and 
protection) of integration, that does not mean of course that there was absolutely no 
interest in pursuing the generic benefits of competition. Both the Commission and 
the Court have referred at times to the potential benefits of improved competition and 
efficiency - for example, lower prices, technological progress, distributive
54 Commission of the European Communities, First Report on Competition Policy (1972), at
p.12.
55 Commission of the European Communities, First Report on Competition Policy (1972), at 
p .13 ,15-16.
56 Ehlermann, C.D., ‘The Contribution o f the EC Competition Policy to the Single Market’, 
(1992) CMLRev 29 257, at 260, referring in particular to the (then recent) decisions: Soda 
Ash-ICI Commission Decision o f 19 December 1990, O.J. 1991, L152 and Tetra Pak I 
Commission Decision of 24 July 1991, Press Release IP (91) 715.
57 Van Miert, K., in: Amato, G. and Van Miert, K., ibid, p.15. Similar, see eg., Van Miert, K., 
‘Competition Policy in the 1990’s *, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 11 May 1993.
58 Gerber, D.J., The Transformation o f  EC Competition Law?, ibid at p.102*
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efficiency.59 The direct pursuit of the competition paradigm was however clearly 
subordinate to the direct pursuit of integration in the earlier years of the 
implementation of Community competition policy.60
Thereby» it is important to recognise that the direct pursuit of integration in the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 EC was not an exclusively political one; 
competition policy was not simply being used as an instrument of politics. As detailed 
above with reference to the Spaak Report» although a political aim» there are rational 
economic arguments justifying the Community market integration process.61 Net 
efficiency gains were expected to result from the creation of a customs union (that is, 
a free trade area and a common external tariff) amongst small and previously 
protectionist states.62 It was argued that the benefits include scale economies and 
increased import competition and export gains, which lead to increased allocative 
efficiency. Therefore, it must be re-emphasised that competition and integration can 
be seen to be actually consistent in their goals. In fact, competition was not so much 
subordinate to the integration paradigm, but ancillary to it. The Commission and the 
Court of Justice assumed that a system of undistorted competition would derive 
directly from the primary goal of the establishment of the Common Market.63 If there 
was a hindrance to the establishment of the Common Market, there was a distortion of 
competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC.
59 See eg., Consten and Grundig v Commission Cases 56 and 58/64 (1966) ECR 299, (1966) 
CMLR 418 at 339 and 470 respectively.
EC Commission First Report on Competition Policy, (Brussels, 1972), at p. 11; EC 
Commission Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy: 1983 (Brussels, 1984) at p. 11; Van 
Miert, K., *Competition Policy in the 90’s \  speech for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (Cheltham House, London), 11 May 1993; Commission’s Action Programme for the 
Second Stage of the Common Market (Nov. 1962), Common Market Report (CCH) 201-21 
(Feb. 1963).
60 Furthermore, there were explicit and implicit agricultural and industrial policies pursued 
within the Community which, for public ends, were generally applied in a way incompatible 
with free competition
Amato, G., 'Antitrust and the Bounds o f  Power’, (1997) at pp.43-44.
61 Fels, A. and Edwards, G., in Ehlermann, C-D and Laudatti, L., ibid, 1998, pp. 63-64. Also 
Schaub, A. at pp. 126-127.
62 See eg. Pelkmans, J. ‘ The Institutional Economics o f  European Integration’ in: M. 
Cappelletti, Seccombe, M. and Weiler, J. (eds), 'Integration Through the Law: Europe and the 
American Federal Experience’, (1981), Berlin; Cini, M. and McGowan, L., ‘Competition 
Policy in the European Union \  (1998), New York.
63 Mirroring the original position of the Spaak Report, see above, p.6.
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Thus, the Court of Justice, echoing the Commission’s reasoning,64 stated in the 
Grundig Case:
’Since the agreement...aims at insulating the French market for Grundig products and 
maintaining artificially, for products o f a very widespread brand, separate national markets 
within the Community, it is therefore such as to distort competition in the Common Market.’65
2 3  Other Aims Pursued in Community Competition Policy
Consideration of the overriding approach of Community competition policy does not
exclude the possibility that other aims have also been pursued under Community
competition policy beyond the interests of Single Market integration (and
competition). The Court of Justice stated that restraints on competition in the pursuit
of other policy objectives can be justified, so long as ‘workable competition* is
maintained:
‘ The powers conferred upon the Commission under Article 81(3) show that the requirements 
for the maintenance of workable competition may be reconciled with the safeguarding of 
objectives of a different nature and that to this end certain restrictions on competition are 
permissible, provided that they are essential to the attainment of those objectives and that they 
do not result in the elimination of competition for a substantial part of the Common Market.’66
As stated above, however, it is difficult to delimit these further aims individually and 
to determine their relationship with each other and with the paradigm of workable 
competition accurately. Jacquemin and de Jong,67 for example, consider the aims of 
EC competition law (beyond the primary aim of Single Market integration) to be:
- diffusion of economic power, even with the sacrifice of efficiency;
- economic freedom of market participants, specifically of small and medium-sized 
firms;68
i.
64 A further example of the Commission’s approach is Soda Ash-ICI, Commission Decision of 
19 December 1990, OJ 1991, L152 at 13.
65 Case, ibid at 474.
66 Metro SB-Grossmaerkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission Case 26/76 (1977) ECR 1875, para 
21.
67 Jacquemin and de Jong, European industrial Organisation, Macmillan Press, 1977.
68 This approach can be traced to the influence of the Freiburger School on German 
competition theory and practice, see Ehlermann, C-D and Laudatti,"!: (eds), ibid, 1998, at p.xi.
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- efficient allocation of resources and the maximum satisfaction of consumers.
• ' r
Bellamy and Child,69 on the other hand, do not consider the Community to be 
pursuing such a direct approach in protecting small and medium-sized firms, nor do 
they believe that the Community ignores the benefits of micro-economic efficiencies 
so easily. They state that the Community rules on competition only fulfil two broad 
functions beyond the direct prevention of barriers to trade by private agreements and 
undertakings:
- preservation of effective competition to stimulate the creation of the Single Market
- to encourage efficiency, innovation and lower prices.
Consideration of these two opinions alone are enough to show that, beyond the aim of 
single market integration, it is not completely clear which specific aims Community 
competition policy pursues.70 Suffice it to say that these further aims were always 
embedded in a reasoning that was focused on the overriding goal of economic 
integration. Where private parties were attempting territorial restrictions, there would 
be severe scrutiny by the authorities and, in the case of absolute territorial protection, 
even a quasi-automatic illegal restriction of competition.71
2.4 Summary
Integration, as the main goal of the Community, became the overriding goal directly 
pursued in the application of Article 81 EC. 72 This can not be criticised in legal
For a critique of the policy o f protecting small and medium-sized firms, see Korah, V., ‘EC 
Competition Policy: Legal Form or Economic Efficiency \  (1982) 39 Current Legal Problems 
81.
69 Bellamy, C. and Child, G.D., ‘Common Market Law o f Competition \  4th Ed., (1993), p.33.
70 See further, eg., Hawk, B., in: Ehlermann, C-D and Laudatti, L (eds), 1998 at p. 356. For a 
thorough analysis of the different policies pursued, see Bouterse, R., Competition and 
Integration - What Goals Count?, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1995.
71 Consten and Grundig v Commission Cases 56 and 58/64 (1966) ECR 299, (1966) CMLR 
418 at 339 and 470 respectively.
72 In economic terms however, this approach has been strongly questioned. Massey argues that 
the approach of the Community may be wrong on the basis that an effective competition policy 
based upon an efficiency assessment is a key element in ensuring that the benefits of market 
integration are achieved, which however 'is not the same as making market integration an 
objective o f competition policy at the expense o f  efficiency'. Massey, P., ibid, at p. 100. Van 
den Bergh even argues that 'the failure to take account o f  economic insights has enabled EC 
competition rules to harm, rather than promote market integration.', Van den Bergh, R., 
Modem Industrial Organisation versus Old-fashioned European Competition Law', (1996) 2 
ECLR 75-87 at p.75.
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terms, since it adheres both to the literal wording of Article 81 EC and the 
subordination of the provisions to the overall integration objective within the terms of 
the Treaty.* 723
Questionable is whether this overriding goal in the direct implementation of 
Community competition policy has remained unchanged following the amendments 
made to the Treaty of Rome, whereby, in particular, the de jure completion of single 
market integration was brought about.74 This question does not consider in detail any 
changes in the reasoning in Commission decisions or cases before the European 
Courts that might have occurred.75 It aims solely to identify any move away from the 
pursuit of integration as the overriding paradigm in the application of Community 
competition law.
3 Community Competition Policy, the Single European Act and the Treaty 
of Maastricht
3.1 Competition Policy in General
The Single European Act76 marked a determined change in approach in the 
Community’s attitude towards the importance of competition provisions as a whole 
within the Community, and the importance of protecting undistorted structures of 
competition in the application of Community competition policy.
The SEA detailed the completion of the Single Market by 1992.77 In an attempt to 
strengthen the ability of the Community to prevent national regulations from 
inhibiting intra-Community trade, the SEA implemented a series of measures to
For a classical critique of the approach, see Joliet, R, 'The Rule o f  Reason in Antitrust Law ’, 
(1967), Diss., University of Liege; Korah, V., 'EC Competition Policy: Legal Form or 
Economic Efficiency *, (1982) 39 Current Legal Problems 81
72 OJ 1973 C92/1.
73 See above at p. 15
74 According to the Single European Act 1986.
75 Note that Gerber and Wesseling, for example, detect a change in reasoning during the early 
1980’s, whereby there was an increased use of economics and politics, characterised by a 
sectorially differentiated application of the antitrust rules (while however still maintaining an 
overriding goal of integration). Gerber, 1992, ibid; Wesseling, Diss., 1999 ibid at pp.45-56.
76 17 February 1986, OJ (1987) L 169/7, following Commission White Paper, *Completing the 
Internal M arket\COM (85) 310 final, 14/06/1985.
77 For a bibliography of literature analysing the SEA and the 1992 programme, see Bahiyyih 
G. Tahzib, Selected Bibliography on Europe, 11 Michelin Journal of International Law 571 
1990 (as cited in Gerber 1994, ibid at p.124).
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remove all remaining trade restrictions in practically all sectors of the economy.78 
This policy expanded the scope of free competition within the Common Market*79
In conjunction with this development, the Commission determined that in general, 
within the context of the Single Market programme under the SEA, the instrument 
provided by Community competition law in maintaining systems of undistorted 
competition should be intensified (rather than reduced).80 While maintaining that 
competition policy should also foster market integration in a positive way, allowing 
scope for co-operation between firms likely to further technical and economic 
progress in the wider Community interest81, the Commission determined that a 
structure of free and undistorted competition within the Community would be vital if 
the benefits deriving from integration were to be felt by the consumers:
‘Competition policy has a key role to play in ensuring that the opening of the market yields all 
the benefits expected of it. It must ensure that these barriers are not replaced by divisions of 
markets resulting from restrictive business practices or protectionist measures taken by the 
Member States’.82
78 Excluding, for example, defence industries.
79 For a more detailed analysis of this process, see Ehlermann, C-D., The Contribution o f  
Competition Policy to the Single Market, ibid 1992; Nicolaides, P., ibid, p.11-12. See also 
Amato, G. in: Amato, G. and Van Miert, K., ibid at p.8, who notes that the increase in 
competition was a natural result of the integration process: integration could not be driven by 
centralised economic planning since such policies differ considerably between Member States. 
While it is never a non-normative science, the protection of competition is less controversial 
than centralised industrial policy.
80 See eg., Commission White Paper 1985 COM (85) 310 June 14 1985 at 39-40; European 
Commission, Fifth Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
Concerning the Implementation of the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, 
COM (90)90, March 28 1990; ‘Horizontal Concentrations and Competition Policy in the 
European Community\ in: European Economy, May 1989, No.40; Report made for 
Commission by T. Padoa-Schioppa et a i, *Efficiency, stability and equity Oxford University 
Press, 1987.
A good academic study of the issues is provided by Montagnon, P., ‘European Competition 
Policy \  (1990), Chatham House Papers, Pinter Publishers, London.
Note that, in the minority, Davidow suggests that there is no consistent relationship between 
strengthened antitrust enforcement and the integration of the Member States into a Common 
Market. He does however recognise that the Common Market is based upon free competition 
and thereby his argument that the development was purely political and bureaucratic appears 
self-contradictory, in: Davidow, J., Competition Policy, Merger Control and the European 
Community's 1992 Program, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1991, Voi. 29 pp.l 1-40.
81 See eg., Commission Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy, 1987, Introduction at p. 14.
82 Commission Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy, 1987, Introdflftion at p.13-14.
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Therefore, the Single European Act led to an emphasising of the significance of 
competition policy and a re-assessment of its role. Hence, Lord Leon Brittan, then 
Commissioner for competition, stated in 1990 that:
‘We are on the eve of 1992. Competition policy is now mature...it is now at the centre of 
politics, economics and law.’83
The Council may also be seen to have been expressing its view of the importance of 
competition policy during this period.84 It extended the scope of Community 
competition rules to include new industrial sectors (for example, air and sea 
transport).85 Most importantly, this dynamic led, as we shall see below, to the 
adoption of a system of Community concentration control.86
In tandem with these Community developments was the greater importance given to 
competition policy by those Member States for which previously it had had little 
significance. Thus, Spain established a system of competition law in 1989,87 Italy in 
1990,88 followed by Ireland in 1991,89 and Denmark and Holland in 1997.90
3.2 Generic Competition in the Implementation of Competition Policy 
The emphasis placed upon the significance of competition policy in the lead up to the 
Single European Act and its aftermath pre-empted not only an expansion of 
Community competence in competition matters, but also an increased significance of
83 Brittan, L, (1990), Observations to the Directors General Competition Meeting, Brussels, 
July 1990. See Wilks, S. and McGowan, L., who also emphasise the importance of the ability 
and conviction of the then Competition commissioners. Lord Leon Brittan and Peter 
Sutherland, who were, in their opinion, also instrumental in raising the profile of competition 
law during the 1980*5, in: ‘The First Supranational Policy in the European Union: 
Competition Policy \  European Journal of Political Research, (1995), Vol28, 141-165 at p. 151- 
2.
84 Ehlermann C-D, 'The Contribution o f EC Competition Policy to the Single Market 
CMLRev (1992) 29 at p.258. Gerber has also noted a heightened emphasis o f the application 
of the provisions aimed at preventing national government interference with the process o f free 
competition, even at the expense o f the regulation o f private conduct., see Gerber, 1994 ibid at 
pp. 137-141.
85 Council Regulation (EC) No. 4056/82 of 22 Dec. 1982, O.J. 1982, L 378/4; Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 3975/87 of 14 Dec. 1987,0.J. 1987, L374/1.
86 Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations 
between Undertakings.
87 Spanish Defence of Competition Law, Law No.16,17th July 1989 (as amended).
88 Law No. 287 of 10 October 1989, Official Gazette o f the Italian Republic No. 240, 
13.10.1989
89 Competition Bill 1991 (as amended).
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the protection generic competition itself in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC.90 1 
Again this development is evident upon analysis of the practice of the Court of Justice 
and the Commission and the Commission’s statements of policy. This does not 
necessarily mean however that the Community institutions were thereby in effect 
altering the substantive text of the competition articles laid down in the Treaty, action 
that would clearly be beyond the limits of their own competence. Rather, they found 
the literal wording of Articles 81 and 82 EC to be sufficiently general as to allow for 
a change of emphasis in their interpretation.92
3.2.1 The Practice of the Court of Justice and the Commission 
As early as 1974, Advocate General Trabbuchi had predicted in the Belgian Peintres 
case that, once the markets become integrated, the objectives of the Community in its 
application of competition law (that is, the intermediate goals) must change. Hence:
* the Community interest which the prohibition of restrictive agreements is designed to further 
is not simply one of preventing the partitioning of the territory of the Community into separate 
national market but now, principally, of keeping competition in a healthy state in terms o f the 
Common Market. *93
Thus, he called for an emphasis on the protection of generic competition (moving 
away therefore from the previous Community approach of treating a restriction on 
parallel trade as constituting a ‘restriction on competition’).
This prediction proved to be remarkably prescient upon analysis of Commission 
decisions and Court of Justice cases from the later 1980’s.94 As early as in 1966, the 
Court of Justice had stated that a term conferring exclusivity on a distributor might 
not infringe Article 81(1) where it was vital to his decision to market a particular 
supplier’s goods.95 A progressive limiting of the scope of Article 81(1) EC became
90 Respectively: Competition Act 1997, Statute No.384 10th June 1997; New Regulations on 
Economic Competition (Competition Act) Statute Book 1997,242.
91 Again, for reasons stated above, the thesis will concentrate mainly upon developments 
affecting Article 81 EC.
92 See eg., Frazer, T., 'Competition Policy after 1992: The Next S t e p MLR 1990 609-623 at 
612-617.
93 Case 73/74, ibid at p. 1523 (author’s emphasis).
94 Note that it is not categorically stated that these developments are exclusively a reaction and 
response to the changing economic and constitutional conditions of the Community.
95 Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Vim Case 56/65 (1966) ECR 235 at 250. Also, 
eg., Grossmaerkte v Commission Case 26/76 (1977) ECR 1875 and LC Nungesser KG v 
Commission Case 258/78 (1982) ECR 2015.
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more prevalent in the run up to, and after, the SEA. For example, the Court of Justice 
in Delimitis v Herminger Braeu AG96 held that an exclusive purchasing obligation in a 
beer supply agreement does not automatically mean that the agreement restricted or 
distorted competition.97
3.2.2 The Commission’s Statements of Policy
The Commission has consistently stressed the importance of competition policy 
within the context of the integration objective in its annual Reports on Competition 
Policy.98 9An example is in its Eighteenth Competition Policy Report, where the 
Commission stated that:
‘An effective competition policy is the sole means of making the most of the potential offered 
by the completion of the large market and thus, by increasing competitive pressure, of 
producing a more competitive Community economy. More competition will also strengthen the 
position o f European industry in both world and dominant markets. Without such a policy, 
there is the risk that Community consumers would be unable to enjoy the promised benefits of 
a large integrated market.’
Furthermore, the Commission’s Green Paper on Vertical Restraints expressed this 
development clearly. The emphasis in the text was decisively concerned with the 
economic effect of individual vertical restraints on competition rather than their 
implications for single market integration. Thus, the ongoing integration process of 
the Single Market is described as only adding an extra dimension to the analysis of 
vertical restraints, rather than providing the main parameters.100 This development
96 Case C-234/89, (1991) IECR 935, (1992) 5 CMLR 210
97 Other case examples include: Remia Nutricia v Commission Case 42/84, (1985) ECR 2545, 
(1987) 1 CMLR 1, where the ECJ held that restrictive covenants imposed on the vendor of a 
business and its associated goodwill might fall outside Article 81(1) EC where they are 
necessary to the performance o f the transfer in question; Erauw-Jacquery Sprt v La 
Hesbignonne Société Co-operative Case 27/87 (1988) ECR 1919, where the ECJ held that a 
provision preventing a licensee exporting seeds protected by plant breeders’ rights could fall 
outside Article 81(1) EC where it was necessary to protect the right of the licensor to select his 
licensees; Delimitis v Herminger Braeu AG Case C-234/89, ibid.
This development is analysed by Green, N. in: *Article 85 in Perspective: Stretching 
Jurisdiction, Narrowing the Concept o f  a Restriction and Plugging a Few Gaps', (1988), 9 
ECLR 190. Also see eg., Whish, 1993 ibid pp.208-211.
98 This has been consistently expressed in the Introductions to most Competition Reports by 
the Commission. It was particularly emphasised in the Introduction to the 24th, 25th and 26th 
Reports.
99 European Commission, Eighteenth Report on Competition Policy, 1988, Introduction.
100 European Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in the EC Competition Policy, 
COM (96) 721, Brussels, 22.01.1997, at p.23. See also, analysis on pp. 23-26, ibid.
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was stated in more concrete terms in the Communication published by the 
Commission as a follow-up to the Green Paper.101 The Commission stated:102
‘In reforming Community policy in the field of vertical restraints, the Commission pursues the 
following objectives:
- the protection of competition, which is the primary objective of Community competition 
policy, as it enhances consumer welfare and creates an efficient allocation o f resources;
- market integration, in the light of enlargement, which remains a second important objective 
when assessing competition issues.’
This shows a firm change in approach by the Community.
The change is further borne out when considering the substantive assessment 
introduced under the Merger Regulation for concentrations in 1990.103 This is 
concerned solely with the competitive effect of the structural changes on the market 
as a whole and does not include reference to, or scope for, integration considerations 
(nor for efficiency concerns).104
Arguably, this process was codified in the Maastricht Treaty, in which there was an 
assertion of generic competition as an autonomous fundamental principle, together 
with an adoption of a Community industrial policy that was no longer regarded as the 
enemy of competition, but on the contrary as an expression of the need to restructure 
all sectors of the economy along competitive lines.105
101 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the application of the 
Community competition rules to vertical restraints, COM (1998) 544.
102 ibid, at p. 5. Note that it also stated that legal certainty for business, the enforcement costs 
to business and competition authorities, and the possibilities for improving decentralisation 
have to be taken into account.
103 Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations 
between Undertakings.
IM Note that Article 2 of the Regulation mentions that among the factors to be taken into 
account in the appraisal of concentrations is the 'development o f technical and economic 
progress * providing that it is ‘to the consumer’s advantage and does not form an obstacle to 
competition’. It is therefore considered that there is no efficiency criterion in the Merger 
Regulation, see eg. Jacquemin (1990) at p. 549; Camesasca, P., The Explicit Efficiency Defence 
in Merger Control: Does it Make the Difference?, (1999) ECLR 14-28.
105 Articles 3(l)m and 157 EC. See Amato, ibid at p. 45. Also , Ehlermann, C.D., ‘The 
Contribution o f EC Competition Policy to the Single Market’, in (1992) 29 CMLRev 257-282. 
Amato, taking up this idea, states that the evolution of Community competition law has ensured 
that today the understanding of industrial policy as implemented at the Community level means 
protecting competitive markets, in: Amato, G. and Van Miert, K., ibid at p.9.
This is not however undisputed, see eg. Streit, M.E. and Mussler, W., ‘The Economic 
Constitution o f the European Community: From “Rome” to “Maastricht”’, (1995) 1 E U , 5-30
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The development at the Community level is to a certain extent reflected by the 
Member States. Belgium reformed its system of competition law in 1991106 and the 
UK has made similar reforms more recently to create a more competition-orientated 
system.
It is not possible or necessary to analyse the shifts in approach to the substantive 
application of Article 81 (1) EC in any more detail within the confines of the thesis, 
or the degree to which they have been implemented.108
Vital, on the other hand, is to be clear about their implications for the relationship 
between the Single Market integration paradigm and the competition paradigm in the 
implementation of EC competition policy.
4 Implications of the Developments in EC Competition Policy
Some commentators perceive that the changes implemented and pre-empted by the 
Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty (in particular, the de jure completion 
of the single market) have lead (and must lead) to a change in the overriding goal of 
Community competition policy: from an aid to integration to an instrument to protect
at 21-25, interpreting Article 130 TEU (now 157 EC), which states that ‘The Community and 
the Member States shall ensure the conditions necessary fo r  the competitiveness o f the 
Community's industry\  and the effectiveness, with regard to specific provisions of the TEU, of 
the accompanying limitation in Article 130 (3) that: ‘This title shall not provide a basis fo r  the 
introduction by the Community o f any measure which could lead to a distortion o f 
competition. According to the authors, the discretion allowed by other provisions of the Treaty 
lead to the conclusion that, ‘The principle o f undistorted competition must now be considered 
o f  equal rank with industrial policy, R&TD policy and social policy, regional policy, 
environmental policy and further activities introduced by Article 3 (ibid, at p.24). It is 
submitted however that in legal terms, none of these objectives state directly that the structures 
o f competition should be distorted, whereas Article 130 (3) contains an explicit prohibition on 
Community policies which distort competition.
See also however Sauter, W., ‘The Relationship between Industrial and Competition Policy 
under the Economic Constitution o f the European Union, with a Case Study o f 
Telecommunications', 1995, EUI Diss., Florence, who considers that Community competition 
law is integrated into the wider plane of economic law of the EU, taking account of broader 
social and economic goals. Also Gerber, D., 1992 ibid at p.136.
106 Law of July 1991 on the protection of economic competition.
107 Competition Act 1998.
108 For a thorough account of the transformation of Community competition law, and a 
consideration of future developments, see Gerber, D.J., ‘The Transformation o f European 
Community Competition Law?', Harvard International Law Journal (1994) 35 Harvard Law 
Journal, 97-147.
See also Wilks, S., 1992 ibid, concentrating in particular on the institutional dynamics 
involved.
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competition in the Single Market Endemic is the opinion expressed, for example, by
Gerber, that the integration paradigm must be replaced: ~
-,
‘Competition law conceived as a means of achieving economic integration loses its way where 
such integration already has been achieved...shom of its special role in achieving economic
109integration, the competition law system must redefine its mission. *
These submissions can however be shown to have ignored the (on-going) context in 
which the changes have taken place.
Following the Maastricht Treaty, the goal of structures of undistorted competition 
within the Community did arguably become autonomous of other Community 
goals.109 10 However, this goal does not exist in a vacuum. We have seen above that 
competition is a result o f the Single Market. It is also desirable for the Single Market: 
it is necessary for the consumers to derive the benefits of integration; structures of 
undistorted competition within the Single Market breed competitiveness of 
Community firms, which in turn benefit the consumer.111 Thus, the Commission 
stated in its Green Paper on Vertical Restraints:
a successful single market giving European companies the possibility o f economies o f scale 
and scope while still being subject to effective competition, is seen as the springboard for 
competitiveness in increasingly global and competitive world markets.*112
109 Gerber, (1994) ibid, at p.142. He later refines this statement however, acknowledging that 
integration issues will not disappear in the application of competition law provisions; rather, 
they are losing their dominant, identity-defining position.
On the contrary, however, integration remains the overriding goal, lying behind any changes in 
direction which may appear in the direct application of the competition law provisions (as 
shown below).
See also eg., Bos, P-V., ECLR (7) 1995 p.412; Wesseling, R., ECLR (2) 1997 p.95; Wesseling, 
R., ELR (22) 1997 p.44-5.
110 See above p.26.
111 See above at p. 13.
112 ibid, atp.22.
The Commission goes on to highlight the benefits to be gained from structures of undistorted 
competition within the Community as including static efficiencies (where competitive pressures 
reduce the price in high priced Member States to levels nearer those in lower-priced Member 
States) and lower prices (because o f ‘natural’ cost advantages or greater competitive pressures). 
Further, dynamic efficiencies involve the increasing competitive pressures, which encourage 
firms to greater efficiencies (e.g. economies of scale).
See also. Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, ibid at p .l.
f MHWIMlWHyLWWIW
29
It cannot be maintained that the objective of undistorted competition alone is 
necessary to obtain the benefits of an integrated market, with the consequence that the 
integration objective is subordinate to that goal. The integrated Single Market is 
based upon a system of undistorted competition, and there must be a fully integrated 
market to obtain those benefits in the first place. They are not (and never were113) two 
incompatible and opposing aims. Indeed, the benefits envisaged by the Commission 
as deriving from structures of undistorted competition mirror those that should derive 
from integrated markets.114
To cite Amato, the relationship between competition and integration is a circular one:
‘...on the one side the process of integration has greatly enhanced the role o f competition, on 
the other competition has become the main weapon that the integration could use to enforce its 
own goals. And the process has been a circular one: more competition has resulted in more 
integration, more integration has resulted in more competition.*115
Following the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, the overriding goal of integration in 
the application of Community competition law does not therefore simply disappear, 
nor does it become any less significant in Community competition law. The change 
that has taken place is a change in the direct application of the Community 
competition provisions. Previously the direct application of the competition 
provisions emphasised the promotion (and protection) of integration over and above 
the maintenance of a structure of undistorted competition (that integration was 
anyway deemed to bring about). A restriction on the freedom to trade across the 
borders of a Member State (and therefore a hindrance of the integration objective) 
was taken to be a restriction on competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC. 
Following the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty (and the de jure completion of the 
single market), the thrust of competition policy is rather to protect and promote the 
structure of undistorted competition directly (in order to promote and protect 
integration). A restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC is a 
hindering of the integration objective.
113 See above, where it is described how pursuing integration was deemed to lead 
automatically to competitive markets.
114 Compare benefits as listed in note 112 with those listed at p i 8.
115 in: Amato, G. and Van Miert, K., ibid, 1997 at p.6.
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Nevertheless, the direct protection of single market integration may still take 
precedence in the application of the competition law provisions. The Commission 
states in its Green Paper that absolute territorial protection and Resale Price 
Maintenance which may affect interstate trade between Member States will not only 
continue to fall perse  within Article 81 (1), but are unlikely to be exempted.116 In this 
sense, Community competition law must continue to be aimed at preventing private 
agreements that re-erect the trade barriers:
* The EC experience shows that the removal of non-tariff barriers is not sufficient for the full 
development of parallel trade, arbitrage and changes in distribution across Europe. For the 
complete success of economic integration it is necessary that producers, distributors and 
consumers, find it profitable to move towards the new market situation and do not take actions 
to avoid or counteract the effects of the Single Market measures. The elimination of barriers to 
trade may not achieve its objectives if producers and/or distributors introduce practices 
contrary to integration. Unfortunately in many cases it is likely that they have strong incentives 
to do so.’117
The emphasis on the direct pursuit of competition in the application of Articles 81 
and 82 EC that has occurred as a result of the de jure completion of the Single Market 
is therefore qualified by the integration goal in two dimensions. First, it is limited by 
the direct protection of integration in the continued quasi-per se prohibition on 
territorial protection. Secondly, where competition is directly pursued in the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, the overall objective of integration (as the main 
goal of the Community according to Article 2 EC) remains paramount: the integration 
of the markets remains the reason for the direct protection of the structures of 
undistorted competition.
Therefore, the overriding goal of competition policy has not changed. This fact was 
echoed by Lord Leon Britton, then Commissioner for competition, when he stated:
It should not be assumed...that the goal of 1992 has somehow changed the nature of 
competition policy. It has not. Rather, it has served to give new impetus to our implementation 
of policy and to educate both industry and governments on the crucial role of competition in 
E urope /118
116 See, Executive Summary, ibid.
117 Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, COM (96) 721 at para. 78.
118 Brittan, L., ‘European Competition Policy • Keeping the Playing Field Level’, ibid at p.2.
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As will become clear, the overriding objective of integration (both ‘internal’ and 
‘external’) was behind the implementation of a Community Merger Regulation and is 
vital to the question of the proper scope of the Merger Regulation.
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III EC MERGER REGULATION: HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW
A THE ISSUE
As stated above, there was no specific system of concentration control included in the 
Rome Treaty. The Merger Regulation suffered an extremely long incubation period of 
over twenty years, having been mooted for the first time by the Commission in 
1972.119 Why was the implementation of a regulation of concentrations at the 
European level such a delicate issue? There are two sides to the answer
First, the regulation of concentrations in general is a matter of considerable 
controversy as a matter of economics, politics and the law.
Secondly, within the context of the Community and the overriding approach of 
Community competition policy (based as it was upon the success of Single Market 
integration), concentrations were regarded as being a positive and even natural 
response to integration and the globalisation of the markets. Moreover, the Member 
States had to be convinced not only of the benefits of concentration control within the 
Community (controversial in itself), but also of concentration control at the 
Community level.
Each of these reasons shall be considered in turn.
B THE GENERAL CONTROVERSY
As a starting point, it must be noted that the reluctance to implement a formal and 
general concentration control at Community level was actually mirrored at the 
national level.120 Concentrations are different. Wherein lies that difference?
119 The Commission explicitly informed the Council of its intention to implement a system of 
Community concentration control in 1972, Council Resolution of 5 December 1972 on 
inflation control, item VIII, OJ No. C l33,23 December 1972, p.14.
This lead to a formal proposal in 1973, OJ 1973 C92/1 of 31.10.1973.
120 See Annex 1 and the dates for entry of national legislation.
34
The regulation of concentrations per se provokes political sensitivities and 
controversies in a greater intensity than does the control of the conduct of 
undertakings:
’Intervention to prevent a concentration is an interference with the operation of the free market 
in which, generally, shareholders are left to buy and sell shares as they deem appropriate. Some 
proponents of the free market argue that interference is justified only where a concentration 
would have a seriously damaging effect on the competitive structure of an industry-.Others 
however, more sceptical about the operation o f the free market, argue that a more 
interventionist stance should be adopted so that various socio-political considerations...can also 
be taken into account421
Hence, unrestricted concentration activity pertains more to liberal ideas on natural 
forces of the free market. Restrictive agreements directly affect competitors’ freedom 
to act in line with the natural forces of free competition, but concentration control 
constitutes a form of structural regulation. Concentrations may in fact be a response 
to such natural market forces. They may be necessary to enhance efficiency and 
competitiveness of an individual firm. They may even be necessary for the continued 
survival of a company.12 22 123
Nevertheless, where a political order wishes to promote structures of free 
competition, the control of concentrations may be deemed necessary. This is in 
recognition of the changes in economic power in a given market that concentrations 
can effect* Concentrations establish structural control - the control of permanent or 
long-run contractual relations among suppliers; they may create the conditions in 
which anti-competitive conduct is more likely. Thus:
’ ... they can create or enhance interdependencies among buyers and sellers and thereby 
enhance the likelihood of joint or co-operative exercise o f market power or the abuse of 
economic power against small trading partners ...The rationale for the anti-trust oversight of 
concentration structure lies in the influence of market structure on the feasibility and 
profitability o f conduct inconsistent with efficiency and economic freedom.
121 Whish, Competition Law , 1993,3rd Edition, at p.664.
122 See eg., Continental Mergers are Different, Centre for Business Strategy, London Business 
School, 1990 at pp. 106-7; Bishop, M. and Kay, J., European Mergers and Merger Policy, ibid, 
1993, p.295.
123 Boner, R. and Krueger,R. The Basics o f  Antitrust Policy - A Review o f Ten Nations and the 
European Communities \ World Bank Technical Paper Number 160,1991 at p.68.
35
In relation to this concern, it has further been suggested that structural ex ante 
regulation is often superior to ex post conduct regulation because of the practical 
informational difficulties faced by the regulator in controlling anti-competitive 
conduct:
'...the merit of structural regulation...is that it stops the additional incentive and opportunity for 
anti-competitive behaviour. Conduct regulation aims to address that behaviour directly, but it is 
questionable whether the authorities are always sufficiently well-informed to detect undesirable 
conduct, and to impose effective and appropriate remedies. Thus, structural regulation eases 
problems of enforcement. . J24
Yet even if we accept that maintaining competitive market structures denies market 
players the opportunity to behave anti-competitively, this does not necessarily 
condone the regulation of concentrations. It must be shown that firms enjoying a 
position of economic power on a given market will act anti-competitively and are 
capable of doing so over a long period of time; in short, that they should be legally 
punished for just such a position.
There are contrasting positions adopted on this point in academic thought. The most 
traditional and diametrically opposed are the Harvard and the Chicago Schools.
1 The Harvard School
According to the Harvard School124 25 in the US, the potential to behave anti- 
competitively in a position of economic power relies upon the presence of natural 
barriers to entry on a concentrated market (for example, economies of scale, absolute 
cost advantages and consumer loyalty). These barriers enable an established dominant 
firm to maintain and exploit its position.
124 Kay, J. and Vickers, J., Regulatory Reform in Britain ", Economic Policy, Oct. 1988.
But see the criticism of this proposition in ‘Discussion', Kay and Vickers, ibid, at pp.345-349, 
in particular at p. 344 and p.346-7.
125 e.g.. Bain, 'Barriers to New Competition’ 1956 Harvard University Press, Cambridge; 
Kay sen and Turner, 'Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis’ 1959 Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge; Galbraith, *The New Industrial State' 1967,); Scherer, F. and 
Ross, D., Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance* 3.Ed., 1990; Adams, W. 
and Brock, J., 'Revitalising a Structural Antitrust Policy’, 39 Antitrust Bulletin (1994) 235.
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The Harvard School represents a structural approach to competition regulation. It 
presumes that there is, in general, a positive link between intense competition and 
increases in social welfare, based upon the direct causal links between structure, 
conduct and performance. Hence, competition and competitive market structures 
should be defended, and thereby concentrations which would create or consolidate an 
undesirably concentrated market structure should be prohibited.126 Taken to its limits, 
it is suggested that if market structure is taken care of, market conduct and 
performance may even take care of themselves.
2 The Chicago School
To this picture must, in contemporary competition policy thinking, be added the 
critique of the Chicago School.127 This school questioned the substantiality of these 
barriers to entry. They claimed that the Harvard School had exaggerated their size and 
effect* Many barriers pertained to by that school - where they are not artificial - are 
not barriers at all but actually result in a benefit to welfare through efficiency gains. If 
a dominant firm were to charge supra-competitive prices in the absence of artificial 
barriers to entry, new and dynamic competition would quickly enter the relevant 
market. Therefore:
'Antitrust...can be confined to the demolition o f arbitrary (deliberately devised and imposed) 
barriers to entry and the prevention o f  the creation o f  such barriers. It need not confuse itself 
with such tasks as attempting to break up major firms in highly concentrated industries'.128
Clearly, this defines a different line on the appropriate approach to monopoly and 
concentration policy. The causal links between structure, conduct and performance 
are not regarded as being completely deterministic. Therefore, a neutral stance is 
adopted with regard to concentrated markets. Rather, market conduct should be
126 In favour of structural regulation on the basis that economic theory suggests that markets 
cannot be left completely on their own, see eg, van Mourik, Aad, ‘The Role o f  Competition 
Policy in a Market Economy in: Nicolaides, P. and van der Klugt, A., *Competition Policy o f  
the European Community 1994, European Institute o f Public Administration, Maastricht.
127 e.g., Stigler, The Organisation o f  Industry' 1988 Harewood; Bork, The Antitrust Paradox' 
1978 N.Y. There can be no doubt that it has been o f substantial influence in US Antitrust. For 
useful demonstrations o f the debate, see Lonbay, J. (ed.), ibid; Williamson, ‘Antitrust 
Enforcement: Where it has been; where it is going ’ in: Antitrust Economics (1989) Oxford; 
Posner, *The Chicago School o f Antitrust Analysis’ (1979) 127 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 925-48.
128 Brozen, ’Competition, Efficiency and Antitrust' in: The Competitive EC: Selected Readings 
(1975).
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regulated in a cost-benefit approach. There should be a case-by-case assessment of 
the conduct of large firms to assess whether the benefits of large size (e.g. economies 
of scale) might outweigh the anti-competitive costs. According to this view, a 
concentration policy is not strictly necessary, since a firm created by a concentration 
can be assessed and controlled in the same way as a large firm.
Clearly, although founded upon economic theory, the two schools would be attractive 
for very different political ideologies. Yet the ultimate aim of the two is the same - to 
explain the effect of concentrated markets for the aim of maintaining structures of 
free competition (in the interests of consumer welfare). To this extent, recourse to 
empirical evidence may be made.
3 Empirical Evidence
There is no doubt that concentrations may engender efficiency benefits in the form of 
economies of scale which may override competition concerns for a particular 
industry:
‘ Cartels tend to preserve the status quo and keep less efficient business units in existence, 
thereby enabling the more efficient firms to make comfortable profits. Concentrations, on the 
other hand, are thought to play a more dynamic role in the development of the economy. 
Economies of scale have almost become a slogan which is repeatedly invoked so as to grant 
complete immunity to concentrations. ,I29
According to empirical evidence however, the potential for negative effects of a 
concentration on a given market for the ultimate consumer tend to outweigh the 
positive.129 30 Generally, concentrations often do not lead to efficient economies of
129 Joliet, R., Monopolisation and the Abuse o f a Dominant Position, (1969), RTDE p259.
130 Recognised explicitly by the Commission in its Third Report on Competition Policy (1973) 
at paragraph 27.
See for a good summary of the economics involved in the trade-off between the benefits and 
problems of a monopoly situation, Van Mourik, Aad, ‘The Role o f  Competition Policy in a 
Market E c o n o m y in: Nicolaides, P. and van der Klugt, A., ‘Competition Policy o f  the 
European Community', 1994, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht.
For a more detailed analysis, see Jacquemin, A., Buigues, P. and Ilzkovitz, F., ‘Horizontal 
Concentrations and Competition Policy in the European Community’, in: European Economy, 
May 1989, No.40 at pp. 17-22. They conclude that the theoretical argument about the costs and 
benefits of concentrations does not allow a general presumption for or against regulation. 
Regarding empirical evidence, they suggest that: la body o f convergent evidence suggests that 
concentrations are far from being a panacea to improve competitiveness’. They go on to the 
less sweeping, yet still consistent, conclusion that a general presumption in favour of such
scale, and the post-merger performance of the merged entity is often no better than 
the performance of the separate undertakings. Concentrations will often lead to 
insuperable barriers to entry for new entrants on the market and anticompetitive 
conduct by the merged entity.131 A political system that aims to promote structures of 
free competition and competitiveness should lean towards regulation rather than 
apathy with regard to mergers.
Structural regulation and conduct regulation should therefore be seen as 
complementary. The one does not obviate the need for the other.132
As noted repeatedly above, this was not however the original approach adopted in the 
Rome Treaty. The Rome Treaty only regulated private conduct of firms rather than 
structural changes of the market. This may be contrasted with the ECSC Treaty of 
1951, which had given the High Authority the right to declare a concentration in the 
coal or steel industry ‘unlawful’, and to prohibit it, if it so chose.
concentrations is not justified. Kay however criticises the conclusions they make on the basis of 
the empirical evidence they have used. He states that a more accurate interpretation would be 
'the only conclusion to be drawn from  the empirical evidence is that a general presumption 
against (horizontal) concentrations is justified\  Kay, N., 'Mergers, acquisitions and the 
completion o f the internal market in: Hughes, K.(ed.), ‘European Competitiveness ', 1993, 
Cambridge University Press. It should be noted however that the authors draw that final 
conclusion in the European context (and in consideration of the fact that the empirical evidence 
does not refer to the dynamic conditions which are the result of the 1992 single market 
programme). This may therefore explain their more cautionary approach.
Most strictly, see Blank, ibid, who considers that concentrations in general represent as much 
of a danger to competition as cartels and that the possible efficiency gains are overstated at 
pp.68-81 ;127.
Generally, see eg., See also, eg., Meeks, G., ‘Disappointing Marriage: A Study o f the Cains 
from C o n cen tra tio n (1977), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Hughes, A., ‘The 
impact o f  concentration: a survey o f  empirical evidence fo r  the UK', in: Fairbum, J.A. and 
Kay, J.A.(eds), *Mergers and Merger Policy’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.30-98; 
Whish, 1993, ibid, p.669-671; Jacquemin, A.P., 'Concentration and European Policy\ in: 
'Concentration and Competition Policy in the European C o m m u n ityAdmiraal, P.(ed), 1990.
131 Whish, 1993 ibid, atp.671.
132 Boner and Krueger, ibid, p.68; Van Mourik, Aad, ‘The Role o f Competition Policy in a 
Market Economy in: Nicolaides, P. and van der Klugt, A., ‘Competition Policy o f  the 
European Community ’, 1994, European Institute o f Public Administration, Maastricht; Whish, 
1993, ibid, p.669-671; Jacquemin, A.P., 'Concentration and European P o l i c y in: 
*Concentration and Competition Policy in the European Community', Admiraal, P.(ed), 1990; 
Jacquemin, A., Buigues, P. and Ilzkovitz, F., ‘Horizontal Concentrations and Competition 
Policy in the European C o m m u n ity in: European Economy, May 1989, No.40 at pp. 17-22; 
Kay, N., ‘Concentrations, acquisitions and the completion o f the internal market’, in: Hughes, 
K.(ed.), ‘European Competitiveness’, 1993, Cambridge University Press; Meeks, G., 
‘Disappointing Marriage: A Study o f  the Gains from Concentration’, (1977), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge; Hughes, A., ‘The impact o f concentration: a survey o f empirical
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On the basis of the empirical evidence concerning the effect of concentrations 
however, the omission of a concentration control in the Rome Treaty is surprising. 
The objective of the Community was the integration of the markets (Article 2 EC), 
whereby the maintenance of structures of undistorted competition constituted a means 
of achieving this aim (Article 3g EC). Was it the result of an adherence to a specific 
economic theory that explains the omission, or was it the pursuit of more pressing 
aims that lay behind the Community’s apparent benevolent attitude to mergers outside 
the coal and steel sectors?
C THE EUROPEAN CONTROVERSY
The regulation of concentrations at the Community level concerns two specific issues. 
First, it is necessary to consider the need to control concentrations within the 
Community. Secondly, it is necessary to consider the need for such control to take 
place centrally, at the Community level.
1 The Need for Concentration Control within Community
1,1 The Need of Concentration Control and the Rome Treaty 
The general theoretical analysis above has demonstrated that there was some debate 
about the significance of merger control in a legal and political order that pursues 
structures of undistorted competition. Empirical evidence however provides a 
persuasive reason for the regulation and control of concentrations in preference to a 
more laissez-faire approach.
Yet the Community approach to concentration control at the time of the 
implementation of Rome Treaty was not based upon this theoretical debate 
concerning the effect of concentrations on the structures of free competition within 
the Community. Rather, it was based upon political concerns. This explains the 
disparity in approach between the ECSC Treaty (that included a system of 
concentration control) and the Rome Treaty (that did not include a system of 
concentration control). For the coal and steel industry had been the basis of German
evidence fo r  the UK', in: Fairbum, J.A. and Kay, J.A-(eds), *Concentrations and 
Concentrations P o l ic y Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.30-98.
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military machine in the Second World War, and there was palpable political concern 
to restrict significant levels of national concentration in that sector.133 ;.-i1 v v .
On the other hand, during the negotiations of the Rome Treaty in the mid-1950’s 
there were perceived no political reasons to control concentration activity in 
industries other than coal and steel.134 For this reason, a concentration control was 
missing from the Community competition laws enshrined in the Treaty; 
concentrations were not perceived to present a problem. This conclusion is supported 
by the fact that none of the Member States themselves had any system of 
concentration control at that time.135 Economic considerations that there were centred 
not upon the potentially adverse effect of too much concentration on a specific 
market, but rather upon the need for the growth and expansion of companies in the 
progress of the reparation of the war-tom national economies.
As the national economies of the Member States began to recover, this benevolent 
attitude of the Community towards concentrations did not disappear entirely, but 
merely shifted their focus. Hence, they concentrated upon the globalisation 
phenomenon, and the need for European companies to compete with the American 
and Asian markets. Unregulated concentration activity was deemed to be important in 
allowing the corporate restructuring which was necessary for the opening up of 
national markets to Community and world markets.136 Community firms began to 
recognise the need to adapt and to grow in order to increase profitability, efficiency 
and technical progress. Concentration and acquisition was therefore a natural and 
legitimate reaction to the goal of integration of the Member State markets, and the 
Community adopted a correspondingly benevolent attitude towards them.137
133 See eg., Lord Leon Brittan, Competition Policy and Merger Control in the Single 
European Market, ibid, p.23.
It may be submitted that the Freiburger Ordoliberalen School was influential in this approach. 
They had highlighted the need to regulate for a competitive economy to prevent the building up 
of private power in too few hands, possibly leading to links with public power, see note 15 
above.
134 See eg., Concentration Control in the EC: a Survey o f  European Competition Laws \ 
London, Kluwer, 1988 at p.222; Bourgeois, J.H.J. and Langeheine, B., Jurisdictional Issues: 
The EEC Merger Control Regulation, Member State Laws, and Articles 85 and 86, Fordham 
International Law Journal, (1990-1), Vol.14 387-411 at p.497; Lord Leon Brittan, Competition 
Policy and Merger Control in the Single European Market, ibid, p.23.
135 Germany was the first in 1973 and France in 1977. When it joined the Community in 1973, 
the UK already had a system of merger control (dating from 1965). For details o f all Member 
States, see Annex 1.
136 So-called ‘external integration’, see above at p.9.
137 See eg., Commission Memorandum, p.8; See Von der Groeben, M. H., Member o f the 
European Commission, Address to the European Parliament o f 16 June 1965, ‘La politique de
41
Nevertheless, the Commission was aware of the threat that concentrations could 
represent to the structures of free competition within the Community that constitute 
the means of achieving the integrated market (Article 3g EC in conjunction with 
Article 2 EC). Powerful concentration of industries along national lines could act to 
foreclose individual markets and hinder the integration process. Concentrations could 
therefore present a problem with regard to the Community objectives.
A dichotomy in the approach towards concentrations within the Community arose. It 
was explicitly expressed by the Commission in its Memorandum of 1966.
1.2 Concentration Control and the Commission Memorandum of 1966 
The issues and concerns presented by concentrations prompted a Commission study 
in 1966 entitled ‘Le Problème de la Concentration dans le Marché Commun’. In this 
Report, the Commission detailed precisely the dichotomy that concentrations 
represented at the Community level.138 *While there clearly remained a bias towards 
the positive effects that concentrations can have for the Community, the Commission 
also considered that it was necessary to control concentrations that could lead to 
monopolistic conditions on a given market. Thus, it stated that:
‘Cette adaptation des entreprises aux dimensions du marché commun va d’ailleurs dans le sens 
des objectifs du traité de Rome. La croissance des entreprises permettra une amélioration de la 
rentabilité, une accélération du progrès technique et une réduction des coûts de 
production...Une raison supplémentaire d’agrandisement des firmes européennes est la
 ^ »139concurrence internationale de plus en plus vive sur les marchés mondiaux... 
while maintaining that:
concurrence partie intégrante de la politique économique dans le Marché communataire\  
Doc. 8158/1, VI/1965/5.
This policy has not been without reproach. See eg., Kay, who presents evidence that the 
subversion of internal market objectives to external market objectives and the benevolent 
attitude towards concentrations has the very opposite effect, restricting competition in the 
internal market, which in turn restricts Community competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. According to Kay, the two agendas are actually consistent where the Community 
directly pursues a system of undistorted competition as a primary and ultimate aim. Kay, N., 
‘Concentrationsr acquisitions and the internal market’, in: Hughes, K., European 
Competitiveness’, 1993, Cambridge.
138 This dichotomy remains discernible. More recently the balance of the equation has however 
changed. See above, p.9.
139 Commission Memorandum, 1966, ibid at p.7.
‘Une concurrence efficace entre entreprises oligopolistiques répond aux objectifs du T ra ité . 
Cette concurrence peut favoriser le progrès technique et économique à  de multiples égards e t 
elle peut en même temps être suffisamment intensive pour que les utilisateurs et les 
consommateurs bénéficient de ce progrès.
En revanche, il y a lieu, du point de vue de la concurrence, de formuler des réserves à  
l'encontre des concentrations sd traduisant par la création de situations de monopole dans le  
marché commun.*140
13  Commission Proposals for a Merger Regulation 
1.3.1 The 1970's
In the 1970's, the Commission's conviction that there was a need for a system of 
Community merger control to prevent the creation of monopolistic markets gathered 
momentum. The Commission explicitly informed the Council in 1972 of its intention 
‘to submit, independently of the application of Article 86 (now Article 82 EC) to 
specific cases, proposals for the introduction of more systematic supervision 
arrangements for mergers reaching a certain scale’.141 It was an intention that led to a 
formal proposal.142
The reasons for the Commission’s proposal were given in detail in its Third Report on 
Competition Policy. Again, the dichotomy that mergers represented for the 
Community objective of successful integration was presented:
‘It is incontrovertible that the process of industrial concentration is on the increase. The causes 
lie largely in the desire and need of Community firms to adapt constantly to the new scale o f 
their markets and to improve their competitiveness on the world market. Many mergers, as a 
result of the structure o f the markets in which they occur, in no way lessen competition but, on 
the contrary, can increase i t  However the Commission cannot overlook that the EEC Treaty, in 
making it responsible for applying the rules on competition, requires it to preserve the unity o f 
the Common Market, to ensure that the market remains open and ensure effective competition. 
Excessive concentration is likely to obstruct these aims’.143
140 ibid a tp . l l .
141 See Council Resolution of 5 December 1972 on inflation control, item VIII. OJ No. C133, 
23 December 1972, p.14.
142 Proposal by the Council of a Regulation for the Control o f  Mergers, OJ C92 of 31.10.1973.
143 ibid at pp.28-9. See also, in particular, pp.31-3.
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The Commission no longer limited the necessity for a system of Community 
concentration control to a prevention of the creation of monopolistic market 
conditions. The substantive test of the proposed Regulation concerned the acquisition 
or enhancing of the power to hinder effective competition, unless the concentration is 
indispensable to the attainment of an objective given priority by the Community 
(Article 1).
The European Parliament had also expressed its belief in 1971 that there should be a 
system of Community concentration control.144 Therefore, it was not surprising that 
the proposal (with some amendments145) was approved by the Parliament.146 The 
momentum towards the successful implementation of a Merger Regulation were 
however stalled in the Council.147 Here, the proposal encountered intractable Member 
State resistance.148
While they had recognised that there was the need for such a system in general 
terms,149 in practice the Member States were extremely suspicious about ceding 
national control over concentrations to a supranational authority. The main 
reservations of the Member States were founded upon the wony that national social 
and regional policies may not be adequately safeguarded in individual decisions taken 
at the Community level.150 In 1980, the Commission, in restating its opinion that there 
was a need for a Community Merger Regulation, highlighted the main political 
concerns preventing the Council from implementing a Regulation:
'(i) the legal basis o f any such Regulation which the Commission feels should refer not 
only to Article 87 but also Article 235 of the EEC Treaty;
144 Resolution of the European Parliament on the rules of competition and the position of 
European firms in the common market and in the world economy, OJ C 66 of 1.7.1971, p.12.
145 For the details of these amendments, see Commission Fourth Report on Competition Policy 
at p.19.
146 OJ C23 of 8.3.1974, p.19. The Economic and Social Committee followed suit, see OJ C88 
of 26.7.1974, p.19.
147 A series of meetings took place of a Council Working Party on Economic Questions. In 
1976 it submitted an interim report to the Committee of Permanent Representatives, calling for 
political guidelines on five main problems - the legal basis for the proposed regulation and the 
principle o f premerger control, the scope of the regulation, the possibility of derogations from 
the concept o f incompatibility with the common market, notification of planned mergers and 
decision-making powers. The Committee considered the Report during 1977. See European 
Commission, Seventh Report on Competition Policy at p.57.
148 In detail on this, see Markert, K, ‘EEC policy towards mergers’, in: George, K. and Joll, C. 
(eds) ‘Competition Policy in the UK and EEC’, 1975 Cambridge University Press.
149 As agreed upon at the Paris Summit, 21.10.1972, EC-Bulletin Nr. 10-1972, p.20.
150 European Commission, Fourth Report on Competition Policy, p.19.
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(ii) a clearly-defined sharing o f responsibilities between the national and Community 
authorities in applying the relevant national law and implementing a future Community law;
(iii) closer association by the Member States in the Commission’s decision-making process 
when establishing that a given merger is incompatible with the common market rules of 
competition or when granting exemption to these rules on account o f other objectives.’151
1.3.2 The Early 1980’s
In recognition of the inherent limitations of the established use of Article 82 EC as a 
system of structural control, the Commission increased its calls for a specific legal 
provision to control concentrations. In 1981 it made a further proposal.152 However, it 
was again met by resistance from the Member States, in particular the UK and 
Germany. Their basic reluctance was compounded by the decline of merger activity 
in the 1970’s.
1.3.3 The Single European Act 1986
Fundamental for the final implementation of a European Merger Regulation was the 
Single European Act in 1986 and its implications.
As described above, the Single European Act detailed the completion of the Single 
Market by 1992 in legal terms. Within the context of this development, the 
Commission determined that in general the Community goal under Article 3g EC of 
ensuring the non-distortion of competition within the Common Market should be 
reinforced (rather than reduced).153
151 European Commission, Tenth Report on Competition Policy, p.29.
152 COM (81)773,12.2.1982.
The proposal was approved by the Economic and Social Committee, subject to a number of 
comments, see OJ C 252,27.9.1982.
The proposal was approved by the European Parliament, subject to a number of 
recommendations, see OJ C 322 of 28.11.1983.
133 See above, pp21-23.
Specifically, see *Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the European Community’, 
in: European Economy, May 1989, No.40, considering the question: should European 
competition policy be strengthened or loosened in the context of achieving the internal market, 
within the context of horizontal concentrations?
See also, in particular, the study by T. Padoa-Schioppa et a i, 'Efficiency, stability and equity 
Oxford University Press, 1987. But cf. Davidow, who states that it was never obvious that the 
EC had to have greater antitrust powers just because it is a common market. He submits that 
there is no consistent relationship between strengthened antitrust enforcement and the 
integration o f nation-states into a common market. The Commission strengthened its 
competition policy on the basis of the 1992 Single Market Programme, but the real reasons
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The Commission thereby became increasingly concerned that there were types of co­
operation - in particular national mergers affecting cross-border markets - which 
might significantly hinder this integration process. The arguments centred around the 
reduction in the number of independent actors that mergers effect. As a consequence 
of this structural change, national champions might attempt to foreclose their national 
markets to improve their competitive position in a potential or actual Community­
wide market. The Commission considered that merger control was a necessary 
corollary of the 1992 programme.
In tandem with this change in attitude was the expected proliferation of mergers as 
firms responded to the new market conditions. The Single Market programme, and 
the anticipated increase in competition, forced European companies to restructure and 
to concentrate on their core businesses, an impetus which had be initiated by the 
market integration dynamic precipitated by the Rome Treaty. This contributed to an 
increase in concentrations taking place within the Community for two reasons. First, 
there were divestments by firms of non-core activities in which they did not enjoy a 
comparative advantage, which increased the number of mergers and acquisitions. 
Secondly, European firms recognised the need to expand Community-wide operations 
as the Community markets integrate and grow. Larger Community firms realised that 
they had to be present in the different Member States in order not to forgo demand. 
The easiest and quickest method to achieve this was of course to take-over or merge 
with firms in other Member States. Added to this dynamic were firms of non- 
Community countries attempting to gain some representation in Europe, fearing that 
the Community might become a near impenetrable economic base. In the late 1980’s 
and early 1990’s, there was a significant increase in cross-border concentrations.154
were political and bureaucratic, in: Competition Policy, Merger Control and the European 
Community’s 1992 P r o g r a m Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1991, Vol. 29, pp. 11- 
40.
154 Statistics show that there was a corresponding peak of concentration activity within the 
Community in the period 1989-1990, see eg. ‘Competition and Integration - Community 
concentration control policy\ European Economy, European Commission, Directorate- 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs at p.22. On the reasons for this, see eg., 
Jacquemin, A., ‘The International Dimension o f European Competition Policy’t Journal of 
Common Market Studies, (1993) 31 pp.91-101 at pp.92-94.
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As a result, the Commission became ever more vocal in its call for a Community 
Merger Regulation in the mid to late 1980’s.155 In 1984 (taking into account the 
proposals and suggestions made by the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee with regard to the 1981 proposal156) it made a modified proposal 
for the adoption of a Regulation to control mergers.157 Its efforts were again rejected 
by the Member States. Nevertheless, it noted that the majority of Member States were 
in agreement about the need for a system of Community control, if of differing 
opinions about how such a system should be framed.158
The Commission modified its 1984 proposal in 1986 with respect to the procedures 
under the proposed Regulation.159 There was however no progress in the Council 
towards a final implementation of a Regulation. Again, in its Report on Competition 
Policy for that year, the Commission however emphasised that such a system of 
control was necessary to achieve an integrated internal market by 1992.160 The 
European Parliament meanwhile suggested that the Commission should withdraw the 
proposal altogether (which had been the result of a series of modifications to the 
original 1973 proposal) and make an entirely fresh start in the attempt to fill the 
important gap in Community competition policy.161
While Member State resistance was still proving decisive, a further development 
occurred that indirectly added impetus to the eventual implementation of a 
Community Merger Regulation. This was the Philip Morris case, in which the Court 
of Justice concluded that Article 81 EC may be applied to mergers.162 The unclarity of 
the case decision itself and the inappropriateness of Article 81 EC as a provision of 
merger control meant that the after-effects of the Philip Morris judgment were 
instrumental in persuading the Member States.163
155 Krimphove, D., ‘Europaeische F usionskon tro lle1992, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, at pp. 
91-110.
156 See above, note 152.
157 COM (84) 3.2.1984.
158 See Commission Fourteenth Report, p.50 and Commission Fifteenth Report at p.47.
In particular, the proposed exclusivity o f control by the Commission for mergers falling within 
the scope of the Regulation had been a stumbling block in the Council. For details (and the 
compromise reached), see below at pp. 140-50.
159 COM (86)675,2.12.1986.
160 Commission Sixteenth Report, p.49.
161 See Parliament Resolution on the Fifteenth Report of the Commission o f the EC on 
Competition Policy at point 29, in: Annex 1, Commission Sixteenth Report.
162 Cases 142/84 and 156/84 (1987) ECR 4487, (1988) 4 CMLR 24. For full details, see below.
163 See Bulmer, S., 'Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: the Case o f  
Concentration Control\  1994 Public Administration, 72, 423-444 at^p. 431-2. He notes that
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These developments in particular changed the opinion of the previously sceptical 
European industry.164 Furthermore, as integration was progressing, the benefits of 
centralised control of concentrations in terms of regulatory efficiency of a one-stop 
shop rather than multiple referrals to individual Member States was, for European 
industry, tangible.165
On 25th April 1988, the Commission once again to offered a modified proposal.166 
Following consultations with the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee, the Commission made a second (amended) proposal in 1988 in 
November.167
It was this proposal that was finally adopted by the Council on 21 December 1989.168 
The Commission stated in its 1990 Report on Competition Policy that the logic of the 
single market was behind the Member States unanimous agreement to implement a 
European Merger Regulation.169 It went on to state:
the legal uncertainty caused businesses to begin to notify concentration activity to DGIV, even 
though there was no clear set of rules and conventions, and created such concern that corporate 
actors joined the existing alliance for supranational regulation.
See also, eg., B ulmer, S., ‘The Supranational Regulation o f Mergers', RUSEL Working Paper 
May 1993; Woolcock, S, ‘European Concentrations: National or Community Controls?’, 
RIIA Discussion Papers, 15, 1989; Korah, V. and Lasok, P., ‘Philip Morris and its Aftermath \  
CMLRev (1988) vol.25, no.2, pp.333-68; Broberg, M., The European Commission’s 
Jurisdiction to Scrutinise Mergers, 1998 ibid, at p.2.
164 See eg., Woolcock, S., 1989 ibid, p.18.
165 In particular, the EC industrialists’ interest group, UNICE. See eg. UNICE ‘Concentration 
control at community level’, UNICE declaration of 10 Nov.1987, Brussels; UNICE 1Amended 
proposal fo r  a Council regulation on the control o f  concentrations between undertakings’, 
UNICE position o f  4 May 1988, Brussels; UNICE ‘Draft regulation regarding the control o f  
concentrations’, UNICE note of 17 Nov. 1989. Brussels; UNICE 'Draft regulation on 
concentration control’, UNICE position paper of 14 Dec. 1989 Brussels.
166 OJC 130 of 19.5.1988.
167 COM(88) 734 25.11.1988.
168 OJL395, 30.12.1989.
169 In support of this conclusion, see eg. the statements of UK Junior Trade Minister John 
Redwood at a press conference held to mark the adoption of Regulation 4064/89,who stressed 
the need in view of business facing multiple hurdles in the execution of concentrations 
(Independent, 22 December 1989). See also, Baroness Elies, MEP, (then Chairman of the 
Legal Affairs and Citizen’s Rights Committee of the European Parliament) in: House of Lords 
Select Committee on the European Communities, Concentration Control, Session 1988/89, 6th 
Report at p.10 (London, 1989); Schwarz, E., ‘Politics as Usual: The History o f  European 
Community Concentration Control’, (1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 607-662; 
Bulmer, S., Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: the Case o f Merger 
Control, Public Administration, Volume 72, 1994 (423-444) at pp.432-3; Woolcock, S., 
European mergers: national or Community controls? RIIA Discussion Paper No. 15, London; 
Lord Leon Brittan, Competition Policy and Merger Control in the Single European Market, 
ibid, at p.32.
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‘Merger control is necessary for both economic and political reasons. The process of 
restructuring European industry has given rise and will continue to give rise to a wave of 
mergers. Although many such mergers have not posed any problems from the competition point 
of view, it must be ensured that they do not in the long run jeopardise the competition process, 
which lies at the heart o f the common market and is essential in securing all the benefits linked 
with the single market In addition, it has become ever more clearly apparent that national rules 
are inadequate as a means of controlling Community-scale mergers, mainly because such rules 
are restricted to the respective territories of the Member States concerned. Clearly, Community 
law must be applied in controlling and examining large-scale mergers, where the reference 
market is increasingly the Community as a whole or a large part of it. The new Regulation also 
introduces a system of control for Member States which do not have any specific rules in this 
area».170
Since its first proposal, the Commission had stressed the need for a system of merger 
control within the Community for economic reasons, within the context of the 
integration aim. After all, the integrated market was based upon a system of 
undistorted competition. Concentrations should not therefore be allowed to distort the 
structures of competition within the Community so that the integration process might 
be hindered. On the other hand, it is important to examine the further assumption of 
the Commission that a structure of national systems of merger control was not 
adequate to fulfil the need for a system of concentration control within the 
Community. The UK government in particular appeared not be convinced of this need 
even as late as May 1989.17' Why was there a need for a system of centralised control 
under Community law?
2 The Need for Centralised Control
If the Commission was convinced of the need to control concentrations per se (in 
terms of the goal of integration and its success), this was not to assume that there was 
automatically an objective need for a centralised Community system of control.172
170 Commission Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy, pp.33-4.
171 See statement by Director General of Fair Trading, Sir Gordon Borrie, arguing that 
increased international co-operation could be adequately taken into account in assessments of 
the structure of competition on national markets, in: Financial Times, 12 May 1989. Also the 
views o f Lord Young, then Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry, Financial Times, 13 May 
1989.
172 Note that the Member States had agreed as early as 1972 that there was a need for the 
control of mergers in accordance with the aims o f the Community. They were not however
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Could not the Commission have encouraged national Member States to adopt their 
own systems of concentration control? Would those already in place not be sufficient 
to control concentrations within the Community? Recourse to economic theory 
demonstrates that within the Community market, centralised control of concentrations 
was a requisite.
2.1 Economic Theory of Centralised and Decentralised Regulation
2.1.1 The Tiebout Model
Traditionally, economic analysis of the costs and benefits of decentralised regulation 
by the Community has applied Tiebout7s model of the efficient provision of local 
public goods.173 The model points initially to a presumption in favour of 
decentralisation. This presumption is operational when certain conditions are 
fulfilled:
- the costless mobility of citizens (or in this case, firms) between jurisdictions;
- a large number of jurisdictions;
- no external effects between jurisdictions.174
Where these conditions are met, there is effective competition between jurisdictions, 
since the individual has the opportunity to leave one jurisdiction for another that may 
better serve their interest. This opportunity puts pressure on the government regulator
convinced that such control should take place at the Community level, Summit Conference for 
Heads of State or Government of the Member States, 19-20 October 1972.
173 Tiebout, C.M-, (1956), ‘A pure theory o f local expenditures’, Journal of Political Economy 
Vol.64, October pp. 416-24.
Application with regard to the assignment of regulatory powers see eg., Neven et al., ibid, at 
p.176; ‘Competition and Integration - Community concentration control policy’ European 
Economy, European Commission, DG for Economic and Financial Affairs at pp. 81 and 91-92; 
Easterbrook, F. H., ‘Antitrust and the Economics o f Federalism’, (1983), Journal of Law and 
Economics, vol. XXVI pp. 23-50; Rose-Ackerman, S., (1981) ‘Does Federalism Matter? 
Political Choice in a Federal Republic’ Journal of Political Economy, Vol.89 No.l pp. 152-65; 
Gatsios, K. and Seabright, P.B. (1989) Regulation in the European Community, Oxford 
Review of EC Policy Vol.5 No.2 pp.37-60; Neven, D.J. (1992) Regulatory Reform in the 
European Community, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol.82 pp.98- 
103; Klibanoff, P. and Murdoch, J. (1998) Local Public Goods Provision with Externalities, 
Local Information and Local Autonomy, MIT, mimeo.
For a general survey of the literature applying the Tiebout model, see Dourding, K., John, P. 
and Biggs, S., Tiebout: a survey o f  the empirical literature, Urban Studies 1994 Vol.31 
pp.769-798.
174 These conditions should be compared with the conditions identified by the McDougall 
Report on fiscal federalism in the EC (see below, note 978).
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to enact a set of laws which will be most beneficial to the population in the individual 
jurisdiction.175 ■
The Tiebout presumption for decentralised regulation has been widely criticised as 
being of little use in real terms, on account of its very limited applicability.176 
Easterbrook177 nevertheless states that where the jurisdictions can also select any set 
of laws they desire, the closer that the conditions are fulfilled, the more likely is 
competition among jurisdictions to be effective - there will be, at the very least, a 
powerful tendency toward optimal legislation.178
It is unnecessary for the purposes of the analysis in hand to examine the extent to 
which the fulfilment of these conditions denotes a valid presumption for 
decentralisation since, in consideration of whether regulation should be carried out at 
Community or at national level, we see that these conditions for decentralisation are 
not met. There are large costs (including linguistic and cultural costs) involved in the 
mobility of firms between Member States. Furthermore, there were very few 
competing jurisdictions. In 1989, only five of the Member States had a system of 
concentration control.179 Even had all fifteen Member States has some sort of system 
of control in 1989 however (as is the case today), the number would be too small to 
offer every different combination of regulatory structures possible (given the large 
number of regulatory questions on which each must act).
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N even et al. state that the non-fulfilment of the first two conditions is not necessarily 
sufficient to rebut the presumption for decentralised control: if, for instance, there is 
only limited mobility between jurisdictions, there may be an increased likelihood of
175 Furthermore, if states collectively fear that particular policy programmes would cause exit, 
they would support centralised (and therefore unified) legislation, see Rose-Ackerman, S., 
‘Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic’, Voi. 89 (1981) Journal of 
Political Economy pp. 152-165.
176 CEPR, ibid, 1993, which considers the non-fulfilment of any of the conditions sufficient to 
rebut the presumption are so restrictive as to make it unhelpful for the analysis of actual 
governments, at pp. 59-62. See also Bewley, T. F., ‘A Critique o f Tiebout's Theory o f Local 
and Public Expenditures’, Econometrica, pp. 713-40; Gatsios, K. and Seabright P.B., 
‘Regulation in the European Community ’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy’, Vol.5, No.2, 
pp. 37-60.
177 Easterbrook, F., ‘Antitrust and the economics o f  federalism \ Journal of Law and 
Economics, Voi. 26, at p. 34.
178 *Also, see Epple, D. and Zelenitz, A., 'The implications o f  Competition among 
Jurisdictions: does Tiebout need Politics?’, Vol.89 (1981), Journal of Political Economy, 
1197; McGuire, M., ‘Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions’, Voi. 82, (1974), Journal 
of Political Economy 112.
179 Being Germany, the UK, France, Luxembourg and Ireland. See Annex 1.
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regulatory capture at a local level (since mobility is a guarantor of accountability); on 
the other hand, there is no reason to believe that centralisation would improve this; 
rather, there would simply be a danger of regulatory capture by interests other than 
those national ones.
Nevertheless, the absence of the third condition - the presence international spillover 
effects between jurisdictions (and the non-fulfilment of the third condition) - is 
considered by the majority of the literature to be sufficient to rebut the 
decentralisation presumption.180 Furthermore, it was identified by the Commission in 
the Padoa-Schioppa Report in 1987181 (concerning a strategy for the evolution of the 
Community economy) as a justification for Community-level action, and was one of 
the three conditions highlighted in the McDougall Report182 for the Commission 
justifying centralised financial regulation.
Moreover, Article 12(2) of the draft European Union Treaty183 drawn up by the 
European Parliament in 1984 included an explicit reference to the spill-over effects 
within the terms of a principle of subsidiarity (a reference that was later lost in the 
subsidiarity principle that was articulated in the Treaty of Maastricht184):
‘Where this Treaty confers concurrent competence on the Union, the Member States shall 
continue to act as long as the Union has not legislated. The Union shall only act to carry oat 
those tasks which may be undertaken more effectively in common than by the Member States 
acting separately, in particular those whose execution requires action by the Union because 
their dimension or effects extend beyond national frontiers. ' 185
180 Rose-Ackerman, ibid and Neven et al., ibid; Bishop, M. and Kay, J., ibid at pp.309-10. 
Also, Klibanoff and Murdoch (1993), ibid, where there are no informational advantages of the 
local regulators.
But cf. Gatsios and Seabright (1989), ibid, who advocate decentralisation with policy co­
ordination. But see the criticism of this suggested solution below.
More extreme (and in the minority), Easterbrook (1983), ibid, doubts that spillovers are 
significant enough to outweigh the virtues of decentralisation.
181 Europe Documents, Brussels and Luxembourg, No. 1451,28th April 1987.
182 The McDougall Report highlighted the conditions of: the existence of economies of scale, 
political homogeneity and cross-frontier effects, Commission of the European Communities, 
McDougall Report o f the Study Group on the Role o f Public Finance in European Integration 
(1977, OOPEC, Luxembourg).
183 See, OJ (1984) C77/33.
184 See below, p. 163.
185 Author’s emphasis.
52
The Draft Treaty therefore also stated that the existence of spill-over effects rendered 
centralised regulation necessary.
Spill-over effect occurs where economic activity within one jurisdiction may effect 
the economic conditions in another, separate jurisdiction. Thus, in the context of 
concentrations, an example would be where a purely national concentration may 
affect a relevant product market which is not just national, but may extend over other 
Member States, and may even be Community-wide. Why are the spillover effects so 
persuasive in the overall balance?
2.1.2 The Problem of Spill-Over Effects
The basic economic premise of a spill-over effects criterion rests on the fact 
efficiency requires that benefits should be enjoyed by those who create them while 
costs should be borne by those who cause them.186 Where this principle is violated, 
spill-over effects have occurred. Such effects have definite consequences for the 
regulation of competition within the Community.
a A Level Playing Field
First, where a national concentration having spill-over effects is assessed by the 
competition authority of that Member State, it is possible that this authority will 
consider only the effects of market power upon domestic interests rather than to 
foreign consumers (or at least, will weight its assessment that way).187 Hence, 
concentrations which might be beneficial in Community terms (because of gains to 
shareholders, workers and consumers outside the jurisdiction of that Member State) 
might be prevented and, conversely, concentrations which distort competition at the 
Community level might be approved (on competition, or even political grounds).188
Furthermore, business in the Community that may extend beyond the borders of a 
single Member State should be as much as possible subject to a singular set of 
standards (procedurally and substantively) so that there are certain parameters by 
which it can shape its conduct. Different standards in the regulation of concentrations
186 See Emiliou, N., Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against *the Enterprises o f  Ambition?\ 
ELRev (1992) 383 at p.396.
187 Neven et al, ibid, at p i94-7.
188 An example would be the concentration between British Airways and British Caledonian, 
upon which the European Commission imposed much stricter conditions than had been 
imposed by the Monopolies and Concentrations Commission in the UK (1988), See The 
Financial Times 20 December 1988.
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in different national jurisdictions within the Community can lead to forum-shopping 
by firms and a resultant partitioning of the Single Market along national lines.189
b Regulatory Efficiency and National Political Sensitivities
Secondly, there is the danger of multiple jurisdiction over one and the same 
concentration, and even of conflicting decisions made by different Member State 
authorities. This is especially true of what may be termed ‘direct’ spill-overs, which 
would be the result of cross-border concentrations. Multiple notifications and 
decisions may be expensive in political terms (concerning the relationship between 
individual Member States). Moreover, national competition authorities may encounter 
informational difficulties where relevant facts are located in other jurisdictions.
Furthermore, multiple national regulation of one and the same concentration is 
expensive in terms of time and resources for the firms involved: the facts contained in 
notification and the manner they are presented may differ for each national market 
and procedure; familiarity with different legal systems and languages is required 
(invoking the need for local experts); the deadlines for decision-making may differ 
and differences in substantive approach by the national systems may affect the 
predictability of the final outcome.190 It is also easier and more effective to negotiate 
remedial action and third parties can intervene more effectively when only one 
authority is involved.191 These considerations are especially important with regard to 
concentration control since without speedy and efficient decision-making the 
optimum moment for concentration may be lost, and the target company may even 
fail in the meantime.
2.1.3 A Co-ordinated System of National Merger Control?
While the presence of spillovers is generally accepted in the literature as highlighting 
the inefficiencies of unilateral national decision-making,192 this does not however
189 See eg., Temple-Lang, J., European Community Constitutional Law and Enforcement o f  
Community Antitrust Law, ibid, p.534-5.
190 The Commission states in its Green Paper that as a general rule and in comparable cases, 
the application o f the Regulation represents a significant cost advantage for business in: 
Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation 1996, ibid at para.55.
See also, eg., Temple-Lang, J., European Community Constitutional Law and Enforcement o f 
Community Antitrust Law, ibid, at p.535.
191 See the Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, ibid at 
para. 56.
192 Rose-Ackerman, S. ibid; Neven et al., ibid; Nevenk, D.J. (1992), ibid; Klibanoff, P and 
Murdoch, J. ibid.
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necessarily lead to the conclusion that there should be a centralised policy and 
control. On the contrary, Gatsios and Seabright have argued that a co-ordination of 
the different national policies may be made which could take account of the 
externalities.193
Neven et al. point however to the deficiencies of such co-ordination in this context.194 
Co-ordination should in theory be ensured by the threat of any Member State to revert 
to non-co-operative policy if any other Member State breached the agreed mutual 
policy. Yet, some states might gain more than others by breaking the co-operative 
agreement and centralisation insures against this. Furthermore, where the policy to be 
implemented involves a large degree of discretion - which the application of 
substantive provisions of competition law does - it may be difficult to detect whether 
an individual Member State is adhering to the policy agreed upon; the only way might 
be for the other Member States to conduct a parallel inquiry themselves.195
2.1.4 Centralised Co-ordination of National Merger Control Policies?
An alternative to centralised regulation might be centralised co-ordination of the 
implementation of national policies by the Commission in the case of spill-overs. 
Such an approach would however present insurmountable difficulties. The Member 
States would somehow have to be persuaded by the Commission to prohibit 
concentrations that might be beneficial at the national level but which might be 
harmful at the Community level (or vice versa). Thereby however, the Commission 
would not have access to all the relevant information in the individual case. 
Therefore, the Member State would have a position of leverage, and could in its 
decision-making exaggerate or play down the effect of a concentration in its 
jurisdiction in order to force political concessions.196
cf. however Easterbrook, whose own very specific interpretation of competition among 
jurisdictions in competition policy doubts that spillovers are sufficient to rebut a general 
presumption for decentralised policy and control, Easterbrook, (1983) ibid.
193 Gatsios and Seabright, ibid.
194 Neven et al., ibid at p.180.
195 See also, Temple-Lang, J., European Community Constitutional Law and Enforcement o f  
Community Antitrust Law, ibid, pp.590-592.
196 See Neven et al., ibid at p i 81, applying the Tiebout model by Klibanoff and Murdoch 
(1993), ibid, to European merger policy.
See also, Temple-Lang, J., ibid, pp.590-592; Commission of the European Communities, 
McDougall Report o f the Study Group on the Role o f  Public Finance in European Integration 
(1977, OOPEC, Luxembourg).
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D SUMMARY OF THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN MERGER 
REGULATION
There was therefore a clear need for a system of merger control within the 
Community system of competition law that aimed to promote structures of 
undistorted competition within the Community. Following the Single European Act in 
particular, the process of Single Market integration was held to be based upon 
structures of free competition within the Community. Since concentrations often 
distorted these structures, the success of Single Market integration required an 
effective system of Community concentration control.
Furthermore, economic, political and regulatory efficiency factors determined that 
this system of control should be centralised. The Commission has consistently 
maintained that: 'overall, merger policy is a good illustration o f a case where the 
gains from centralisation are high\ 197 The validity of this assertion has been 
demonstrated by the application of the Tiebout economic model. While it is not clear 
the extent to which the application of this specific model played a role in the 
Commission’s conviction (that was shared by the European Parliament), it was 
applied in a study made for the Commission.198 Thereby, the importance of the spill­
over effect that concentrations in one Member State may have in others was 
emphasised as being determinative in the case for centralised (Community) control. 
Generally, spill-over effects have been seen to independently provide justification for 
Community action.199
Before examining the competence of the Commission to assess concentrations under 
the EC Merger Regulation - and the appropriateness of the jurisdictional trigger - it is 
necessary to consider that, at the date of the implementation of the Merger 
Regulation, such a legal competence was already in existence. Articles 81 and 82 EC 
had already been found to apply to certain concentrative transactions.
It is necessary to consider in detail the scope of these Articles to apply to 
concentrations, before analysing whether this pre-existing legal competence should
197 CEPR, Making Sense of Subsidiarity: How Much Centralization for Europe? (1993, CEPR, 
London), p.19, n.5.
198 See Padoa Schioppa Report, see note 181 above.
199 See the Padoa Schioppa Report and the McDougall Report, notes 181 and 182 above.
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have any bearing upon the appropriateness of the legal competence of the 
Commission to assess mergers according to the existing jurisdictional trigger of the 
Merger Regulation.
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IV THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LEGAL
COMPETENCE TO ASSESS MERGERS UNDER 
COMMUNITY LAW ACCORDING TO ARTICLES 81 
AND 82 EC
A THE ISSUE
Before the implementation of the Merger Regulation, a legal competence to assess 
mergers according to Community law had been established in the application of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC. The application of Articles 81 and 82 EC was however limited 
to certain types of concentrations.
Since Articles 81 and 82 EC are provisions of primary Community law, the fact that 
they are applicable to certain types of concentration may have a direct bearing upon 
the appropriateness of the turnover thresholds of the Merger Regulation (as a 
provision of secondary Community law). It is necessary therefore to examine in detail 
the scope of the application of these Articles to concentrations. It is necessary, first, 
to determine the types of concentrations to which they apply. Secondly, it is necessary 
to interpret in detail the application of the jurisdictional trigger according to which 
Articles 81 and 82 EC are applicable in general.
B THE LEGAL COMPETENCE TO CONTROL CONCENTRATIONS 
ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 82 EC
1 The Commission Memorandum 1966
As stated above, the Commission first considered the issue of concentrations within 
the context of the Common Market in detail in its Memorandum of 1966.200 Thereby, 
it reiterated the benefits that concentrations could bring about in the Common Market, 
in particular with regard to external integration in the face of global markets. 
Nevertheless, it expressed concern about concentrations that led to monopoly 
positions on a specific market. The Commission determined that such concentrations
200 Commission Memorandum 1966, ibid
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should be controlled. Thereby, it considered the legal instruments that were available 
to it to implement a system of structurai control, namely Articles 81 and 82 EC (that 
were, it should be recalled, primarily aimed at the control of market conduct)?01 
While dismissing the appropriateness of Article 81 EC as a provision for 
concentration control201 02, the Commission advocated the use of Article 82 EC in 
certain circumstances.203 204It stated:
‘...une concentration d’entreprises se traduisant par la monopolisation d ’un marché doit être 
traitée, exception faite de circonstances particulières, comme l’exploitation abusive d’une 
position dominante au sens de l’article 86 (82).4204
According to the Commission, such an application corresponded to the Treaty 
objectives:
‘Cette interprétation correspond au système et aux objectifs du Traité, étaint donné que les 
articles 85 (81) et 86 (82) doivent garantir le fonctionnement du régim e de concurrence qui 
doit être instauré d’après le Traité*.205
The Commission stated that monopolistic positions resulting from such 
concentrations were likely to have the same harmful effects as practices specifically 
mentioned as being prohibited in Article 82 (a-d) EC, for example, a limiting of 
production or technical development.206 It did not however spell out in detail the 
conditions when the formation of a concentration will constitute a breach of Article
201 Commission Memorandum 1966, ibid at pp. 21-26.
202 See the reasons below.
203 Article 82 EC provides:
*Any abuse by one or more undertakings o f  a dominant position within the common market or 
in a substantial part o f  it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so fa r  
as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice o f consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion o f  contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties o f 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject o f such contracts. ’
204 Commission Memorandum, 1966, ibid at p.26, point 26.
205 Commission Memorandum 1966, ibid at p.26 at point 26.
206 Note that in the year preceding the publication of the Memorandum of 1966, the 
Commission twice espoused this theory. See Von der Groeben, Speech before the European
82 EC. Rather, it considered that each case would depend upon its specific facts. In 
general, the nearer to a monopolistic position on the market a dominant undertaking is 
brought by means of a concentration with another undertaking or undertakings, the 
more likely the Commission considered the operation to fall within the scope of 
Article 82 EC.207 208
2 The C ontinental Can Decision bv the Commission288
It was not until 1971 that the Commission put into practice the principle it had 
espoused in its Memorandum of 1966.
Continental Can held a dominant position on the German market (through its 
majority-owned subsidiary SLW) in the market for metal containers for meat 
products, metal containers for fish products and metal lids. SLW acquired a 81% 
shareholding in the capital of TDV, the main Benelux manufacturer of metal 
containers for meat and fish, in which it already held a 10% share.
The Commission held that this transaction virtually eliminated all competition in the 
relevant product markets in a ‘substantial part’ of the Common Market, that is an area 
comprised of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and the northern and central 
parts of Germany. The combined entity would hold a market share of between 80 and 
90 % on the relevant market. According to the Commission, SLW and TDV were 
capable of competing on this geographic market, even though at the time of the 
transaction SLW was only active on the German market and TDV on the Benelux 
market.
Parliament in Strasbourg on 16/06/1965, published by the EC Commission, and Commission 
Document,'The Problem o f Concentration in the EC \ Brussels, December 1965.
207 Commission Memorandum, ibid at p.26, point 27.
Note that in the same year, MestmMcker extensively considered the application of Article 82 
EC to concentrations. He concluded that Article 82 EC would apply to horizontal and vertical 
concentrations involving an undertaking in a dominant position and resulting in the elimination 
of effective competition for a substantial part of the relevant product. He advised however 
against the application of Article 82 EC to conglomerate mergers on account of the evidentiary 
issues. See Mestmäcker, E-J, Die Beurteilung von Untemehmenszusammenschlüssen nach 
Article 86 des Vertrages über die Europäische Wirtschaftgemeinschaß, in: Caemmerer, von 
E., Schlochauer, H-J and Steindorff, E, Festschrift für Walter Hallstein zu seinem 65. 
Geburtstag, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1966, pp322-354.
208 72/21/EEC9th December 1971, OJ 1972 L7/25 (1972) CMLR D l l ,  CMR 9481.
In the Commission’s opinion, the prohibition according to Article 82 EC applied. It 
stated:
‘For an undertaking in a dominant position to reinforce that position by means o f a merger with 
another undertaking with the consequence that the competition which would have existed 
actually or potentially in spite of the existence of the initial dominant position is in practice 
eliminated for the products in question in a substantial part o f the Common Market constitutes 
behaviour which is incompatible with Article 86 (Article 82) o f the Treaty*.209
The decision was appealed to the Court of Justice.
3 The C ontinental Can Judgment by the Court of Justice210
The Court of Justice annulled the decision of the Commission for the lack of an 
adequate definition of the product market, in particular, the lack of consideration of 
supply-side substitution.211 Nevertheless, it upheld the Commission’s finding that 
Article 82 EC can apply to certain mergers.
Its reasoning was teleological, based not only upon the specific provision itself, but 
upon the system and objectives of the Treaty as a whole. The Court stressed that 
Article 82 EC is part of a chapter devoted to the common rules on the Community’s 
policy in the field of competition, a policy which is based upon Article 3(g) EC. 
According to Article 3(g) EC, the Community’s activity shall include the institution 
of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted.212 The 
applicants had claimed that Article 82 EC is restricted to its literal scope as a 
provision which is merely the specific expression of the framework rule of Article 
3(g) EC. In reply, the Court stated that, on the contrary, Article 3(g) EC considers the 
pursuit of the objectives which it lays down to be indispensable for the achievement 
of the Community’s tasks and it is therefore decisive for the interpretation of Article
209 ibid at paragraph 23.
210 Europembaltage Corporation v Commission & Continental Can Co., Case 6/72, 1973 ECR 
215.
2n Europemballage Corporation v Commission & Continental Can Co., Case 6/72,1973 ECR 
215,247-49; CMR para.9481 at 8302.
212 Case 6/72, ibid, (1973) ECR at 244, para 23. ~
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82 EC; the provisions of competition law in the Treaty must be applied to pursue the 
Community objectives set down in Articles 2 and 3 EC.
From this premise, the Court deduced that the combined application of Articles 81 
and 82 EC should not conspire to allow a significant gap in the control of activity 
which might prove to restrict competition (and hinder the Community objectives set 
down in Articles 2 and 3 EC).* 214 215The two provisions should operate coherently to 
achieve the same aim on different levels:
‘In the absence o f explicit provisions, one cannot assume that the Treaty, which prohibits in 
Article 85 (Article 81 EC) certain decisions of ordinary associations o f undertakings restricting 
competition without eliminating it, permits in Article 86 (Article 82 EC) that undertakings, 
after merging into an organic unity, should reach such a dominant position that any serious
2|j
chance of competition is practically rendered impossible.’
The Court emphasised that the proper functioning of the Common Market depends 
upon this result.216 217It determined that there is no limitation that provides that the 
provision should apply only to practices which damage consumers directly.211 Neither 
must there be, as claimed by the applicants in the case, a link of causality between the 
dominant position and the abuse:
‘...the strengthening of the position of an undertaking may be an abuse and prohibited under 
Article 86 of the Treaty, regardless of the means and procedure by which it is achieved, if it has 
the effects mentioned above’.218
Thereby, the Court concluded that within the meaning of Article 82 EC:
2,3 This standpoint has been criticised in the literature and the applicant’s standpoint supported. 
See eg., Krimphove, Europaeische Fusionskontrolle, ibid at p.196-7. In Krimphove’s opinion, 
Article 82 EC may only be applied to concentrations where a dominant undertaking forcibly 
takes over another by abusing that dominant position through its specific conduct.
For an opposing view, see Mestmacker, E-J, 1966, ibid.
214 Reflecting the Commission’s statement above in its Memorandum of 1966, see pp55-56
215 Case 6/72, ibid, (1973) ECR at 244 at para 25.
216 Case 6/72, ibid, (1973) ECR at 244 at para 25.
217 Case 6/72, ibid, (1973) ECR at 245 at para 26. The Court emphasises that this is also 
implicit from the text of Article 82 EC: letters (c) and (d) of Article 86(2) provides that the 
provision is not only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but 
also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition 
structure.
2,8 Case 6/72, ibid, (1973) ECR at 245 para 27.
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‘Abuse may...occur if an undertaking in a dominant position strengthens such position in such a 
way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition, i.e., that only 
undertakings remain in the market whose behaviour depends on the dominant one.*219
3.1 The Legal Scope of the Continental Can Principle
3.1.1 The Condition of Dominance
Decisions of the Commission and the Court of Justice in the application of Article 82 
EC have shown that the requisite ‘dominance’ may arise from the position of a single 
undertaking alone or the combined position of several undertakings (effectively 
providing a position of ‘joint dominance*).
The wording of Article 82 EC itself contains a further condition for the prohibition to 
bite: the position of dominance held by the undertaking or undertakings must be held 
‘within the common market or in a substantial part o f it.* There is therefore a 
quantitative condition in establishing ‘dominance*.
a Single Dominance
The Commission stated that the concept of dominant position adopted in the later 
judgments of United Brands220 and Hoffmann-La Roche221 is valid in the application 
of Article 82 EC to mergers.222 Proof of a dominant position therefore requires the 
initial definition of the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market.223 
Once this has been determined, it is necessary to show:
Confirmed by the Commission, see eg., ECS/AKZO (No.2), Commission Decision of 
14/12/1985, OJ 1985 L374/1 at paragraph 85.
219 Case 6/72, ibid, (1973) ECR at 245.
220 United Brands v Commission Case 27/76, (1978) ECR 207, (1978) 1 CMLR429.
221 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission Case 85/76, (1979) ECR 461, (1979) 3 CMLR 211.
222 Commission answer to Written Question No. 67/89 by Mr Bangemann, OJ C.167, 
7.7.1988.
223 The Court of Justice stated that this is ‘of essential significance* in Continental Can, Case 
ibid, para.32.
For the purposes of the thesis, it is not necessary to analyse in detail the definition of relevant 
market, which is the same throughout Community law. The Commission has published a Notice 
on establishing the definition of a relevant market, Commission Notice on the definition of 
relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997, C.372/03.
See all the main textbooks for more detail, eg., Fine, F., 1994 ibid, pp. 84-104; Bellamy and 
Child, ibid, pp.593-601,614-616; Whish, R., 1993 ibid, pp.249-259;
mmv m p w
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‘...a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to hinder the 
maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of
, 224consumers.
Thereby, a dominant position does not necessarily constitute a monopolistic position. 
There may indeed be ‘lively competition’ on the relevant market.24 25 Above all, proof 
of a dominant position requires a thorough economic analysis of the market and the 
undertaking’s position on the market.
Nevertheless, the absolute market share of the relevant undertaking may alone be 
determinative where it has persisted over time.226 In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court 
stated that ‘very large’ market shares are in themselves, except in unusual cases, 
evidence of the existence of a dominant position.227 Here, the Court was referring to 
market shares of 65 % and 80 % on the relevant markets. The Court has presumed a 
dominant position for an undertaking with a market share as low as 50 %.228 On the 
other hand, a market share of 10 % has been deemed too small to constitute evidence 
of a dominant position.229
224 United Brands v Commission Case ibid at para 65; Michelin v Commission Case 322/81 
(1983) ECR 3461, 3503 (1985) 1 CMLR 282, 321, para.30; Telemarketing (1985) Case 311/84 
ECR 3261, 3275 (1986) 2 CMLR 558, 571, para. 16; Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission Case 
85/76 (1979) ECR 461,520 (1979) 3 CMLR 211 274, para.38.
225 See eg., Hoffmann-La Roche, Case ibid; United Brands Case ibid. See European 
Commission’s Tenth Report on Competition Policy p. 103.
See Bellamy and Child, 4th ed., pp.604-5.
226 Hoffman-La Roche Case ibid at para 41; ECS/AKZO Commission Decision (1986) 3 
CMLR 273 at paragraph 69; Soda-ash-Solvay, Commission Decision OJ L 152/21 (1991) at 
paragraph 44.
No minimum period has been given by the Court. In the AKZO Case (5/85), three years was 
however sufficient.
227 Paragraph 41.
228 AKZO Ckemie BV v Commission Case 5/85 (1986) ECR 1965, (1987) 3 CMLR 716.
229 Metro-SB-Groessmaerkte v Commission (No.2), Case 75/84 1986 ECR 3021, 1987 CMLR 
118.
In its Tenth Report on Competition Policy, the Commission stated that dominance cannot be 
ruled out where the market share of the undertaking is between 20 % and 40 %, at p.103, note 
4. By implication therefore, a market share below 20 % may well be too small for the 
undertaking to be considered dominant. See Fine, F., ibid, pp.l 15-6.
Note that in a specific application of the Continental Can doctrine, an undertaking was 
assumed not be dominant from the fact that it had a market share of 18 % in: Metaleurop SA, 
Commission Decision of 26/06/1990 OJ L179/41 at p.41, paragraph 17.
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Where no dominance may be presumed from the market shares alone, other factors 
must be taken into account. This includes the market share of the undertaking relative 
to that of the nearest competitors.230
Furthermore, barriers to entry for new undertakings wanting to enter the market are 
important.231 Such barriers may derive from the specific characteristics of the 
individual undertaking itself or from the structure of the relevant market as a whole. 
Relevant characteristics of the undertaking include any technological lead the 
undertaking might have in the relevant product market;232 the overall size and strength 
of the undertaking with regard to its competitors;233 the fact that an undertaking has 
an extensive product range;234 the extent of vertical integration.235 Relevant structural 
barriers to entry include possible legal barriers (for example intellectual property 
rights); the need for specialist know-how;236 the requirement of large capital 
investment;237 brand loyalty.238
Moreover, an undertaking might show dominance by its actual conduct, where it has 
acted without having to take the actions of its competitors into account.239 In practice, 
this generally concerns the pricing patterns of the undertaking.
In summary, in the absence of a very large market share a full economic analysis is 
required in the individual case to establish whether or not the undertaking is able to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and consumers.
230 United Brands, Case ibid, paragraph 110; Hoffman-La Roche, Case ibid, paragraph 51.
231 See eg., United Brands, Case ibid. These consist of access to resources, overall strength, 
economies of scale, intellectual property rights.
232 See eg., Tetra Pak Rausing SA v EC Commission Case T-51/89 (1990) IIECR 309, (1991)
4 CMLR 334.
233 Michelin v Commission, Case ibid. Care must however be taken. It must have some 
relevance to market power within the relevant market; it does not include resources used by the 
undertakings for different purposes which can not be employed in the production or supply of 
goods on the relevant market. See eg., Hoffmann-La Roche Case 85/76 (1979) ECR 522-4
CMLR 276-8.
234 Michelin, Case ibid at paragraphs 53, 55 and AKZO Case ibid, apparently overturning the 
earlier finding in Hoffmann-La Roche, Case ibid at paragraphs 45-6.
235 eg., United Brands, Case ibid, (1978) at paragraph 71; AKZO, Case ibid, (1986) at 
paragraph 61.
6 Hoffmann-La Roche, Case ibid.
237 United Brands, Case ibid.
238 United Brands, Case ibid, paragraphs 93-4.
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Hoffmann-La Roche, Case ibid, (1979) paragraph 74; AKZO, Case ibid (1987) at paragraph
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b Joint Dominance
The literal text of Article 82 EC refers to ‘an abuse by one or more undertakings’. 
Hence, the Commission, the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice 
have held that Article 82 EC could be applied to dominant positions held by more 
than one undertaking.240
The relevant joint dominant position may be as a result of structural links between the 
undertakings (where they may not however be considered to be a single economic 
entity). Hence, in Societa Italiano Vetro and others v. Commission41 24, the Court of 
First Instance considered the situation where there are ‘economic links’ between the 
undertakings:
‘There is nothing, in principle, to prevent two or more independent economic entities from 
being, on a specific market, united by economic links that, by virtue of that fact, together they 
hold a dominant position vis-a-vis the other operators on the same market. This could be the 
case, for example, where two or more independent undertakings jointly have, through 
agreements or licences, a technological lead affording them the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of their competitors, their customers and ultimately of their
,242consumers...
This latter approach of the Court of First Instance has been confirmed by the Court of 
Justice in other cases.243 Economic links may be contractual (incorporating 
simultaneously the risk of Article 81 EC proceedings) or non-contractual (for 
example, cross-shareholdings or common directorships244). The Commission 
meanwhile has appeared to develop the condition, requiring that the undertakings 
must together have the same position with regard to their customers and competitors
eg., Italian Flat Glass, Commission Decision OJ (1989) L33/44, (1990) 4 CMLR 535; 
French West-African Shipowners’ Committees Commission Decision OJ (1992) L 134/1; 
Cewal Commission Decision OJ (1993) L34/20; Societa Italiano Vetro and others v. 
Commission Cases T-68/89 and T-77-78/89 (1992) ECR II 1403; (1992) 5 CMLR 302 at 
paragraphs 358-269.
241 Cases T-68/89 and T-77-78/89 (1992) ECR E 1403; (1992) 5 CMLR 302 at paragraphs 
358-269.
242 Societa Italiano Vetro and others v. Commission Cases T-68/89 and T-77-78/89 (1992) 
ECR I I 1403; CMLR 302 at paragraph 358.
243 Alemelo v NV Energiebedrifj Ijsselmij Case 393/92 (1994) I ECR 1477; Centro Servici 
Spediporto Case 96/94II ECR 753.
244 See eg., the opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in Compagnie Maritime Belge NV and 
Dafra-Lines v Commission Cases C-395/96P and C-396/96P (1996) ECR I I 1019.
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as a single company would have if it were in a dominant position. Further, there must 
be no effective competition between the companies on the relevant market.245
The structural links approach does not however appear to be definitive. In an 
application of the EC Merger Regulation, the Court of First Instance has confirmed 
the Commission’s view that Article 2(3) MR prohibits the creation of an oligopolistic 
market structure, where actual structural links between the undertakings are rendered 
unnecessary:
there is no reason whatsoever in legal or economic terms to exclude from the notion of 
economic links the relationship o f interdependence existing between the parties to a tight 
oligopoly within which, in a market with the appropriate characteristics, in particular in terms 
o f market concentration, transparency and product homogeneity, those parties are in a position 
to anticipate one another’s behaviour and are therefore strongly encouraged to align their 
conduct in the market, in particular in such a way as to maximise their joint profits by 
restricting production with a view to increasing prices.’ 246 247
The Court of First Instance therefore indicated that market structure could also lead to 
a determination of joint dominance, as well as actual economic links between the 
undertakings. Other elements are also significant such as likelihood of tacit co­
ordination according to factors such as market transparency, product homogeneity, 
growth levels, rates of technological change and barriers to entry. Indeed, the Court of 
First Instance made direct reference to the established ‘economic links’ approach (as 
used in the case Società Italiana Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana SpA and PPG Vernante 
Permitcdia SpA v Commission241), stating that any reference to structural links 
between members of an oligopoly in that case had merely been by way of example, 
and that such links are not necessary for a finding of oligopolistic dominance.
While the Gencor case was decided within the context of the application of the 
Merger Regulation, the Court of First Instance stated that its findings on collective
245 See eg., French West-African Shipowners’ Committees Commission Decision OJ (1992) L 
134/1; Cewal Commission Decision OJ (1993) L34/20. See also Commission Notice on the 
Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector 
(1988) OJ C265/3, paragraphs 78-79. See also, Faull and Nickpay, ibid at p.139.
246 Gencor v. Commission Case T -102/96 (1999), IIECR 753.
247 Case ibid.
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dominant positions apply equally to Article 82 EC.248 The approach represents the 
position identified previously by the Commission as being the most appropriate in the 
determination of joint dominance.249 It can therefore be stated with reasonable 
assurance that economic links will not longer be a prerequisite and joint dominance 
extends to tight oligopolistic situations.250 251
c Dominance in a Substantial Part of the Common Market 
As detailed above, Article 82 EC prohibits the abuse of a dominant market position 
only ‘within the common market or in a substantial part o f it’. In Suiker Unie, the 
Court of Justice stated:
‘for the purpose of determining whether a specific territory is large enough to amount to *a 
substantial part of the common market’ within the meaning o f Article 82 of the Treaty, the 
pattern and volume of the production and consumption of the said product as well as the habits
251and economic opportunities of vendors and purchasers must be considered’.
Hence, it appears that the condition requires a quantitative analysis not just of the 
geographic extent of the market but also of the product market within that geographic 
area, considering the economic importance of the market in relation to the Common 
Market as a whole.252
Thereby, however, it has been noted by several commentators that the Commission - 
and the Court of Justice - should not be content simply to find a market that 
constitutes a ‘substantial part of the market’ on which the undertaking is dominant.253
248 Case, ibid, at paragraphs 273-277. See also the opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in 
Compagnie Maritime Beige NV and Dafra-Lines v Commission Cases C-395/96P and C- 
396/96P (1996) E C R II1019 at paragraph 27.
249 Commission Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in 
the Telecommunications Sector (1988) OJ C265/3, paragraphs 78-79.
250 In agreement, see Faull and Nickpay, ibid at p.142.
251 Suiker Unie v Commission Case 40/73 (1975) ECR 1663,1977, (1976) 1 CMLR 295,452.
252 See eg., Schroeter, H. in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid, p827-8; Calliess, C. and 
Ruffert, M. (eds), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag, 1999, Hermann Luchterland 
Verlag GmbH, p927; Bellamy and Child, ibid, p615; Waelbroeck, M. and Frignani, A., 
European Competition Law, (1999) at p258; Faull and Nickpay, ibid, p.145; Gleiss and Hirsch, 
Kommentar zum EWG-Kartellrecht, p330.
253 See eg., Waelbroeck, M. and Frignani, A., ibid at p258, criticising the approach of the 
Commission in the interim order of July 29 1983 in the ECS/AKZO case.
See also United Brands, Case ibid, at paragraph 44 and Michelin, Case ibid at paragraph 23 
where the Court of Justice mixed up the definition o f relevant market and the condition for a 
‘substantial part of the Common Market’. This approach was heavily criticised, see eg., 
Waelbroeck, M. and Frignani, ibid at p258; Markert, K., Note Under the United Brands 
Judgment, in Europarecht 48, 51 (1979); Korah, V., Developments in the Interpretation and
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A single Member State may constitute a ‘substantial part of the market’, but just 
because an undertaking is dominant in that Member State, it may not be dominant on 
the actual relevant market, which might even extend to the whole Community. The 
actual geographical and product market must initially be determined before 
considering the minimum quantitative threshold which the dominant position must 
meet.
What constitutes a ‘substantial part of the Common Market’ is a question of fact in 
each case. As will become clear in the analysis of the jurisdictional criterion for 
Articles 81 and 82 EC (that is, the interstate trade criterion), the application of Article 
82 EC is not confined to relevant markets that extend beyond the borders of a single 
Member State. Nevertheless, the ‘substantial part’ condition prevents all relevant 
conduct that fulfils the interstate trade criterion falling within the scope of Article 82 
EC. The area over which dominance exists must have a certain economic importance: 
trade between a shop situated in Luxembourg with a shop situated in France will 
clearly not fulfil this condition.
Essentially, the extent of the market over which the undertaking has been found to be 
dominant must be considered in conjunction with the dynamics of the product market 
in that geographical area (relative to the dynamics over the Community as a whole). 
This includes the total population of the area as well as factors such as production and 
consumption and buying power. It is clearly possible for a territory to constitute a 
‘substantial part’ of the Common Market for a given product and not for another.254 
Similarly, it is possible for a limited part of the territory of a Member State to be a 
‘substantial part’ of the Common Market, given its economic importance in the 
production or consumption of the relevant product.255
Application o f Article 86 o f  the Treaty o f Rome • Abuse o f a Dominant Position Within the 
Common Market, Notre Dame Law, 768 (1978) at 780.
254 Korah, V., V., Developments in the Interpretation and Application o f Article 86 o f  the 
Treaty o f  Rome - Abuse o f  a Dominant Position Within the Common Market, Notre Dame 
Law, 768 (1978) at 793.
255 See eg., Suiker Unie, Case ibid, where the south of Germany was found to be a ‘substantial 
part’, paragraphs 443-8; Porto di Genova, Commission Decision (1997), OJ L301, where the 
port of Genoa sufficed, given its importance with regard to all maritime import and export 
activities throughout Italy. Similarly, the port of Rodby in Denmark (see Report on 
Competition Policy 1994, Vol XXIV point 226), the port of Holyhead in the UK (Report on 
Competition Policy 1993, Vol XXIII, point 234) and the airport of Zaventem near Brussels 
(British Midland/Regie des voies aeriennes, Commission Decision June 28, 1995, Report on 
Competition Policy 1995, Vol XXV, point 120) have all been found to constitute ‘a substantial 
part’ on similar principles.
Clearly, the condition of a ‘substantial part’ of the Common Market is similar to the 
de minimis criterion for Articles 81 and 82 EC.256 It is a quantitative condition 
declaring that the relevant dominant position must be of a dimension that might harm 
Community objectives. It is however different. It relates to the size and importance of 
the relevant market relative to the product in question. It does not relate to the size of 
the undertaking itself on that relevant market. Furthermore, it involves a process of 
assessment that is not so formalistic, based mainly upon percentage thresholds 
relative a particular geographical area. This fact was stressed by Advocate General 
Warner, who stated that attention should not be exclusively focused upon percentage 
thresholds. He was not prepared to deny, for example, that Luxembourg as a country 
with only 0.23 % of the entire population of the Community could not be a 
‘substantial part’.257 It appears therefore that test is not actually one of the actual size 
of the relevant market relative to the size of Common Market as a whole, but rather 
one of the economic size and importance of that market within the Common Market, 
as considered in absolute terms.
3.1.2 The Concept of Abuse
a Abuse of a Position of Single Dominance
In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court of Justice held:
‘The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a 
dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as result o f the 
very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, 
through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in 
products or services on the basis o f the transactions o f commercial operators, has the effect of 
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the 
growth o f that competition’.258
On the other hand, with regard to all the facts, Humberside ports in the UK and the North of 
England have been found not to be sufficient (see, respectively, Felixstowe Docks and 
Railways Board v British Transport Docks Board (decision o f the English Court of Appeal) 
(1976) 2 CMLR 655; Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns (decision of the English High Court 
QB)1986, 1 WLR 558). Similarly, County Kerry in Ireland (Cadbury Ltd v Kerry Co-op 1982, 
(decision of the Irish Court) ILRM 77).
256 For a detailed description, see below, ppl27-134.
257 BP v Commission Case 77/77 (1978) ECR 1513,1537 (1978) 3 CMLR 174,184.
258 Hoffmann~La Roche v Commission, Case ibid. —
This objective definition of the concept of abuse has been adopted as the standard 
formula in subsequent cases applying Article 82 EC.259
Questionable is whether the concept of abuse used in the application of Article 82 EC 
to concentrations is the same. Analysis of the words of the Court of Justice suggests 
that the concept is more strict in these circumstances. The Court stated that a 
structural strengthening of an undertaking in a dominant position will be an abuse 
where the degree of dominance thereby reached '’substantially fetters competition, ie 
that only undertakings remain in the market whose behaviour depends upon the 
dominant one. ’260
Some commentators have interpreted this principle strictly, claiming that it is no more 
than a refinement of the Commission’s original principle expressed in its 1966 
Memorandum (referring to the creation of monopolistic situations) that it applied in 
its Decision on the concentration. According to this view, the principle is confined to 
abuses which will create monopolistic positions, where competition 'is in practice 
eliminated1.261 26This interpretation is however clearly contrary to the literal wording 
used. The condition that the concentration *substantially fetters competition' is 
clearly wider. Moreover, the Court explicitly stated th a t1such a narrow precondition 
as the elimination of dll competition need not exist in all cases.,262
However, the Court did appear to set a quantitative condition that is narrower than the 
condition espoused in Hoffman-La Roche, which requires only that the maintenance 
of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition is 'hindered*,263 Prima facie, it appears that the abuse must effect a 
substantial distortion of competition structures.264 The Commission appears to have 
implicitly supported this interpretation in Tetra Pak 1, which is the only decision 
where the Continental Can doctrine was found to be fulfilled. The Commission stated 
that the concentration constituted an abuse since it led ‘to Tetra strengthening its
259 Bellamy and Child, ibid 1993 at p.617.
260 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, Case ibid at paragraph 26.
261 See eg., Banks, K., Mergers and Partial Mergers under EEC Law, Fordham International 
Law Journal, (1988), 11 255-309 at pp.268-272; Bechtold, RIW 1985, p.445.
262 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, Case ibid at paragraph 29.
263 See above.
264 Gleiss/Hirsch, Kommentar zum EG-Kartellrecht, Artikel 86, Paragraph 97; Fine, F., 1994 
ibid, p.121-3.
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previously preponderant dominant position in the market...to the extent that any 
competition remaining is substantially fettered or practically rendered impossible\265
Such an interpretation however ignores the basis of the Court’s reasoning. As 
described above, the Court (in upholding the Commission’s reasoning) interpreted the 
concept of abuse in the Continental Can decision with specific regard to the 
objectives of the Treaty laid down in Article 3 (g) EC (ancillary to Article 2 EC). 
Such an interpretation of Article 82 EC has been affirmed on numerous occasions by 
the Court in the application of Article 82 EC to ‘classic’ situations of abuse of a 
dominant position.266 If Article 82 EC is interpreted within the context of this broad 
Community aim, the concept of abuse cannot be limited artificially with regard to the 
specific mode in which it is carried out by the dominant undertaking (that is, whether 
by a merger or by more ‘traditional’ abusive conduct).
A further - and related - argument for such an interpretation is that there is no sense in 
having a quantitative threshold in the definition of abuse for Article 82 EC. The very 
fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position means that the operation is not de 
minimis.267 268The undertaking must be of a certain size in terms of its competitors in 
order to be dominant. The accuracy of these comments is borne out by the Court’s 
tendency to emphasise that an undertaking in a dominant position is deemed to have 
‘a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition on the Common Market’™ Such an undertaking already has a position 
which is of concern with regard to the Community objectives. With reference to the 
text of the individual case, Schroeter demonstrates that the concept of abuse 
employed by the Court (that is, a substantial distortion of competition whereby the 
competitors are dependent upon the behaviour of the relevant undertaking) equates 
with the Court’s definition of dominance in the case. Therefore, within the actual
265 Tetra Pak 1, Commission Decision ibid, at paragraph 47.
Also, in Argyle Group v Distillers, (decision of Scottish Outer House of the Court of Session) 
(1986) 1 CMLR 764, Lord Jouncy stated that with regard to the application o f Article 82 to 
mergers: Tt seems reasonably clear that something more than a mere alteration, albeit 
measurable, in the level o f  competition is required before the event producing that alteration 
can be categorised as an abuse’.
266 See eg., Zoja Cases 6,7/73 (1974) ECR 223, (1974) 1 CMLR 309; Case Hugin ibid\ Case 
Hoffmann-La Roche, ibid.
267 Koch in Grabitz, Kommentar zur EU, (1998), Beck, Artikel 86, Paragraph 85; Schroeter, 
H. in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, Kommentar zum EU Vertrag (1997-9) Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, Artikel 86, Paragraph 68; Deimel, Rechtsgrundlagen einer europaeischen 
Zusammenschlusskontrolle (1992), Nomos, pp. 69-71.
268 Michelin v Commission Case 322/81, (1983) ECR 3461, paragraph 57.
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terms used by the Court in Continental Can, a further strengthening of this position 
automatically involves an abuse.269
The concept of abuse according to the Continental Can principle should not therefore 
differ from its interpretation in the general application of Article 82 EC.270 271
Accordingly, the Commission stated in its Tenth Report on Competition Policy:
‘Strengthening by means of merger is likely to constitute an abuse if any distortion of the 
resulting market structure interferes with the maintenance o f remaining competition (which has 
already been weakened by the very existence o f  this dominant position) or its development. 
Such an effect depends, in particular, on the change in the relative market strength of the 
participants after the merger, ie the position o f the new unit in relation to remaining
27]
competitors*.
Thereby, any concentration effected by a dominant undertaking constitutes an abuse 
within the meaning of Article 82 EC if the resulting change in market structure 
interferes with the maintenance (or development) of the remaining competition in that 
market.
On these terms, the scope of the condition for an abuse within the meaning of Article 
82 EC is extremely broad where an undertaking that is dominant on any given market 
effects a concentration with a competitor. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a 
concentration involving a dominant undertaking may lead to an economy of scale that 
could lead to lower costs and increased competition.272
269 Schroeter, H. in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid, Art.86, paragraph 68; Krimphove, 
Europaeische Fusionskontrolle, ibid at p.200 (in criticising the Continental Can case for its 
lack o f clarity and attempting thereby to limit its significance).
270 Schroeter, in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid, Art.86, paragraph 68.
Korah states that *something less than the elimination o f  competition probably suffices to 
infringe the Article*. Thereby, she refers to the standard application of Article 82 EC which 
provides that any reduction o f competition making it harder for others to compete might 
infringe the Article. Korah, V., Control o f Mergers under EEC Competition Law, (1987) 
ECLRpp.239-255atp.241.
Elland relies simply on the Commission's statement in its Tenth Report on Competition Policy 
(at p.103), Elland, W., ibid (1991) at p.25.
271 ibid, at paragraph p.103.
272 Korah, V., Control o f  Mergers under EEC Competition Law, (1987) ECLR 239-255 at p.
243. —
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b Abuse of a Position of Joint Dominance
Questionable is whether the Continental Can doctrine can be extended to cover 
concentrations by undertakings on an oligopolistic market. Thereby, it may cover 
situations where an undertaking that is part of the oligopoly merges with one or more 
of its competitors.
Based upon the context in which the principle is to be applied - that is, the general 
aim of the Community under Article 3 g EC - it is submitted that it would extend to 
cover such concentrations. An undertaking in a joint dominant position has the same 
position of special responsibility not to impair undistorted competition on the 
Common Market.
3.1.3 Vertical and Conglomerate Concentrations
The main scope of the principle under Continental Can covers horizontal 
concentrations between competitors. Nevertheless, where competition on the relevant 
market is distorted by a vertical or a conglomerate concentration, Article 82 EC will 
also apply. For vertical concentrations, this is conceivable where the connection to an 
upstream or downstream market influences the market entry of competitors.273 
Similarly, barriers to entry may be created by conglomerate mergers sufficient to 
constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 82 EC (in particular through the 
addition to the overall financial strength of the dominant undertaking).274
The Court has indeed found that an abuse within the meaning of Article 82 EC can 
take place on a different market from the market on which the undertaking in question 
is dominant.275
273 Article 82 EC was applied to a vertical concentration in Mickelin/Actor NV. The 
Commission decided that the concentration did not breach Article 82 EC. See Commission 
Eighth Report on Competition Policy, p.104.
In agreement, see eg., Gleiss/Hirsch '¡Commentar zum EWG-Kartellrecht\ Artikel 86, 
paragraph 100; Schroeter in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid, Art.86 paragraph 68; 
Deimel, ibid p.71-2
274 See eg., Gleiss/Hirsch, Art.86 paragraph 100; Schroeter in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, 
ibid, Art.86, paragraph 68; Deimel, A. ibid p.71-2.
Against this (but for practical evidential reasons only), Mestmàcker, E-J, ibid, 1966.
275 See eg., CBEM v CLT and IPB, Case 311/84 (1985) ECR 3261; ECS/AKZO Commission 
Decision (1986) 3 CMLR 273.
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4 The Limitations of Article 82 EC as a Source of Merger Control
As a seamless instrument to control concentrations within the Community, Article 82 
is clearly inadequate.
4.1 The Scope of Article 82 EC
First, the provision is only applicable where an undertaking is already dominant - it 
does not catch the creation of dominance in the first place.276 Not only did this leave a 
lacuna in the Community’s competence to assess mergers, but it was illogical in 
economic terms, treating differently situations with an identical economic effect on 
account of the means in which they are brought about. For example, a take-over 
effected in stages by a non-dominant undertaking may breach Article 82 EC as soon 
as the acquiring undertaking thereby becomes dominant, and attempts to take-over an 
additional share of the target undertaking. On the other hand, if a non-dominant 
undertaking acquires another (non-dominant) undertaking in one single transaction so 
that it becomes dominant, Article 82 EC will not apply.
4J2 The Procedure under Article 82 EC
Secondly, there was no notification procedure under which concentrations could be 
registered in advance for an initial assessment. Assessment takes place a posteriori, 
according to criteria which must be applied to the individual facts of the case. This is 
extremely inappropriate for mergers, which in particular require fast decision-making 
and legal certainty.277
4 3  The Remedies under Article 82 EC
Thirdly, divestiture, which would appear to be the remedy available under Article 82 
EC278, is unsatisfactory and complex. Its severity could deter the implementation of 
many potentially beneficial mergers. It was not clear whether there was an effective
276 See Metaleurop SA, Commission Decision of 26/06/1990,01 L 179/41, paragraph 17.
See eg, Vogel, L., (1988), 'Droit de la Concurrence et Concentration Economique, Etude 
comparative' Collection Droit des Affaires et de lEntreprise, Serie Etudes et Recherches, 
Paris, p.334; Banks, K., Mergers and Potential Mergers under EEC Law, Fordham 
International Law Journal, 11 (1988) at p.273; Bellamy and Child, ibid, p,380; Krimphove, 
ibid, at p.190-1 and 195. Against this, in the minority, Deimel, ibid, p.71
277 See above. See eg., Krimphove, ibid, p.203.
278 This had been ordered by the Commission in Continental Can, Commission Decision, 
(1972) OJ L725.
procedure to grant interim relief to prevent a concentration taking place (as an 
alternative remedy and with a preventive function).279
4.4 Summary
These problems which are inherent to the application of Article 82 EC to 
concentrations provide the reason for the rare use of the Continental Can doctrine in 
practice. The Commission has formally applied the doctrine in only two decisions. In 
Metaleurop SA, the doctrine was invoked but declared inapplicable to the transaction 
in question since none of the parties was dominant on any of the relevant market.280 In 
Tetra Pak 1, the Commission applied the Continental Can doctrine.281 The abuse of 
the dominant position (through its strengthening) arose however not from the 
concentration per se but from the fact that Tetra Pak had thereby acquired an 
exclusive licence with regard to technology which was essential for the relevant 
market.
The usefulness of Article 82 EC as a means to control mergers within the Community 
was more informal, where the uncertainties of its scope could be overcome amicably 
in the pragmatic negotiation with the parties concerned. Following the Continental 
Can judgment, the annual Competition Reports did contain a large number of 
instances of Article 82 proceedings having been used by the Commission as a 
leverage to force parties to modify their original plans and to make themselves 
compatible with the requirements of effective competition within the Common 
market.282 Furthermore, there were many investigations which did not result in formal 
decisions, either because there was no dominant position283 or no evidence of 
abuse.284
279 In particular on this, see Banks, ibid, pp.277-278, who considers that interim relief could 
only be granted in very limited circumstances.
280 Metaleurop SA, Commission Decision of 26/06/1990, OJ L179/41 paragraph 17.
281 Tetra Pak 1, Commission Decision of 26/07/1988, OJ L272/1 at pp.39-40.
282 eg., British Airways/British Caledonian, Commission Decision, Commissions’ Eighteenth 
Report on Competition Policy 1988, at para. 81; Pilkington/BSN-Gervais-Danone, 
Commission Decision, Commission’s Tenth Report on Competition Policy 1980, at para’s 152- 
55; Air France/Air Inter/UTA, Commission Decision, Commission’s Twentieth Report on 
Competition Policy 1990, para. 116.
283 See eg., AVEBE/KSH, Commission Decision, Commission’s Eighth Report on Competition 
Policy (1979) points 147-8; Coats Paton/Guetermann, Commission Decision, Commission’s
Ninth Report on Competition Policy (1980), point 132; Fichtel &. Sachs/Huret, Commission 
Decision, Commission’s Ninth Report on Competition Policy (1980), at point 133; Ashland 
Oil/Cabot, Commission Decision, Commission’s Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy 
(1985) at point 109; Pont a Mousson/Stanton &Stavely, Commission Decision, Commission’s 
Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy (1985) at point 10; Baxter Travenol
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5 Summary of the Legal Competence to Apply Article 82 EC to 
Concentrations
The Commission» upheld by the Court of Justice, had established a legal competence 
to assess concentrations under Article 82 EC. This was possible with regard to any 
concentration involving an undertaking in a position of single or joint dominance that 
hinders the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or 
the growth of that competition constitutes an abuse within the meaning of Article 82 
EC. The concentration may be horizontal, vertical or conglomerate (although the 
condition is clearly more easily satisfied for horizontal concentrations).
The scope of Article 82 EC to apply to such concentrations was however subject to a 
specific jurisdictional criterion - the interstate trade criterion. It is necessary to 
examine the application of this criterion in detail. First however we must consider the 
applicability of Article 81 EC to concentrations, since the jurisdictional trigger for 
this provision is the same.
C THE LEGAL COMPETENCE TO CONTROL CONCENTRATIONS
ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 81 EC
1 The ‘Dual-Standard’ Doctrine
1.1 Im plem entation o f  the P rinciple
In its Memorandum of 1966, the Commission had discounted the applicability of 
Article 81 EC to concentrations:
‘...la différenciation généralement appliquée dans le traitement juridique des ententes et des 
concentrations s’impose pour des raisons de fait et que l’article 85 (Article 81 EC) ne p e u t...
Labomtories/Smith Kline RIT, Commission Decision, Commission’s Fourteenth Report on 
Competition Policy (1985) point 157; Sea Containers/Stena Tiphook, Commission Decision, 
Commission’s Twentieth Report on Competition Policy, point 109.
284 eg., GKN/Sachs, Commission Decision, Commission’s Sixth Report on Competition Policy 
(1977) at points 181-2; AVEBE/KSH, Commission Decision, Commission’s Eighth Report on 
Competition Policy, points 147-8; Michelin and Michelin Nederland/Actor, Commission 
Decision, Commission’s Eighth Report on Competition Policy, point 146; PSA Peugeot- 
Citroen/Chrysler, Commission Decision, Commission’s Eighth Report on Competition Policy, 
at point 149; Eagle Star-Allianz Versicherung, Commission Decision, Commission’s Twelfth
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être appliqué aux accords ayant pour objet l’acquisition de la propriété d ’entreprises ou de 
parties d’entreprises ou la réorganisation de la propriété des entreprises (fusion, participation, 
acquisition d” éléments d’actif)-’* 285
Here, it clearly advocated introducing a ‘dual-standard’ doctrine into Community 
law.286 According to this principle, different legal rules should be applied depending 
on whether the behaviour restricting competition is a cartel or a concentration, that is 
whether the conduct in question is behavioural or structural. The Memorandum does 
not have any binding force, but indicated precisely the attitude of the Commission 
towards the application of Article 81 EC to concentrations. It did not reflect the views 
of the experts consulted in the report, nor did it reflect the experience of US law.287 It 
was however an opinion held by the majority of commentators at that time.288
Report on Competition Policy (1983) at point 103; GEC-Siemens/Plessey, Commission 
Decision OJ C239/2 (1990), (1992) 4 CMLR 471 at paragraph 42.
285 Community Memorandum, 1966, ibid at p.24, para. 14.
286 See eg., Vogel, L., who makes a comparison of the ’double standard* doctrine in US and 
European law in: (1988), ’Droit de la Concurrence et Concentration Economique, Etude 
comparative ’ Collection Droit des Affaires et de lEntreprise, Serie Etudes et Recherches, 
Paris, pp.232-70. See also, Bos et al, ibid, at p. 5; Goldman and Lyon-Caen, ibid, at pp. 496- 
500.
287 Joliet, ‘The Rule o f Reason in Antitrust Law', 1967, Diss., L ’Université de Liege, at p.42 
has however noticed some distinction in the operation of the Sherman Act to concentrations 
and cartels. He notes that despite the anomalous decision of Appalachian Coals Inc. v US, 288 
US 344 (1933), a distinction has remained between the rules applied to cartels and those 
applied to concentrations under the Sherman Act, showing an undeniable discriminatory 
treatment in favour of integration.
The majority opinion however corresponds to the comments o f Rahl in relation to s.7 of the 
Clayton Act: ‘antitrust evolution has finally ironed out its old ambivalence and has brought 
anti-concentration policy alongside the policy o f loose arrangements’ in: Rahl, J. ‘Antitrust 
Law in Search o f a Policy’, Proceedings of the 4th Annual Corporation Counsel Institute 57 
(1965).
288 Bail, in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid, para. 169 on Article 85; Gleiss/Hirsch, 
‘Kommentar zum EWG-Kartellrecht’, Paragraphs 220 zu Article 81 (1), Para. 100 zu Article 
82; Steindorff, *Kooperation, Konzentration und Fusionen von Unternehmen in der EW G’, 
Revue de Marché Commune 1968, p.182; Mestmaecker, ‘Die Beurteilung von 
Untemehmenszusammenschluessen nach Article 82 des Vertrages ueber die Europaeiscke 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft ’, p.327; Riesenkampff, A., *Auswirkungen des Urteils des EuGH vom 
17.11.1987 (Philip Morris), WuW 1988; Immenga/Fuchs, 'Article 81 EWG-Vertrag als Grenze 
fiter Untemehmensbetweiligungen’, NJW 1988, p.3052; Hefermehl, W, Beurteilung von 
Fusionen und Konzembildungen nach Art. 85 und 86 des EWG-Venrages, in: Dietz/Huebner 
(ed.), Festschrift fiter H.C. Nipperdey II, p.771; van Ommeslaghe, P., Die Anwendung der 
Anikel 85 und 86 des Rom-Vertrages auf Fusionen, Gesellschaftszusammenschluesse und 
Gemeinschaftsunternehmen, in: Beitraege zum EWG-Kartellrecht, p.49.
But against this, see eg., Blank, J., ‘Europaeiscke Fusionskontrolle im Rahmen der An. 81, 82 
des EWG-Vertrages’, 1991, p.128; Emmerich, ‘Die Auslegung von Article 81 (1) EWGV durch 
die bisherige Praxis der Kommission EuR 1971, p.295; Bemini, Revue de Marché Commune 
1968, p.274; Canellos and Silber, ‘Concentration in the Common market\  CMLRev 1970 
p-138; Goldman, Lyon-Caen, ‘Europaeisches Handelsrecht’, p.296.
78
1.2 The Reasoning behind the Implementation of the Dual-Standard Doctrine
', j
1.2.1 The Literal Wording of the Provisions and the Legal Question 
According to the literal wording of the condition laid down in Article 81 (1) EC, it is 
difficult to exclude the possibility that the prohibition could extend to cover 
concentrations in legal terms. It is not, according to its literal wording, a condition 
aimed solely at cartels.289 290 In general terms, all that is necessary for a breach of the 
condition in Article 81 (1) EC is an agreement (or concerted practice) between 
undertakings that has as its ‘object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion o f 
competition within the common market.,29°
The minority opinion of the experts consulted in the Memorandum (who advised 
against the application of Article 81 EC to concentrations) stressed the fact that the 
provision is directed at market conduct rather than at a change in the internal structure 
of the undertakings.291 29This was accepted by both the Commission and the majority of
292commentators.
However, it may be submitted that this is not accurate as a statement of law.
First, the argument cannot be sustained that because the examples contained in 
Article 81 (1) (a-e) of restrictions of competition relate only to the conduct of 
undertakings, the scope of the Article implicitly does not embrace concentrations.293 
While these examples relate to the Member States original intentions, they are not 
exhaustive, and may be seen only as a system of priorities existing at that time. They 
do not exercise a limitation on the scope of the prohibition condition under Article
289 Downes and Ellison posit the theory that it had been nevertheless originally intended that 
Article 81 EC should apply to concentrations, but that such an application was thwarted, not by 
the substantive wording o f Article 81 EC itself, but by Regulation 17, which was passed by the 
Council under powers conferred by Article 87 EC in order to implement the substantive law 
established by Articles 81 and 82 EC in: Downes, A and Ellison, J., ‘The Legal Control o f  
Concentrations in the European Communities’, Blackstone Press, 1991 at p.2. See also Blank, 
J., ibid, p.110. But against this, see Sedemund, J. and Montag, F., ‘Europaeisches 
Gemeinschaftsrecht’, NJW 1988,10, p.608.
290 Generally, the restriction should be ‘appreciable’, see Commission Notice on Minor 
Agreements, 1970, OJ 1986, C231/2. Amended in 1977,1986 and 1997 OJ 1997 C372. For a 
more detailed analysis of the condition, see below, pp130-137.
291 Commission 1966 Memorandum, ibid, p.21
292 See note 288.
293 This is the position adopted by Hefermehl, W, Beurteilung von Fusionen und 
Konzembildungen nach Art. 85 und 86 des EWG-Vertrages, in: Dietz/Huebner (ed.), 
Festschrift juer H.C. Nipperdey II, p.771.
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81(1) EC.294 Indeed, the Commission has stated that Article 81 EC does not include 
any limits that are not clearly contained within its text.295
Secondly, and more fundamentally, it should be recognised that concentrations are as 
much the result of conduct on the market as are cartels.296 297They may (although not 
always) involve an agreement between parties which may restrict competition within 
the meaning of Article 81 (1) EC.
Thirdly, the statement is inconsistent with the Court of Justice’s later interpretation of 
Article 82 EC in Continental Can291, determining that Article 82 EC does not only 
apply to market conduct that may directly harm competitors, but also to conduct 
which harms competitors by distorting the structure of undistorted competition in the 
Community within the meaning of Article 3g of the Treaty.298 The ECJ feared in that 
case that a ’diverse legal treatment’ of economic activity within the Commission by 
the provisions of competition law in the maintenance of effective competition within 
the Common market would make a ‘breach in the entire competition law which could 
jeopardise the proper functioning o f the Common market
The dual doctrine invoked by the Commission therefore remains a statement of 
principle rather than a summary of the legal position.299 30The Commission’s reasoning 
was not based upon the actual scope of the prohibition condition under Article 81(1) 
EC according to its literal wording, but rather upon matters of policy and upon 
technical grounds.500
294 Also, Blank, J., ibid, p. 112
295 Case Grundig, ibid, p.322
296 Blank, ibid, p.128
297 Case 6/72, ibid.
298 Case 6/72, ibid, p.244.
299 In agreement, see Venit, J., ibid, Private Investors Abroad, p.12.
It has even been suggested that the approach adopted by the Commission represents a breach in 
Community law, as was feared by the ECJ in Continental Can, see Kassamali, RA., From 
Fiction to Fallacy ’ 21 (1996) p.97.
300 See below. In agreement, see Venit, J., Mergers, Acquisitions, and Joint Ventures under 
EEC Law after Philip Morris: Plus Ca Change, plus c'est ta Même Chose? The Applicability 
o f  Article 85 to Mergers and the uncertain Content and Fate o f  the Proposed Regulation on 
the Control o f  Concentrations, Private Investors Abroad, p.12.
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1.2.2 The Dual Doctrine as a Statement of Principle
a The Unsuitability of the Substantive Condition in General under Article 
81(1) EC
The Commission pointed to the fact that there was a need for different tests for 
concentrations and cartels since they have different characteristics and potential 
effects on competition.
This conclusion is valid. Concentrations often involve a costly one-off investment, 
and represent permanent change in the personality of the companies involved and the 
structure of the market on which they are active. The consequences of these changes 
will only appear in the medium to long term. Cartels, on the other hand, are transitory 
and can be subject to on-going control and revision of any regulatory decision taken. 
Furthermore, the effect of concentrations on the market in question differs from that 
of cartels. They are in general more likely to increase competition in the long term 
through efficiency gains and to constitute the natural structural development of the 
relevant market, particularly with respect to the progress of Single Market 
integration.301
The Commission therefore determined that the application of Article 81 EC would 
not provide logical results, since it prohibits cartels in principle (according to Article 
81(1) EC) whereas - given the potential benefits to consumer welfare of 
concentrations - the prohibition on concentrations should be stated only as an 
exception. It should be limited to those instances in which the existence of the 
concentration offers undertakings concerned excessive economic power. According to 
the Commission, the same treatment of these two different types of potentially 
anticompetitive conduct would lead either to too few cartels or to too many 
concentrations being prohibited.302
More recent commentators have stated that this concern of the Commission is not 
valid: different types of cartels are assessed in different ways according to their own 
specific character; there is no all-embracing per se prohibition of cartels. Moreover,
301 See above, pp.39-41.
302 Commission Memorandum, 1966, ibid at p.22.
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the Court of Justice has always stressed that not every restriction of competition falls 
under Article 81(1) EC.303
This more recent criticism is the result of a failure to appreciate the prevalent 
approach of the Commission at the time when the Memorandum was written. The 
Commission’s statements have specific regard to its policy (particularly prevalent in 
the early years) of finding a restriction on the freedom to trade of the parties to the 
agreement to be a restriction of competition. Thereby, almost all concentrations 
without exception would fall within the scope of Article 81(1) EC, even if they may 
have beneficial results in competition terms. While those beneficial results could be 
taken into account under Article 81(3) EC, this would mean intolerable delay and 
uncertainty for projected concentrations.
b Type of Agreements covered by Article 81 (1) EC
The Commission pointed out that the express requirement of an agreement under 
Article 81 (1) EC would inevitably exclude the control of concentrations achieved by 
other means, for example by the acquisition of control by stock exchange 
purchases.304 305
This does not restrict the applicability of Article 81 EC to some types of 
concentrations. It does however limit its usefulness relative to an independent system 
of control implemented specifically for the regulation of concentrations.
c The Problem of the Nullity Sanction - Article 81 (2) EC
According to Article 81 (2) EC, where an agreement bringing about a concentration 
falls within Article 81(1) EC (and there is no exemption under Article 81(3) EC), that 
agreement is null and void and the concentration itself would have to be divested. The 
Commission considered divestment to be too severe a sanction for concentrations.303
303 For example, STM v Maschinenbau Ulm, Case ibid p.282; Consten and Grundig v 
Commission, Case ibid, p.322; Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin and Wilkin, Case ibid, p.544; 
Voelk v Vervaeke (1969) Case 5/69 (1969) ECR 295 (1969) CMLR 273.
304 Commission Memorandum, 1966, ibid at p26.
305 Commission Memorandum, ibid at p.23. ■-=*■
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This position is to be supported.306 Not only is divestment extremely complex and 
expensive but Article 81(2) EC may, at the Commission’s discretion, be accompanied 
by a heavy fine. These sanctions are inappropriate in the circumstances that a 
concentration might take place simply in order to save a failing firm, or might in fact 
enhance the Community objective of 'external' integration.307 While an Article 81(3) 
EC exemption would take such potential benefits into account, the legal uncertainty 
and delay renders it similarly inappropriate. Legal certainty and speed of the decision 
are consistently stressed as being of paramount importance for concentration activity. 
Moreover, the specific application of Article 81(3) EC brings with it its own 
difficulties, as shown below.
d The Problem of the Exemption to the Rule - Article 81 (3) EC
First, the Commission stated that the examination of potential efficiency benefits of a 
concentration (ex ante) under Article 81(3) EC cannot be undertaken as reliably as it 
can concerning an anti-competitive co-operative agreement. This reason is however 
easily dispelled. Is not such an ex ante assessment necessary in any type of policy to 
control concentrations (where efficiency benefits are taken into account)? :
Secondly, according to Article 81 (3) a, concentrations could only be exempted where 
it was demonstrated that the necessary benefits required could not have been achieved 
by a lesser restriction on competition. The Commission considered that this precluded 
its application to concentrations since concentrations involve the total fusion of one 
undertaking with another; the parties are no longer free to act independently.
Recent commentators have criticised this standpoint. They claim that the clause does 
not refer to a restriction on the parties’ conduct but to a restriction on competition on 
the market.308 It is submitted however that this criticism does not take adequate notice 
of the early Commission approach, which was to concentrate upon restrictions on the 
freedom to trade of the parties to the agreement. On the basis of this latter (and at that 
time, predominant) reasoning, it is a valid concern. It is only within the context of the
306 Also Hefermehl, W, Beurteilung von Fusionen und Konzembildungen nach Art. 85 und 86 
des EWG-Vertrages, in: Dietz/Huebner (ed.), Festschrift fuer H.C. Nipperdey II, p.771 at 
p.780; van Ommeslaghe, ibid at p.69.
Against this, in the minority, Blank, ibid at p.132 , who considers that the application of the 
Community principle of proportionality would prevent divestment taking place.
307 See above at p. 8.
308 Blank, ibid p.131.
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more recent approach - an assessment of the conduct’s effect on competition 
structures - that the stated position of the Commission may be queried*309
Thirdly, the Commission validly pointed out that Article 81 (3) EC required that the 
benefits should be overseen for a long period of time. Concentrations however 
involve a definitive change in the ownership of undertakings and, for reasons of legal 
certainty, can only be forbidden or allowed on a lasting basis.310
Lastly, Article 81 (3) was, according to the Commission, unsuited to the assessment 
of concentrations since it presents the Commission with some opportunity to 
introduce industrial policy factors into its analysis. This would have encountered stiff 
opposition from some Member States (most notably Germany and the UK). Such a 
concern is however still valid with regard to the implementation of a specific system 
of merger control: regulation of market structures directly provides the opportunity to 
pursue particular industrial policy aims.311
13  Summary and Evaluation of the Unsuitability of Article 81 EC to Apply to 
Concentrations
The analysis above determines that in legal terms, Article 81 EC was by no means 
excluded from application to concentrations. Some of the perceived unsuitability of 
Article 81 EC to assess concentrations derived from the Commission and the ECJ’s 
pervasive tendency to equate a restriction on the freedom to trade of a competitor 
with a restriction on competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC. Thereby, all 
horizontal concentrations would have breached Article 81(1) EC, since a horizontal 
concentration involves a complete restriction on the freedom to trade of a competitor 
(as the target company). Supporting this conclusion is the difference in the positions 
adopted by the contemporary commentators and by those considering the issues more 
recently. The majority of contemporary commentators tended to accept the
309 Thus, Joliet considers that this second reason is the main reason for the inappropriateness 
of Article 81(3) to concentrations, not because concentrations could not be assessed effectively 
under this condition (criticising the Commission’s other reasons) but because it would favour 
loose-bound cartels over concentrations, which is absurd, (1970) ibid at p.280.
310 Note that this is purely a procedural matter and does not affect the applicability - or 
suitability - of Article 81 EC as a provision to assess concentrations. The period of time for 
supervision derives from Regulation 17 with specific regard to cartels and may also be subject 
to the principle of proportionality. If  this period is not appropriate for concentrations, this only 
affects the applicability of Article 3 of Regulation 17. Joliet, 1970 ibid at p.281; Blank, ibid, at 
pp.131-2.
3,1 These concerns ensured however that there would be no specific efficiency defence when 
the European Concentration Regulation was implemented. See below at note 978.
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Commission’s position, even if some of them differed slightly in their specific 
reasoning.312 More recent studies have tended to be more severe about the 
Commission’s reasoning in its rejection of Article 81 EC as a provision for 
concentration control.313 *Thereby, Bos et al3H and Vogel315, for example, claim that 
the Commission exaggerated these technical difficulties involved. They point to the 
undesirability of treating concentrations and agreements differently, where they have 
the same effect in economic terms. According to these authors, what lay behind the 
reluctance to apply Article 81 EC to concentrations was in fact solely their benevolent 
attitude towards concentrations in terms of economic and industrial policy.316 This 
was in spite of the potential distortions of competition they might represent by 
effecting a reduction of the number of independent players on a relevant market.
Certainly, the Commission expressed such a positive approach towards 
concentrations on numerous occasions,317 and this approach contributed to the early 
omission of a Community system of merger control (whether directly or through the 
application of existing Treaty provisions). It should not however be forgotten that the 
Commission had expressed awareness about the dangers that concentrations could 
present to competition structures (and, by direct connection, single market 
integration) as early as 1966.318 Furthermore, the Commission applied Article 82 EC 
to the creation of a concentration just five years later in Continental Can.319
It is submitted that the technical deficiencies of the provision that were highlighted by 
the Commission, in particular those that led to legal uncertainty and delay, were 
pertinent. These include, specifically, the nullity sanction and the exemption 
procedure. Any concentration fulfilling the conditions of the Philip Morris doctrine is
312 For example, Joliet, whose main reasons lay more with Article 81 EC’s inapplicability on 
grounds of legal policy, set in the legislative history and wording of the substantive provision 
(see above regarding his criticism of the use of Article 81(3) EC, based upon a restriction of 
economic freedom of the parties being a restriction of competition), than its actual technical 
deficiencies in practice. Joliet, ibid, 1970, p274-7.
313 Blank, ibid, who submits that neither the literal wording, the teleological structure, the 
legislative history nor the technical issues prevent the application of Article 81 EC to certain 
types of concentrations. Similarly, Bos, ibid, p.5-6 and Vogel, ibid, pp.234-238; Goldman, B. 
et Lyon Caen, A., ibid, pp. 670-671.
3.4 ibid.
3.5 Vogel, L., (1988), ibid.
316 Bos, P.-V. et al., ibid, pp.5-6. See also, Vogel, L. ibid, pp.234-238; Goldman, B. et Lyon 
Caen, A., ibid, pp. 670-671.
317 See above.
312 Commission Memorandum 1966, ibid, (see above).
3,9 Case, ibid.
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provisionally void under Article 81(1) EC, pending the possibility of an exemption 
according to Article 81(3) EC. This procedural structure is particularly unsuited to 
merger control because of the delays involved and the legal uncertainty. Moreover, 
the notification procedure under Article 81 EC was ill-equipped for concentration 
control: there was no definite time limits for the Commission to decide whether an 
agreement infringes Article 81 EC.320 Thereby, comfort letters are useful for certainty 
in the individual case, but do not aid the construction of coherent concentration 
policy.321 Another significant factor was that Form A/B did not provide adequate 
instructions for determining the relevant product and geographical markets, or 
whether a specific transaction constitutes a ‘concentration’.322
Uncertainty would have also developed where the Commission might give negative 
clearance to a concentration under Article 81 EC, but the Member States are not 
prevented from applying their own national laws.323
What the Commission can however be criticised for is ignoring the fact that most of 
these technical deficiencies of Article 81 EC in the assessment of mergers were 
procedural and derived from Regulation 17/62. They might therefore have been 
overcome by the appropriate amendment of that Regulation, an option that the 
Commission apparently failed to consider.
With the Commission’s position towards the applicability of Article 81 EC to 
concentrations as it was, there arose the significant danger of a legal loophole in 
control. Even after Continental Can324, there was a broad band of co-operative 
behaviour by firms which, being more concentrative than collusive, would not fall 
within Community control. This was a lacuna of control that the Court of Justice 
proved to be extremely concerned about. In a landmark decision, the Court of Justice 
appeared to tackle the anomaly head on.
320 See in particular, Fine, F., ‘Concentrations and Joint Ventures - the Law and Policy o f  the 
EC', (2nd Ed.), 1994.
321 Note that the MR involves short and strict time limits.
322 The Commission adopted Form CO to deal with this problem under the MR.
323 See eg. Procureur de la Republique v Giry and Guerlain, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, (1980) 
ECR 2327, (1981) 2 CMLR 99.
324 Case, ibid.
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2 The Philip Morris Case - BAT and Reynolds v Commission325
In its Philip Morris decision, the Commission had found a previous arrangement 
between Philip Morris and Rembrandt to breach Article 81 EC. Following a 
significant restructuring of the agreement however, the Commission declared the 
transaction to be compatible with Article 81 EC. Competitors of the two companies 
pursued their original claim of a breach of the same article to the European Court of 
Justice.
Under the new agreements, Philip Morris (PM) obtained a direct shareholding in 
Rothmans International (RI), which was previously solely controlled by Rothmans 
Holdings (RH), a 100 % owned subsidiary of Rembrandt (R). That holding was 30.8 
%, representing 24.9 % of the votes. R, on the other hand had a 30.8 % interest in RI, 
representing 43.6 % of the votes, which was held in its favour by RH. The agreements 
also provided, in particular, that: PM would not increase its shareholding in RI in 
such a way that its voting power would reach 25 % or more; that each of the parties 
had a right of first refusal if either of them assigns its shareholding; that PM would 
inform the Commission about any future amendment to the agreements; that PM 
would not have any representative on the board or management body of RI; that PM 
would not seek or accept any information which would be relevant to its own 
competitive behaviour within the Community.
Thus, in general terms, the transaction involved the acquisition of a minority 
shareholding by one company in another.
The Commission’s decision was appealed to the Court of Justice. Regarding the facts 
of the case, the Court considered that, while the acquisition of a minority holding in a 
competitor could fall within Article 81 (1) EC, there was further necessary a 
framework whereby the commercial conduct of the companies in question would be 
influenced. On the facts, there were no such agreements or strategies between the 
purchaser and the target company which could fulfil this criterion and the Court of 
Justice upheld the Commission’s decision.326
325 Cases 142/84 and 156/84 (1987) ECR 4487, (1988) 4 CMLR 24.
326 Advocate General Mancini on the other hand considered a breach of Article 81 (1) to have 
occurred. On this, see Fine F., ECLR 1987, p333 at 340-41, who also criticises the Courts 
conclusion in the judgment. Also, see Korah, V. and Lasok, P., ibid. The Court of Justice also 
upheld the Commission decision that Article 82 EC was inapplicable, since there was no 
possibility of an abuse occurring where Philip Morris was in no position to exercise an 
influence on the commercial policy of Rothmans International, Case ibid at paragraph 65.
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The significance of the case however lies in the further statement of principle 
espoused by the Court. This is contained in the following paragraphs:
‘Although the acquisition by one company of an equity interest in a competitor does not in 
itself constitute conduct restricting competition, such an acquisition may nevertheless serve as 
an instrument for influencing the commercial conduct of the companies in question so as to 
restrict or distort competition on the market on which they carry on business.
That will be true in particular where, by the acquisition of a shareholding or through subsidiary 
clauses in the agreement, the investing company obtains legal or de facto control of the 
commercial conduct of the other company or where the agreement provides for the commercial 
co-operation between the companies or creates a structure likely to be used for such co­
operation.
That may also be the case where the agreement gives the investing company the possibility of 
reinforcing its position at a later stage and taking effective control o f the other company. 
Account must be taken not only of the immediate effects of the agreement but also of its
327potential effects and of the possibility that the agreement may be part o f a long-term plan.’
The Court further stated that every agreement must be assessed in its economic 
context and in particular with regard to the situation on the relevant market. This 
includes any commercial relationships that the participating companies might have 
outside the Community, in recognition of the fact that the agreement might be part of 
a policy of global co-operation between the companies which are part of it.327 28 329
Questionable is whether the Court thereby extended the scope of the prohibition 
under Article 81(1) EC beyond the acquisition of minority holdings with attendant 
ability to influence the commercial conduct of the target company (as a competitor), 
to include the simple acquisition of majority holdings or even total mergers.
3 The Legal Implications of the Philip Morris Decision
The paragraphs 37-40 of the Philip Morris decision raised three points of
329controversy:
327 Case, ibid at paragraphs 37-39.
328 Case, ibid at paragraph 40.
329 The thesis does not consider in any further depth the more traditional conditions required 
under Article 81 (1) EC, for example the meaning of 4undertaking\ See further on this eg.,
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First, what constituted the ‘Agreement* within the meaning of Article 81 (1) 
EC whose anticompetitive effect was to be assessed (and which would be 
void under Article 81 (2) EC)?
Secondly, in what circumstances the acquisition of a holding in a competitor 
constitutes a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) 
EC? Thereby, is any minority holding sufficient, or is at least the possibility 
of legal or de facto control over another competitor necessary? If the 
acquisition of control is required, does the principle extend to majority 
holdings and total integration (where control is per se acquired) or must the 
participating undertakings retain some independence?
Thirdly, must the target company always be a competitor or could the 
principle extend to vertical and conglomerate concentrations?
3.1 The Meaning of ‘Agreement* according to Article 81(D EC in the 
Application of the Philip Morris Doctrine
Article 81(1) EC prohibits co-operative conduct between undertakings which affects 
interstate trade and has as an object or effect a restriction of competition on the 
common market.330
Fundamental to its application therefore is an *agreement’ between undertakings, a 
'decision’ by associations of undertakings or a ‘concerted practice’ carried out by 
undertakings.331 If these agreements or practices are considered to fall within Article 
81(1) EC, they are void under Article 81 (2) EC.
Questionable is what constitutes an ‘agreement* or ‘concerted practice’ within the 
meaning of Article 81(1) EC (that is void under Article 81 (2) EC) for the application 
of the principle espoused in Philip Morris.
Blank, ibid, pp. 137-145. The jurisdictional condition of lan effect on interstate trade ’ however 
is analysed below.
330 For the full text, see note 43.
331 The concept of concerted practice is extremely broad, and the borderline between where a 
‘concerted practice’ ends and an ‘agreement’ begins within the meaning of Article 81 (I) EC is 
not distinct.
See in particular, ICl v Commission Case 48/69 (1972) ECR 619 at 64. For comment, see eg., 
Whish, (1993) ibid, p 190-201; Koch in Grabitz, Kommentar, ibid, Artikel 81EC, paragraph 19,
u h h u u w h m ^ «»»»»-
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3.1.1 The Agreement to Transfer Shares
From the literal text of the judgment, it appears that the agreement to transfer the 
ownership of the shares constitutes the ‘agreement* within the meaning of Article 81 
(DEC.
Some commentators however refuse the submission that the agreement to transfer 
represents the agreement which falls within Article 81 (1) EC (and hence, is void 
according to Article 81 (2) EC) under the Philip Morris doctrine.332 They restrict the 
application of the Philip Morris doctrine by submitting that it concerns only a further 
agreement or concerted practice between the parties (or between one of them and a 
third party) beyond the actual agreement to transfer ownership, through which the 
freedom to compete of at least one will be restricted. There is, according to them, a 
workable distinction between the acquisition of the equity and the exercise of an 
influence over the commercial conduct of that undertaking. Only the exercise of the 
voting rights pursuant to the acquisition of the shares is void, not the actual 
transferral. Accordingly:
‘Die Kapitalbeteiligung selbst an einem Wettbewerber ist insoweit lediglich ein Indiz fuer eine 
daneben bestehende Vereinbarung oder abgestimmte Verhaltensweise zwischen den
333betroffenen Unternehmen.*
This interpretation however ignores the literal wording of the case. In strict legal 
terms, Philip Morris extends to the agreement to transfer the shares itself (that is, 
between two participating undertakings or by friendly public bid):
‘Although the acquisition by one company of an equity interest in a competitor does not in 
itself constitute conduct restricting competition, such an acquisition may nevertheless serve as
332 Fuchs, A. and Immenga, U., Artikel 85 EWG-Vertrag als Grenze fu r  
Untemehmensbeteiligungen?', NJW 1988, pp.3053-55; Deimel, ibid, pp.89-91; Korah, V. and 
Lasok, P., ibid; Riesenkampff, A., Auswirkungen des Urteils des EuGH vom 17.11.1987 
( ‘Philip Morris'), in: WuW 1988, p.469.
Venit considers that the example given in paragraph 38 of the judgment of an acquisition by 
one company in another falling within Article 81(1) EC (that is, where through the acquisition 
the acquiring company obtains legal or de facto control over the conduct of the company taken 
over) requires further agreements between the acquirer of the minority share and the majority 
shareholder in the target company to co-ordinate conduct (thereby resolving the apparently 
conflicting statements by the Court, referring to the companies remaining independent in 
paragraph 31 and the acquisition of control by one in another in paragraph 38, see below), in: 
Venit, J., Private Investors Abroad, ibid, pp.69-71. In agreement, see also Riesenkampff, A., 
Auswirkungen des Urteils des EuGH vom 17.11.1987 ( ‘Philip Morris'), in: WuW 1988, p.466.
an instrument for influencing the commercial conduct of the companies in question so as to 
restrict or distort competition on the market on which they carry on business.'3 34
>
Here the Court states that, while such a transfer agreement does not constitute 
conduct restricting competition as a general rule, nevertheless it may be an 
instrument fulfilling this purpose. It may of course be argued that the Court only 
intended to state that a transfer agreement only serves as such an instrument where 
there are other ancillary restrictive agreements that bring about a co-ordination of the 
conduct of the parties.335 The Court’s further statements contradict this interpretation 
however. There will be a restriction of competition where the transfer agreement ipso 
facto gives legal or de facto control. Thus:
The circumstances in which this will be true are if the investing company, by the acquisition o f  
a shareholding or through subsidiary clauses in the agreement, obtains legal or de facto  
control or where the agreement provides for commercial co-operation between the companies 
or creates a structure likely to be used for such co-operation.'336  ^ •
It is clear that the acquisition itself may be the instrument which effects this influence 
or control, independent of further agreements or circumstances.
If the agreement to transfer the ownership of the shares constitutes an agreement 
within the terms of Article 81 (1) EC under the Philip Morris principle therefore, it 
appears - prima facie - that this should be indiscriminate of the method of acquisition: 
it would include the acquisition of shares by agreement with the undertaking itself or 
its parent company (as in Philip Morris), an acquisition through purchases from third 
parties (for example, on the stock exchange), or the purchase of shares subject to 
public offer. It is necessary to investigate this hypothesis more closely.
a Direct Agreement between the Participating Undertakings
Clearly the first example is an agreement within the meaning of Article 81 (1) EC, 
since it corresponds directly to the Court’s statement in Philip Morris, as analysed 
above.
90
333 Immenga and Fuchs, (1988) ibid, p.3053 (author's emphasis).
334 Case, ibid, at Paragraph 37 (author’s emphasis).
335 See note 332 above.
336 Case, ibid, at Paragraph 38 (author’s emphasis).
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b Acquisition on the Stock Exchange
On the other hand, the Court did not consider directly the acquisition of shares from 
third parties, for example on the stock exchange. Clearly acquisition on the stock 
exchange can lead to integrated structures which enable co-operation which may 
restrict competition. This alone is given by some commentators as a reason for Article 
81 (1) EC to apply to such transactions.337 However, in strict legal terms, an 
insuperable difficulty arises since there appears to be no ‘agreement’ within the 
meaning of Article 81 (1) EC; there is no co-ordination of market conduct between 
the parties (which could lead to a restriction of competition).338
There is a further practical difficulty with regard to acquisition on the stock 
exchange.339 This considers the fact that such acquisitions are characterised by the 
acquisition of shares from numerous third parties. Questionable thereby is which of 
these many contracts restricts competition (and is therefore null and void according to 
Article 81 (2) EC)? If a combination of more than one is involved, at what point is 
competition restricted where they are bought successively?
c Acquisition by Public Bid
The third issue concerns the applicability of Article 81 EC to public bids. In legal 
terms, where the public bid is hostile there is no agreement that could represent co­
ordinated or collusive conduct within the terms of Article 81 (1) EC, and the 
provision is inapplicable. Where the public bid is friendly however, Article 81 (1) EC 
would be applicable in legal terms.340
d Ancillary Agreements
Aside from the agreement to transfer the shares itself, other ancillary agreements may 
be relevant (if not necessary). The Court states that:
337 Mestmaecker, EuR 1988, p.371; Von der Esch, Merger Control at the Community Level - 
Evidence submitted to the European Communities Committee o f  the House o f Lords, at p.2, 
relying on Article 3g EC; Schoedermeier, WuW 1988, p-191.
338 See eg., Immenga and Fuchs, NJW 1988, p.3053; Deimel, A., ibid at p.88.
But against this, in the minority, see Blumberg, J.P. and Schoedermeier, M., ‘EC  
Concentration Control: no smoke without fire?*, International Financial Law Review, London, 
Vol.7, N r.l, January 1988 p.36: 4the share purchasing contracts (between the bidding 
company and the shareholders o f the target) can very well be agreements to acquire control. '
339 See eg., Deimel, ibid, p.89; Immenga and Fuchs, (1988) ibid, p.3052.
340 See eg., Calkoen, J.L. and Feenstra, J.J., Acquisition o f  Shares in other Companies and EEC 
Competition Policy: The Philip Morris Decision, International Business Lawyer, 1988, pp.167- 
170, at p.168.
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‘The circumstances in which this will be true are if the investing company, by the acquisition of 
a shareholding or through subsidiary clauses in the agreement, obtains legal or de facto 
control...’341
Therefore, where the transfer agreement itself does not lead to such an acquisition of 
control or commercial influence, there may be other agreements arising whereby the 
commercial conduct of the participating undertakings (as competitors) will be 
affected and which fall within Article 81 (1) EC.342 These need not be explicitly 
within the contract to transfer, but may arise from the surrounding circumstances.343 
They do require initially however that there be an agreement within the meaning of 
Article 81 (1)EC.
3.1.2 Evaluation
Upon analysis, the Philip Morris principle applies to the agreement to transfer the 
ownership of shares in one undertaking to its competitor. Such an agreement only 
however exists where those shares are transferred by direct agreement between the 
parties or by acquisition under friendly public bid.
The principle also covers ancillary agreements between the parties which may restrict 
competition within the common market. These would however fall within the scope 
of Article 81 EC in its traditional application.
3.2 The Types of Acquisition of a Holding in a Competitor that Constitute a 
*Restriction o f Competition’ within the Meaning of Article 81(1) EC in the 
Application of the Philip Morris Doctrine
3.2.1 The Apparent Paradox in the Judgment - Independence versus Control 
Various commentators have pointed to a paradox in the Commission’s reasoning in 
the principle espoused in Philip Morris.344 This centres around the fact that Article 81
341 Case, ibid, at Paragraph 38 (author’s emphasis).
342 Immenga and Fuchs, (1988) ibid, p.3053; Deimel, ibid, p.89.
343 Immenga and Fuchs, (1988) ibid, p.3053; Deimel, ibid., p.89.
344 Steindorff, E., Kooperativer Untenehmenszusammenschluss und Kartellverbot - Erste 
Bemerkungen zum Rothmans-Morris-Urteil des EuGH, Zeitschrift fuer das Gesamte 
Handelsrecht, p.60; Riesenkampff, A., (1988) ibid at p469-70; Schroeder, D, Die Anwendung 
des Kartellverbotes au f verbundene Unternehmen, WuW 1988 at p. 279.
Deimel goes so far as to claim that this independence must be not only at the time of the 
agreement, but continue in the long term, Deimel, A., ibid, at p.94.
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is aimed at collusive conduct of independent undertakings. Concerning the facts of 
the judgment, the two participating undertakings certainly remained independent, 
since the issue involved a minority share holding with various agreements excluding 
co-operation between the parties. In the further principle set forth in Philip Morris 
however, there is a breach of Article 81 EC where there is an acquisition of control by 
one undertaking in another.345
How are the participating undertakings to remain independent (and therefore in co­
operation) if one is simultaneously acquiring control over another? The answer to this 
paradoxical situation has direct implications for the scope of the principle. If the 
participating undertakings are not required to remain independent - that is, the 
principle includes the acquisition of control of one over another - then it may extend 
to the acquisition of majority holdings and even to total merger.
a Paragraph 31 • Continued Independence of the Undertakings
Some commentators have highlighted the Court’s statement in paragraph 31 of the 
decision:
‘Since the acquisition of shares in RI was the subject-matter of agreements entered into by 
companies which have remained independent after the entry into force of the agreements, the 
issue must be examined first of all from the point of view of Article 85 (Article 81 EC).*34*
According to them, this condition would be irrelevant if Article 81 EC were to be 
used to assess effects on market structure.347
Upon analysis however, this statement by the Court is not conclusive. It is made 
solely in relation to the specific case at issue and the requirement to consider the 
applicability of Article 81 initially with regard to the specific facts of the case. Since 
co-operation was possibly involved, Article 81 EC is the logical provision to consider
But against this conclusion, see eg., Emmerich, V, Europaeische Fusionskontrolle nach dem 
Zigaretten-Urteil, p. 951 in: Baur, J.F., Hopt, K.J., Mailaender, K.P., FS fuer Ernst Steindorff 
turn 70. Geburtstag, Berlin/New York 1990, at p.958. Also, Fine, F., (1987) ECLR ibid, at 
p342.
345 Case, ibid at Paragraph 38.
346 Case, ibid, at Paragraph 31.
347 See eg., Deimel, ibid, p.94; Gleiss A. and Hirsch, M., Kommentar ibid, Paragraph 19; Fine, 
F, (1987) ibid, p.342; Emmerich, V., in FS fuer Ernst Steindorff, (1990) ibid, at p.958; Venit, 
J., Private Investors Abroad, ibid, p.60-61.
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first since it is primarily directed at cartels and collusive behaviour. It does not 
represent a general limitation of the scope of Article 81 EC.
More pertinent is to turn to the literal wording of the substantive condition under 
Article 81(1) EC. We find that does not in fact explicitly require that the two parties 
to the agreement in question remain independent after the consummation of their 
agreement.348 It requires only that there be agreement between undertakings which 
may affect trade between Member States and which has the object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.349 350
In terms of practical policy, Fine states further that:
‘to limit the application of Article 85 (1) (Article 81(1) EC) to the acquisition o f control in 
another undertaking falling short of actual merger would constitute an artificial distinction 
which would only encourage raiders to obtain control rather than to accomplish a take-over.’
b Paragraphs 44-45 - Co-ordination not Concentration?
Some commentators submit that the wording of the Court stresses the collusive nature 
of the agreements:351 it did not explicitly consider to what extent the effects on the 
market structure resulting from the concentration may be assessed under Article 81 
EC; rather, it focused upon the issue of the co-ordination of competitive behaviour of 
the companies involved in the concentration.
On the contrary however, the Court makes explicit reference to ‘take-overs’ in its 
judgment. Thus, in paragraph 44, it states:
‘ In the market situation described by the Commission...any company wishing to increase its 
market share will be strongly tempted...to take control o f a competitor. In such circumstances, 
any attempted take-over and any agreement likely to promote commercial co-operation 
between two or more of those dominant companies is liable to result in restriction of 
competition.’
348 Fine, F., (1987) ibid, at p.342; Scrivens, R. ‘The *Philip Morris’ Case: Share Acquisitions 
and Complainants’ Rights’, 1988 6 EIPR 163-171. But against this, see Sedemund J. and 
Montag, F., Europaeisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, ibid, at 
p.609 and Immenga and Fuchs, ibid, at p.3055-6
349 In full, see note 43.
350 Fine, F., (1987) ibid, at p.342.
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In paragraph 45 of the judgment, the Court again states:
‘It must consider in particular whether an agreement which at first sight provides only for a 
passive investment in a competitor is not in fact intended to result in a take-over o f that 
company, perhaps at a later stage, or to establish co-operation between the companies with a
352view to sharing the market.*
Therefore it can not be maintained that the wording of the judgment was clearly and 
exclusively aimed at collusive conduct.
3.2.2 Other Relevant Statements bv the Court of Justice in its Judgment 
a Paragraph 71 - a Statement of New Principles
Some commentators have drawn attention to paragraph 71.351 253 354In consideration of the 
legality of the Commission’s statement of reasons for its decision, the Court states:
‘In this case the contested decisions concern the agreements of a type which had not been dealt 
with in the previous administrative practice of the Commission; they do not lay down new 
principles but are limited essentially to an examination o f  the special features o f the
„ . . >354agreements in question.
This does not however constitute a limitation to the principle. First, the statement 
refers to the Commission decision, not to the judgment by the Court itself. Secondly, 
the statement relates to application of the law to the specific facts of the case itself 
(which was found to be coherent with Article 81 EC), not the statement of principle 
concerning the general applicability of Article 81 to acquisitions. Furthermore, the 
judgment does not lay down any new principles since it is coherent with the 
Community task as set down in Article 3g EC: that is, to maintain a system of 
undistorted competition within the Community.
351 Van Bael and Beilis, 2nd Edition, at p.304; Venit, J., Private Investors Abroad, ibid, pp.67- 
69.
352 Author’s emphasis.
353 Rieserikampff, A. (1988) ibid, at p.371. Also, Venit, J., Private Investors Abroad, ibid,
p.66.
354 Author’s emphasis.
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b Paragraphs 43-5 * Related only to Oligopolistic Markets 
Lastly, some commentators have suggested that the principle in Philip Morris (and 
they are not unanimous in their interpretation of that principle) is further restricted by 
the Court’s emphasis in the case that the relevant market was a tight oligopolistic 
one.355 Once again, this fails to make the distinction between the Court’s statement of 
general principle concerning the application of Article 81 EC to concentrations in 
general and the consideration of the facts of the specific case in an application of 
Article 81 EC.
3.2.3 Summary of the Types of Acquisition of a Holding in a Competitor that 
Constitute a Restriction of Competition within the Meaning of Article 81(D 
EC in the Application of the Philip Morris Doctrine 
Therefore there is no condition within the Philip Morris principle that the 
undertakings should remain independent after the agreement It applies to total 
concentrations (where there is an ‘agreement’ within the meaning of Article 81 (1) 
EC).356
This was the view expressed by Peter Sutherland, then Commissioner for 
competition, in a press release following the Philip Morris judgment:
‘The unambiguous confirmation by the Court that Articles 85 (and 86)357 apply to transactions 
relating to changes in corporate ownership will help the Commission to develop a merger 
policy based on sound legal principles and market analysis.*358
3 3  Relationship of the Acquiring Undertaking to the Target Undertaking - Does 
the Philip Morris Doctrine Extend to Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers?
In the Philip Morris case, the Court focuses the application of the doctrine it espouses 
on the acquisition of shares in a competitor.359 Questionable is whether the principle 
extends beyond such horizontal concentrations to vertical and conglomerate 
concentrations.
355 Case, ibid at Paragraphs 43-45. See Fine, F., (1987) ibid at p. 342; Moosecker, 
K./W endepunkt in europaeischen Kartellrecht: Einfuehrung einer Fusionskontrolle durch di 
richterliche Hintertuer?\Handelsblatt of 3.12.1987, Nr.232 at p.3.
356 As considered by Advocate General Mancini in Philip Morris at paragraph 7; Fine, F., 
(1987) ibid; Scrivens, (1988) ibid.
357 Now Articles 81 and 82 EC.
358 Commission Press Release IP (87) 407 dated 18 November 1987, ‘Breakthrough fo r  
Competition Policy in Court Judgment*.
3.3.1 Vertical Mergers
The Grundig case359 60 and the Italy case established that Article 81 EC does not 
distinguish between cartels and, for example, systems of selective distribution. The 
provision does not just apply to agreements between competitors.
Therefore, it is submitted that the principle in Philip Morris should not be restricted 
to only horizontal concentrations, but should extend also to vertical concentrations 
where the object or effect is to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 
81(1) EC.361 This is in recognition, further, that large concentrations often cannot be 
labelled simply horizontal, conglomerate or vertical, but may involve more than one 
such link.
3.3.2 Conglomerate Concentrations
Although some commentators have rejected the application of the Philip Morris 
principle to conglomerate concentrations because there is no competition link 
between the participating parties,362 there is no reason to do so in a strict legal 
interpretation of Article 81 (1) EC.363 Competition can be restricted within the 
meaning of Article 81 (1) EC by such concentrations where, for example, the merged 
entity will have a financial strength vastly superior to its competitors.364
Therefore, Article 81 EC is applicable to conglomerate concentrations where their 
object or effect is to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC
3-3.3 Evaluation
Upon analysis, the Philip Morris principle applies to agreements to transfer the 
ownership of shares in one undertaking to another undertaking, regardless of whether 
they are direct competitors. It includes vertical and conglomerate mergers as well as
359 Case, ibid, at Paragraph 37.
360 Consten and Grundig v Commission, Case ibid, at Paragraph 387; Italian Republic v 
Commission, Case ibid, at Paragraph 485.
361 Emmerich, V. in: FS fuer E. Steindorff, (1990) ibid, at p.963; Schoedermeier, M., WuW 
1988, p.189; Korah, V., who states that at least leaves the door open for application to vertical 
mergers, in: ECLR 1987, ibid at p.247; Deimel, A., ibid, at p.92; Moosecker, K., (1987) ibid, 
p.3.
But, in disagreement, see Riesenkampff who, in a very restrictive analysis of the law as applied 
to the facts, denies that the principle applies to vertical mergers, ibid (1988) at p.470.
362 Schoedermeier, 1988, ibid, at p.188; Riesenkampff, ibid (1988) at p.470.
363 Emmerich, V. in: FS fuer E. Steindorff, (1990) ibid at p.963; Deimel, ibid, at p.92.
364 Deimel, ibid, p92.
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horizontal mergers where the object or effect of the merger is to restrict competition 
within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC.365
: S -. • •
3.4 The Commission’s Subsequent Practice
The response of the Commission to the case appeared to be mixed.
On the one hand, the Commission did not consider the Philip Morris case to be a 
radical extension of its powers. Rather, it considered it to be a confirmation of its 
already established policy towards joint ventures.366 The Commission considered it to 
endorse its previous policy towards joint ventures, whereby Article 81 EC applies not 
only to specific restrictive clauses in agreements on the formation of joint ventures, 
but to the formation of the joint venture itself, where such a transaction provides a 
framework for co-operation between the parents that is likely to restrict 
competition.367
On the other hand, the Commission made some much more direct public statements. 
In a press release following the Court’s judgment, it claimed that: ■.r . >
‘the importance of the case for the development of the Community’s competition policy lies in 
the Court’s ruling that Article 85 (Article 81) of the EEC Treaty is applicable to agreements 
whereby a company acquires control o f a competitor by buying shares or making arrangements 
for co-operation between them.’
The Commission went on to state:
‘the unambiguous confirmation by the Court that Articles 85 and 86 apply to transactions 
relating to changes in corporate ownership will help the Commission to develop a merger 
policy based on sound legal principles and market analysis.’368
Furthermore, Peter Sutherland, former Commissioner for competition stated:
365 Emmerich in: FS fuer E. Steindorff, (1990) ibid p.963; Schoedermeier, WuW 1988, p,189; 
Korah ECLR 1987 at p247; Deimel, ibid, p.92
Against this, Riesenkampff, A., ibid (1988) at p.470.
366 Van Bael and Beilis, 2nd ed., at pp. 304-307; Immenga and Fuchs, ibid, at p.3056.
Cf. Riesenkampff, A., ibid, (1988) who sees the Philip Morris Case (and the Comaud Decision 
below) as no more than an application o f Article 81 to a co-operative joint venture agreement 
Also, Koenigs, F. 'Neuere Entwicklungen des EWG-Rechts, p.152.
367 Commission Seventeenth Report on Competition Policy, at Paragraph 101.
368 Commission Press Release IP(87)497 (November 18,1987).
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‘....the article 85 (Article 81 EC) applies to certain forms of concentrations.’369 370
The only opportunity for real clarification of the Commission’s position in legal terms 
arose in the case Camaud/S.0 .F.R.E.B.370 The Commission’s reasoning in the case 
however was ambiguous.
The decision involved the acquisition of 66.6 % of the shares held by Sacilor S.A. in 
Sofreb by its competitor, Camaud. The Commission found, directly referring to 
Philip Morris, that this acquisition would create a structure which would result in co­
operative behaviour with another competitor, Continental Can, which owned 33.4 % 
of the shares in Sofreb through a subsidiary. This constituted therefore an application 
of the principle in Philip Morris to the acquisition of majority holdings.371
As a compromise, Camaud offered to buy the shares owned by Continental Can 
through its subsidiary. Following an assessment under the Community competition 
rules, the Commission agreed to this since there would then be no risk of co-operation 
between two direct competitors.
Questionable is under which provision the Commission assessed these modifications 
to the transaction. The Press Release issued after the case was remarkably unclear on 
this point.372 Indeed, it does not say at all whether the assessment took place under 
Article 81 or 82 EC. Certainly there were no indications that Comaud held a 
dominant position in the market within the meaning of Article 82 EC. This does not 
preclude however that it was this provision under which the revised transaction was 
assessed.373
369 In Ferry, J., ibid, p .l 8. And see statement by Peter Sutherland above.
370 Other interesting but inconclusive cases include: British Airways/British Caledonian, 
Commission Decision, (1988) 4 CMLR 258; Air France/Air Inter/UTA, Commission Decision, 
Commission’s Twentieth Report on Competition Policy at point 116; GC&C/Irish Distillers, 
Commission Decision, (1988) 4 CMLR 840; GEC-Siemens/Plessey, Commission Decision, OJ 
C239/2 (1990); Hudson Bay, Commission Decision of 28 October 1988, OJ 1988 L316/43. 
Further, see Fine, F, (1987) ibid, pp. 58-64.
371 Repeated in Commission Bulletin, 1988 -1, p.27 that the principle applies to majority 
holdings.
Cf. Riesenkampff, who maintains that the case concerned a joint venture and simply followed 
an established Commission policy in: Riesenkampff, A., ibid, (1988) at pp.471-2.
372 Commission Press Release IP (88) 14 dated January 1988, ‘Settlement o f a Dispute 
Concerning the Acquisition o f Sofreb Shares by Camaud (France).'
373 Although cf, Scrivens, who considers that this fact alone allows the conclusion that Article 
81 EC was the provision applied in this case, in: Scrivens, R. 'The 'Philip Morris’ Case: Share 
Acquisitions and Complainants' Rights', 1988 6 EIPR 163-171.
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If the reporting of the reasoning in the case was (perhaps deliberately) vague, the 
attitude of the then Commissioner for competition, Peter Sutherland, however was 
(again) not: ';r!
‘This case is an important example o f how the Commission can apply Article 81 to mergers 
following the Court’s jurisprudence in the Philip Morris case.’ 374 375
3.5 Legal Climate Post-Philip Morris
As a preliminary, it is important to note that the Philip Morris decision by the Court 
of Justice was not as radical a development in legal terms as it might first appear. It 
was in line with the Court of Justice’s previous statements about the applicability of 
Article 82 EC to both conduct and to structural changes of ownership in Continental 
Can.™
In terms of its specific application in future concentration cases, the effect of the case 
was very limited. Its immediate legal implications were largely of uncertainty - legal 
and practical.
First, intense academic debate arose about the exact scope of the principle. Where it 
was - wrongly - denied that the case extended to the regulation of concentrations,376 
this lead only to further problems of principle: what was the meaning and extent of 
the required ‘independence’ of the participating companies (economic or legal)? How 
long must such independence subsist? How can the paradox between assumption of 
control and continued independence be resolved?377
374 Agence Europe, Nr. 4698, 13 January 1988, p.9. But cf Koenigs, who stresses that the 
Commission emphasised the danger of co-operation between the two parent companies which 
this case represented, and therefore this can be brought within the joint venture policy of the 
Commission in: Koenigs, F. Neuere Entwicklungen des EWG-Rechts, at p.152. In agreement, 
see Riesenkampff, A., ibid (1988), p.471-2.
375 See above, pp.60-62.
376 The difficulties in maintaining this position resulted in some rather artificial theoretical 
distinctions being drawn. For example, Schmidt claimed that the Philip Morris doctrine did not 
implement a system of concentration control according to Article 81 EC, but rather the 
application of EC cartel rules to conditions of concentration, in: Schmidt, K., ‘Europaeische 
Fusionskontrolle im System des Rechts gegen Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen\ BB Heft 11, 
20.04.90, p.723.
377 Various solutions to the paradox were posited. Some authors maintained that the Court had 
referred to the legal independence o f the parties rather than to their economic independence. 
See eg., Schoedermeier, M., ibid at pp. 189-90; Emmerich, V., JuS 1989, ibid at p.55. In detail 
on the implications of this distinction, see Deimel, A., ibid at p.101.
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Secondly, even if it is accepted that Article 81 EC applies to some types of 
concentrations, unacceptable levels of uncertainty still existed in the practical 
application of Article 81 EC to concentrations.378 If Article 81 EC were to apply to 
friendly public bids for example, and the transfer of the shares is declared null and 
void retrospectively, there arises the apparently insurmountable problem of tracing 
the original vendors.379 Furthermore, to re-enter the shares onto the stock exchange 
would create unacceptable legal and economic uncertainty on the markets.
The uncertainty caused by the Philip Morris judgment was coupled by a tangible 
hardening of attitudes by the Commission: the Commissioner in charge of 
competition policy, Peter Sutherland, warned that if the Council failed to adopt a 
Merger Control Regulation, the Commission would not have hesitated to apply 
Article 81 to concentrations.380
Thereby, the after-effects of the Philip Morris judgment was instrumental in changing 
the attitudes of both European industry and the Member States with regard to 
concentration control.381 Fundamental however was the aftermath of the 
implementation of the Single European Act.382
Another solution posited was that the requirement o f independence concerns the relationship 
between the seller and the purchaser, while the requirement of legal or de facto control 
concerns the relationship between purchaser and target company. See again, eg., Emmerich, 
JuS 19S9, ibid at pp. 54-55. This distinction is at best arbitrary and illogical. See criticism of 
Riesenkampff, who rightly states that only the relationship between the target and the purchaser 
is of any relevance in competition terms, Riesenkampff, ibid (1988).
Steindorff considers that Article 81 EC applies to the acquisition of control through the 
acquisition of shares up to a certain intensity where there is commercial or strategic unity. This 
is as clearly unworkable standard and it is not justified according to the wording of the Philip 
Morris decision. His alternative is to restrict the meaning of the Philip Morris doctrine to the 
facts of the case, but again this is clearly against the literal wording of the case, in: Steindorff, 
ibid.
Riesenkampff suggests that the Philip Morris doctrine only applies to the acquisition of a 
minority holding by one undertaking in another where there are also ancillary clauses giving de 
facto  or legal control of the acquiring undertaking over the commercial conduct of the target 
undertaking, in: Riesenkampff, A, ibid (1988) at pp.469-70. Also Venit, J., Private Investors 
Abroad, ibid.
378 On the uncertainty caused for business circles, see in particular, Calkoen, J.L. and Feenstra, 
J J ., Acquisition o f Shares in other Companies and EEC Competition Policy: The Philip 
Morris Decision, International Business Lawyer, 1988, pp.167-170.
379 See eg., Blumberg and Schoedermeier, ibid, p.36; Korah, V., ECLR 1987, ibid, p.240.
380 Commission Press Release, IP(87) 282 of 9 July 1987.
381 See Bulmer, S., ‘Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: the Case o f  
Concentration Control’, 1994 Public Administration, 72, 423-444 at p. 431-2. He notes that 
the legal uncertainty caused businesses to begin to notify concentration activity to DGIV, even 
though there was no clear set of rules and conventions. This created such concern that
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Summary of the Scope of the Philip Morris Principle 
Legal analysis of the Philip Morris case and the weight of subsequent Commission 
statements determines that Article 81 EC is applicable to horizontal mergers 
undertaken by previously independent undertakings by direct agreement or by 
friendly public take-over.382 83 It is also applicable to vertical and conglomerate mergers 
undertaken by previously independent undertakings by direct agreement or by 
friendly public take-over where their object or effect is a restriction of competition 
within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC.
The reluctance of some contemporary commentators384 to admit a system of 
concentration control under Article 81(1) EC, and consequent restrictive 
interpretation of the open-ended statement of principle by the Court, can be explained 
by two reasons. First, the definition of a restriction of competition within the meaning 
of Article 81(1) EC that was pervasive at that time included a restriction on the 
freedom to trade of a competitor, an approach that threw the inadequacy of Article 81 
EC as a system of merger control into sharp relief. Secondly, the inadequacies
corporate actors joined the existing alliance for supranational regulation. Also, see eg., 
B ulmer, S., ‘The Supranational Regulation o f Mergers’, RUSEL Working Paper May 1993; 
Woolcock, S, *European Concentrations: National or Community Controls?’, RIIA 
Discussion Papers, 15, 1989; Korah, V. and Lasok, P., 'Philip Morris and its Aftermath’, 
CMLRev (1988) vol.25, no.2, pp.333-68.
382 See above, pp.21-22.
383 See below on issue of continued applicability.
Note that Mestmaecker considers that the Philip Morris doctrine is applicable to all types of 
mergers, in: Mestmaecker, E-J, Fusionskontrolle im Gemeinsamen Markt zwischen 
Wettbewerbspolitik und Industriepolitik, EuR, 1988, p.349.
384 eg., Sedemund, J. and Montag, F., ibid; Schmidt, K., ibid; Steindorff, E., ibid (all without 
elaborating on the reasons);
Gonzalez Diaz and Jones, who state only that the Philip Morris case is ambiguous and suggest 
only that it should be read in the context of preceding Commission policy, Gonzalez-Diaz, E. 
and Jones, C., ibid at pp.79-83;
Immenga, U. and Fuchs, A. who posit the doctrine o f a qualified minority holding, being the 
acquisition o f a minority holding in a competitor with further agreed restrictions of 
competition, in: Immenga and Fuchs, ibid.
Riesenkampff, A ., ibid, who maintains that Philip Morris was restricted to the specific facts of 
case and in any case follows established Commission policy with regard to joint ventures, see 
Riesenkampff, ibid (1988);
Moosecker, K., who rejects the application of Article 81 EC to the acquisition of majority 
holdings according to an interpretation of the literal text (in particular paragraph 37) but does 
not thereby consider the paradox issue of the later paragraphs in: ‘Wendepunkt in 
europaeischen Kartellrecht: Einfuehrung einer Fusionskontrolle durch di richterliche 
Hintertuer? ’, Handelsblatt of 3.12.1987, Nr.232 at p.3.
But accepting the application of Article 81 EC to concentrations, see eg., Scrivens, R. ‘The 
‘Philip M orris’ Case: Share Acquisitions and Complainants’ Rights’, 1988 6 EIPR 163-171; 
Mestmaecker, E-, 1988, ibid; Fine, F., (1987) ibid, at p.342 (although he does seem to limit the 
doctrine to concentrations effected in oligopolistic markets); Schoedermeier, ibid at p.191.
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presented by the combination of Articles 81 and 82 EC meant that many 
commentators were anxious to maintain the pressure for an independent system of 
concentration control and to restrict the uncertainty of application of Article 81 to 
already established principles (according to the approach to joint ventures).
The contemporary stance adopted by the literature did not however reflect the 
reaction of the Commission (as shown by several official statements) or of the 
business community. Companies began to notify merger activity to the Commission 
voluntarily for clearance under Article 81 EC» even though there were no clear 
rules.385
D SUMMARY OF THE TYPES OF CONCENTRATION TO WHICH 
ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC MAY BE APPLIED
The Commission and the Court of Justice had therefore established a competence to 
apply Community law to certain types of concentrations before the implementation of 
the Merger Regulation.
The Commission, upheld by the Court of Justice, had established a legal competence 
to assess concentrations under Article 82 EC. This was possible with regard to any 
concentration involving an undertaking in a position of single or joint dominance over 
a substantial part of the Community that hinders the maintenance of the degree of 
competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition constitutes 
an abuse within the meaning of Article 82 EC. The concentration may be horizontal, 
vertical or conglomerate (although the condition is clearly more easily satisfied for 
horizontal concentrations).
The Court of Justice had also held that Article 81 EC is applicable to horizontal 
mergers undertaken by previously independent undertakings by direct agreement or 
by friendly public take-over.386 It is applicable to vertical and conglomerate mergers 
undertaken by previously independent undertakings by direct agreement or by
385 eg., Camaud, Commission Decision, ibid and GEC/Siemens/Plessy, OJ C239/2 (1990), 
(1992) 4 CMLR 471. See Financial Times, 6 February 1989, p.4 (noting that in 1988 DGIV 
had made 25 formal decisions and 36 written clearances).
386 See below on issue o f continued applicability.
Note that Mestmaecker considers that the Philip Morris doctrine is applicable to all types of 
mergers, in: Mestmaecker, E-J, Fusionskontrolle im Gemeinsamen Markt zwischen 
Wettbewerbspolitik und Industriepolitik, EuR, 1988, p.349.
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friendly public take-over where their object or effect is a restriction of competition 
within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC. In both cases, there must be an ‘appreciable’ 
effect on the free play of competition for the prohibition of Article 81(1) EC to bite.
i ,.
Having considered the types of concentrations to which Articles 81 and 82 EC are 
applicable, it is necessary to consider the extent to which they apply where there is an 
overlap with national control. In view of the primacy of Community law387, the 
jurisdictional divide between national and Community control of the types of mergers 
for which Articles 81 and 82 EC are applicable is established by the jurisdictional 
scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC.
387 See eg., Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68 (1969) ECR 1, (1969) CMLR 100.
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V THE SCOPE OF ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC - THE 
JURISDICTIONAL DEMARCATION LINES
A THE ISSUE
As stated above, the Commission and the Court of Justice established a legal 
competence to apply Community law to certain types of concentrations.388 This was 
in recognition of an existing gap in the Community’s competencies with regard to the 
Treaty aim of maintaining structures of undistorted competition within the Common 
Market (Article 3g EC). As has been demonstrated, this aim is consistent with the 
Community objective of Single Market integration.
The competence to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC to mergers in general not only 
restricted to concentrations of a specific form and structure. It is also limited by the 
jurisdictional scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC: the scope of the application of the 
interstate trade criterion.With regard to Article 81 EC, there is also a further condition 
that must be fulfilled: the restriction on competition must be ‘appreciable*. This is a 
quantitative condition requiring that the restriction be of sufficient gravity for 
Community law to be applicable in place of national provisions of competition law.
B THE JURISDICTIONAL CRITERION FOR ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC 
. ■ AN EFFECT ON INTERSTATE TRADE
The interstate trade criterion determines the legal competence to apply Articles 81 
and 82 EC. It defines the boundary between conduct which is subject to Community 
law and conduct which is governed solely by national law. For either of Articles 81 
and 82 EC to apply, the conduct in question must ‘affect interstate trade' in order for 
either of the Articles to be applicable.
Whereas the appreciability condition for Article 81 EC sets a quantitative threshold to 
omit conduct that is not of sufficient scale to be of concern at the Community level,
388 Note that this is not a legal right of the Community to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC; it is a 
general legal right of application since national authorities (and in certain cases, national 
courts) may also apply Articles 81(1) and Article 82 EC. See in detail on this, eg., Bellamy and 
Child, (1994), ibid, pp.641-668; Whish, (1993) ibid, pp.318-328. Contrast this position with 
the Merger Regulation below. —
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the interstate trade criterion pinpoints conduct that is likely to be of a Community 
dimension rather than a national dimension because of its actual effect.
In order to analyse the legal competence to apply Community law to concentrations, it 
is necessary to analyse the interpretation and the operation of this criterion in detail.
2.1 The ‘Effect on Interstate Trade* Condition as an Autonomous Criterion 
Analysis of early academic debate reveals that it was by no means clear that the 
interstate trade criterion represented an independent jurisdictional criterion at all. 
There was some suggestion that it might rather form part of the condition in the 
substantive assessment of conduct under Articles 81 and 82 EC. The debate centred 
upon the correct interpretation of the word ‘effect*.
2.1.1 The Academic Debate - The Meaning of *Effect’
The controversy focused upon whether the word ‘effect* should be interpreted as a 
neutral or a pejorative condition: is the condition of the criterion fulfilled when 
conduct has both a negative and positive influence on interstate trade, or does it only 
require a harmfitl influence on those trade patterns?389
The problem was exacerbated by the words adopted in the different language versions 
of the original Treaty. The verb used in French, ‘'affected, has a predominantly 
neutral sense, but could also be employed to suggest a pejorative meaning. The 
German word ‘beeintraechtigen* is similarly ambiguous. On the other hand, the 
corresponding words used for the Italian p regiudicare*) and Dutch ( ‘ongunstig bein 
vloeden ’) versions of the Treaty are more pejorative.
The consequences of each approach are distinct. If the criterion is pejorative, it may 
thereby be seen as dependent upon - and even part of - the substantive assessment 
determining a breach of Articles 85 or 86 EC. If, on the other hand, it has a neutral 
sense, it may be seen as an autonomous jurisdictional trigger.
While the early academic debate concentrated upon the literal text of the criterion, the 
approach of the Court of Justice however could be seen to move away from the literal 
text to adopt a more teleological approach.
389 For a detailed account, see Goldman, B. and Lyon-Caen, A., ‘Droit Commercial 
European*, Fourth Edition, 1983, Paris.
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2.1.2 The Approach of the Court of Justice
2.1.2.1 The Interstate Trade Criterion as a Jurisdictional Criterion
The Court of Justice has declared on numerous occasions that the purpose of the 
interstate trade criterion was to * define the boundary between the areas respectively 
covered by Community law and the law of the Member States. ,39° It therefore clearly 
considers the interstate trade criterion to be a jurisdictional criterion determining the 
scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC, autonomous of the substantive assessment carried out 
according to these Articles.
This result may be further deduced by a comparison of Articles 81 and 82 EC with 
the equivalent provisions set down in the Coal and Steel Treaty. Within the sectors to 
which the ECSC Treaty applies, the Member States gave up entirely their 
competencies to apply national provisions of competition law. There is no 
jurisdictional issue with regard to the delimitation of Member State and Community 
competence in these sectors. Thereby, Articles 65(1) and 66(7) ECSC, which are 
equivalent provisions to Articles 81 and 82 in the EC Treaty, do not contain the 
further condition that there should be an effect on interstate trade.
2.1.2.2 The Context for the Interpretation of the Interstate Trade Criterion 
a The Original Definition
The original definition of the ‘effect on inter-state trade' criterion laid down by the 
Court of Justice was in the case of Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm:
391
‘ it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of 
objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct 
or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States. " 39012
390 See eg., Consten and Grundig v Commission Cases 56 and 58/64 1966 ECR 299 at 341; 
Commercial Solvents v Commission Cases 6 & 7/73 (1974) ECR 223 (1974) 1 CMLR 309, 
Paragraphs 30-33; Hugin Kassaregister AB v Commission Case 22/78 1979 ECR 1869 at 1899. 
See also Advocate General Trabbuchi in Papiers Peints v Commission Case 73/74 (1975) ECR 
1491,1522-1524 (1976) 1 CMLR 589,602-605.
391 Case 56/65 (1966) ECR 235, (1966) CMLR 357.
392 Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm Case 56/65 1966 ECR 235 at 249.
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b The Development of the Original Interpretation
Subsequently, however, that initial interpretation was developed. In fact, w ithin the 
space o f  a  month, the European C ourt had supplemented th is ruling by its decision in 
the  Grundig  case.393 H ere, the C ourt emphasised the overall context in which the 
criterion m ust be examined. Its purpose is to  establish  a boundary betw een 
Com m unity law and that o f  the M em ber States in the contex t o f competition rules, 
w hereby it  covers:
‘any threat, either direct, actual o r  potential, to  freedom  o f  trade between M em ber 
States in  a manner which m ight harm  the attainment o f  the  objectives o f  a  single  
m arket between States’ *94
T he scope o f Articles 81 and 82 E C  should therefore cover all conduct that affects 
in terstate trade whereby the  objectives o f  the Single M arket m ight be harmed.
c Pejorative or Neutral Effect?
T h e  C ourt then went on to  state th e  nature o f ‘effect* on  interstate trade that w as 
required:
‘Thus the fact that an agreement encourages an increase, even a large one, in the volume of 
trade between States is not sufficient to exclude the possibility that the agreement may ‘affect’ 
such trade...’.395
In an answ er to the linguistic debate that had been carried o u t in academic circles, the 
C ourt therefore made clear that the 1'effect’ did not have to  be detrimental; it could 
even m ean an increase in trade. T h e  decisive factor denoting a Community interest 
w as show n to be not in the quantitative  effect on trade, that is whether trade is 
increased o r  hindered, but rather in a  change in the structures and flo w  o f  trade itself. 
I f  the alleged infringement changed the  intensity o r the direction o f the flow  of goods, 
artific ially  diverting it from  its norm al and natural course (in a manner that m ight 
harm  Com munity objectives), then Community law  is invoked.
393 Consten and Grundig v Commission Cases 56 and 58/64 1966 ECR 299.
394 Author’s emphasis.
395 Consten and Grundig v Commission Cases 56 and 58/64 1966 ECR 299 at 341.
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Hence, the word ’effect’ is indeed neutral in its application: it entails both positive and 
negative consequences. Nevertheless, it also must have as a consequence a negative 
effect on the objectives of the Single Market.
3 The Application of the Interstate Trade Criterion in Practice
3.1 An Effect on the Flow or Pattern of Trade
3.1.1 The Concept of Trade*
First, the meaning of 'trade’ has been found to extend beyond just the movement of 
goods. It also incorporates the supply of services396, such as insurance397, banking and 
money transmission398, the management of artistic copyrights399, the organisation of 
trade fairs400, television broadcasts and the services of public utilities401 (such as gas 
and electricity402). Even the performance of individual artistes403 and the provision of 
consulting services by an individual404 405have been held to constitute ‘trade* within the 
context of the criterion.
Moreover, the right of establishment and the free movement of the suppliers also 
constitute ‘trade’403. Similarly, the flow of profits from one Member State to 
another406. It even appears that where a business established in one Member State has 
a branch407 in another, the existence of the branch constitutes trade, so that if the
3 eg., GVL v Commission Case 7/82 (1983) ECR 483; Bodson v Pompes Funebrés des 
Regions Uberées Case 30/87 (1988) ECR 2479 (1989) 4 CMLR 984.
397 eg., VdS v Commission Case 45/85 (1987) ECR 405 (1988) 4 CMLR 264.
398 eg., Zuechner v Bayerische Vereinsbank Case 172/80 (1981) ECR 2021 (1982) 1 CMLR 
313.
399 eg., BRT  v SAB AM Case 127/73 (1974) ECR 51 and 313 (1974) 2 CMLR 238, 269 and 
282.
400 eg., SMM&T Exhibition Agreement, Commission Decision OJ 1983 L376/1 (1984) 1 
CMLR 611.
401 eg., Sacchi Case 155/73 (1974) ECR 409 (1974) 2 CMLR 177.
402 eg., Scottish Nuclear, Nuclear Energy Agreements, Commission Decision OJ 1991 
L178/31.
403 RA1/UNITEL, Commission Decision OJ 1978 L157/39 (1978) 3 CMLR 306.
404 Reuter/BASF, Commission Decision OJ 1976 L254/40 (1976) 2 CMLR D44. Note however 
that it is not clear whether the provision of professional services fulfils the term, even if 
governed by a system of ethical rules, see Bellamy and Child, ibid, at p.109.
405 Pronuptia de Paris v Schillgalis, Case 161/84 1986 ECR 353 at 26.
406 Fire Insurance (D), Commission Decision OJ 1985 L35/20,29-36 (1985) 3 CMLR 246, on 
appeal VdS v Commission Case 45/85 (1987) ECR 405 (1988) 4 CMLR 264.
407 The definition of ‘branch’ is broad; it is thought to include any company in which more 
than half of the shares are owned by foreigners.
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activities o f the branch are affected directly or indirectly, there is a relevant effect408. 
Trade* is therefore an extremely broad concept409.
3.1.2 The Concept o f ‘Effect* - Alteration o f T rade Flow s
* ...it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of 
objective factors of law or fact that it may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or 
potential on the pattern of trade between Member States, such as might prejudice the aim of a 
single market in all the Member States.*410
The Court of Justice and the Commission adopt the same approach in assessing the 
criterion. In essence, the condition is fulfilled if the conduct in question alters the 
normal flow or pattern of trade, or causes trade to develop differently from the way it 
would have developed in the absence of the agreement411.
As noted above, the ‘effect* upon transnational trade itself is neutral, and may 
therefore include an increase in interstate trade412 413. It may be direct*11: there is no 
doubt that the condition is satisfied if it could directly result in the partitioning of 
national markets, thereby hindering the objective of integration, which represents the 
context in which the criterion is to be applied414. This covers arrangements confining 
an undertaking’s activities to one area that will prevent it from operating elsewhere in 
the Community, and such exclusive arrangements often have a virtually automatic 
effect on trade between Member States415.
408 Verband der Sachversicherer e.V. v. Commission Case 45/85, 1987 ECR 405 pp.441-4, 
458-9; Belgische Vereeniging der Banken, Commission Decision O J. 1987 L. 7/27 p.33.
409 The concept of ‘trade’ was described by the Court of Justice as having ‘a wide scope’, in, 
eg., Zuechner v Bayerische Vereinsbank, Case 172/80 (1981) ECR 2021 (1982) 1 CMLR 313.
410 This is the interpretation which the Court of Justice has consistently used, eg., Grundig v 
Commission, Case, ibid.
411 eg., Frubo v Commission Case 71/74 (1975) ECR 563 (1975) 2 CMLR 123; Michelin v 
Commission Case 322/81 (1983) ECR 3461 (1985) 1 CMLR 282; VW/MAN, Commission 
Decision OJ 1983 L376/11 (1984) 1 CMLR 621; Aluminium imports from Eastern Europe 
Commission Decision OJ 1985 L92/1,46 (1987) 3 CMLR 813.
412 Case, ibid.
413 eg., the agreement directly relates to international transactions (eg., Zuechener, Case ibid), 
restricts imports or exports (eg., Miller v Commission Case 19/77 1978 ECR 131 1978 2 
CMLR 334), where the parties are situated in different Member States (eg., Sole distribution 
agreements fo r whisky and gin. Commission Decision OJ 1985 L369/19 1986 2 CMLR 664), 
or where the agreement applies to more than one Member State (eg., Cases 43 & 63/82 VBVB 
and VBBB v Commission 1984 ECR 19 1985 1 CMLR 27).
414 eg, Papier Peints v Commission Case 73/74 (1975) ECR 1491 (1976) 1 CMLR 589; 
Salonia v Poidomani and Giglio Case 126/80 (1981) ECR 1563 (1982) 1 CMLR 64.
415 See eg., Pronuptia Case 161/84, 1986 ECR 353, 384, (CCH) at 14,245, ground 26, where 
the Court of Justice held that: franchise agreements for the distribution o f goods which 
contain provisions sharing markets between the franchiser and the franchisees or between the
I l l
It may also be indirect 4I6: foreign trade is not necessary; it is sufficient if the 
behaviour merely renders it more difficult to import products417. Indeed, the products 
affected need not even be goods or services which are in competition with those of 
the party under investigation. Thus, in Salonia v Poidomani418, an agreement 
concerning domestic press had a sufficient effect on the import of foreign newspapers 
(which were not inter-changeable with the national product) since the products shared 
the same channels of distribution. In B.N.I.C. v Aubert419 the Court of Justice found 
that a restriction on the production of a raw material (produced locally) affected 
interstate trade because the end product (cognac) was exported all over the world.
It may be further stressed that there is not even a need to prove an actual effect on 
trade between Member States - a potential effect suffices.420 It is then sufficient that 
there is a possibility that foreign competitors might decide to enter the home market, 
or that such a demand might come into existence and the Commission and the 
European Courts will also consider the way the market and the trade of the parties 
concerned might develop over time.421 Thus, the Court of Justice stated in AEG v 
Commission:
‘...the mere fact that at a certain time traders applying for admission to a distribution network 
or who have already been admitted are not engaged in intra-Community trade cannot suffice to 
exclude the possibility that restrictions on their freedom of action may impede intra- 
Community trade, since the situation may change from one year to another in terms of
franchisees themselves are in any event liable to affect trade between Member States, even i f  
they are entered into by undertakings established in the same Member State, in so far as they 
prevent franchisees from establishing themselves in another Member State ’.
See also. Commission Decisions: BMW Belgium NV and Belgian BMW Dealers, OJ (1978) 
L046/33, paragraph 23; 80/1283, Johnson and Johnson at paragraphs 35-36; 84/282 Pilots SpA 
and Arbois-Modelud Agreement at paragraphs 4043, 50-51; 82/203 Moet et Chandon Lid at 
paragraph 13; Miller International Schallplatten GMBH, paragraphs 5-6,10-17.
416 Re Zanussi SpA Guarantee, Commission Decision OJ (1978) L 322/26, (1979) 1 CMLR 
81.
417 An example of this would be the requiring of a foreign business to sell goods through 
smaller distributors, see eg Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v EC Commission Case 8/72 
1972 ECR 977, p.991.
4,8 Case 126/80 1981 ECR 1563.
419 Case 136/86,1987 ECR.
420 Eg. AEG-Telefunken v Commission Case 107/82 1983 ECR 3151,1984 3 CMLR 325. 
Commission Decisions: Re Vacuum Interrupters Ltd OJ 1977 L 48/32, 1977 1 CMLR D 67; 
Servicemaster, L332/38 OJ (1988), (1989) 4 CMLR 581 at paragraph 23; Scottish Nuclear, 
Nuclear Energy Agreement, OJ (1991) L 178/31 at paragraph 31.
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alterations in the conditions or composition of the market both in the common market as a 
whole and in the individual national markets.
Furthermore, the condition may also be fulfilled if the conduct is confined to a single 
Member State. There have been numerous cases.421 23 Where an agreement is intended 
to operate across an entire national market there seems to be an almost irrebuttable 
presumption that it will affect inter-state trade.424 In Belasco v Commission425, the 
Court stated that successful cartels confined to a single Member State have to take 
measures to oppose imports, and therefore national agreements may be prohibited. 
Distribution agreements within one Member State (or even to a small area within a 
Member State) may fulfil the criterion if they are part of a network of identical or 
similar agreements. Thereby, the cumulative effect of the network on trade must be 
considered.426
In general, where there are actual or potential direct restrictions on imports or exports 
between Member States, the conditions of application for the prohibition are usually
421 Allgemeine Elektrizitaets-Gesellschafi A.E.G.-Telefunken A.G. v Commission Case 107/82 
1983 ECR 3151; Miller International Schallplatten GmbH. v. Commission Case 19/77, 1978 
ECR 131 pp. 150-1; Chemie B.V. v. Commission Case C-62/86 1991 ECR 1-3359 p.3374.
422 AEG  v Commission Case 107/82, 1983 ECR 3151,3201, at 14018, ground 60.
423 eg. Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH Case 56/65 (1966) ECR 235, 
(1966) 1 CMLR 357; Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission Case 8/72 (1972) 
ECR 977; (1973) CMLR 7; S C Belasco v Commission Case 246/86 (1989) ECR 2117, (1991) 
4 CMLR 96; Remia and Others v Commission Case 42/84 (1985) ECR 2545 para.22,(1987) 1 
CMLR 1; Bundeskartellamt v Volkswagen Case C-266/93 (1995) ECR, 1-3477, (1996) 4 
CMLR Antitrust Reports 505; Re Vacuum Interrupters Ltd Commission Decision OJ 1977 L 
48/32, 1977 1 CMLR D 67; Re Italian Cast Glass Commission Decision OJ 1980 L 383/19, 
1982 2 CMLR 61; Re Italian Flat Glass Commission Decision OJ 1981 L 326/32 1982 3 
CMLR 366.
424See also eg Salonia v Poidomani Case 126/80 1981 ECR 1563, 1982 1 CMLR 64; 
Pronuptia de Paris v Schillgalis Case 161/84 1986 ECR 353, 1986 1 CMLR 414. See Faull, 
ibid at p.494, who affirms this principle. Also Whish, 1993, ibid, p218.
425 Case 246/86 (1989) ECR 2181, (1991) 4 CMLR 96 at 33-35.
426 eg., Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin and Wilkin, Case 23/67 1967 ECR 407; Erauw-Jacquery 
v La Hesbignonne, Case 27/87 (1988) ECR 1919 (1988) 4 CMLR. The Court of Justice has 
also analysed a selective distribution system by reference to the structure of the market 
concerned including the possible existence of similar distribution arrangements operated by 
other manufacturers, eg., Case 75/84, 1986 ECR 3021, 3985.
For an example of the Commission applying the cumulative approach to a distribution system, 
see Royon/Meilland (Roses), Commission Decision OJ L369/9 (1985). It has also applied the 
approach in its substantive analysis o f joint ventures, eg. Optical Fibres, Commission Decision 
OJ L236/30 (1986).
Note that the De Minimis exception is also subject to the network rule. It does not apply 4where 
in a relevant market competition is restricted by the cumulative effects o f parallel networks of 
similar agreements established by several manufacturers or dealers. OJ (1997) C372/04.
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satisfied.427 More recently, however, the Court of Justice has tended to accept 
appreciable effects on interstate trade even where there was no indicated mechanism 
restraining trade across frontiers.428 Thereby, the application of the condition in 
practice has become extremely wide. In the case Windsurfing International Inc v 
Commission429, the ECJ stated that, although it would only be the particular 
provisions that restricted competition that would be void, if an agreement as a whole 
affects trade between Member States, Article 81 may be breached even where those 
restrictions of competition do not affect such trade.430
Essentially, there need only be an indirect causation between the conduct and any 
actual or potential effect on interstate trade in the relevant market, or on a dependent 
market.431
3,2 The Hindering of the Objectives of the Single Market
If the required ’effect* is neutral, it must however have a negative consequence: it 
must hinder the objectives of the Single Market:
‘any threat, either direct, actual or potential, to freedom of trade between Member States in a 
manner which might harm the attainment o f the objectives o f a single market between 
States’432
427 See eg., Servicemaster, Commission Decision of 14 November 1988, OJ 1988, L332/38 at 
Paragraph 23; Scottish Nuclear, Nuclear Energy Agreement, Commission Decision of 30 April 
1991, OJ (1991) L 178/31 at Paragraph 31.
An exception appears to be the Hugin case, Case ibid. Korah suggests that the reason for this is 
that the condition about trade between Member States is meant to distinguish important 
agreements, subject to Community competence, from minor ones to be dealt with only by 
national authorities (see Korah, V., ‘An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and 
P r a c t ic e 1997, Hart, Oxford, at p. 59). It is submitted that this interpretation is misguided 
(note that Korah herself states that the Court did not make such an argument) and here would 
only add to the uncertainty of the application of the criterion. In fact, the case can be explained 
upon much more objective reasoning that there was no current interstate trade in the relevant 
market, nor was there likely to be in the future (see below).
428 See eg., BNIC vAubert, Case 136/86,1987 ECR 
See Korah, 1997, ibid at p.59
429 Case 193/83 (1986) ECR 611, (1986) 3 CMLR489.
430 See further eg, Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns (decision of the English High Court QB) 1986 I 
CMLR 1; Welded Steel Mesh Commission Decision OJ 1989 L 260/1,1991 4 CMLR 13 at 162 
; Holleran v Daniel Thwaites P.L.C. (decision o f the English High Court Chancery 
Division) 1989 2 CMLR 917 and see Shaw, ‘The United Kingdom\ in: Behrens, P. 'EEC 
Competition Rules in National Courts’, Part 2, Nomos, Baden Baden 1992 p. 140 on Holleran 
as an example of this rule.
431 BNIC v Aubert, Case 136/86, ibid (the case concerned a down-stream market).
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The early practice of the Commission and the Court of Justice regarded an actual or 
potential effect upon interstate trade as automatically hindering the objectives of the 
common market. Specifically, conduct or agreements (or concerted practices) that 
affected (or could affect) interstate trade would automatically hinder the process of 
integration by partitioning markets and preventing the free flow of trade between the 
Member States.
It has been established above that conduct is assessed for its compatibility with 
Articles 81 and 82 EC (once it has been established that either is applicable) within 
the context of the overriding Community objective of Single Market integration: the 
integration objective informs the substantive assessment of conduct that takes place 
under Articles 81 and 82 EC.432 33 It could therefore be envisaged that a condition 
requiring a hindering of the Single Market integration process for Articles 81 and 82 
EC be applicable (in the application of the jurisdictional criterion) is superfluous; the 
substantive assessment embraces both the question of the applicability of Articles 81 
and 82 EC and the question of whether they have been infringed.434 This would be 
however to ignore the literal wording of the Court of Justice. The ECJ considered the 
jurisdictional criterion to be fulfilled where "any threat, either direct, actual or 
potential, to freedom of trade between Member States in a manner which might harm 
the attainment of the objectives of a single market between States.’435 Thus, the 
condition contained within the jurisdictional criterion requires a potential harm to the 
objectives of the Community for Articles 81 or 82 EC to apply. On the other hand, the 
substantive condition of each of these Articles, that is the assessment of conduct once 
it is established that either Article 81 or 82 EC is applicable, focuses upon assessing 
whether there has been an actual harm to those objectives. As detailed above, the 
Court of Justice and the Commission prohibit agreements under Article 81 EC and 
conduct under Article 82 EC that actually harm the integration paradigm.436
Fault has expressed the test as 'the reasonably foreseeable effect on the reasonably 
foreseeable development o f trade’. Faull, (1989) ibid, at p. 493
432 Case, ibid, Author’s emphasis. See also, eg., Brasserie de Haecht S.A. v Wilkin and 
Another, Case 23/67 (1967) ECR 407, (1967) CMLR 26 at Paragraph 5.
433 See above.
434 Thereby, some German scholars would describe the interstate trade criterion as being both 
a TCollisionsnorm’ and a ‘Sachnorm’. See eg, Koenigs, F., 'Die Beeintraechtigung des 
Handels Zwischen Mitgliedstaaten’, ibid, at p.570.
435 Author’s emphasis.
436 See above at pp 13-31.
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Some years after the Grundig judgment437 however, the Court of Justice appeared to 
develop the application of the interstate trade criterion on the basis if this further 
condition.
3.2.1 The Commercial Solvents Case438 439- A Structure of Undistorted Competition 
within the Community as an Autonomous Criterion 
The case concerned a refusal to supply by an Italian company (a subsidiary of the US- 
based Commercial Solvents company) to a downstream competitor in Italy (Zoja). 
Commercial Solvents was the only world source of the raw material concerned and a 
refusal to supply meant that Zoja would be eliminated from the relevant market. Zoja 
sold 90% of its production on world (non-Community) markets. The applicants 
therefore claimed that the refusal to supply did not affect interstate trade, since Zoja 
was not involved in interstate trade.
The Court of Justice however, in its consideration of the scope of Article 82 EC, 
stressed the importance of Article 3g EC (that is ancillary to the overall integration 
objective under Article 2 EC), according to which the activities of the Community 
shall include the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common 
Market is not distorted:
‘when an undertaking in a dominant position within the Common Market abuses its position in 
such a way that a competitor in the Common Market is likely to be eliminated, if does not 
matter whether the conduct relates to the latter's exports or to its trade within the Common 
Market, once it has been established that this elimination will have repercussions on the 
competitive structure within the Common Market. ^ 39
437 Case, ibid.
438 Case 6 and 7/73 (1974) ECR 223.
439 ibid, at 8821. The Commercial Solvents doctrine has been confirmed on numerous 
occasions, see eg, Greenwich Film Prod, v: SACEM, Case 22/79, 1979 ECR 3275; United 
Brands Case ibid; GVL v EC Commission Case 7/82, 1983, ECR 483, 3 CMLR 645; 
BPCIACI, Commission Decision O.J. L 212/1 (1984); Re Vacuum Interrupters Ltd 
Commission Decision OJ (1977) L  48/32; ENl/Montedison, Commission Decision OJ L5/13 
(1987) Napier Brown-British Sugar Commission Decision OJ (1988) L284/41; ECS/AKZO 
Commission Decision OJ (1985) L374/1; London-European-Sabena, Commission Decision OJ 
1988 L317/47,1989 4 CMLR.
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Thereby, it became arguable that a mere distortion of the competitive structures with 
the Community was sufficient to render Articles 81 and 82 EC, without the need to 
show an actual or potential effect on interstate trade.'440
3.2.2 A Synthesis of the Two Approaches in Practice: ffagm441 42
The judgment of the Court of Justice in Hugiri442 provided an implicit limitation to the 
scope of the criterion in line with an explicit recommendation by Advocate General 
Reischl in the same case. Advocate General Reischl had emphasised that the effect on 
the structure of competition within a Member State was not sufficient to fulfil the 
condition of an effect on interstate trade. His reasoning centred upon the need to keep 
the jurisdictional criterion separate from the substantive condition of Articles 81 and 
82 EC, which was in line with the purpose and the wording of the interstate trade 
criterion:
‘To me it would at any event appear unacceptable to treat the criterion of an effect on trade as 
being virtually the same as an effect on competition. That would be an interpretation contrary 
to the wording, according to which the element of an effect on trade is of particular importance 
in delineating the sphere of application, which can only mean that that element must have an 
independent meaning/443
He also stressed that in the Commercial Solvents and United Brands judgments (the 
latter of which invoked the Commercial Solvents doctrine), the conduct involved was
440 See eg. Goldman, B., Lyon-Caen, A. and Vogel, L., ibid, at p.742. Koenigs offers a useful
breakdown of the types of conduct and agreements which will fulfil the criterion, stating that 
there are two groups: conduct or agreements which directly or indirectly partition national 
markets and conduct or agreements which effect the system of undistorted competition within 
the Community in the sense of Article 3g EC. Nevertheless, he concedes that the Court of 
Justice does not expressly distinguish between these two types and concludes that the criteria 
developed by the Court of Justice determining the fulfilment of the criterion are very abstract 
and undefined, Koenigs, F., 1988,‘Di<? Beeingtraechtigung des Handels zwischen
Mitgliedstaaten’, in: *Strafrecht, Untemehmungsrecht, Anwaltsrecht’, Festschrift fuer Ernst 
Pfeiffer at pp.573-5; 585.
See also Faull, J. (1989) at p.499. He suggests however that nearly all cases impairment of 
structure will also give rise to actual or potential alteration of trade patterns and that it is often 
difficult to determine which approach has been adopted by the Commission or the European 
Courts (See eg, Suiker Unie v Commission, Joined Cases 40-48/73, 50/73, 54-56/73, 111/73, 
113/73, 114/73, 1975 ECR 1663; C.R.A.M. and Rheinzink v. Commission, Cases 29 & 30/83, 
1984 ECR 1679); Rolled Zinc and Alloys, Commission Decision OJ L362/40 (1982).
441 Hugin v. Commission, Case 22/78, 1979 ECR 1869.
442 Hugin v. Commission, Case 22/78, 1979 ECR 1869.
443 Case, ibid at Paragraph 8.
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not actually confined to a single Member State; some interstate trade was involved.444 
Analysis of the two cases confirms this contention. In Commercial Solvents445 the 
Court of Justice stressed that Zoja was at present able to export (and was actively 
doing so on a very limited scale) to at least two Member States. In United Brands,446 
the relevant conduct had made it impossible for the Danish undertaking concerned to 
purchase bananas in Germany and then market them in Denmark.
The effect of the Court of Justices final judgment in Hugin447 was to provide a 
synthesis of the two approaches, without however explicitly addressing the 
controversy.
The Hugin448 case involved a refusal by of a cash register manufacturer (Hugin) to 
supply new cash registers (for sale and rent) and spare parts (for maintenance) to 
Liptons. Uptons was established in London. In 1971, Uptons became general agent 
for the marketing of Hugin cash registers in England, Scotland and Wales. In the 
European countries where it was active (United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands), the machines were marketed by 
subsidiary companies of Hugin, general agents or main distributors. Following a 
restructuring of the UK distributors in UK, distribution in the UK fell under the 
almost exclusive control of a subsidiary company of Hugin. This subsidiary 
restructured the sales organisation in the UK, including thirteen main distributors 
each responsible for a certain territory. Under this system, Liptons was offered the 
opportunity to be authorised dealer for the London region.
444 Note also that Advocate General Mischo stated in his second opinion in Belasco and others 
v Commission that:
/  do not share the opinion that in the case o f a purely national agreement it is permissible 
to conclude that trade between Member States has been affected solely because the structure 
o f competition within that Member State has been changed in such a way that imports 
encounter conditions different from those which would have prevailed in the absence o f the 
agreement. It seems to me that if such a principle were upheld, the great majority o f purely 
national agreement would be deemed to affect trade between the Member States and would be 
caught by Article 85. I do not think that such a result is in conformity with the spirit o f the 
provision.’ Case, ibid at Paragraph 14.
445 Case, ibid.
446 Case, ibid.
447 Hugin v. Commission, Case 22/78, 1979 ECR 1869.
448 Hugin v. Commission, Case 22/78, 1979 ECR 1869.
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Unhappy with the profit margins of such a distributory network» Uptons refused, and 
subsequently the UK subsidiary of Hugin refused to supply new cash registers and 
spare parts. Liptons complained to the Commission that this was an abuse of a 
dominant position under Article 82 EC. The Commission sustained this claim. Hugin 
then appealed to the Court of Justice.
The Court of Justice examined the applicability of Article 82 EC to Hugin* s conduct 
based upon the application of the interstate trade criterion in some detail.
The application of the test depends on establishing the hypothetical situation where 
the alleged infringement does not exist. If this demonstrates a pattern of interstate 
trade different from that which has evolved because of the infringement, the relevant 
effect is established.
The Court examined separately the effects on Liptoris commercial activities and on 
trade in spare parts in general, both of which were markets on which Hugin held a 
dominant position.
a H ugin*s Commercial Conduct
Thus, it was established that Liptons* commercial activities were based in the London 
region; they never extended beyond the United Kingdom, nor were there any 
intentions to do so. This conclusion was reinforced by looking at the particular nature 
of the activities in question: the maintenance, repair and renting out of cash registers 
and the sale of used machines cannot constitute profitable operations beyond a certain 
area around the commercial base of the undertaking. On this basis, there could neither 
be an effect on interstate trade in terms of the pattern or flow of trade, nor in terms of 
a distortion of the structure of competition in the Community; the markets are 
strongly localised.
b Hugin*s Distribution of Spare Parts
In terms of the distribution of Hugin spare parts, it was noted that Liptons had 
attempted unsuccessfully to obtain such parts from Hugin distributors in other 
Member States. Prima facie, there appeared to be then an impediment to interstate 
trade.
Questionable was whether this conduct of Hugin had the effect of an export ban, 
preventing interstate trade where it would otherwise take place. Here, it was
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necessary to examine whether there would have been any advantage to a potential 
repairer (which is not subject to a refusal to sell) in obtaining spare parts from another 
Member State other than the one in which it is based (baring in mind that the 
Community-wide structure of the market is of small localised firms).
In considering this question, the Court of Justice pointed to the value of spare parts as 
being Relatively insignificant’. Therefore, there was little commercial interest in 
imports and exports from and to different Member States. Furthermore, it was not 
alleged that there were price differentials on various local markets. The Court of 
Justice concluded that:
’...Hugin’s conduct cannot be regarded as having the effect o f diverting the movement of goods 
from its normal channels, taking account of the economic and technical factors peculiar to the 
sector in question.’
In summary then, there was no reason under normal commercial conditions for an 
independent undertaking to turn to a supplier based in a Member State different from 
the one in which it operated. Uptons' attempts to exercise interstate trade represented 
not the course of normal trade, but an attempt to compensate for the existence of the 
refusal to supply. Without the Hugin distribution network (which excludes Uptons), 
there would be no question of interstate trade.
Thus, the jurisdictional criterion for the application of Article 86 EC was not fulfilled 
for Hugin's conduct on either market.
c Evaluation
The Hugin judgment449 determines that where the relevant markets are, according to 
normal commercial conditions, localised, exclusively national and isolated and there 
is no actual or potential interstate trade within the relevant product market, or a 
dependent market, Articles 81 and 82 EC will not apply. There must be an interstate 
trade element involved. It is irrelevant that there was a clear effect on the structures of 
competition (including the actual exclusion of a market player).450
449 Case, ibid.
450 Note that Goldman and Lyon-Caen even considered that Hugin’s distribution system was 
large enough to have had a Community dimension, that is that the conduct affected Community 
structures of competition and not just national structures of competition, ibid, at p.742. But 
against this, Bellamy and Child, ibid at p. 117-118.
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This conclusion is coherent with the general statement of the Court of Justice 
expressed in the judgment concerning the application of the interstate trade criterion:
‘Community law covers any agreement or practice which is capable o f constituting a threat to 
freedom o f  trade between member-States in a manner which might harm the attainments of the 
objectives of a Single Market between the member-States, in particular by partitioning the 
national markets or by affecting the structure o f  competition within the Common Market.'*51
Questionable is whether this pattern has been followed in the application of the 
Commercial Solvents doctrine in subsequent Commission decisions and cases before 
the Community courts.
3.2.3 Later Applications of the Commercial Solvents Doctrine 
This approach has been followed in all the applications of the structural approach by 
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance.451 52 Similarly, the Commission has 
consistently adopted this approach. Two examples are Soda-ash - /C/453 and Soda- 
ash - Solvay,454
Soda-ash-ICI Decision
In the first case, there was conduct which was directly aimed at imports from outside 
the Community by a dominant undertaking in the UK market. The Commission 
stressed that the relevant conduct should be examined in the overall context of the 
phenomenon of the strict separation of national markets in the Community. It stated:
451 ibid, at paragraph 17 (author’s emphasis).
452 See eg, Greenwich Film Prod. v. SACEM, Case 22/79, 1979 ECR 3275; Radio Telefis 
Eireann v European Commission, Case T69/89, ECR 1991, vol.II, 485; BBC v European 
Commission, Case T-70/89, ECR 1991 Vol.II, 535; GVL v EC Commission Case 7/82, 1983, 
ECR 483, 3 CMLR 645; Beige Transports v Commission Cases T-24/93, T-25/93, T-26/93, T- 
28/93, ELR 1996,11-1201; Corrine Bodson v Pompes Funèbres des Regions Liberees Case 
30/87 1988 OJ C157, p.5; ENI/Montedison, Commission Decision OJ L5/13 (1987).
453 Decision 91/299/EEC (1990), OJ No.L152 p.21, para’s 63-64.
454 Commission Decision OJ 1990 L52 p..40, para’s 65-66. See also, eg. Commission 
Decisions: Napier Brown-British Sugar OJ 1988 L284/41; ECS/AKZO OJ 1985 L374/1; 
London-European-Sabena, OJ 1988 L 317/47, 1989 4 CMLR; BPCUICl, O.J. 1984 L 212/1; 
Re Vacuum Interrupters Ltd OJ 1977 L 48/32; Aluminium Imports from Eastern Europe OJ 
1985 L92/1.
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‘The maintenance and reinforcement of ICI’s dominant position in the United Kingdom affects 
the whole structure of competition in the common market and ensures that the status quo, based 
on marked separation, will be maintained/453
The Commission clearly envisages the possibility of there being interstate trade in the 
relevant product market if the conduct had not been carried out, since otherwise the 
issue of market separation along national lines would not be an issue - it would have 
been a natural characteristic of that relevant product market.
Soda-Ash-Solvav Decision
Similarly, in the second case, the conduct was directly aimed at eliminating imports 
from the United States, where Solvay was in a dominant position on the UK Market 
and was tying in customers along national lines. Although aimed at extra-Community 
competitors, the Commission stressed that these practices had the effect of 
reinforcing the structural rigidity and the division of the soda-ash market on national 
lines, thus harming or threatening to harm the attainment of the single market. The 
Commission clearly envisaged that, without the structured tie-ins, there might be 
transnational trade which might have exerted competitive pressure on the UK market.
Summary
According to this analysis, therefore, the structural approach does not represent an 
autonomous approach in the application of the interstate trade criterion. The Court of 
Justice has after all rejected attempts to create artificial distinctions in Community 
competition law between behaviour and structure, emphasising above all the Single 
Market objectives as the context for interpretation.456 Conduct will fall within the 
ambit of Articles 81 and 82 EC if it distorts the structure of competition. However 
those competition structures must be structures of competition at the Community level 
rather than at the purely national or local. Hence, there must initially be an actual or 
potential, direct or indirect effect on cross-border trade on the relevant market (or a 
market directly dependent). The fulfilment of this condition determines automatically 
the fulfilment of the second condition of a potential hindering of the integration 
objective of the Community. *
455 ibid, at para. 64
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This conclusion raises however a further question. The application of the interstate 
trade criterion as the jurisdictional criterion has been shown to be aligned with the 
overriding objective of Community competition policy - the pursuit of Single Market 
integration. Conduct falls within the scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC because it 
actually or potentially affects interstate trade and thereby potentially hinders the 
process of Single Market integration. Questionable is whether the effect of the de jure 
completion of the Single Market (according to the Single European Act)437 might 
affect either the application or even the appropriateness of the interstate trade 
criterion to determine the jurisdiction to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC.
C TH E CHANGING EC CONSTITUTION AND T H E  INTERSTATE TRADE 
CRITERION
1 The Issue
Having analysed in detail the legal scope to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC according to 
the interstate trade criterion, it is necessary to consider the claims advocated by some 
commentators that the constitutional amendments made to the EC Treaty since its 
original implementation in 1957 have changed the appropriateness of the interstate 
trade criterion as a jurisdictional trigger.456 758
Firstly, it might be that the de jure completion of the Single Market after the Single 
European Act has changed the structures of Community markets to the extent that the 
interstate trade criterion is no longer suitable in practical terms. Secondly, the de jure 
integration of the national markets in 1992 and the effect of the Maastricht Treaty,
456 See eg., Europemballage & Continental Can Co. v Commission, Case 6/72, 1973 ECR 215, 
at paragraph 8171 and (implictly) B.A.T. and R.J. Reynolds v Commission, Cases 142 & 
156/84,1987 ECR at paragraph 14,405.
457 See above, pp.21-30
458 See in particular Bos, P~V ‘Towards a Clear Distribution o f  Competence between EC and 
National Competition Autkorities,r (1995) 7 ECLR 410-416; Wesseling, R., ‘Subsidiarity in 
Community Antitrust Law: Setting the Right A g e n d a (1997) 22 ELR 35-54; Wesseling, R., 
'The Commission Notices on Decentralisation o f  EC Antitrust Law: In for a Penny, Not fo r  a 
Pound", (1997) 2 ECLR 94-97; Rodger, B.J. and Wylie, S.R., ‘Taking the Community Interest 
Line: Decentralisation and Subsidiarity in Competition Law Enforcement", (1997) 8 ECLR 
485-491. Also, see Wolf, who proposes a new jurisdictional divide between Community and 
national competition laws, but does not however suggest how such a new attribution of powers 
should be made, in: Wolf, D., ‘Zum Verhaeltnis vom Europaeischen und Deutschen 
Wettbewerbsrecht’, (1994) 8 Europaeische Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschaftsrechts at p.223 onward; 
Gaeblein, W., ‘Einheit der Wettbewerbsordnung im Europaeischen Binnenmarkt’, in 
Festschrift filer Karl Beusch zum 68. Geburtstag am 31. Oktober 1993, Walter de Gruyter, 
Berlin, New York, 1993 at p. 267 onward.
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according to which the goal of protecting structures of undistorted competition within 
the Community arguably became autonomous of other Community goals, may have 
refocused the thrust of competition policy. A perceived change in the goals of 
Community competition policy might have clear implications for the continued 
relevance of the interstate trade criterion that is focused in its application upon the 
integration goal.
The Maastricht Treaty introduced another principle that might affect the continued 
relevance of the interstate trade criterion. This is the subsidiarity principle that 
directly relates to the appropriate scope of Community law.459 However, it must be 
recognised that Articles 81 and 82 EC are enshrined in the EC Treaty. In a binding 
Protocol annexed to the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam, it was made clear 
that the principle of subsidiarity does not call into question the powers conferred on 
the European Community by the Rome Treaty, as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice.460 Subsidiarity does not therefore affect the interpretation or application of 
the interstate trade criterion of Articles 81 and 82 EC.
2 D e Jure Integration and the Need for a New Jurisdictional Criterion or 
Articles 81 and 82 EC
Commentators who press the need for a new jurisdictional criterion highlight the 
statements made by Advocate General Trabbuchi in Papier Peints in 1974, in which
459 Note that there is a further issue of the Member States obligations under Article 3g EC, and 
whether they are thereby under an obligation to harmonise their systems of competition law, 
and the relation of this obligation to the principle of subsidiarity. In deference to politics, the 
debate is centred upon procedure rather than substantive law. Nevertheless, the consensus of 
opinion is that there is no such obligation. See eg. Bos, ibid, (1995) pp.415*6; Wesseling, ibid, 
(1997) 22 ELR at pp. 40 and 53; Dreher, M., ibid, Part V; Lenz, C.O., ‘Pflicht zur 
Harmonisierung des Kartellrechts in der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft, insbesondere fuer die 
Mitgliedstaaten?’ in: Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts, 1992/3, Referate des Einundzwanzigsten 
FIW-Seminars 1993, Carl Heymans Verlag, Koeln, 1994,25 at 30 and 31; Weatherill, S., 'Law 
and Integration in the European Union' (1995) p.152; Ullrich, 'Harmonisation within the 
European Union’ (1996) 17ECLR 178.
But against this, Power, V., ‘Competition Law in the EU: Should there be a Convention?* 
(1995) 2 ECLR at pp.75-6.
460 See Protocol 30, at paragraph 3.
Similarly, although less equivocally, the Commission stated in its 1993 Report to the Council 
on the application of the subsidiarity principle to Community legislation that the acquis 
communautaire should not thereby be called into question, see Commission Report to the 
European Council on the Adaptation of Existing Legislation to the Subsidiarity Principle, COM 
(93) 545 atp.6.
In the literature, see eg., Emiliou, N., Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against ‘the 
Enterprises o f Ambition?*, ELRev (1992) 383 atp401.
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he considered the future appropriateness of the interstate trade criterion in some 
detail. It is necessary to consider the validity of the statements made by Advocate 
General Trabbuchi within the context of the existing scope of the interstate trade 
criterion, before dealing with the specific arguments of the commentators.
2.1 Advocate General Trabbuchi in Papier Peints and the Need for a 
Reinterpretation of the Interstate Trade Criterion 
In Papier Peints, Advocate General Trabbuchi first acknowledged that the interstate 
trade criterion was originally defined in order to emphasise the importance of 
freedom of trade between States and the integrationalist goals. He suggested that once 
this integration has been achieved, the Community interest which the prohibition of 
restrictive agreements is designed to further becomes not simply one of preventing the 
partitioning of the territory of the Community into separate national markets, but 
principally of keeping competition in a healthy state in terms of the common 
market.461 Thereby, the criterion must adapt itself accordingly. There will be, 
according to the Advocate General, a need to:
‘...replace the concept of interstate trade with a concept which is not limited by reference to 
the location of the undertakings which are parties to the agreement, or to the place where the 
products covered by the agreement had their origin or are sold within the Community.’462
He did not however claim that there will be a need for an entirely new jurisdictional 
criterion:463
‘ ...possible consequences of the literal interpretation of the criterion...should impel us to seek a 
wider interpretation, better suited to the purpose which must be ascribed to Article 85 within 
the framework o f a common market characterised henceforward by a high degree of economic 
integration between the States which constitute it.’464
461 Groupement des Fabricants de Papier Peints de Belgique v Commission Case 73/73 
(1975) ECR 1491 at p.1522.
462 Case, ibid at p. 1523.
463 As maintained by Goldman and Lyon-Caen, ibid at p.742; Faull, (1989) ibid at p. 505-6; 
Wesseling, (1997) ELR, ibid, pp. 47-8.
Note that according to Korah, this represented a third way of interpreting the interstate trade 
criterion, see Korah, V., (1997) pp. 57-8. This interpretation does not however represent the 
literal wording of Trabbuchi's statement.
464 Case, ibid, at p.1524 (author's emphasis).
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In essence therefore, the Advocate General advocated an expansion and increased 
flexibility in the interpretation of the criterion to take into account the changed 
structure of the Single Market. There should be a shift in emphasis in the 
interpretation of the existing interstate trade criterion away from its literal text 
towards an interpretation which includes an effect on competition structures within 
the Community.
In effect, he predicted the way that the interpretation of the interstate trade criterion 
was to develop in response to the changing Community. This may be demonstrated by 
analysing the anomalous situations which he highlighted as arising through the 
application of the literal interpretation465.
2.1.1 The First Case Scenario
The Advocate General’s first concern was that an agreement involving two national 
firms covering nearly the whole of Germany would not be covered by the interstate 
criterion. It is submitted however that the teleological interpretation of the interstate 
trade criterion according to the integration goal would include such an agreement. 
Recall that the condition is not purely locational and literal, but may be fulfilled even 
if the agreement is confined to a single Member State466. It depends upon the patterns 
of interstate trade (actual or potential) within the Community, which must have 
developed in a manner different from the way they would have developed without the 
alleged anti-competitive conduct having taken place. The effect on these patterns may 
be actual or potential, direct or indirect.
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that Advocate General Trabbuchi's first case scenario 
would not be held to fulfil the criterion in its existing interpretation. The only conduct 
falling outside the scope of the criterion would be conduct effected on a market that is 
an isolated, local and national market involving no interstate trade whatsoever; in 
short, for conduct that would not distort Community structures of competition (and 
therefore hinder the integration objective).467
465 Note that these examples have been picked up in more recent literature as well, eg. 
Wesseling, ibid, 1997, at p.96.
466 Indeed, if it covers the whole of a single Member State, there is effectively an irrebuttable 
presumption that interstate trade has been affected, see above.
467 Furthermore, even if such conduct were to fall within the scope o f Article 81 EC, it would 
most likely fall under the de minimis thresholds (Notice on Minor Agreements, 1970, OJ 1970, 
C231/2. Amended in 1977, 1986 and 1997 OJ 1997 C372). For a detailed analysis of the de 
minimis provision, see below at ppl27-133.
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2.1.2 The Second Case Scenario
The Advocate General’s second case scenario concerned agreements of minimal 
importance to the Community in Luxembourg which will nevertheless always have 
cross-border effect (because of the size of the country) and will be caught by a literal 
interpretation of the criterion.
This concern is only of concern with regard to the application of Article 81EC, since 
abusive conduct under Article 82 EC will only be prohibited where dominance can be 
shown over a ‘substantial part o f the Common Market*Z68 With regard to Article 81 
EC however, the interstate trade criterion has developed in its application so that it 
will not bring conduct under the prohibition of that Article that is not of sufficient 
scale to affect Community objectives. It incorporates the condition of ‘appreciable’ 
effect, which has been articulated in more formal terms by a Commission Notice.468 69
2.1.3 Summary
Advocate General Trabbuchi was remarkably prescient in predicting the increasing 
importance of a system of undistorted competition within a unified and integrated 
Single Market and its protection in the application of Community competition law. 
This development has taken place within the context of the integration objective, 
which is a present and on-going process.470 Thereby, the teleological interpretation of 
the interstate trade criterion that the Commission and the Court of Justice have 
developed has been able to take these changes into account.
2.2 The Literature and the Need for a New Jurisdictional Criterion of Articles 81 
and 82 EC
In spite of the flexibility of the interstate trade criterion in its teleological 
interpretation and application, some commentators maintain that there is a need for an 
entirely new jurisdictional criterion.471
According to Bos, for example:
468 See above for an analysis of this concept.
469 Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance OJ (1997) C372/04. For a detailed 
analysis of the condition of ‘appreciability’ for Article 81 EC, see below.
470 See above.
471 See note 458.
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‘...politically and economically market integration should now be deemed to have been 
fulfilled and the criterion of effect on the trade between Member States should be said to have 
lost its market integration objective and therefore its meaning as a criterion for the application 
of European Commission competition law.’472
Similarly, Wesseling has stated:
‘The formal establishment of the internal market... affected the pertinence of "interstate trade 
effect”...In a unified multinational market, within which there are no longer any national 
frontiers hindering the movement of goods, the jurisdictional criteria must assume a 
significance to match the new situation which has come into being.’473
These claims are however unfounded. With the de jure integration brought about by 
the Single European Act, integration has not necessarily been achieved de facto. The 
European Commission has underlined the fact that the Single Market has not yet been 
fully accomplished, even after 1992:474
‘Even though many of the administrative and other public barriers to trade have been removed, 
we do not yet have a real single market in some sectors and there remain significant price 
differences between Member States. This suggests there are still significantly unexploited 
advantages to be had from further integration../
Hence, the need to promote integration is still present and pertinent. Furthermore, 
there is a need to protect existing integration. Competition policy, even if increasingly 
pursuing generic competition directly, is wedded to the integration objective. As
472 Bos, ibid, 1995, p. 412.
473 Wesseling, R., ''The Commission Notices on Decentralisation o f EC Antitrust Law: In for a 
Penny, not for a Pound’, (1997) 2 ECLR 94-97 at p. 96.
474 See also EC Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, p.21.
See in the literature, eg., Groger, T. and Janicki, T. who stress that the internal market has not 
yet been completed in a practical sense in view of the residual technical, regulatory and 
distribution-related barriers, ‘Weiterentwicklung aus Europaeischen Wettbewerbsrechts\ 
WuW 12 (1992) 991 at p. 1000-
Note that Bos admits that the internal market in a practical sense has not yet been completed in 
view of the numerous technical, regulatory and distribution-related barriers, but then appears to 
discount it. In fact, Bor's overall argument is inherently contradictory. On the one hand, he 
proclaims the completion of integration and the end of national markets. On the other, he 
pushes a restricted role for Community supranational law in favour of national law. In effect 
then, he bases his argument for a restricted application of Community law upon there being no 
definable national markets post single market integration, but then, as a result, proposes 
increased application of national regulations by national authorities who will assess economic 
conduct according to its potential effect on national market competition structures, in: Bos, 
(1995) ibid.
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described above, the maintenance of structures of undistorted competition is 
consistent with the integration goal.475
2 3  Summary
The analysis above has shown that the teleological interpretation and application of 
the interstate criterion ensures that it is not rendered obsolete by the changing 
constitutional structure of the Community and the evolving goals of competition 
policy. There is no need for a new jurisdictional criterion for Articles 81 and 82 EC. 
Above all, it is the functionalist formulation of the interstate criterion that has enabled 
it to adapt to cover all conduct that could fall within the prohibition of Articles 81 and 
82 EC that might hinder the integration objective of the Community (either in its 
promotion or protection).
D THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERSTATE TRADE CRITERION
TO CONCENTRATIONS TO WHICH ARTICLES 81 AND 82 APPLY 
IN PRACTICE
1 Applying the Interstate Trade Criterion in General
The Commission is under an obligation to provide some rational reasoning for its 
conclusion upon the likely effect of the alleged infringement upon interstate trade.476 
In practice however, it has often failed to provide detailed reasoning for its finding of 
an effect on interstate trade - the condition is dealt with in a brief and cursory way.477
Nevertheless, analysis of the Commission’s statement of reasons in successive cases 
reveals a juridical reasoning that can be drawn upon by private parties to give them 
some certainty in the assessment of whether Articles 81 or 82 EC might be applicable 
to a specific case.
475 See above at pp27-31.
476 In Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v Commission the Court of 
Justice overturned the Commission’s finding that a national system of collective resale price 
maintenance affected interstate trade, since the Commission had not explained in sufficient 
detail the precise way in which interstate trade would be affected, Case 73/74 (1975) ECR 
1491,(1976) 1CMLR 589
477 See Koenigs, F., (1988) ibid at p.570. Koenigs also criticises the tendency of the 
Commission not to apply the criterion at the beginning of an investigation, as would be 
expected of a jurisdictional criterion which establishes the applicability of Community law.
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It was demonstrated that the ‘effect’ required to fulfil the criterion is neutral, and may 
be actual or potential, direct or indirect. The substance of analysis therefore becomes 
focused upon establishing that there was an element of interstate trade involved 
(according to a very broad interpretation of ‘trade’). This element may be detected in 
very broad circumstances: if the relevant market (or a market dependent upon it478) 
naturally involves or may involve (according to the natural dynamics of the market) 
any interstate trade at all479 (not only as regards the parties directly concerned in the 
alleged anti-competitive conduct, but the structures of the market in general), then it 
may be stated that the condition will be fulfilled, except perhaps in very exceptional 
circumstances.
The condition may therefore be more succinctly stated: where the relevant product 
market (or a market directly dependent upon that market) involves actual or potential 
interstate trade (according to the natural development of the market), there is a de 
facto presumption that an alleged anti-competitive conduct which takes place on that 
market will affect interstate trade.
In general terms, particularly due to the increased integration of and interrelationship 
between national markets within the Community following the creation of the Single 
Market, this effective shift in the burden of proof has not gone unnoticed in the 
literature, even if not clearly delineated in legal terms. For example, Goyder has 
commented:
‘In practice, the Commission will now assume that trade between Member States is affected by 
virtually any practice which brings about some noticeable effect on market conditions or 
structures and involves undertakings of a size above the level affected by the current Notice.480 481
The onus of proof will then effectively shift to the parties to prove the negative, in most cases a 
difficult ta sk f481
478 BNICvAubert, Case, ibid.
479 See eg., Commercial Solvents v Commission, Case ibid.
480 This is a reference to the De Minimis Notice described above.
481 Goyder, 1993 p. 116. See also, eg , Emmerich, V., ’Kartellrecht’, 6. Edition, Muenchen 
1991, p.518; Reich, N-, Vie Bedeutung der Binnenmarktkonzeption juer die Anwendung der 
EWG-Wettbewerbsregelungen \ FS fuer Emst Steindorff, Berlin/NY 1990, p.1071; Van Bael, I. 
and Beilis, J.-F., "World o f Competition' Unit B, Western Europe, Vol. B l, European 
Economic Community, New York 1987 Nr.222; Green, N-, 'Article 85 in Perspective: 
Stretching Jurisdiction, Narrowing the Concept o f a Restriction and Plugging a Few Gaps', 
(1989) ECLR Vol.9, 190-207 at p.192.
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2 Applying the Interstate Trade Criterion to Concentrations
As stated above, Articles 81 and 82 EC may apply to some types of horizontal, 
vertical or conglomerate mergers where interstate trade is affected. Thereby the 
interstate trade criterion is de facto fulfilled where any of the relevant markets 
involved in the merger involve actually or potentially, directly or indirectly interstate 
trade (or there is such a market that is directly dependent upon any of the relevant 
markets). This presumption is only rebutted in exceptional circumstances (that will be 
clear upon any analysis of the specific markets affected by the individual 
concentration).
Hence, for horizontal mergers, the interstate trade criterion is usually fulfilled where 
the merger involves one or more undertakings active on any markets that actually or 
potentially involves interstate trade (or there is such a market that is directly 
dependent upon any of those markets).
For vertical mergers, trade may be affected within the meaning of the interstate trade 
condition where, for example, distribution channels are thereby actually or potentially 
Mocked in’ within a single Member State for a product that is marketable Community­
wide, or where the merger actually or potentially leads to a significant increase in 
resources of the combined entity such that cross-border trade and competition is 
affected for the relevant product. The requisite effect on interstate trade may be on 
any of the markets on which the individual entities were active or any directly 
dependent markets.
A conglomerate merger is effected by firms active on different and independent 
markets. Again, trade may be affected actually or potentially, directly or indirectly on 
each of the relevant markets or a directly dependent market.
E * A PPRECI ABILITY* AND ARTICLE 81(1) EC
In its application of the Article 81(1) EC prohibition, the European Commission and 
the Court of Justice have developed a further condition that must be fulfilled before 
an agreement (or concerted practice) will be found to be void under Article 81(2) EC 
(subject to exemption under Article 81(3) EC). It is a quantitative condition of 
‘appreciability’ that attempts to restrict the application of Article 81(1) EC to
131
agreements and conduct that pose a real threat to the integration objectives that are 
pursued at the Community level in the application of Community competition law 
provisions.
Expression of the condition may be found in Commission decisions dating from as 
early as 1964.482 483The Court of Justice followed a similar approach in its case Société 
Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulmm  In this case, the Court of Justice stated 
that in applying Article 81 EC, it is initially necessary to consider the purpose of the 
agreement or conduct at hand in its full economic context. If this does not reveal 'an 
effect on competition that is sufficiently deleterious\  the consequences of the 
agreement or conduct should then be considered. It is thereby necessary to find those 
factors present that show that competition has in fact been prevented, restricted or 
distorted to an appreciable extent
The Court of Justice thus introduced a further quantitative condition to the 
substantive assessment of agreements or conduct under Article 81(1) EC. In effect, 
agreements or conduct would be considered to be consistent with the integration 
objectives of the Community where their object or effect was not ‘appréciable’.
In later cases, the Court of Justice appeared to develop and expand the significance of 
the ‘appreciability’ condition. Thereby, its relevance was extended to include the 
application of the interstate trade criterion as well as the substantive assessment of 
whether there has been the required restriction or distortion of competition. The 
approach is expressed succinctly in Beguelin Import v GL Import Export;484
‘...to come within the prohibition imposed by Article 85 (Article 81), the agreement must affect 
trade between Member States and the free play of competition to an appreciable extent.’485
Thereby, the early Commission practice that had considered appreciability only 
within the context of the substantive assessment of a potential restriction of
482 GrosfiUex/Fillistorf, OJ (1964) 58/915; Nicholas Freres/Vitapro, OJ (1964) 156/2287.
483 Case 56/65 (1966) ECR 235, at p249.
484 Case 22/71 (1971) ECR 949 (1972) CMLR 81.
485 This is the approach that the Court of Justice has consistently followed this approach in its
case law, see eg., Voetk v Vervaeke Case 5/69 (1969) ECR 295 (1969) CMLR 273; Cadillon v 
Hoess Case 1/71, (1971) ECR 351; Distillers v Commission Case 30/78 (1980) ECR 2229, 
(1980) 3 CMLR 121; Salonia v Poidomani and Giglio Case 126/80 (1981) ECR 1563 (1982) 1 
CMLR. ~
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competition486 was revised in the Commission’s first Notice on Agreements of Minor 
Importance in 1970487, and in its later decisions.488
Although the ‘appreciability’ condition was therefore deemed applicable to both the 
jurisdictional as well as the substantive assessments under Article 81 EC, in practical 
terms the blurring of that distinction is of negligible importance: such is the breadth 
of the interstate trade criterion in its application (as demonstrated above) that where 
there is no appreciable effect on interstate trade because the relevant market is 
localised and regional, there can hardly be any appreciable effect on competition. 
Conversely, if there is an appreciable distortion of competition within the Common 
Market, an appreciable affect on interstate trade may be assumed.489
Nevertheless, there are dangers inherent to a blurring of the substantive and 
jurisdictional lines, even if the operation of the substantive and the jurisdictional 
conditions of Article 81(1) EC are coherent in their overriding policy aim of 
promoting and protecting Single Market integration. It should not be forgotten that if 
Article 81 EC is found not to apply on the basis of a lack of an appreciable effect on 
interstate trade, national laws are automatically applicable. This may operate to 
distort the level playing field sought in the application of competition law within the 
Community and it also raises the spectre of the (covert) pursuit of national policies 
through the regulation of agreements and conduct that essentially is of a Community 
dimension (although of no direct threat to the Community goals). There is therefore a 
valid reason to resist the development of the appreciability condition into a quasi- 
jurisdictional criterion.
486 See eg., Grosfillex/Fillistorf, OJ (1964) 58/915; Nicholas Freres/Vitapro, OJ (1964) 
156/2287; SECEMAS, OJ (1968) L201/4; Conventron Chaufournier, OJ (1964) L122/8.
487 Commission Notice, OJ C64/1.
Subsequent Commission Notices followed the same pattern: Commission Notice on 
Agreements of Minor Importance OJ (1997) C372/04; Commission Notice on Agreements of 
Minor Importance OJ (1986) C231/2; Commission Notice OJ (1977) C 313/3, (1976) 3 CMLR 
648.
It is an approach that has also been -  where it has been considered at all - acknowledged in the 
literature, see eg., Bellamy and Child, ibid at p. 118; Korah, V., An Introductory Guide to EC 
Competition Law and Practice, pp67-8; Schroeter, H. in Groeben/Thiesing/Ehlermann, ibid, 
pp240-249; Emmerich, in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid, pl75.
488 See eg., IATA Passenger Agency Programme and IATA Cargo Agency Programme, OJ 
(1991) L258/18.
489 See in agreement, Schroeter, H., in: Gleiss/Hirsch, ibid at p.241-2.
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In its recent draft proposal for a new Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance,490 
the Commission has clearly recognised that the continued blurring of the 
jurisdictional/substantive conditions in the application of the ‘appreciability’ criterion 
is untenable. The Notice provides that the appreciability condition should apply only 
to the determination of a restriction of competition according to Article 81(1) EC. 
Unofficially at least, it appears that the ‘appreciability* condition as defined in the 
new Notice is not a good indicator of what conduct or agreements have a Community 
Dimension.491 The reason for this is that the definition of ‘appreciable’ has become, 
both in the hands of the Court of Justice and the Commission, increasingly formalistic 
rather than effects-based. Where these thresholds are raised to the levels proposed in 
the new draft notice, there would be even less logic in applying the criterion to the 
jurisdictional trigger.
The application of the ‘appreciability’ condition was not however always formalistic, 
in particular in the hands of the Court of Justice. In the early case of Volk v 
Vervaeke492 the Court of Justice had stated that:
‘...an agreement falls outside the prohibition of Article 85 (Article 81) where it has only an 
insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons 
concerned have on the market of the product in question.’
Therefore, the requirements of Article 81(1) EC had to be considered in the actual 
economic context in which the agreement existed. The Court considered that it was 
essential to be able to show that the agreement was of such significance that there was 
a reasonable expectation that it would exercise an influence direct or indirect, actual 
or potential, on trade between Member States to an extent that would harm the 
attainment of the objectives of a Single Market between the Member States. The 
emphasis was on the overall expected effect of the agreement in its context, rather 
than any specific quantitative thresholds. Generally, it was necessary to compare the 
market situation that has arisen on account of the agreements with the market 
situation that would have arisen if there had been no such agreements at all. Thereby, 
the effect on competition, the market position of affected parties, the type and
490 Commission Draft Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, OJ (2001) C149/18.
491 Peeperkom, L., Revision o f the 1997 Notice on Agreements o f  Minor Importance, 
Competition Policy Newsletter, 2, June 2001, p4.
492 Case, ibid.
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quantity of goods affected and the legal context were all considered.493 If the analysis 
was ostensibly based upon economic evaluations* issues of competition policy - in 
particular* the integration of the markets - were also influential.494
Subsequently* however, a more formalistic approach did become discernible. The 
Court of Justice began to concentrate upon the size of the participating undertakings 
on the relevant markets. Sometimes this would involve considering the turnover of 
the undertakings themselves.495 More often however, market share was the key 
indicator. Thus, it was determined that a cumulative market share of less than 1% 
would not be appreciable.496 On the other hand, a market share of more than 5% 
would generally give automatic ‘appreciability’.497 While this 5% threshold has been 
followed in the majority of cases, it can not be viewed as absolute. Some heed is still 
taken of the overall economic context in which the agreements or conduct were to 
operate. This works to bring certain agreements or conduct within the scope of Article 
81(1) EC even where the 5% threshold was not achieved* in particular where those 
agreements involved large undertakings,498 or where they are necessary to enable 
entry into a new market499
The ‘appreciability’ criterion that had been read into the application of Article 81 EC 
by both the Court of Justice and the European Commission in their practice was 
deemed by the Commission as early as 1970 to be at once important and uncertain 
enough to warrant specific definition in a Notice. In its Notice on Agreements of 
Minor Importance, the Commission adopted the 5% market share threshold to 
determine appreciability, in conjunction with a combined annual turnover of less than
493 See eg., Beguelin Import v GL Import Export Case 22/71 (1971) ECR 949 at 960.
494 Schroeter, H., in Groeben/Thiesing/Ehlermann* ibid at p242; Rehbinder, in: 
Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid at p.60.
495 See eg., Distillers v Commission Case 30/78 (1980) ECR 2229, (1980) 3 CMLR 121; 
Musique Diffusion Française Case 100/80 (1983) ECR 1825, 1900-1901 (1983) 3 CMLR 221, 
329-330.
496 See eg., Voelk v Vervaeke Case 5/69 (1969) ECR 295 (1969) CMLR 273; Cadillon v Hoess 
Case 1/71, (1971) ECR 351
497 See eg.* Miller v Commission Case 19/77 (1978) ECR 131 (1978) 2 CMLR 334; AEG v 
Commission Case 107/82 (1983) ECR 3151 (1984) 3 CMLR 325; Enichem v Commission 
Case T-6/89 (1991) ECR 1623.
See on this, Bellamy and Child, ibid, at p.119-120.
498 See eg., Musique Diffusion Française Case 100/80 (1983) ECR 1825, 1900-1901 (1983) 3 
CMLR 221, 329-330.
499 See eg., Voelk v Vervaeke Case 5/69 (1969) ECR 295 at 305; Nungesser Case 258/78 
(1982) ECR 2015.
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15 million currency units for the participating undertakings (20 million currency units 
for vertical agreements).500
The threshold has been revised on numerous occasions since501 and the terms of the 
most recent 1997 Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance502 are more complex. 
The Commission retains the general threshold that agreements between undertakings 
fall outside the scope of Article 81(1) EC if the aggregate market shares held by all of 
the participating undertakings does not exceed 5% but no longer incoiporates a 
turnover criterion.503 This general condition relates however only to horizontal 
agreements. For vertical agreements, the Notice is more generous, setting a 10% 
limit.504 Nevertheless, the Notice states that for any agreement that has as its object 
the fixing of prices, the limiting of production or sales or the sharing of markets or 
sources of supply, the application of Article 81(1) EC cannot be ruled out.505 506For 
these types of cases however, the Notice states that it is for the national authorities in 
the first instance to take action. The Commission will only intervene when it 
considers that the interest of the Community so demands, and in particular if the 
agreements impair the proper functioning of the internal market.
The Notice incorporates further refinements to the existing case law. Agreements 
between small and medium sized companies (as defined by the Commission 
Recommendation of 3rd April 1996s06) are deemed to fall outside the scope of Article 
81(1) EC, even if they collectively exceed the market share thresholds, unless the 
agreements cover a ‘substantial* share of the relevant market. Further, the Notice 
states that the de minimis thresholds do not apply where competition in a relevant
500 Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance of 27.05.1970, OJ ( 1970) C64 p. 1.
501 Commission Notice on Agreements o f Minor Importance OJ (1997) C372/04, amending 
(and refining) the 1986 Notice, Notice on Agreements o f Minor Importance OJ (1986) C231/2 
(that had replaced Notice OJ (1977) C 313/3, (1976) 3 CMLR 648 which had amended the 
original 1970 Notice).
502 Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance OJ (1997) C372/04, amending 
(and refining) the 1986 Notice, Notice on Agreements o f Minor Importance OJ (1986) C231/2 
(that had replaced Notice OJ (1977) C 313/3, (1976) 3 CMLR 648).
See Korah, who evaluates the draft version of the Notice which was eventually implemented in 
1997 in her book, ibid at pp. 67-8.
503 Notice 1997, ibid at paragraph 9a.
504 Notice 1997, ibid at paragraph 9b.
505 Notice 1997, ibid at paragraph 11.
506 (1997) 4 CMLR 510, Document COM (96) 261, whereby the maximum number of 
employees is 250, the annual turnover is 40m ECU and the balance sheet total is 27m ECU.
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market is restricted by the cumulative effects of parallel networks of similar 
agreements established by several manufacturers and dealers.507
Although in practice the Commission has normally followed the principles set out in 
the Notice, these criteria are not, in legal terms, an absolute yardstick, and specific 
agreements falling below the thresholds may none the less be found to have an 
appreciable effect.508 Hence, where agreement or conduct involves large undertakings, 
the Commission has followed established Court of Justice practice, in particular 
where oligopolistic markets are involved.509
It must be highlighted that the European Courts may not feel bound by the criteria 
within the Notice, and may continue to follow their own jurisprudence when 
determining whether agreements are de minimis under Article 81(1) EC.510
Having established that Articles 81 and 82 EC apply to some types of concentrations 
that may affect interstate trade (and that fulfil the respective quantitative conditions 
for Articles 81 and 82 EC), it is imperative to recognise that this competence pre­
empted the implementation of the Merger Regulation. Furthermore, that it derives
507 Notice 1997, ibid at paragraph 18.
See Delimitìs Case C-234/89 (1991) 1 ECR 935 (1992) 5 CMLR 210 for the two fold test in 
assessing whether such agreements might have the requisite ‘cumulative effect’ at paragraphs
23-24.
See eg., Breeders rights: roses, Commission Decision OJ 1985 L369/9 (1988) 4 CMLR 193; 
Tves Saint Laurent Parfums, Commission Decision OJ 1992 L12/24,31.
508 See eg., Musique Diffusion Française Case 100/80 (1983) ECR 1825, 1900-1901 (1983) 3 
CMLR 221, 329-330; Distillers Company v Commission Case 30/78 (1980) ECR 2229 (1980) 
3 CMLR 121.
It may be argued that the fact that the Notice is not binding inhibits its usefulness, see eg., 
Goyder, D., ibid, at p. 111.
On the other hand, it may be submitted that to override the presumption of the Notice, the issue 
of jurisdiction in a specific case would be so clear-cut that there is sufficient certainty for the 
applicability of Articles 81 and 82 EC. Furthermore, the Notice may be relied upon by 
individual parties without the risk of any sanction should the presumption prove unjustified. 
The Commission states that notification will no longer be necessary for such agreements, ibid, 
at Paragraph 4. Moreover, the Commission will not institute any proceedings either on 
application or on its own initiative for such agreements, and where undertakings fail to notify 
an agreement falling within the scope of Article 81(1) because they assumed in good faith that 
the agreement was covered by this Notice, the Commission will not consider imposing fines, 
ibid, at Paragraph 5.
509 See eg.. Floral, Commission Decision 28 November 1979, OJ 1980 L39/51 (1980) 2 
CMLR 265, where the parties held only 2%  of the German market but were the three largest 
French manufacturers and represented over 10% of Community production. See also, eg., UK 
Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange, Commission Decision OJ 1992 L68/19.
510 See eg., the comments of Advocate General Warner, Miller v Commission Case 19/77 
(1978) ECR 131 at pp.156-8. See Korah, V., An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law 
and Practice, p.68.
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from primary Community law. Questionable therefore is the direct implications that 
this pre-existing competence to assess concentrations according to primary 
Community law should have upon the appropriate jurisdictional scope of the Merger 
Regulation.
Before considering this issue in detail, it is necessary to examine the nature of the 
existing jurisdictional criterion of the Merger Regulation itself.
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VI THE JURISDICTIONAL TRIGGER OF THE EC 
MERGER REGULATION -  HISTORY AND 
EVOLUTION
A THE ISSUE
As detailed above, for more than twenty years before the final implementation of the 
Merger Regulation the Commission had consistently stated that there was a need for a 
Community merger control in order to protect the process of Single Market 
integration. Thereby, it might be assumed that the jurisdictional scope of the Merger 
Regulation would extend to all concentrations that may harm that process. There were 
however other pressing factors to be considered that were to prove persuasive in the 
drafting of the final jurisdictional criterion for the European Merger Regulation.
One of the most important principles in the consideration of an appropriate 
jurisdictional trigger was the principle of legal certainty and the idea of a one-stop 
shop. Companies that intend to merge should be clear about the relevant law to be 
applied.511
This is not only a matter of the general legal principle of Community law.512 As has 
been consistently stressed throughout the thesis, certainty is of particular significance 
in the regulation of mergers. If the merging companies are not clear about their legal 
rights and obligations from the outset, the optimum moment for the merger may be
511 This was a particular concern of European industry, see eg., Declaration of UNICE, The 
Union of Industry and Employment Federations in Europe, 4 November 1987.
512 The principle of legal certainty was invoked by the Court of Justice in Case 43/75 Defrenne 
v Sabena (No.2) Case 30/87 (1976) ECR 455, (1976) 2 CMLR 98. The principle has been 
applied in more specific terms as:
(a) The principle of legitimate expectations (See eg., August Toepfer & Co. GmbH v 
Commission, Case 112/77 (1978) ECR 1019).
(b) The principle of non-retroactivity (See eg., Diversinte SA v Administration Principal de 
Aduanos e lmpuestos Especiales de la Junqueros Joined Cases 260/91 and 261/91 ECR 1993 
1 1885.
See also eg., Tetra-Pak Reusing S.A. v Commission Case 260/9 (1990) ECR II 309, p362 
paras. 36-7, citing Amministrazione delle finanza dello Stato v Salumi Joined Cases 212- 
217/80, (1981) ECR 2735, para.10; De Geus v Bosch and van Rijn Joined Cases 212-217/80, 
(1962) ECR 45 p52.
The European Court of Human Rights has also stated that an accepted standard of legal 
certainty is where the citizen is given an adequate indication of the applicable rules, such that 
he can predict in advance what are his rights and obligations: e.g. Silver v UK Eur.Ct. HR
Mi
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lost. A failing target company may disappear. In short, a merger that might have a 
beneficial effect on the Community economy may not take place.513
Furthermore, a certain and fixed jurisdictional criterion was more satisfactory to the 
Member States. They proved anxious not to cede too much control in the assessment 
of mergers that, after all, may have serious implications for national political, social 
and economic goals. Therefore, they consistently expressed their desire to restrict the 
competence of the Community to assess mergers to narrowly defined boundaries that 
were set and clear and could not be gradually eroded through reinterpretation by 
Community institutions. These factors and fears can be seen to have been persuasive 
in the genesis of the jurisdictional trigger of the EC Merger Regulation, and to 
continue to play a role in subsequent Reviews of the operation of the jurisdictional 
criterion by the EC Commission.
B THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL 
CRITERION OF THE EC MERGER REGULATION
The Commission’s initial proposal for a Community Merger Regulation in 1973 
envisaged that all concentrations would fall within its scope ‘m so far as the 
concentration may affect trade between Member States’.514 Thereby, a formalistic de 
minimis provision was provided, whereby concentrations would fall outside the scope 
of the Regulation where:
- the aggregate turnover of the undertakings participating in the concentration is less 
than 200 million units of account, and
- the goods or services concerned by the concentration do not account in any Member 
State for more than 25% of the turnover in identical goods or services or in goods or 
services which, by reason of their characteristics, their price and the use for which 
they are intended, may be regarded as similar by the consumer.515
series A, No.61, judgment of 25th March 1983 5 EHRR 347; Malone v UK Eur.Ct.H.R. Series 
A, No.82, judgment of 2nd August, 1984,7 EHRR 14; Feldman, 1993, p373-5.
513 Neven et al. show that in a structure of costs imposed upon society by a system of merger 
control, the costs of delay imposed on firms and the costs of mistaken judgments about the 
approval or prevention of mergers constitute are the highest, in: Neven et al., ibid, Chapter 2. 
Clearly, certainty is directly related to reducing such costs.
514 Commission Proposal for a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, Article 1(1), Official Journal, C 92,31.10.73 at p2.
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Where concentrations fell within the scope of the Regulation, the Commission would 
have exclusive competence to assess their compatibility with the Common Market. 
Nevertheless, there was envisaged a role for the Member States: there should be an 
Advisory Committee including a representative of each Member State that should be 
consulted before any concentration was prohibited.516 The Committee had the right to 
deliver and annex an opinion to the draft decision of the Commission.
In general, at least to the extent that an interstate trade criterion was adopted in 
conjunction with a de minimis provision, the approach of the Commission towards the 
jurisdictional scope of its proposed Community-level Merger Regulation closely 
mirrored the structure of the existing Articles 81 and 82 EC. It appears to have been 
founded upon the overriding policy for which the Merger Regulation was originally 
implemented - to protect and enhance the process of integration.
Following publication of the proposal, the Economic and Social Committee focused 
upon the considerations that the approach of the Commission raised.517 It noted that 
turnover criteria were suitable because of their simplicity and the fact that there is 
likely to be a relationship between turnover and market power. Nevertheless, while 
accepting the overall suitability (and level) of the turnover thresholds, it highlighted 
the fact that they may include a large element of trade carried out outside the 
Community, and that turnover may in fact bear little evidence of market power in 
practice. The Committee considered that since any threshold must by nature be an 
arbitrary one, there should be provided the opportunity for review at regular intervals, 
which would also take into account the effect of inflation. The Committee was 
however less keen on the market share limb of the jurisdictional trigger proposed by 
the Commission. It considered that the 25% figure could discriminate against 
undertakings in smaller Member States. It urged the Commission to consider whether 
there might be another criterion fairer in its application.
The original Commission proposal in 1973 had also envisaged a distinction between 
applicability and the obligation to notify. Only where the aggregate turnover of the 
undertakings concerned was one thousand million units of account or more were
5,5 Article 1(2), Official Journal, C92, 31.10.73 at pp.2-3.
516 Article 19, ibid.
5,7 Consultation of the Economic and Social Committee on a Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on the Control o f Concentrations between Undertakings, OJ C 88,26.7.74, pp21-22.
concentrations to be notified.518 Furthermore, there was an exception where the 
turnover of the target undertaking was less than 30 million units of account.519 The 
Economic and Social Committee on the other hand considered that the maintenance 
of competition was of overriding importance. On account of the difficulty of breaking 
up mergers that had already been completed, all mergers falling within the scope of 
the Regulation should be notified.520
This idea of a jurisdictional scope based upon the very broad interstate trade criterion 
was met by staunch opposition from the Member States. They would not countenance 
the implementation of a broad Community regime that could run counter to their own 
national policies.521 Germany had a tradition of strongly competition-orientated 
legislation (although with the possibility of the federal economics minister using a 
political override to reject the recommendation of the Bundeskartellamt report).522 
Britain, France, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, on the other hand, expressed concern 
about maintaining their ability to pursue national, industrial, regional and social 
policies. Furthermore, Italy had reservations about the proposed coverage of public 
enterprises.
Member State opposition proved to be intractable throughout the 1970’s. In 1982 
however, the Commission tabled an amended proposal for a Council Regulation on 
the control of concentrations.523 The Commission, in keeping with the Economic and 
Social Committee’s comments of 1974,524 considered first that the market share limb 
of the original proposal in 1973 was far too uncertain and difficult to calculate to act 
as a jurisdictional trigger.525 It nevertheless maintained that market share was an 
important indicator of market structure and an important element in assessing whether 
a merger threatens to eliminate effective competition. Therefore, market share would
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518 Article 4(1), ibid.
519 Article 4(2), ibid.
Note that the European Parliament suggested simplifying this provision, and limiting it to the 
concentration o f only two independent undertakings, see OJ C23, 8.3.74, p.21. It was a 
suggestion ignored by the Commission in its subsequent proposal in 1982, see OJ 36,12.2.82.
520 O JC 8 8 ,26.7.74, p21.
521 See Woolcock, S., European Mergers: National or Community Controls?, ibid, pl2.
522 Note that Bulmer has suggested that domestic institutional dynamics (concerning the 
Bundeskartellamt and the Federal Government) were also important in determining Germany’s 
position, in: Bulmer, ibid at p.I4.
523 Amended proposal for a Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ C36, 12.2.82.
524 See above, p.141.
525 O JC36, 12.2.82, at p.4.
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be dropped as a jurisdictional criterion, but be employed as a presumption of 
compatibility (at the level of 20%).526
Secondly, the Commission proposed to raise the de minimis threshold based upon the 
aggregate turnover of the participating undertakings to 500 million ECU.527 This 
would limit the scope of application of the Merger Regulation and acted as a clear 
attempt to placate the worries of the Member States over the erosion of national 
sovereignty in the policy areas covered by the proposed Regulation. Indeed, the 
Commission suggested that clear reference should be made in the prohibition under 
Article 1(1) to concentrations having a ‘Community Dimension* in order to make it 
clear that the Regulation was to apply to mergers which are of a scale that transcend 
the national context and produce effects at Community level.528
Furthermore, the powers of the Advisory Committee (representing the interests of the 
Member States) were enhanced. Thereby, it was granted the right to delay a decision 
of the Commission and to refer specific mergers to the Council on account of non­
competition criteria that might be considered to take priority in its assessment.529 The 
overriding competence for the application of the Regulation remained however in the 
hands of the Commission, and any opinion of the Council in an individual case would 
be for guidance only.530
These specific amendments - and the oblique references to ‘Community Dimension’ - 
proposed by the Commission in 1982 were not enough to satisfy the Member States, 
whose resistance once again proved determinative.
In 1984, the Commission again made an amended proposal.531 The de minimis 
criterion was revised and the threshold raised to 750 million ECU, with the proviso 
that the exception would not apply where, irrespective of turnover in the market as a
526 OJ C36, 12.2.82, at p4.
It was an amendment that was warmly received by the Economic and Social Committee, while 
stressing that such a presumption should not be irrebuttable, OJ C 252,27.9.1982, p i 6.
527 Note that the Economic and Social Committee considered this figure too high, suggesting 
that 350 million ECU was more appropriate, OJ C252,27.9.1982, p.16.
S28O JC 3 6 ,12.2.82, at p3-4.
529 OJ, C 36,12.2.82, at pp7-8.
530 The Economic and Social Committee emphasised the importance of this fact, OJ C252, 
27.9.1982, pp. 16-17.
531 Amendment to the proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations 
between Undertakings, OJ C51,23.2.1984, p8.
i.
144
whole, the share in a substantial part of the common market was greater than 50 %. 
The proposal floundered once again before the Council and the Member States still 
proved to be unprepared to grant the Community the scope of authority over 
competition and other policies that the terms of the Regulation would provide.
In 1986, the Commission made a further amended proposal. It did not however amend 
either the substantive assessment of concentrations under the Regulation nor the 
jurisdictional scope of the Regulation that had been envisaged in the 1982 proposal. 
Rather, it made some minor alterations to the role of the Advisory Committee.532 It is 
not surprising therefore that it met the same fate as the preceding proposals before the 
Council.
The ramifications of the Philip Morris decision gave the Commission fresh impetus 
in 1988. Furthermore, in the late 1980’s, the Commission (and the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee) gained a powerful ally with the 
voice of the European industrialists.533 This came as a result of the fact that during the 
later 1970’s534 and 1980’s many of the Member States were adopting national systems 
of merger law.535 Compounded with this development was the wave of concentrations 
that took place in anticipation of, and in response to, the process of Community 
integration. Thereby, increasing numbers of concentrations were subject to multiple 
national systems of regulation. European industry showed great concern about the 
inefficiency, the waste of time and resources, and above all the legal uncertainty of 
concentrations falling under the jurisdiction of more than one national law. Not only 
may the assessment criteria differ between the national authorities (creating great 
legal uncertainty) but the ultimate completion of the deal would be delayed until the 
decision of the last authority had been made. Further, the facts contained in the 
notification and the manner they are presented needs to be adapted to the 
particularities of each national market and procedure; there must be a familiarity with 
different legal systems and languages, requiring the use of external local experts in 
most cases. The costs of pre-1992 regulatory diversity (in all policy areas of the 
Community) were examined in the Cecchini report.536 It was estimated that their cost
532 OJ C324, 17.12.1986, p5.
533 See eg., Woolcock, S., ibid p i3.
534 Germany was earlier in 1973. The UK had a system of merger control in place upon joining 
the Community in 1973.
535 For details of the dates (and amendments) see Annex 1.
536 Cecchini, P., Catinat, M. and Jacquemin, A., The European Challenge 1992: The Benefits 
o f  a Single Market (1988, Wildwood House, Aldershot), p.31.
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ran into tens of billions of ECUs. An application of the Tiebout economic model of 
regulation above clearly provided that where there are spill-over effects, centralised 
regulation is appropriate.537
In view of the significant cost savings it allows, most European industrialists 
therefore advocated the principle of a one-stop-shop centralised regulation of 
concentrations having a cross-border effect, together with exclusive control.538 
According to these principles, there would be a level playing field for all 
concentrations with a cross-border effect, whereby they would be subject to a uniform 
set of rules: concentrations falling within the scope of the Merger Regulation would 
be assessed by a single authority only, and would not be subject to multiple scrutiny 
at the national level.539 Such a system was clearly not encapsulated by the uncertain 
application of Article 81 EC post Philip Morris.
Emboldened by the increasing support of European industrialists, and very aware of 
the confusion engendering from the Philip Morris decision, the Commission made a 
further amended proposal in 1988.540 This time however, it confronted the fears of the 
Member States of an overbroad application of the Regulation head on. Instead of the 
hitherto all-inclusive approach based upon the interstate trade criterion, the 
Commission proposed a more limited positive threshold criterion to limit the scope of 
the Merger Regulation. Thus, concentrations would fall within the scope of the 
Regulation where they had a Community dimension, that is where:
- at least two of the undertakings effecting the concentration have their principal field 
of Community activities in a different Member State; or
- the undertakings effecting the concentration have their principal field of Community 
activities in one and the same Member State, but where at least one of them has
537 See above at pp.49-54.
538 See Declaration of UNICE, The Union of Industry and Employment Federations in Europe, 
4 November 1987; Lord Leon Brittan, Competition Policy and Merger Control in the Single 
European Market, ibid at p.31.
539 In the minority, see Centre for Business Strategy, which highlights the dangers of regulatory 
capture that arise under the principle of one-stop-shop, Centre for Business Strategy, 
Continental Mergers Are Different - Strategy and Policy fo r  1992, London Business School, 
Sussex Place, Regent’s Park, London, 1990 at pp. 126-7. Also, Bishop, M. and Kay, J., 
European Mergers and Merger Policy, ibid, p.311-2.
540 Amended proposal for a Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ C 130,19.5.1988, p4.
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substantial operations in other Member States in particular through subsidiaries or 
direct sales.541
A concentration was deemed not to have a Community Dimension where:
- the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is less than 
1000 million ECU; or
- the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeds 1000 
million ECU, but where the aggregate worldwide turnover of the undertaking to be 
acquired is less than 50 million ECU; or
- where all the undertakings effecting the concentration achieve more than three- 
quarters of their aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same 
Member State.542
The Commission was to retain exclusive competence to apply the Regulation. The 
position of the Advisory Committee was retained, but it no longer had the power to 
delay decisions by the Commission, or to refer them to the Council. Rather, it would 
be kept fully informed throughout the proceedings and the Commission would have to 
take utmost account of any opinion it delivered, informing it of the manner in which 
its opinion was taken into account.543 While apparently weakening the Member 
States* participation in decision-making under the Regulation, the amendment made 
sense in terms of legal certainty and speed, issues whose importance had been 
emphasised by the Economic and Social Committee.544
The development was not however to satisfy the Member States. It was not only the 
jurisdictional criterion that was proving controversial. The proposed provision for the 
substantive assessment of concentrations for compatibility with the Common Market 
retained non-competition criteria.545 Germany and the UK in particular expressed 
concern that the exclusive competence of the Commission to examine mergers on 
non-competition grounds falling within the Merger Regulation would afford it too 
much opportunity to pursue its own industrial or political goals, at the expense of
541 Article 1(2), ibid.
542 Article 1(3), ibid.
This proposal was accepted without amendment by the European Parliament, OJ C309, 
5.12.1988, p55.
543 Article 18, ibid.
544 OJC252, 27.9.1982, pl6-17.
545 This was unchanged from the 1973 proposal.
147
national policies. The UK still advocated decisions based upon public interest 
grounds (although admittedly the ‘Tebbit Doctrine1 of July 1984 - as a Parliamentary 
answer to a question in the House of Commons - had provided that references should 
be made to the MMC on competition grounds only). Germany remained adherent to 
competition as the exclusive basis for the assessment of mergers. Meanwhile, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal now advocated the inclusion of a public interest defence based 
upon issues of regional policy.546
It was the position shared by the UK and Germany that was to hold sway in final 
negotiations for the provision for the substantive assessment of mergers under the 
Merger Regulation: the assessment of concentrations under the Regulation was to be 
limited to their effect on competition within the Community. The exact reasons for 
this result are unclear. In general however it is likely that the smaller countries (and 
those, like Italy, without their own systems of merger control) were won over by the 
feeling that supranational control could be more trusted to look after their interests in 
assessing mergers affecting their territory than a haphazard system of national 
controls. It has been suggested further that France proved more malleable in its 
position because it held the Presidency of the Council of Ministers at the time and 
wanted to take the credit for the successful implementation of the Merger 
Regulation.547 548
The jurisdictional question remained bitterly contested to the last however.348 
Specifically, the smaller states (and Italy) favoured a lower threshold. Many 
(including Italy) did not have merger control systems of their own and for these 
countries that generally had smaller, highly interdependent economies, the European 
market was the relevant geographical context for appraising concentrations.549 France, 
the UK and Germany on the other hand favoured higher thresholds because they 
considered that low thresholds would include mergers with a largely domestic effect. 
The concern was that mergers assessed at the Community level would result in anti­
competitive conditions at the national level. Furthermore, France was anxious not to 
lose the opportunity to allow mergers that might promote national champions, perhaps 
under state ownership.
546 The industrial group UNICE also strongly supported a public interest exemption.
547 See Bulmer, S., (1994) ibid at p.15.
548 Bulmer, S., (1994) ibid, at p.12.
These political dynamics lead to a particular structure of competence for the 
Commission to control concentrations under the European Merger Regulation.
C THE COMPROMISE
Even though economic analysis suggested that the gains of centralisation in the 
control of mergers within the Community were high, and industry championed the 
idea for a one-stop shop for cross-border mergers, in the event the jurisdictional 
trigger within the formal text of the EC Merger Regulation that was finally 
implemented allowed a very narrow scope of competence for the Commission (which 
was solely responsible for the application of the Regulation, subject to review by the 
ECJ549 50). This was clearly in deference to the fears of the larger Member States. 
Article 1(2) MR provided that a concentration has a Community dimension where:
‘(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than 
ECU 5,000 million; and
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than ECU 250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves 
more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same 
Member State’.551
Even with a jurisdictional threshold set at this high level however, further provisions 
were necessary to satisfy the fears expressed by Germany that concentrations with 
exclusively national effects might be assessed at the Community level rather than for 
their effect on localised national markets. Thus, Article 9 MR, known as ‘the German 
clause*, provides that the Commission may refer a notified concentration to 
competent Member State authorities where the Member State so requests within the 
allowable time, based upon the threat of a concentration to create or strengthen a 
dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly 
impeded in a Member State market presenting all the characteristics of a distinct 
market.552 Furthermore, there was also the ‘two-thirds’ rule laid down in Article 1 
MR, providing that where each of the undertakings concerned in a concentration
549 Bulmer, S., (1994) ibid at p.12.
550 Article 21(1) MR.
551 Before amendments, see below at pp. 154-156.
552 For a detailed analysis of this provision, see below at pp198-206.
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achieves more than two-thirds of the aggregate turnover within the same Member 
State, the Merger Regulation will not apply.553
In an attempt to satisfy the desires of the smaller Member States (in particular, 
Holland), many of which did not have their own independent systems of merger 
control, Article 22(3) MR was also included. It provides that decisions regarding the 
compatibility of concentrations lacking a Community Dimension within the Common 
Market can be taken by the Commission where a Member State so requests.554 The 
provision became known as the ’Dutch Clause’.
It is clear that both Articles 9 and 22(3) MR compromise the one-stop-shop principle 
that constitutes one of the most significant principles upon which the Merger 
Regulation was based. However, their inclusion into the text of the Merger 
Regulation proved to be essential for its successful implementation (even if, in 
practice, they have seldom been invoked555). Indeed, Lord Leon Britton, then 
Competition Commissioner, said of Article 9 MR:
‘It is a well known secret that this was the last provision of the Regulation to be agreed and that 
on that agreement depended the fate of the Regulation as a whole.*556
That the competence structure was the result of a political compromise was therefore 
never in doubt. We have moved a long way from the original proposal - moulded 
largely by the objective of integration -  of a jurisdictional trigger of the Regulation 
based upon the interstate trade criterion with a de minimis threshold.
553 A further relevant provision is Article 21(3) MR, that provides that Member States may 
take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than those taken into 
consideration by the Regulation that are compatible with general principles and other 
provisions of Community law.
This is not strictly a ‘fine-tuning’ provision or an exception to the one-stop-principle, since it is 
only meant to apply outside the field of competition, see eg.: Commission Decision of 19 May 
1993, IBM France/CGl Case IV/M336; Commission Decision of 14 March 1994, Newspaper 
Publishing, Case IV/M423; Commission Decision of 21 December 1995 Lyonnaise des 
Eaux/Northumbrian Water Case IV/M567; European Commission, XXIIIrd Report on 
Competition Policy 1993, at paragraph 321; European Commission, XXIVth Report on 
Competition Policy 1994, paragraph 335.
554 For a detailed analysis of this provision, see below at pp.226-230.
555 See below.
556 Lord Leon Brittan, The Law and Policy o f  Merger Control in the EEC, 15 (1990) ELR, 
(351) at 355.
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The explicit terms of the Regulation as finally implemented admitted that the 
compromise was far from ideal. Thus, Article 1(3) MR provided that the thresholds 
would be reviewed before the end of the fourth year. In its notes to the Council, the 
Commission further reserved the right to consider other criteria to determine 
jurisdiction. However, the compromise agreed upon did manage to satisfy the 
competing issues of regulatory efficiency, the concerns of the Member States and, 
where the thresholds were reached, the principle of a one-stop-shop. Lord Leon 
Brittany then Commissioner for competition, stated:
‘The clear division of tasks brought about by the Regulation will mean that there will be no 
scope for argument about jurisdiction between the Community and the Member States. The 
turnover threshold was chosen as a criterion for that very purpose. It is in some ways a blunt 
and arbitrary instrument but has the great merit of clarity’.557
The Commission has subsequently considered what would be a more appropriate 
scope for the European Merger Regulation in 1993,1996 and 2000 (ongoing).
D THE COMMISSION’S CONSIDERATION OF AN APPROPRIATE 
SCOPE FOR THE MERGER REGULATION IN ITS SUBSEQUENT 
REVIEW
Neither the ECJ nor the Court of First Instance has considered what would be the 
appropriate definition of ‘Community Dimension’ in the abstract, that is outside the 
technical application of Article 1 MR.558
Corresponding to the legal requirement in Article 1(3) MR, the Commission on the 
other hand reconsidered the appropriateness of the jurisdictional trigger in 1993.559 It 
concluded that while there was some concern about concentrations with a cross- 
border effect not falling within the scope of the Regulation, this was not sufficient to
557 Lord Leon Brittan, Competition Policy and Merger Control in the Single European 
Market, Grotius Publications Ltd., Cambridge 1991, p. 53.
Echoing this statement, see Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation (1996), ibid, 
paragraphs 31 and 32.
558 In Air France v EC Commission, the Court of First Instance considered the question of 
whether the Commission had applied Article 1 MR correctly to a concentration, Société 
Anonyme à  Participation Ouvrière Compagnie Nationale Air France v Commission o f the ECy 
Case T-3/93 CLR 1994I I 121.
559 Report from the Commission to the Council on the Implementation of the Merger 
Regulation, COM(93) 385 final, Brussels, 28 July 1993.
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convince the Member States and European industry that an amendment to the 
jurisdictional thresholds was necessary. It determined to continue to analyse the 
operation of the existing Regulation before making any proposal for revision. To this 
end, the Commission determined that a proposal would be made to the Council by the 
end of 1996.
In its Green Paper of 1996, the Commission considered what would be the optimum 
allocation of merger cases between the Commission and the Member States in the 
light of two fundamental Community objectives: the principle of subsidiarity and the 
objective of sustaining market integration (with the principle of a one-stop-shop for 
merger control).560
Thereby, it might be considered that the Commission was adopting a part policy (the 
Single Market objective and regulatory efficiency) and part legalistic (the principle of 
subsidiarity) approach in its review. However, the analysis of subsidiarity undertaken 
above determines that this was not so. Aside from the controversy over whether it 
may be applied retrospectively, Article 5 EC is not legally applicable to the actual text 
of the EC Merger Regulation in isolation: where the EC Merger Regulation applies, 
the Commission was given exclusivity of control.561 In recognition of this fact, the 
Commission was careful not to claim that subsidiarity had legal implications within 
the terms of the review of the turnover thresholds: it stated rather that the definition 
of Community Dimension given in Recital 9 of the Regulation ('significant structural 
changes the impact o f which goes beyond the national borders o f any one Member 
State') is *inspired by the same principles that underpin subsidiarity \  The approach 
of the Commission in its 1996 Review may therefore be stated to have been purely 
policy-based.
1 The Principle of Subsidiarity
The Commission intonated that subsidiarity represented a policy benchmark against 
which the operation of the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation should be 
measured. That is, that action should be taken at the most appropriate level of
560 ibid, at pp.9-16.
561 Kamburoglou, P. 'EWG-Wettbewerbspolitik und Subsidiaritaet’, Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb (1993) 4 at p.275.
152
jurisdiction in view of the objectives to be attained and the means available to the 
Community and the Member States.562
It considered the relevant Community objective with regard to concentration control 
to be the distortion of competition structures within the Community that may impede 
the process of integration.563 According to the Commission, concentrations may 
impede this Community objective where they have significant cross-border effects, 
that is where their impact on the structure of competition extends over a geographic 
area exceeding the borders of a single Member State. This is the case when, for 
example, the parties have significant activities in more than one Member State, or 
their activities in one Member State have significant competitive repercussions in 
other parts of the Community.564
The Community provides the best means to deal with such concentrations since its 
powers of investigation and its remedial and enforcement action extend beyond 
national boundaries. Furthermore, control at the Community level is best placed to 
take into account issues such as the globalisation of the relevant markets. Therefore, 
action by the Community is justified to assess cross-border concentrations that have a 
cross-border effect on competition at the Community level.
2 The Single Market Obiective and a <One-Stop-Shop’
Referring to the Single Market objective specifically, the Commission reiterated the 
dual policy of the Community towards concentrations: the need for European 
business to adapt in size to multi-national markets (as laid down in Recitals 3-5 of the 
Merger Regulation) and the need to preserve undistorted competition structures 
within the Community.
In line with these objectives, all concentrations that have cross-border effects on 
competition should be assessed at the Community level for their effect on Community 
structures of competition (where they are not de minimis).
562 See analysis below of Article 5 EC, pp 155-161.
563 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, ibid at point 25.
564 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, ibid at points 
25-6.
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The ‘one-stop-shop" principle facilitates another goal of the Merger Regulation, that 
is the provision of a single framework within which concentrations with a Community 
Dimension are assessed within a definite and foreseeable timetable. It is related to 
subsidiarity since the scale and effects of concentrations with a Community 
Dimension justify Community action. The Commission states that it is also linked to 
regulatory efficiency considerations, whereby the costs for business restructuring in 
the Single Market are minimized for concentrations with a Community Dimension, 
since a one-stop-shop averts the need for multiple filing according to differing 
notification requirements, procedures and legal standards.565
3 Summary
According to the Commission, consideration of the Community objectives of 
subsidiarity, the Single Market and the principle of a one-stop-shop determine that all 
concentrations with a cross-border effect on competition should be assessed at the 
Community level:
‘...the Community dimension of a concentration should ideally be defined on the basis of its 
effects on the market.*566
On the basis of these conclusions, the Commission expressed concern about the high 
level of multiple national filings in the Community. It stated that it was aware of 
about one hundred cases in the last two and a half years, of which about 35% were 
notified to two of more (and up to ten) national authorities.567 This suggested that a 
large number of mergers with a cross-border effect were not falling with in the EC 
Merger Regulation.
The situation was seen to be especially pressing on account of new systems of 
national control coining into force, and the increase in merger activity as a result of 
market integration.
565 See also on this eg., Commission White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employment 1994, especially Part II, Chapters 2-6.
566 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, ibid, at para’s 31-2.
See also statement by Commission in Commission XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 1993 
(1994, OOPEC, Luxembourg), paragraph 43.
567 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, at Paragraphs 
87-88. It stresses that these numbers are represent the minimum level that the actual total must
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The initial conclusions reached by the Commission in its Review seem to suggest a 
solution that mirrors the original proposals made in 1973 for a jurisdictional trigger 
based upon the interstate trade criterion and perhaps incorporating a more formalistic 
de minimis provision.568 However, the Commission was well aware of the other 
factors contributing to the issue.
E THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT
TO ARTICLE 1 MR
Reasons of practicability, legal certainty and - undoubtedly - political viability, 
determined that the Commission did not recommend a change from the definition of 
‘Community Dimension’ for the purposes of the Regulation as currently used (that is, 
the jurisdictional criterion based upon turnover thresholds).569 A reduction in the level 
of the quantitative criteria was however proposed.
The Commission considered that a reduction of the threshold criteria to a combined 
world-wide threshold of ECU 2 billion and a Community threshold of ECU 100 
million for each of at least two companies involved would embrace most instances of 
multiple filings570. However, the Commission was aware that this proposal could well 
be met by firm opposition in the Council. It therefore proposed a second, more 
limited, amendment.
The Commission proposed that mergers of multiple notification falling between the 
current thresholds and lower thresholds should fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Regulation571. It recommended a cut-off threshold of ECU 2 billion (world-wide) and
be, since it did not yet have the records for 1995, and the 1993-4 records were difficult to 
analyse accurately.
568 See above at pp.140-141.
569 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, ibid, at 
paragraph 31.
570 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, ibid, at 
paragraph 65.
571 It stated that the suggestion of the Member States that three or more notifications should be 
taken to trigger the application of the Regulation (where if there were only two, this could be 
solved by bilateral co-ordination) should be considered and evaluated in the consultation 
period (at para.80). Note however that para. 86 it stated that the smaller the number of Member 
States’ laws required for establishing the Commission’s competence, the simpler the 
procedures and the greater the degree o f legal certainty for the undertakings.
Similarly, the Economic and Social Committee rejected the need for such a limitation. They 
state that it is not so much a matter of co-ordination as of contributing to the creation of a level
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100 million (Community-wide). A concentration would be considered to come within 
the jurisdiction of an individual Member State if it met the national thresholds 
triggering an obligation to notify in systems of mandatory control or subjecting a 
concentration to a system of voluntary notification.372
Following the publication of the Green Paper, the Economic and Social Committee 
published a reaction.572 73 In this paper, they considered the Commission’s proposal for 
a solution to the multiple filing problem. It expressed some important - and valid - 
reservations:
First, they highlighted the fact that a concentration which is subject to filings in 
several Member States might only have significant effects in one State. Hence, the 
mere existence of several filings is not enough to determine Commission competence
to assess mergers.
Secondly, the mechanism proposed makes Community competence not only 
conditional on national legislation, but also on the interpretation given it by the 
national authorities in each individual case. Furthermore, this procedure is very slow 
and expensive for the undertakings concerned.
Although not specifically focused upon by the Committee, it should further be 
pointed out that, as the Commission has subsequently noted, not all Member States at 
that time had a system of merger control and others had a system based on voluntary 
notifications.574 57
The Committee therefore proposed a different solution. The suggested parameter was 
a turnover by at least two parties in each of two or more Member States affected by 
the concentration of over a certain threshold. This would not require any system of 
referral to national legislation.573
playing field across the Community which is important. Further, the avoidance of conflicting 
decisions and legal uncertainty, OJ No. C56/71 of 24.2.1997 at paragraph 2.2.3.
572 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, ibid, paragraph 
79.
573 OJ No. C56/71 of 24.2.1997.
574 See Commission Report to the Council on the application of the Merger Regulation 
thresholds, 2000, paragraph 5.
575 This reflected a similar proposition made by the Italian Delegation in the Council Working 
Group on the Commission’s proposal for amending the Merger Regulation, ie below the 
original thresholds, the Merger Regulation would also apply to concentrations meeting a world­
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We can see that in the amendments to the Regulation, which were made in 1997 
(coming into force on 1 March 1998), the Committee’s general suggestion was 
adopted by the Council in a specific provision. Council Regulation 1310/97576 
amended the text of the Merger Regulation, allowing for an alternative test of 
Community dimension that was to be considered as well as the original test as 
implemented in 1989 (see above):
a) the undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate world-wide turnover of 
more than ECU 2,500 million;
b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all 
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 100 million;
c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose of point b, the 
aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than 
ECU 25 million, and
d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than ECU 100 million,
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than 2/3's of its aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State’.577
F THE APPROACH OF THE LITERATURE IN CONSIDERING AN 
APPROPRIATE SCOPE FOR THE MERGER REGULATION
Several commentators have criticised the fact that the existing jurisdictional criterion 
of the Merger Regulation is approached as a matter of regulatory efficiency, legal 
certainty and political compromise, rather than rational economic theory.578
wide threshold of ECU 2 billion and a national threshold of ECU 50-100 million for each of at 
least 2 companies in each of at least three Member States).
576 3 0 June 1997,O JL 180/1 (1997).
577 Note that Article 1(4) MR, as amended by Council Regulation 13010/97, required the 
Commission to report to the council before 1 July 2000 on the operation of the threshold 
criteria set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.
578 Kassamali, R.A., (1996) ibid, at p.99-102; O’Keefe, S., Merger Regulation Thresholds 
(1994) ECLR (1), at p.30; Morgan, E.J., Subsidiarity and the Division o f Jurisdiction in EU
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These analyses are based upon the assumption that economic theory should dictate 
what the law is. Economic theory determines that mergers should fall within the 
scope of the Merger Regulation where their economic effect is of such significance 
that the Community has an interest in applying its own law rather than leaving it to 
national assessment according to national laws. Spill-over effect of concentrations 
rebuts the general presumption for decentralised regulation, and requires a system of 
centralised jurisdiction. ‘Spill-over effect’ occurs where economic activity within one 
jurisdiction may effect the economic conditions in another, separate jurisdiction (it is 
not synonymous with the idea of multiple national filing).579 Without explicitly 
acknowledging the Tiebout model580, it appears that this is the approach adopted in 
the literature considering the appropriateness of the jurisdictional criterion of the 
Merger Regulation.581
Kassamali and Morgan provide suggestions for an alternative jurisdictional trigger. 
They do not however consider that such a criterion should be effects-based. Rather, 
they emphasise the need to align the technical jurisdictional and the substantive 
criteria in economic terms. Thereby, they propose that a market share criterion would 
be more appropriate to determine those concentrations that might have a significant 
effect upon the competition structures of the Community.
The proposed solution is not however consistent with their preceding analysis. In 
effect, they propose to replace one arbitrary quantitative jurisdictional criterion with 
another, even if the one they propose may be more consistent with the substantive 
assessment under Article 2 MR than are the existing turnover thresholds.
Merger Control (1999) Antitrust Bulletin at p.8; Broberg, M., The EC Commission’s 
Jurisdiction to Scrutinise Mergers (1998), Kluwer.
Similarly, in an application o f the principle of subsidiarity, see Continental Mergers are 
different, Centre for Business Strategy, London Business School, 1990; Bishop, M., and Kay, 
European Mergers and Merger Policy, ibid pp.308-312.
579 See above pp.52-53.
580 See above, pp49-52.
581 Kassamali, (1996) ibid, p.105; Morgan, (1999) ibid at pp.8-10.
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G EVALUATION OF THE APPROACH OF THE COMMISSION AND 
IN THE LITERATURE
The Commission determined in its Green Paper of 1996 that in policy terms, that is 
with respect to regulatory efficiency and a straightforward application of the concept 
of subsidiarity within the context of the goal of the Single Market, those 
concentrations that may have a cross-border effect on competition should fall under 
the scope of the Merger Regulation.582
The literature reaches a similar conclusion that all concentrations that have a spill­
over effect onto more than one national market should fall within the scope of the 
Merger Regulation, whereby it bases its conclusions upon economic theory.
In the literature, a full definition of ‘spill-over’ effect is not articulated in any detail. 
Since both commentators however make reference to the Commission’s Green Paper, 
it may be that they use ‘spill-over’ in the same narrow sense as the Commission - that 
is, to mean a cross-border effect on competition alone.583 This condition would appear 
to be synonymous with the condition of the interstate trade criterion that is the 
jurisdictional trigger of Articles 81 and 82 EC. Recall that the interstate trade 
criterion is fulfilled where Community structures of competition are distorted by an 
actual or potential effect on interstate trade (rather than at the national/local level).584
Therefore, both the Commission and the literature consider that all concentrations 
that have an effect on interstate trade within the Community should fall within the 
Merger Regulation and, by implication, under the exclusive control of the 
Commission (even if the criterion finally proposed is a compromise of this position in 
consideration of other principles). This is consistent with an application of the 
Tiebout principle of regulation that has been shown to be persuasive in previous 
Commission Reports.585 In practical policy terms, however, the direct application of 
the interstate trade criterion was however rejected: both the Commission and the 
literature dismiss the interstate trade criterion as being too vague, and, in the event,
582 See above, pp. 153-154.
583 Although note that Kassamali, (1996) ibid, at p.97 (note 40) seems to consider that spill­
over effect refers to external industrial and social implications o f decisions taken at the national 
level.
584 See the analysis of Commercial Solvents above.
585 For an application of Tiebout, see above at pp.49-53. For an application of Tiebout by the
Commission, see Padoa Schioppa Report, note 181. ■-»*
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the Commission was forced to accept that a substantial lowering of the current 
quantitative thresholds would not be possible in the current political climate.
The approach of the literature and the European Commission therefore mirror 
eachother in as much in their conclusion as in their approach that is based upon 
seeking a ‘policy-compromise’ (the Commission in terms of the Community objective 
of integration, together with the principles of regulatory efficiency, a one-stop-shop, 
subsidiarity and the recalcitrance of the Member States; the literature in terms of 
rational economic theory).
Questionable however is whether it is absolutely correct to approach the issue in 
terms of policy alone, in acknowledgement of the wider legal dynamics of the 
Community. The EC Merger Regulation, as a provision of secondary Community law, 
derives from the Treaty in which boundaries of competence of the Community are 
drawn. It is therefore necessary to consider specifically in the analysis of the 
appropriateness of the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation whether the 
Treaty requires in and of itself a specific scope of Community competence to assess 
mergers as a matter of law.
The Merger Regulation was implemented according to specific legal bases of the 
Treaty - Articles 83 and 308 EC. Questionable is whether these legal bases have legal 
implications for the appropriate scope of the EC Merger Regulation - do they delimit 
a specific scope of the Merger Regulation in legal terms? The question entails 
analysis not only of the operation of Articles 83 and 308 EC in technical terms as 
legal bases for secondary Community law, but also a consideration of their operation 
in conjunction with the principle of subsidiarity. As will be demonstrated below, 
subsidiarity informs the use of Articles 83 and 308 EC to the extent that they are not 
relied upon to implement an exclusive competence of the Community.
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VII THE LEGAL BASES OF THE MERGER
REGULATION, THE LEGAL PRINCIPAL OF 
SUBSIDIARITY AND AN APPROPRIATE 
JURISDICTIONAL CRITERION
A THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
The operation of subsidiarity is contextual in the sense that it is a principle that 
operates in conjunction with existing or proposed Community legislation, refining 
and adapting either the literal text of a provision or its interpretation. In order to fully 
understand its operation in conjunction with the material provisions of Articles 83 EC 
and 308 EC, it is however useful to analyse the principle in isolation.
Subsidiarity, as a principle guiding the relationship between the individual, the group 
and society, has noble origins in papal dictates dating back to the early twentieth 
century.586 587It has also been developed as a legal concept in Germany with regard to 
the relationship between regional and federal regulation.387
Within the context of the European Community, the principle of subsidiarity is 
essentially to clarify the spheres of competence of the Community with regard to 
those of the Member States. It is arguable that subsidiarity as a principle of policy 
was first introduced into the debate about the Community’s appropriate legal and 
political structure in the mid-1970s,588 finding its expression in particular in the 
McDougall Report on the role of public finance in European integration. This Report 
considered the question of which economic policy areas should be funded at 
Community level and the effect of Community funding on the policies that remained 
in the hands of national governments.589 As noted above, the Report considered that 
the existence of economies of scale, political homogeneity and cross-frontier effects 
provided that centralised regulation was appropriate.
586 See eg., Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, (London, Catholic Truth Society, 1936), p.31 
paragraph 79.
587 For a useful overview, see Stadler, H., Subsidiaritaetsprinzip und Federalismi, (1951) 
Freiburg.
588 See Emiliou, N., Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against ‘the Enterprises of Ambition?', 
ELRev (1992) 383 at p.391.
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The draft European Union Treaty by the European Parliament on the other hand 
referred explicitly to subsidiarity in its Article 12(2).589 90 Thereby, it considered that the 
Community must only act to carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more 
effectively in common than by the Member States acting separately. A particular 
example of this was held to be the where the relevant action has a dimension or 
effects that extend beyond a single Member State.
The Single European Act introduced subsidiarity formally, but it was restricted to a 
limited field and its meaning was not elucidated. Hence, Article 130r(4) EEC 
provides:
4The Community shall take action relating to the environment to the extent to which the 
objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be attained better at Community level than at the level 
o f the individual Member States.’
The Padoa-Schioppa Report591 undertaken by the Commission one year later 
employed subisidiarity as a political principle.592 The Report concerned the economic 
policy issues arising as a result of Iberian accession and the project for the completion 
of the European internal market. It considered that there were two guiding principles 
which could be used to decide whether Community intervention was necessary: cross- 
frontier spill-over effects and the need to combat unemployment. Essentially, where 
spill-over effects were present, the question arose of which level of authority was 
better suited to fulfil a particular objective adequately. This second test was an 
efficiency test involving in particular the issue of unemployment: the Report 
considered that if regional unemployment was the result of Community policies, the 
Community was entitled to act. It was therefore a two-tier test that was founded upon 
the existence of spill-over effects.
The Treaty of Maastricht finally implemented subsidiarity as a general legal criterion 
into the text of the EC Treaty itself. Article 5 EC states:
589 Report, ibid.
590 In full, see above, p.51.
591 Report, ibid.
592 See Emiliou, N., Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against ‘the Enterprises o f  Ambition?’, 
ELRev (1992) 383 at p.396.
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‘The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and 
of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what
*593is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
In general terms it determines that the Community593 94 may only act within the confines 
of the aims and competencies laid down in the EC Treaty. The provision is a formal 
expression of a limitation on the competence of the Community to act in its status as 
an international organisation. Thereby, the right of the Member State to act at the 
national level takes precedence over the right of the Community to act on the Member 
States* behalf, unless the relevant area falls within the Community’s exclusive 
competence, or unless the object of the proposed action cannot be achieved at the 
national level and lies within the framework of the powers and aims laid down in the 
Treaty. Where such Community-level action is required, it is only legitimated to the 
extent that it is necessary.
The application therefore involves a presumption for decentralisation in the sense that 
if the desired end may be effectively achieved at the national level, the Community 
has no mandate to act.595 It is above all designed to ensure that Community decisions 
are taken as near to the citizens of the Community as possible and that the national 
identity of the Member States and their national legal systems are guaranteed to the 
greatest extent within the context of the Community’s objectives. Thereby, it is 
debatable whether the Member States have a right to refuse to act in the instance 
where that action would be effective without triggering the Community’s competence 
according to Article 5 EC. The better opinion is that it cannot: the ability of the
593 As introduced by Article G(7) TEU.
594 The Community is the actual addressee of the principle, and thereby all its political organs, 
see Lambers, H.-J, Subsidiaritaet in Europa - Allheilmittel Oder juristische Leerformel. EuR 
(1993) p.229 at pp237-9; Zuleeg, Af., in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid at p.228.
While it is possible (although not universally accepted) that they might consider the acts of 
Community institutions within the context of subsidiarity, the actual decision-making of the 
European courts is thought not to be subject to the application of the principle, see Zuleeg, Af., 
in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid at p.228-9.
595 See eg., Commission Public Comment, AE 1805/4; Zuleeg, Af., in: Groeben, Thiesing, 
Ehlermann, ibid at p.226; Groger, T. and Janicki, T,, 'Weiterentwicklung aus Europaeischen 
W ettbewerbsrechtsWuW (1992) Vol.12 at p.993; Emiliou, N., Subsidiarity: An Effective 
Barrier Against ‘the Enterprises o f Ambition?’, ELRev (1992) 383 at p401.
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Community to use its competencies cannot depend upon the willingness of individual 
Member States.596
The implications of the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity for 
Community competition law are expressed in two dimensions.597 598First, it is applicable 
to the jurisdictional divide between the application of national and Community 
provisions of competition law. In recognition of the primacy of Community law, it 
therefore influences the scope of Community competition law. Secondly, since it 
refers to Community ‘action’, it also influences the enforcement of Community law, 
determining whether this should be in the hands of Community or national 
authorities. With regard to Community law generally, the Commission has expressed 
the scope of the subsidiarity thus:
‘The full effect of the subsidiarity principle depends on consideration by the Community’s 
institutions of a number of questions...:
- What degree of constraint is to be applied for the implementation of shared powers?
- What are the limits on legislative action compared with non-binding means of action?
59$- What is the role of subsidiarity in the management and control o f  implementation!'
Questionable is how the principle is applied to these two dimensions of Community 
competence in competition law: when can it be said that a particular objective of the 
Treaty cannot be effectively achieved at the Member State level? In its Report to the 
European Council, the Commission proffered three questions that must be answered 
in each case:
What is the Community Dimension o f the Problem?
596 See eg.. Zuleeg, M., in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid at p.226; Lambers, H.-J, 
Subsidiaritaet in Europa - Allheilmittel oder juristische Leerformel, EuR (1993) p.229 at p. 
236.
In favour of the Member State prerogative, see Jurass, H., EG-Kompetenzen und das Prinzip 
der Subsidiaritaet nach Schaffung der EU, EuGRZ (1994) p209 at p. 210.
597 In general terms, three dimensions have been identified: uniform versus differentiated 
policy design; central versus local administration; central versus local government, in: CEPR, 
‘Making Sense o f Subsidiarity: How Much Centralisation fo r  Europe?', in Series: Monitoring 
European Integration 4, 1993.
With specific regard to competition law however, only two are relevant: see eg., European 
Commission, Green Paper on Vertical restraints; Van Miert, K., Subsidiarity and 
Decentralizaton in the Application o f  European Competition Law', Antitrust: Rules, 
Institutions and International Relations, International Conference, 20th November 1995
598 Commission Report to the European Council on the Adaptation of Existing Legislation to 
the Subsidiarity Principle, COM (93) 545 at p.2 (author’s emphasis).
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- What is the most effective solution, given the means available to the Community and to the 
Member States?
- What is the real added value of common action compared with isolated action by the Member 
States?’599
Questionable is whether the principle presents a clear set of justiciable rules that can 
be analysed in the abstract. This has been severely doubted, even by the Commission 
itself.600 Nevertheless, certain conditions are discernible that elaborate the basic 
framework provided by the Commission above.
In the first place, there must be a need for action with regard to the Treaty objective, 
and the effect that is sought must not already be in existence.601
Secondly, as is clear from the literal text, the relevant area in which the Community 
intends to act must be an area in which the Community does not have exclusive 
competence for the subsidiarity principle to apply. The category of ‘exclusive 
competences’ of the Community is difficult to delineate. In broad terms, exclusivity 
will be characterised by areas in which the Community has the sole task of 
‘completing’ a particular field of regulation.602 This is not however the same as where 
the Community simply has an obligation to act in any given area,603 and exclusivity 
does not, for example, extend to the general competence that the Community has to 
propose and implement provisions according to the general legal bases of Articles 
308 and 94 and 95 EC.604 A further example of exclusive competence is where the 
Community has actively exhausted the extent of its competence in a given field: 
exclusive competence may not just be inherent to the provisions of the Treaty, but
599 Commission Report to the European Council on the Adaptation of Existing Legislation to 
the Subsidiarity Principle, COM (93) 545 at p .l.
600 The Commission itself has stated:l...subsidiarity cannot be reduced to a set o f procedural 
rules; it is primarily a state o f  mind’ COM (93) 545. See also, eg., Moeschel, W., Zum 
Subsidiaritaetsprinzip im Vertrag von Maastricht, NJW (1993) p.3025 at 3070. The House of 
Lords Select Committee, in denying the justiciability of subsidiarity, has stated:
‘’The Committee do not believe that subsidiarity can be used as a precise measure against 
which to judge legislation. The test o f subsidiarity can never be wholly objective or consistent 
over time...to leave legislation open to annulment or revision by the European Court on such 
subjective grounds would lead to immense confusion and uncertainty in Community law’, 
House of Lords Select Committee, Report on Economic and Monetary Union and Political 
Union.
601 Zuleeg, M., in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid at p.226.
602 Zuleeg, M., in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid at p.214.
603 Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parliament Européen’, Le Principe de 
Subsidiarité, SEC (92) 1990 at p.6.
604 Zuleeg, M., in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid at p.215.
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may also arise out of the measures taken by the Commission or the Council on the 
basis of the Treaty.605 In general, each area of purported Community action must be 
considered on its own terms to determine whether it may be stated to be characterised 
by ‘exclusivity*.
Thirdly, it appears from the Commission Report to the Council above606 that the issue 
must be shown to have a ‘Community Dimension*. From the McDougall and Padoa 
Reports above, it is apparent that the Commission considers that ‘Community 
Dimension’ is embodied by spill-over effects.607 This also corresponds to Article 
12(2) of the draft Treaty drawn up by the European Parliament that refers to 
‘dimension or effects that extend beyond a single Member State. ' It is effectively an 
expression of the Tiebout principle.608 609
Fourthly, it is necessary to consider the effectiveness and efficiency of action at the 
national level to achieve the particular objective. Thereby, it may be determined that 
the harmonisation or co-ordination of national laws might bring the required result 
and Community action is not necessary. Further, the Member States may be able, 
through individual (unconcerted) parallel action, to fulfil the relevant 
Community aim. On the other hand, the interests of the objective of integration 
might override this, for example where national authorities might not co-operate with 
this goal in their decision-making or legislating so that the unified development of the 
economic conditions within the Community might be affected.610 A classic example 
of this would be of course the maintenance of undistorted competition throughout the 
whole Community.
605 Opinion o f the Court of Justice delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 
228(1) of the EEC Treaty, Opinion 2/91 ECR (1993) 1 1061 at pl076-7.
606 Commission Report to the European Council on the Adaptation of Existing Legislation to 
the Subsidiarity Principle, COM (93) 545 at p .l.
607 In agreement that spill-over effect normally justifies Community action, although 
unanimously incorporating this condition into the fourth test laid out in this thesis, see eg. 
Jurass, H., EG-Kompetenzen und das Prinzip der Subsidiaritaet nach Schaffung der EU, 
EuGRZ (1994) p209 at p. 215; Geiger, R., Kommentar zum EG-Vertrag, (1993), p.29; Zuleeg, 
M-. in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid at p.228.
608 See above, pp.49-53.
609 See eg., Everling, in: Everling, U ./Schwartz, I./Tomu$chat, C , ibid, at p.12; Schwartz, l  in: 
Groeben et al., ibid, pp.669-671.
610 See eg., Groger, T. and Janicki, T., 'Weiterentwicklung aus Europaeischen 
Wettbewerbsrechts\ WuW (1992) Voi. 12; Zuleegr M., in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid 
at p.228.
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Fifthly, it is necessary to consider the efficiency of action at the Community level with 
regard to the specific objective in comparison with action at the national level within 
the specific context of its scale or effect1 Generally, if it has been determined that 
national action is not appropriate, it will be clear that the Community represents a more 
efficient forum. However, it is conceivable that action at the level of the Community 
suffers from the same deficiencies as at the national level.2
Finally, Community action is only legitimised to the extent that it is necessary and 
suitable to achieve the relevant Community objective. This is a formal expression of the 
proportionality principle that has long been recognised as a general principle of 
Community law by the European Courts.3 Thereby, where there exists a choice of 
suitable action or measures to pursue a given Community objective or objectives, the 
least onerous must be selected. Further, the extent of the encroachment into the 
competencies of the Member States must be proportionate to the objective sought.4 
Thereby, the Commission and the Council enjoy a degree of discretion that may 
however be subject to scrutinization by the European Court of Justice.5
B THE MERGER REGULATION AS AN AMENDMENT TO THE 
TREATY OR AN EXPANSION OF THE TREATY - ARTICLE 308 EC 
OR ARTICLE 48 TEU AS A LEGAL BASE?
In analysing the legal bases of the Regulation, it is necessary to demonstrate initially 
why a Community system of merger control could be implemented according to 
secondary law and did not require an amendment to the Treaty according to Article 48 
TEU (ex.309 EC).
The issue of how a Community system of merger control could be legally implemented 
was, from the initial proposal by the Commission in 1973 until the final agreed upon
1 Geiger, R., Kommentar zum EG-Vertrag, (1993), p28; Zuleeg, M.t in: Groeben, Thiesing, 
Ehlermann, ibid at p.228.; Jurass, H., EG-Kompetenzen und das Prinzip der Subsidiaritaet 
nach Schaffung der EU, EuGRZ (1994) p209 at p.211.
2 Jurass, H., EG-Kompetenzen und das Prinzip der Subsidiaritaet nach Schaffung der EU, 
EuGRZ (1994) p209 at p. 211
3 First invoked in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH Cast 11/70 (1970) EC R 1125.
See also, eg., Werner A. Bock KG v Commission Case 62/70 (1971) ECR 897; Behla-Muehle 
Josef Bergmann KG  v Grows-Farm GmbH Case 114/76 (1977) ECR 1211.
4 See Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau Case 265/87 ECR (1989) 2237 at 2269.
5 United Kingdom v European Council Case 84/941 ECR (1996) 5755.
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text of the provision, one of the most controversial matters involved in the
implementation of the Merger Regulation; Italy in particular argued that the only
possibility for an implementation of a Community system of merger control was an
%
amendment to the Treaty text according to the procedure under Article 48 TEU.6 7
The origin of the dispute lies in the fact that it was unclear what exactly constitutes an 
amendment of the Treaty text (requiring Article 48 TEU procedure) as opposed to a 
necessary expansion of the Treaty according to its objectives (requiring Article 308 
EC8 procedure), and how'the two procedures are related.9
With regard to this issue, there is a consensus of opinion that if a new legal provision 
intentionally diverges from a specific and set Treaty text in its material content, this
constitutes a ‘Treaty amendment’.10 This would require a procedure under Article 48
■ -  ' *
TEU, since the Court of Justice has expressly stated that Article 308 EC must not be 
invoked to implement an amendment to the existing EC Treaty: \
‘(Article 308), being ai^integral part of an institutional system based" on the principle of 
conferred powers, cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope o f Community powers 
beyond the general framework created by the provisions o f the Treaty as a whole and, in 
particular, by those which define the tasks and activities of the Community. On any view, 
Article 308 cannot be used as the basis for the adoption of provisions whose effect would in
6 Groeben, von der H. ‘Handbuch des Eurppaeischen Rechts\(\9%y) at p.445; Krimphove,
(1992) ibid, p.340. /  V.
7 Article 48 TEU states: ‘The government o f  any%iember State or the Commission may submit 
to the Council proposals fo r  the amendment o f  thpTreaties on which the Union is founded. I f  
the Council, after consulting the European Parliament and, where appropriate, the 
Commission, delivers an opinion in favour o f  calling a conference o f  representatives o f the 
governments o f  the Member State, the conference shall be convened by the President o f  the 
Council fo r  the propose o f  determining by common accord the amendments to be made to 
those Treaties. The European Central Bank shall also be consulted in the case o f  institutional 
changes in the monetary area.
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the Member States in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements *
8 Article 308 EC states: T f action by the Community should, prove necessary to attain, in the 
^tfurse o f  the operation o f  the Common Market, one o f  the objectives o f  the Community and 
this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall take the appropriate 
measures, acting unanimously on a  proposal from  the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament *.
9 In detail on this, see Haede, U. and Puttier, A., Zur Abgrenzung des Artikels 235 EGV von 
der Vertragsaenderung (1997) 1 EuZW.
10 Krimphove, (1992) ibid, p.340; Schwartz, L, in: Groeben et al., Kommentar ibid, Artikel 
236, .Paragraph 2f; Grabitz, E. in: Grabitz, E. (ed) Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, 1990, 
ArtikeV308, Paragraph 4.
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substance be to amend the Treaty without following the procedure which it provides for that 
purpose/11
Advocates of Article 48 TEU as the appropriate legal base therefore claimed that the 
parties to the Treaty had wished to establish European economic law forever according 
to the set legal parameters in the Treaty. They argued that to implement a system of 
Community merger control would be to intentionally amend that set Treaty text, and 
this may only be effected on the basis of Article 48 TEU proceedings.12 
This assumption is however starkly inaccurate. The Treaty does not pertain to limit 
itself to a static legal, economic and political structure (existing at the time of its 
conception). The inclusion of legal bases in the Treaty text (for example, Articles 83 
and 308 EC), and the fundamental principles set down in Articles 2 and 3 EC alone, 
make it clear that the Treaty is concerned with the establishment (and maintenance) of a 
dynamic integrated market, based upon a developing structure of effective 
competition.13 This is a long-term and continual goal of the Treaty. Since merger 
control is aimed above all at the prevention of the creation of anti-competitive 
concentrations of economic power, a system of Community merger control is consistent 
with the Treaty text.
This was certainly the opinion of the Spaak Report, which clearly envisaged the Treaty 
objectives as encompassing a system of Community merger control.14 On the basis of 
that Report, a system of Community merger control was mooted between the Member 
States at the signing of the Rome Treaty. The impediment to its implementation was the 
Community policy towards concentrations at that time (outside the coal and steel 
sector), rather than legal issues.15 Moreover, and vitally, the ECJ subsequently extended 
Articles 81 and 82 EC and established a legal competence of the Community law to 
assess concentrations.16
It is clear therefore that a system of Community merger control was coherent with the 
objectives laid down in the Rome Treaty. In particular, it conformed to the aim of 
ensuring that competition within the Common Market is not distorted according to
11 Opinion 2/94 (re Accession o f the European Communities to the European Human Rights 
Convention) (1996) 2 CMLR at paragraph 30.
12 See in more detail, Krimphove, (1992) ibid at p.340.
13 See above. See also, Krimphove, (1992) ibid at p.341.
14 ibid, at p.60.
15 See above, pp.39-41.
16 See Continental Can and Philip Morris principles above.
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Article 3(1 )g EC, an aim that became more pronounced following the Single European 
Act of 1986. The introduction of a system of European merger control did not 
necessitate a change to the Treaty text. Therefore, the system of Community merger 
control was legitimately implemented on the basis of a provision of secondary 
Community law.
Paragraph 8 of the Preamble to the Regulation states that the Regulation is based upon 
both the legal base of Article 83 EC and the base of Article 308 EC. Questionable is 
whether either or both of these legal bases have implications for the appropriate 
jurisdictional scope of the Merger Regulation.
C THE LEGAL BASES OF THE MERGER REGULATION - ARTICLES 
83 AND 308 EC
Article 308 EC is a provision which is only to be invoked where the Treaty itself does 
not provide the relevant powers to fulfil the Treaty aims.17 It is subordinate to the other 
legal bases. Therefore it is prudent to first examine the extent to which the legal base of 
Article 83 EC acted as a legal base for the Merger Regulation and its possible 
implications for the appropriate jurisdictional scope of the Regulation.
1 * Article 83 EC
1.1 The Substantive Provision 
Fundamentally, Article 83(1) EC provides:
‘Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council shall...adopt any 
appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 
86 (Articles 81 and 82 EC).’
1.2 Article 83 EC and the Merger Regulation
Article 22(2) MR states that Regulations 17/62, 1017/68, 4056/86 and 3975/87 are not 
to apply to ‘concentrations’ as defined in Article 3 MR. Regulations 17/62, 1017/68, 
4056/86 and 3975/87 were the implementing regulations for the principles
17 See eg., Case 8/73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v Massey-Ferguson GmbH(1973) ECR 897; 
Case 45/86 EC Commission v Council (1987) ECR 1493. See eg., Krimphove, (1992), ibid 
p.342; Schwartz, I. in: Groeben et al, Kommentar ibid, p.602; Mestmaecker, ibid, 1988, 
p.371; SteindorfÇ ibid, p.3; Boehm, R, ibid, at pp.113; Dom, D., bid, pp.39-40; 
Heade/Puttler, ibid, p.15; Gericke, H., ibid, pp. 107-9; Everling, ibid, p.13; Geiger, 
Kommentar ibid, Art. 308, Paragraph 9.
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of Articles 81 and 82 EC according to Article 83 EC.628 On the basis of Article 22(2) 
MR therefore, the Merger Regulation has become the sole implementing regulation 
according to Article 83 EC for all concentrations falling within the scope of Articles 
81 and 82 EC
A minority of commentators have sought to question the legitimacy of this partial 
disapplication of Regulations 17/62, 1017/68, 4056/86 and 397S/87.629 The majority 
however accept that regulations implemented according to Article 83 EC may be 
amended or disapplied by later regulations implemented according to the same 
Article.630 This is in line with the position adopted by the Court of Justice.631
Questionable is the extent to which Article 83 EC represents the legal base of the 
Merger Regulation.
13 The Principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC to be Implemented According to 
Article 83 EC
Since Articles 81 and 82 EC are applicable to concentrations, and the Merger 
Regulation implements the principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC, it has been mooted 
that Article 83 EC may provide an adequate legal base for the Merger Regulation. 
This is the position adopted by the English Court of Appeal in Dan A ir632
628 Note that the Commission’s Proposal for new Council Regulation on the implementation of 
the rules in Articles 81 and 82 EC provides that there should be a single implementing 
regulation for all sectors on the base of Article 83 EC, since the Court of Justice has held that 
the Community competition rules apply in full to the transport sector, see Commission Proposal 
COM (2000)582 atp.5.
629 Fine, F,, ibid 1990 (but opinion revised in Fine, F., ibid 1994 at pp, 131-3); Venit, J., ‘The 
Merger Control Regulation - Europe Comes o f Age... or Caliban's Dinner \ CMLRev (1990) 7- 
50 atpp. 16-17.
630 The majority of commentators accept the legitimacy of this partial disapplication of 
Regulation 17/62 on the basis of Article 83 EC and replacement by MR for concentrations 
above the thresholds. See eg., Jones and Gonzalez-Diaz, ibid; Soames, T, ibid, at p.224; 
Bourgoeis, J. and Langeheine, B., Jurisdictional Issues: the EEC Merger Control Regulation, 
Member State Laws and Articles 85 and 86, Fordham International Law Journal, 1990-1, 14 
p.387; Immenga, U. in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid at p.1084; Fine, F., (1994) ibid pl31-3; 
Downes and Ellison, ibid pp. 184-5; Cook and Kerse, ibid p l4  (stressing adequate procedural 
framework rather than substantive however); Deimel, A., ibid, at p.119-20. Bos et al. 1992, 
ibid, stressing that the Merger Regulation has far more comprehensive powers for Commission, 
at p.374.
631 Case 32/65 Italy v Council and Commission (1966) ECR 389; (1966) CMLR 39.
632 R.. v. Secretary o f State fo r  Trade and Industry and another, ex parte Airlines o f Britain 
Holdings PLC and others (The Times, December 10, 1992). The Court regarded the matter as 
acte clair and refused to refer the question to the Court o f Justice for a preliminary ruling.
-------
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‘It seems to me to be quite clear that Regulation 4064 has been adopted as an ‘appropriate 
regulation’ to give effect to the principles set out in Article 86 (Article 82 EC)...the effect of 
the Regulation is to require the Commission to deal with all questions arising under Articles 85 
and 86 (Articles 81 and 82 EC) and to leave it to the national courts to apply their own 
domestic competition legislation to concentrations within their purview/
This would have serious implications for the Merger Regulation. In Commission v 
Council633 the ECJ held that the relevant Regulation based on Article 133 EC and 308 
EC was void since Article 113 EC would have been an adequate legal base.
However, in technical terms Articles 81 and 82 EC do not apply to all types of 
concentration within the meaning of Article 3 MR (Article 3 MR does not require, for 
example, an ‘agreement’ between the parties). This would suggest that there is a 
legitimate need for Article 308 EC as a legal base.
The contrary position may however be sustained where a very wide interpretation of 
the clause principles set down in Articles 81 and 82 EC* is adopted. This 
interpretation does not restrict the use of Article 83 EC to the material content of the 
provisions (Articles 81 and 82 EC) in the individual cases (that is, their technical 
scope). It embraces instead the fundamental principles according to which Articles 81 
and 82 EC are in general applied - that is, the pursuit of the goal of integration (and 
the ancillary maintenance of undistorted systems of competition). Thereby, it is 
arguable that the scope of Article 83 EC is broad enough to be adequate as the legal 
base for a Community Merger Regulation on its own. This position has been adopted 
by some commentators.634
The majority of commentators have however adopted a more limited interpretation of 
the ‘principles’ of Articles 81 and 82 EC to be implemented by a legal provision on 
the basis of Article 83 EC. According to them, Article 83 EC refers only to the 
material principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC in their limited application to 
concentrations.635 It is used in order to realise the material principles laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 EC in the concrete and specific case.
633 Case 45/86, 1987, ibid.
634 See eg., Mestmaecker, ibid, 1988 p.365; Mestmaecker, E., Europaeisches Wettbewerbsrecht 
1974, pp. 420-424; Steindorff, HW  Skript 10, ibid 1988; Blank, ibid, pp202-203.
635 See eg., Gleiss/Hirsch, Kommentar ibid, Artikel 87, Paragraphs 2 and 3; Sckroeter, H., in: 
Groeben et al., Kommentar, ibid, p905; Ritter, in: Immenga/Mestmaeeker, ibid pp 1470-1.
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The majority opinion is to be approved in view of the literal text of Article 83 EC. 
The provision refers explicitly to the ‘principles set out in Articles 81 and 82’. 
Furthermore, the (admittedly non-exhaustive) examples given in Article 83 paragraph 
2 (a-e) EC refer exclusively to the material content of Articles 81 and 82 EC. It 
further reflects the position adopted by the Court of Justice636 and is the interpretation 
explicitly adopted within the terms of the Merger Regulation itself (Preamble):
Whereas Articles 85 and 86 (Articles 81 and 82 EC), while applicable, according to the 
case-law of the Court of Justice, to certain concentrations, they are not, however, sufficient to 
control all operations which may prove to be incompatible with the system of undistorted 
competition envisaged in the Treaty;
- Whereas a new legal instrument should therefore be created in the form of a Regulation to 
permit effective control of all concentrations from the point o f view of their effect on the 
structure of competition in the Community and to be the only instrument applicable to such 
concentrations;
- Whereas this Regulation should therefore be based not only on Article 87 (Article 83EC) but, 
principally, on Article 235 (Article 308EC) of the Treaty, under which the Community may 
give itself the additional powers of action necessary for the attainment o f its objectives...’637
Article 83 EC is therefore a base for the Merger Regulation to the extent that the 
Merger Regulation realises the material principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC 
where they are applicable to the specific area of mergers. The Merger Regulation has 
however extended the application of Community law to concentrations beyond the 
material scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC (which is covered by the legal base of Article 
83 EC).638 For this extension of substantive Community legal competence, the legal 
base of Article 308 EC is required.639 Furthermore, Article 308 EC is required 
because of the different procedural and substantive approaches introduced by the 
Merger Regulation. For example, the Regulation is preventative in its approach to
636 Nouvelles Frontières (Joined Cases 209-213/84); Case 32/65 Italy v Council and 
Commission (1966) ECR 389 (1966) CMLR 39.
637 Recitals 6-8 (Author’s emphasis).
638 See above. Cf., in the minority, Mestmaecker, who considers that the Philip Morris 
principle extends to all types of concentration. Therefore, in his opinion, whichever 
interpretation of ‘principle* within the meaning of Article 83 EC is adopted, Article 83 EC 
alone serves as an adequate legal base for the Merger Regulation, in: Mestmaecker, ibid 1988 
pp.367-371.
639 See eg.. Krimphove, (1992) p. 344-5; Blank, ibid p.207; Venit, ibid, 1990, pp.13-14; 
Schwartz, in: Groeben et al, Kommentar ibid, p.602-4; Ritter, in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, 
ibid 1472.
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concentrations, allowing also for negotiation and the giving of undertakings according 
to Article 8 MR.640 Moreover, the Merger Regulation - unlike Articles 81 and 82 EC 
- includes strict deadlines which, if not met, provide for the automatic validity of the 
proposed concentration.6*1
It remains to be considered the legal relevance of Article 83 EC as a legal base for the 
Merger Regulation. Does it determine that the Merger Regulation must - to the extent 
that they apply to concentrations - implement exactly the material principles set out in 
the text of Articles 81 and 82 EC? Is it at least permissible to restrict or modify in any 
way the established jurisprudence in the interpretation of Articles 81 and 82 EC 
within the terms of the EC Merger Regulation?
1.4 The Legal Effect of Article 83 EC as a Legal Base
Article 83 EC incorporates an imperative: the Council is obliged to implement all 
suitable Regulations or Directives to give effect to the material principles set out in 
the text of Articles 81 and 82 EC.642 Thereby, legal provisions implemented on the 
basis of Article 83 EC do not have to provide for the comprehensive and absolute 
implementation of the material principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC, but they must not 
alter the material text of these provisions.643 This refers to both the material content 
and the material scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC.
With specific regard to the jurisdictional criterion of Articles 81 and 82 EC, we find 
therefore that Article 83 EC does not legitimate any substantive amendment to the 
interstate trade criterion. The Council may not adopt a provision on the basis of 
Article 83 EC that allows the regulation of agreements or conduct that does not 
actually or potentially affect interstate trade according to the principles of Articles 81 
and 82 EC.644
640 Immenga, in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid, p.782; Krimphove, (1992) ibid, p.344.
641 Krimphove, (1992) ibid, p.344
642 See eg., Schroeter, H., in: Groeben et aí., Kommentar ibid, p.902; Gleiss/Hirsch, ibid, 
Article 87 paragraph 1; Mederer, W., in: Groeben et ah, Kommentar ibid, p2043.
643 Gleiss/Hirsch, ibid, Artikel 87, Paragraph 3; Blank, ibid, p.202; Schroeter, H., in: Groeben 
et ah, Kommentar, ibid, pp.905, 907; Mestmaecker, E-J. in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid, pl4- 
5; Ritter, in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid, pp 1470-1.
See also by analogy the Court of Justice’s decision in Brasserie de Haecht/Wilkin Case 48/72 
ECR 1973, 77, 86, no.6. In this case, the Court stressed that Regulation 17/62 did not and 
could not modify the effects of Article 81(1) and (2) EC.
644 See expressly, Schroeter, H ., in: Thiesing/Groeben/Ehlermann, ibid p.905.
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This restriction on the operation of Article 83 EC as a legal base appears to extend to 
the limitation of application of the principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC to 
undertakings of a particular size and dimension. Consider the ‘appreciably’ 
criterion of Article 81 EC which was shown above to exercise a quasi-jurisdictional 
function in the way it has been applied and developed by the Court of Justice and the 
European Commission. When the Commission decided formally define the 
‘appreciability’ criterion in the application of Article 81(1) EC (in a way that did not 
entirely reflect the existing case law of the Court of Justice) it did not look to the 
Council to implement a Regulation based upon Article 83 EC. Rather, it introduced a 
(non-binding) Commission Notice that gave formalistic expression to its application 
of the de minimis criterion.
It could be deduced from this fact that Article 83 EC does not provide a legitimate 
legal base to implement a Regulation that would alter the interpretation of the 
material provisions of Article 81(1) EC. This goes beyond the more traditional belief 
that Article 83 EC cannot countenance an alteration to the material text itself.643 
However, this assumption determines a limitation on the use of Article 83 EC that 
might be overly broad. Is it not plausible, for example, that the interpretation of the 
principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC might be legitimately ‘re-focused’ for 
specific types o f transaction? This would be in recognition that certain types of 
transaction might have differing effects on Community objectives, in particular for 
the overriding objective of Community competition law - Single Market 
integration.645 46 It might also be in recognition of the fact that the material provisions of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC are ill-suited to regulate certain types of transactions that affect 
these objectives.
Traditional analysis appears to deny this application of Article 83 EC. Schroeter 
expressly states that provisions implemented on the basis of Article 83 EC should 
enable the principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC and cannot restrict them for certain 
types of transactions, making specific reference to concentrations.647 Nevertheless,
645 Schroeter considers that Article 83 EC does not empower the Council to exclude particular 
undertakings, branches of the economy or areas within the Community Market from the 
application of the principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC, Schroeter, H.t in: 
Thiesing/Groeben/Ehlermann, ibid p905.
646 1 am indebted to Professor Claus-Dieter Ehlermann for suggesting this theory, as well as the 
analogy that follows.
647 Schroeter, H., in: Thiesing/Groeben/Ehlermann, ibid p.907.
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heed should be taken of more recent developments in the area of state aid regulation 
that suggest a rather different conclusion.
In the area of state aids, Article 89 EC provides a legal basis equivalent to Article 83 
EC for the Commission to implement suitable Regulations for the application of 
Articles 87 and 88 EC (and in particular, to determine the conditions in which Article 
88(3) EC shall apply and categories of aid that are exempted from the procedure). 
Article 89 does not incorporate an imperative like Article 83 EC: it only empowers 
the Council to implement Regulations. It operates however in a similar way in that it 
does not allow the implementation of a Regulation that would constitute a material 
change to the principles enshrined in Articles 87 and 88 EC.648 Nevertheless, a debate 
arose in the literature about whether regulations might be implemented on the basis of 
Article 89 EC in order to define or render specific particular terms within Articles 87 
and 88 EC - for example, the meaning of ‘aid’, ‘the furthering of economic 
development’ or ‘effect on interstate trade’, whereby the consensus of opinion 
suggested that it did.649
Although an initial proposal by the Commission establishing certain conditions 
relating to the examination of notified aids that was submitted to the Council on 4 
April 1966650 failed to gain the Council’s approval, the debate referred to above has 
been rendered academic in view of the more recent use of Article 89. It has been 
invoked to implement various Regulations that have actually adapted the 
interpretation of conditions laid down in Articles 87 and 88 EC for specific types of 
state aid. The de minimis Regulation for the application of Articles 87 and 88 EC 
provides a specific example of this.651 This ‘appreciability* Regulation effectively
648 Mederer, W., in: Thiesing/Groeben/Ehlermann, ibid, p2044.
649 See eg., Mederer; W., in: Thiesing/Groeben/Ehlermann, ibid, p2044; Wenig, F-H, in: 
Thiesing/Groeben/Ehlermann, (4th Ed.) , p2747; Schina, D., State Aids under the EEC Treaty, 
(1987) ESC Publishing, Oxford, p i 18; D’Sa, R.M., European Community Law on State Aid, 
1998, Sweet and Maxwell, p i 06.
This is aside from the debate about whether such Regulations should be implemented with 
regard to policy issues, see on this Schima, B., Das Subsidiaritaetsprinzip im Europaeischen 
Gemeinschaft, Wien 1994, at p i 18; D’Sa, R.M., European Community Law on State Aid, 
1998, Sweet and Maxwell at pp38-9; Mederert W., in: Thiesing/Groeben/Ehlermann, ibid, 
p2044-45.
The defining sentiment in terms of policy in practice was however that the Notice was proving 
inadequate, and that it had failed to stem the tide o f notifications, see Commission’s Twenty 
Fourth Report on Competition Policy, paragraph 20; Brittan, L., European Competition Policy 
- Keeping the Playing Field Level, Brassey’s, 1992, p.8.
650 See European Commission Xth Report on Competition 1967, paragraph 64.
651 Council Regulation 69/2001 OJ (2001) L010/30. This was implemented according to 
Article 2 o f Council Regulation 994/98 of May 7 1998 on the application o f  Articles 87 and 88
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restricts the scope of the interstate trade criterion laid down in Article 87 EC (by 
setting a minimum fixed amount of aid over a given period of time for which the 
prohibition of Article 87 EC applies). What is particularly interesting is that the 
Council implemented Regulation in spite of the fact that de minimis Notices652 that 
the Commission had previously issued had been heavily criticised as illegally 
amending the text of Article 87(1) EC.653 Indeed, the Court of Justice had not yet 
unequivocally accepted the presence of an ‘appreciability’ criterion in the field of 
state aid. In 1987, Advocate General Lenz had stated:
‘...it would seem inappropriate to extend the principle of appreciable effect to the prohibition 
on aid in Article 92 (87) of the EEC Treaty. It cannot be inferred either from the wording of the 
relevant provisions or from the case-law of the Court of Justice that there should be such an 
exception to the fundamental prohibition of state aids.’654 65
This position was not unanimously held. Some read de minimis and the requirement 
of ‘appreciability* to be a general principle of Community law, so that activity of too 
little significance is excluded from regulation within the Community.633 This appears 
to have been the rationale behind the Commission’s approach, considering in the 
Notice itself that it ‘...ought to be left to concentrate its resources on cases of real
o f the Treaty establishing the EC to certain categories o f horizontal State aid (that had been 
implemented on the basis of Article 89 EC(1998) OJ LI 42/1). Article 2 of that Regulation 
provided that the Commission could adopt a de minimis Regulation for Article 87(1) EC 
according to the procedure under Article 8 of the Regulation.
But see also, for example, Council Regulation 70/2001 of 12 January 2001, allowing the 
Commission to approve certain types of aid to small and medium enterprises, subject to 
specific thresholds (implemented according to Article 1 of Council Regulation 994/98 of May 
7 1998); Council Regulation 68/2001 exempting certain types of training aid, subject to 
specific thresholds (implemented according to Article 1 of Council Regulation 994/98 of May 
7 1998); Article 19 of Regulation 659/1999 regarding the application of Article 88 EC, that 
effectively expands the literal text of Article 88 EC by providing that where a Member State 
accepts measures proposed by the Commission to alleviate prohibited instances of state aid 
(and informs the Commission), it is bound.
652 Community Guidelines on State Aid for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises OJ (1992) 
C213; Commission Notice on the De Minimis Rule for State Aid OJ (1996) C68/9.
653 See eg., D’Sa, R.M., European Community Law on State Aid, 1998, Sweet and Maxwell; 
Stuart, Recent Developments in EJJ Law and Policy on State Aids (1996) 4 ECLR 226 at 
p229.
654 France v Commission Case 102/87 (1988) ECR 4067 at 4078. Similar, though less 
forthright, see Advocate General Capotorti in: Philip Morris v Commission Case 102/87 
(1988) ECR 4067 at 4078.
The Court had considered arguments that specific aid was de minimis, but each time had 
determined that the was no such argument, without affirming the actual presence of the 
condition: Re Meura: Belgium v Commission Case 234/84 (1988) ECR 2263; (1988) 2 CMLR 
331; Deufil v EC Commission Case 310/85 (1987) ECR 901; (1988) 1 CMLR 553.
655 Schina, D., State Aids under the EEC Treaty, (1987) ESC Publishing, Oxford p27.
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importance to the Community.'656 It is further an application of the subsidiarity 
principle, even though in strict legal terms the principle is not applicable 
retrospectively to Treaty Articles.657 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the 
‘appreciably’ criterion is not explicitly enshrined in the literal text of Article 87 EC, 
nor was there existing Court of Justice case law, as had been the case with Articles 81 
and 82 EC. It is therefore surprising - in view of the approach taken under Article 83 
EC - that the basis of Article 89 EC was used to implement a de minimis regulation; 
that, in effect, Article 89 was used to restrict the scope of the material provision of 
Article 87 EC.658
The terms of the Regulation even appear to distinguish between different sectors of 
the economy in the application of Article 87 EC: thus, the Regulation is not 
applicable in the sectors of agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture and transport, since 
there is a risk that 'even small amounts o f aid could fulfil the criteria o f Article 87(1) 
o f the Treaty in those sectors'.659 Further, the de minimis Regulation only covers 
some types of aid: export aid and aid favouring domestic over imported products are 
expressly exempted from the application of the Regulation.660 These types of aid are 
clearly of particular concern to the protection an integrated Single Market.
Clearly, the effect of Council Regulation 69/2001 is to express an interpretation of 
Article 89 EC that has been hitherto denied the similar provision of Article 83 EC.661 
Questionable therefore is whether the traditional approach in the literature towards 
Article 83 EC is correct. May not analogy be drawn with the developments that have 
been established in practical and theoretical terms under Article 89 EC?
The regulation of state aids is a rather anomalous area of regulation within the 
competition law field. It raises its own specific issues that must be considered - for 
example, political, social and structural concerns - whereby certain types of aid may
656 Community Guidelines on State Aid for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises OJ (1992) 
C213, p.9.
657 See above, p.123.
658 Indeed, it had been the method that had previously been envisaged in the literature as the 
legitimate way to introduce a de minimis provision into Community state aid regulation, see 
eg., Rose
659 Council Regulation 69/2001 OJ (2001) L010/30, Preamble Paragraph 3.
660 Council Regulation 69/2001 OJ (2001) L010/30, Preamble Paragraph 4. This is in line with 
the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (OJ 
(1994) L336/156).
661 See above, pp. 175-176.
have a positive effect for the overriding Community policy objective of Single Market 
integration.662 Nevertheless, the overriding objective in the implementation of 
Articles 87 and 88 EC - as part of the acquis of the Community competition law 
provisions - is just that: the promotion and protection of Single Market integration. 
This reflects the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, and the argument is therefore 
sustainable that the material principles of these Articles through the implementation 
of provisions on the basis of Article 83 EC may be defined or rendered specific for 
sui generis sectors or types of transaction that require different treatment within the 
context of that overriding goal.
1.5 Article 83 EC and the Subsidiarity Principle
In so far as Article 83 EC is not employed to implement an exclusive competence of 
the Community, the principle of subsidiarity informs its operation as a legal base. In 
order for an area of Community competence to be considered ‘exclusive* within the 
meaning of Article 5 EC, exclusivity of action must actually be directly conferred 
according to the Treaty.
Article 83 EC only gives the Council (acting by qualified majority on a proposal by 
the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament) the competence to 
implement the appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC. It does not thereby stipulate that these provisions must bestow 
exclusive competence upon the European Institutions. Further, Article 85(1) EC states 
that national authorities in the Member States will assist and co-operate with the 
Commission in applying the principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC. These 
substantive provisions themselves do not operate to prevent the application of 
national law to all agreements and conduct to which they are applicable. The primacy 
of Articles 81 and 82 EC before national competition law has been interpreted to 
operate only to the extent that there is a direct conflict with a provision of national 
law.663
It follows that exclusivity has not been conferred upon Article 83 EC in its operation 
as a legal base. Subsidiarity therefore applies to the extent that Article 83 EC is used 
as a legal base, that is to the extent that it is used to implement provisions in order to
662 For a more comprehensive account of the issues raised by the regulation of state aids within 
a Community context, see Schina, D, ibid, ppl-10.
663 Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68 (1969) ECR 1, (1969) CMLR 100.
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apply the principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC. Hence, in general terms, the use of 
Article 83 EC is only legitimated to the extent that Community action is required (that 
is, the issue has a Community Dimension’), and then only to the extent that action is 
necessary.
It has been demonstrated above that Community Dimension’ is deemed for conduct 
and agreements that have spill-over effects: the Community - and, in particular, the 
Commission - has tended to use a straightforward application of the Tiebout 
principle.664 Further, it has been repeatedly shown that where potentially 
anticompetitive agreements or conduct have an effect on interstate trade, action at the 
national level is not adequate to achieve the Community’s objectives: national 
competition authorities endure informational difficulties and an inability to extend 
remedial and enforcement action beyond national boundaries. Furthermore, control at 
the Community level is best placed to take into account issues such as the 
globalisation of the relevant markets.665
The application of subsidiarity to the legal base Article 83 EC upon which the EC 
Merger Regulation is (in part) based does not therefore affect the conclusion that the 
interstate trade criterion is the appropriate jurisdictional trigger, subject however to 
the suggestion above that its application might be ’refocused’ to some extent for 
concentrations specifically.
2 The Legal Base of Article 308 EC
Article 308 EC provides:
‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of 
the Common Market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided 
the necessary powers, the Council shall...take the appropriate measures.’
664 See eg., EC Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, 
ibid at points 25-6; EC Commission's McDougall Report, ibid; Padoa Schioppa Report, ibid; 
Article 12(2) of the European Parliament's Draft European Union Treaty.
665 See eg., EC Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, 
ibid at points 25-6.
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The proper definition of Article 308 EC and the appropriate conditions for its 
application have given rise to considerable debate and controversy.666 There is 
however a consensus of opinion that, generally, the provision provides the means to 
close the gaps which can exist between a Community objective deriving from the 
Treaty, and the scope of the powers of the Community which have been set down in 
the Treaty to fulfil this objective.
According to the literal text of Article 308 EC, there are five broad conditions which 
must be fulfilled for its application as a legal base:
- First, action must be required by the Community in order to fulfil one o f the
objectives o f the Community;
- Secondly, that objective must be one which is to be attained within the course o f the 
Common Market;
- Thirdly, there must not be any Community powers existing which are sufficient to 
pursue this objective;
- Fourthly, the appropriate measure must appear necessary to achieve the aforesaid 
Community objective,
- Fifthly, the measure implemented must be appropriate to fulfil the Community 
objective for which it is implemented.
It is necessary to consider each of these conditions in general, and then to consider 
how each one in turn is fulfilled by the Merger Regulation,
666 For the opinion of the Court of Justice, see in particular, HZA Bremerhaven v Massey- 
Ferguson Case 8/73 (1973) ECR 897; OECD Court of Justice’s Opinion 2/92 1995.
In the literature, see in particular: Schwartz, /. in: Groeben et al., Kommentar ibid, pp.590-718; 
Contantinesco, V. et al, ibid, pp. 1509-1540; Geiger, Kommentar ibid, pp.789-792; Boehm, R., 
ibid, pp. 104-119; Dom, D., ibid; Gerick, H-P, Allgemeine Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse nach 
Artikel 235 EWG-Vertrag, Hamburg 1970; Marenco, G., Les conditions d ’application de 
l ’article 235 du Traité CEE, 1970 RMC pp. 147-157; Close, G., Harmonisation o f laws: use or 
abuse o f powers under the EEC Treaty? 1978 ELR pp.461-481; Nicolaysen, G., Zur Theorie 
von den Implied Powers in den Europaeischen Gemeinschaften, 1966, EuR pp. 129-142; 
Everling, U./Schwartz, I/Tomuschat, C. Die Rechtssetzjungsbefugnisse der EWG in 
Generalermaechtigungen, insbesondere in Article 235 EWG-Vertrag, 1976, EuR, Sonderheft; 
Schwartz, I., Article 235 EG-Vertrag nach Maastricht, in: Festschrift Ernst-Joachim 
Mestmaecker, Baden-Baden 1996, pp.467-482; Steindorff, E., Grenzen der EG-Kompetenzen, 
Heidelberg 1990 p.48, 82, 112-122; Weiler, J., The Transformation o f  Europe, Yale Law 
Journal 1991 100 pp.2403-2483; Haed/Puttler, Zur Abgrenzung des Art. 235 EGV von der 
Vertragsaenderung, 1 EuZW (1997) 13-17.
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The Relevant Community Objective to be attained in the Course o f the 
Operation of the Common Market
2.1.1 The Conditions in General 
a The ‘Relevant Community Objective*
The exact meaning and scope of the words ‘Community objective" according to 
Article 308 EC have been the subject of some considerable debate. There is a 
consensus of opinion that it pertains to an objective deriving from the Treaty.667 It is 
not however generally agreed upon what constitutes an ‘objective of the Treaty*.
In this regard, the aims and objectives of the Community that are set down in the 
Preamble are a cause of particular controversy.668 It is certain that the direct aims set 
down in Article 2 EC (the establishment of the Common Market,669 an economic and 
monetary union and the implementing of common policies or activities referred to in 
Articles 3 and 3a) constitute objectives of the Treaty.670 On the other hand, the further 
condition ‘within the course o f the operation o f the Common Market* of Article 308 
EC would seem to exclude the establishment of the Common Market as an ‘objective’ 
within the meaning of Article 308 EC. Otherwise, the text of the provision would 
make no sense, where the object would be to create the Common Market ‘in the 
course of the operation of the Common Market*. Further, it is not at all clear whether 
the other more indirect aims set down in Article 2 EC (which are to be pursued 
through the establishment of the Common Market, an economic and monetary union 
and the implementing of common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 
3a) could constitute a ‘Community objective* within the meaning of Article 308 
EC.671
667 See eg.. Everting in: Everling, U/Schwartz, I./Tomuschat, C., ibid, p.10; Boehm, R., ibid at 
p, 105-6; Schwartz, in: Groeben et al., Kommentar ibid, p641; Hartley, T.C., ibid, at p.104; 
Haede, U. and Puttier, A., ibid, pl4; Dom, ibid, pp.22-3; Krimphove, E., (1992) ibid, p.345.
668 See eg., Schwartz, I , in: Groeben et al., Kommentar ibid, pp. 140-152; Boehm, R., ibid, 
pp. 108-110; Dom, D., ibid, p.23-4; Haede/Puttier, ibid at p.14.
669 The ECJ has stated that the establishment of the Community is a Community objective, see 
eg., Gaston Schut Douane Expediteur BV v Inspecteur dr Invoerrechten en Accijnzen Case 
15/81 (1982) ECR 1409.
670 See eg., Schwartz, l ,  in: Groeben et al., Kommentar, ibid, p.644; Everling, ibid, p.10; 
Steindorff, ibid, p.45,48-49,117,122.
671 The ECJ has stated that they are, see eg., Seeleute, Case 167/73 (1974).
The majority opinion follows this: see eg., Marenco, ibid, p.149; Gericke, ibid, pp22-4; 
Tomuschat, ibid, p.60; Dom, ibid, pp.l 12-4; Boehm, ibid, pp. 105-6; Schwartz, I in: Groeben et 
al., Kommentar, ibid, p.647.
But against this in the minority, see, eg., Everling, ibid, pp.9-10; Steindorff, ibid, p.45, 48-9, 
117,122.
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It is on the other hand well-established in the literature and by the Court of Justice 
that the aims and objectives contained in Article 3 EC may constitute an objective 
within the meaning of Article 308 EC.672
b ‘In the Course o f  the Operation o f  the Common Market *
The clause ‘...in the course of the operation of the Common Market...* appears to 
provide a qualification to the very broad power that Article 308 EC might otherwise 
provide. Nevertheless, many commentators either dismiss the significance of this 
further condition, or lend it an interpretation that is too wide to act as any 
limitation.673
This standpoint is not however without controversy. In particular, confusion has 
arisen because of the different phrasing of the clause in some of the official 
languages:
The Dutch, German and Danish versions correspond: (in German) Tm Rahmen der 
europaeischen Gemeinschaft*. The French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese versions 
are however more ambiguous: (in French)‘dons le fonctionnement du marche 
commun’. The English version is also similar to this version: ‘in the course o f the 
operation of the Common Market\ Various interpretations have been made.
The wider interpretation considers that the clause allows the implementation of a 
provision for any objective which may have any connection to the Common Market, 
however indirect. According to this standpoint therefore, the clause does not restrict 
the Community objective to economic and financial issues, or even to objectives 
which are directly within the Treaty text.674
The better opinion is that these do constitute objectives within the meaning of Article 308 EC, 
but are also limited in that they arise ‘through the establishment of the Common Market...', see 
eg., Schwartz, /  in: Groeben et al., Kommentar, ibid, p.647; Gericke, ibid, pp.24; Steindorff, 
ibid, p.45,48-9,117,122.
672 See eg., Massey-Ferguson Case 8/73 (1973), 897 at p.907.
Schwartz, /  in: Groeben et al., Kommentar ibid, p.641; Geiger, Kommentar 2nd Ed., p.790; 
Constantinesco, V. et al., ibid, p.I52Q; Boehm, R., ibid at p. 110; Dorn, D., ibid, p.22-3.
673 See eg., Everling, U., Die allgemeine Ermaechtigung der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft zur 
Zielverwirklichung nach Article 235 EWG-Vertrag, in: Everling, UVSchwartz, ITTomuschat, 
C , ibid, pp.2-26; Opperman, T., Europarecht, Muenchen, 1991.
674 Close, G., Harmonisation o f laws: use or abuse of the powers under the EEC Treaty? ELR 
1978, pp.461-481.
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Alternatively, the clause has been interpreted restrictively, pertaining to a protection 
of the functioning of the Common Market only.675 Similar to this interpretation is the 
even more restrictive interpretation that the clause should pertain only to the 
protection of the Common Market as existed before the Treaty amendments, that is 
the protection of only the four freedoms and the system of undistorted competition.676 
An interpretation which is aimed solely at the protection of the Common Market is 
however not coherent with the literal wording of the clause.677 The text of Article 308 
EC refers to a provision which necessary to attain a particular objective of the 
Community.
The interpretation closest to the literal wording (which is also the majority opinion) 
finds that the clause requires the relevant Community objective to be pursued (in the 
implementation of a provision on the basis of Article 308 EC) in harmony with the 
rules of the Community. In its choice of provision to be implemented on the basis of 
Article 308 EC therefore, the legislator must ensure that it fits into the functioning of 
the Common Market according to the rules of the Treaty.678 Thereby, the majority 
opinion in the literature interprets ‘Common Market’ to embrace the whole economic, 
political and institutional system established according to the Treaty, in every phase 
of its development.679
2.1.2 The Application of the Conditions in the Implementation of the Merger 
Regulation
Questionable is what objective was or objectives were to be pursued through the 
implementation of the Merger Regulation according to the legal basis of Article 308
But cf. at the most extreme, the House of Lords Select Committee, which considered that 
Article 308 could extend only to the economic and financial purposes provided for by Article 2 
EC, in: Session 1977/8,22nd Report.
675 Tomuschat, C., Die Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse in Generalermaechtigungen, insbesondere in 
Article 235 EWG-Vertrag, in: Everling, UVSchwartz, IVTomuschat, C , ibid, pp.45-67; 
Gericke, ibid at p.42.
676 Mestmaecker, Von der Wirtschajtsgemeinschaft zur Wirtschafts- und Waekrungsunion, in: 
Hommelhoff, PVKirchhof, P. (eds) Der Staatenverbund der Europaeischen Union, Heidelberg 
1994 at p.124.
677 Schwartz, I  in: Groeben et al., Kommentar, ibid; Everling, in: Everling, UVSchwartz, 
IVTomuschat, C., ibid, at p.10.
678 See eg., Schwartz, /  in: Groeben et al., Kommentar ibid, p.663; Constantinesco, V., Jacque, 
J-P, Kovar, R., Simon, D., Traité Instituant la CEE Communetaire, Paris, 1992, pp. 1509-1540 
at p. 1514; Boehm, R., ibid, p l  11 at note 21.
679 For a detailed consideration of the concept, and an evaluation of the divergent (and 
minority) opinions, see Dorn, D., ibid at pp.26-28.
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EC (that must be consistent with the establishment and functioning of the Common 
Market according to its rules). Is there at least an overriding objective that is 
discernible, even if a comprehensive and definitive list is difficult to draw up 
according to the evidence available?
According to Article 190 EC, Regulations (directives and decisions) adopted by the 
Community institutions 'shall state the reasons on which they are based../. This 
obligation is applicable to Regulations implemented on the basis of Article 308 EC.680 
Thereby, the Treaty objective which is to be pursued on the basis of Article 308 EC 
must be stated in the Preamble to the legal provision.681 It is necessary therefore to 
turn to the text of the Regulation to determine the relevant Community objective.
The Preamble to the Merger Regulation states that it was primarily implemented in 
order to achieve the Treaty objective contained within Article 3g EC, that is a system 
ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted.682 This is described 
as *essential for the achievement of the internal market by 1992 and its further 
development',683
As noted above, there is no doubt that Article 3 EC constitutes an ‘objective’ within 
the meaning of Article 308, which is, as required, coherent with the functioning of the 
Common Market objective according to its mIes.684Thus, the Community objective 
which was to be pursued through the implementation of the Merger Regulation 
(according to Article 308 EC) is the establishment of a system ensuring that 
competition within the Community is not distorted.683
Admittedly, Paragraph 13 of the Preamble to the Regulation states:
‘...it is necessary to establish whether concentrations with a Community dimension are 
compatible or not with the Common Market from the point of view of the need to maintain and
680 General Customs Preferences Case 44/86 1987 ECR, 1493. at 1519.
Where the obligation is not fulfilled, the legal provision may be declared void as a breach of 
the Treaty (Article 173 paragraph 1).
681 See eg., Schwartz, I in: Groeben et al., Kommentar ibid, p.637.
682 Paragraph 1, Preamble.
683 Paragraph 2, Preamble.
See also, Commission XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 1993 (1994, OOPEC, 
Luxembourg), paragraph 43.
684 See Part I of the thesis.
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develop effective competition in the Common Market; whereas, in so doing, the Commission 
must place its appraisal within the general framework of the achievement of the fundamental 
objectives referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty, including that o f strengthening the 
Community's economic and social cohesion, referred to in Article 130a’.685 86
This last clause does not however represent the objective for which the Merger 
Regulation was implemented on the basis of Article 308 EC:
First, it is less clear that this indirect objective deriving from Article 2 EC actually 
represents an ‘objective’ within the meaning of Article 308 EC.687 
Secondly, and vitally, this objective represents only an indirect objective of the 
Community that is to be brought about through the ‘establishing of the Common 
Market, an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies 
or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 5a'.688 It derives from  these fundamental 
and more general goals of the Community. Therefore, it cannot be incoherent with (or 
superior to) the direct objective of maintaining a system of undistorted competition 
within the Community, which, according to Article 3g EC, provides the means to 
realise the fundamental goal of establishing the Common Market. This conclusion is 
further justified by the fact that the substantive assessment of concentrations under 
Article 2 MR considers only the effect of the proposed concentration on competition 
structures.689 If the strengthening of the Community’s economic and social cohesion 
is formally a factor in the substantive assessment of an individual case, it must 
nevertheless be coherent with the maintenance of a system of undistorted competition 
within the Community.
685 In agreement, see eg., Krimphove, (1992) ibid, p.345; Schwartz, I  in: Groeben et al., ibid, 
p.610; Bulmer, S., ibid, p8.
686 Author’s emphasis.
687 See above, pp.182-183.
688 Article 2 EC.
689 Note that Article 2 of the Regulation mentions that among the factors to be taken into 
account in the appraisal of concentrations is the ‘development o f  technical and economic 
progress’ providing that it is ‘to the consumer’s advantage and does not form an obstacle to 
competition’. This is much more restrictive than the role given to technical and economic 
progress in the context of Article 81 EC: Article 81(3) EC allows exemption from a prohibition 
for a cartel if it ‘contributes...to promoting technical or economic progress while allowing 
consumers a fa ir  share o f the resulting benefit, and which does not...afford...the possibility o f 
eliminating competition in respect o f  a substantial part o f  the products in question. ’ It is 
therefore considered that there is no efficiency criterion in the Merger Regulation, see eg. 
Jacquemin (1990), ibid at p. 549; Camesasca, R , ibid.
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2.2 ‘No Sufficient Community Competence in Existence'
2.2.1 The Condition in General
The use of Article 308 EC as a legal base for the implementation of a provision of 
Community law requires that there be no existing power of the Community which 
would be sufficient to fulfil the purpose for which the provision is implemented.690
2.2.2 The Application of the Condition in the Implementation of the Merger 
Regulation
The analysis carried out above with regard to the scope of Article 83 EC established 
that the Treaty (in particular, Articles 81 and 82 EC) did not apply to all types of 
concentrations that could potentially distort structures of competition within the 
Community.691
There was therefore, as expressed in the Preamble to the Merger Regulation692, the 
need for the legal base of Article 308 EC.
23  *Appears Necessary'
2.3.1 The Condition in General
The implementation of the provision in question must appear necessary to attain one 
of the objectives of the Community. Therefore, one of the objectives of the 
Community is not (or is not sufficiently693) fulfilled, and this is an omission which 
can be remedied by the action of one of the Community organs upon the 
implementation of an appropriate legal provision. It is a broad condition, since it must 
only be proven that there appears to be a necessity. Such is the general nature of 
many of the Community objectives in fact that it could, in their regard, be practically 
always applicable.694 The required necessity therefore depends upon there being a 
particular degree of necessity for Community action.695
The required necessity is to be taken from the point of view of the attaining of the 
Community objectives with regard to the existing competential norms of the Treaty:
690 See note 627 above.
691 See above. Part IV of the thesis.
692 At paragraphs 6-8.
693 In detail considering this distinction (and its irrelevance), see Dorn, D., ibid pp.41-44.
694 Ehring, ibid, p.762; Schwartz, I in: Groeben et al., ibid, at p.667.
695 See eg., Schwartz, /  in: Groeben et al., ibid, p.667.
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the requisite provisions to pursue the relevant Community objective must not already 
be available; Article 308 EC is subordinate to the existing framework of 
competencies. Questionable however is whether this condition also incorporates the 
subsidiarity principle: is it restricted to the instance that the relevant Community 
objective cannot be achieved at the Member State level?
Certainly, the provision does not provide ‘exclusive’ Community competence within 
the meaning of Article 5 EC.696 If it did, its more general nature would allow the 
Community to gradually encroach unchecked on an incredible array of existing 
Member State competencies. Therefore, subsidiarity is applicable to Article 308 EC 
in its role as a legal base: it is only valid as a legal base insofar as the relevant 
Community objective cannot be achieved at the level of the Member States in the 
direct application of Article 5 EC.697 Questionable is the relationship of the condition 
of ‘necessity’ within the terms of Article 308 EC to the subsidiarity principle.
Some commentators consider that the condition of ‘necessity’ according to Article 
308 EC should first be considered independently, and then, where it is considered to 
be fulfilled, the principle of subsidiarity should be applied.698 The better opinion 
however is that subsidiarity is enshrined within Article 308 EC, since the purpose of 
the Article is to allow Community action where it is necessary per se in the broadest 
sense with regard to the Community objectives. Article 5 EC effectively restricts 
Community action within the same parameters. Certainly, the Legal Service of the 
Council has expressed an opinion that the Article 308 EC condition incorporates 
subsidiarity.699
696 Zuleeg, M., in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid at p.215.
697 See eg., Edinburgh European Council Meeting o f 11th and 12th December 1992, 
Conclusions o f  the Presidency, Paragraph I AH.
In the literature, see eg., Schima, B., Das Subsidiaritaetsprinzip im Europaeischen 
Gemeinschaft, Wien 1994, pp.l00-l;Toth, A.G., The Principle o f Subsidiarity in the 
Maastricht Treaty, CMLR (1992) 1079 at p. 1095; Schwartz, /., in: Groeben, Thiesing, 
Ehlermann, ibid at p.627.
Against this, only Grabitz, Subsidiaritaet im Gemeinschaftsrecht, in: Vogel, B./Oettinger, 
G.H. (Eds), Federalismus in der Bewaehrung, Koeln 1992 139-149, at pp. 143-4.
698 See eg., Mueller-Graff, Binnenmarktauftrag und Subsidiaritaetsprinzip?, ZHR (1994) 34 at 
p5 1; Schwartz, L, in: Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, ibid at pp.626-8.
699 Council of the EC, Opinion of the Legal Service, Document 9404/92 of 21st October 1992, 
P-5-
In agreement, see Emiliou, N., Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against *the Enterprises o f  
Ambition?\ ELRev (1992) 383 at p400.
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Hence, the condition of necessity is applied in two ways: it requires that there is no 
existing and suitable Community competence and it requires that there is no 
possibility of the Community objective being fulfilled at the Member State level. It 
does not matter whether the Member States can act on an individual basis in this area 
if such action would not fulfil the specific Community objective.700 On the other 
hand, if the Member States could, through individual (unconcerted) parallel 
action, fulfil the relevant Community aim, it is widely considered that there is no 
‘necessity" within the meaning of Article 308 EC.701
In general, the ‘necessity’ condition under Article 308 EC lends considerable 
discretion to the legislator, who will reach a decision according to complex economic, 
legal, political and technical factors.702
Thereby, however, the condition does invoke the legal principle of the minimum of 
intervention by the Community - that is, the principle of proportionality - which is 
equally a condition of the subsidiarity principle.703 Therefore, the Community may 
only act to the extent that is necessary for the fulfilment of the specific Community 
objective for which the provision was implemented: any hardship caused by the 
provision must not be disproportionate to the benefits accruing from the attainment of 
the objective,704 Analogy can be drawn here with those quantitative conditions of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC that determine that only conduct of the requisite size and 
dimension will be prohibited as interfering with the process of Single Market 
integration (being, respectively, ‘appreciability’ and ‘dominance over a substantial 
part of the Community’).
700 Schwartz, I in: Groeben et al., ibid, p.670; Everling, ibid, p.12; Tomuschat, ibid, p.58; 
Boehm, ibid, p . l l l .
701 See eg., Everling, in: Everling, UVSchwartz, I/Tomuschat, C., ibid, at p.12; Schwartz. 1 in: 
Groeben et al., ibid, pp.669-671.
This reflects the application of the subsidiarity principle, see above pp. 161-167.
702See eg., Constantinesco, V. et al., ibid, p.1515-6; Schwartz. /  in: Groeben et al., Kommentar, 
ibid, p.666-7; Dom, D., ibid, p.37; Tomuschat, in: Everling, U/Schwartz, I/Tomuschat, C , 
ibid, at p.60; Haede/Putter, ibid p.15.
703 See eg., Boehm, R-, ibid at p .l 12; Dom, ibid, p.50.
In line with the ‘two-tier’ approach to ‘necessity’ in Article 308 EC and subsidiarity, some 
however see the principle of proportionality as deriving from the applicability of Article 5 EC 
to the provision rather than enshrined in Article 308 EC itself, see eg., Schwartz, I., in: 
Groeben et al., Kommentar, ibid, p.628.
704 Hartley, T.C., The Foundations o f  EC Law, 1988 (4th ed.) Oxford University Press at
p.106.
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2.3.2 The Application of the Condition in the Implementation of the Merger 
Reeulation
The required necessity for a system of merger control in the Community has been 
demonstrated above. It derives principally from the huge increase in cross-border 
mergers prompted by the single market programme. It was expressed in the 
application of inappropriate provisions (Articles 81 and 82 EC) and an increased 
pressure by the Commission to implement a specific Regulation for merger control.705 706
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated above that, with regard to the Community’s 
legal objectives deriving from the Treaty (in particular, the maintenance of a system 
of undistorted competition at the Community level), action at the Community level
706was necessary.
The legal principle of minimum interference has been shown to be incorporated into 
Article 308 EC. Its application determines that the turnover thresholds should not 
bring within the scope of the Regulation concentrations that do not present a potential 
threat to the Community aim of maintaining a system of undistorted competition 
within the Community. This is valid at least to the extent that the Regulation applies 
to transactions that do not fall within the principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC.
Whether or not the Regulation respects this principle with regard to its jurisdictional 
scope depends upon the operation of the turnover thresholds.
2.4 *Appropriate’
2.4.1 The Condition in General
What can not be disputed is that the measures which are implemented on the basis of 
Article 308 EC must be ‘appropriate’ to fulfil the specific Community objective.
It is well-established that ‘appropriate measures’ includes the provisions of 
Community law within the meaning of Article 189 EC, including regulations.707
705 See above.
706 See above.
707 See eg., Schwartz, I in: Groeben et al, Kommentar, ibid p.716; Constantinesco, V. et al., 
ibid; Usher, J., The gradual widening o f  European Community policy on the basis o f Articles 
100 and 235 o f the EEC Treaty, in: Schwarze, J. and Schmermers, H. (eds), Structure and 
Dimensions o f EC Policy, Baden and Baden, 1988 at p.27; Dorn, D., ibid, pp.63-65.
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Furthermore, and vitally, the legal provision must be appropriate to fulfil the 
objective for which it was implemented.708 A general definition of this condition is 
clearly not possible, since it depends upon the specific aim for which the provision is 
implemented. It does however apply the legal principle of proportionality with regard 
to the appropriateness of the provision implemented to fulfil the specific Community 
goal, and thus mirrors the ‘necessity’ condition of Article 308 EC.709
2.4.2 The Application of the Condition in the Implementation of the Merger 
Regulation
As a regulation, the EC Merger Regulation is an ‘appropriate’ provision to fulfil the 
Community objective of maintaining a system of undistorted competition within the 
Community.
Again, the principle of proportionality is invoked, and the reader is referred to the 
analysis above for the ‘necessity’ condition on this issue.
2.5 Summary
Article 308 EC acts as a legal base for the Merger Regulation at least to the extent 
that it applies to concentrations that do not fall within the scope of Articles 81 and 82 
EC. It does not however apply to such concentrations indiscriminately. It was invoked 
in order to pursue a specific Community objective or Community objectives. While it 
is not possible to give an unequivocal and definitive list of all the objectives it was 
implemented to fulfil, it is clear that the overriding objective mirrors the overriding 
objective of Community competition law: to prevent the distortion of structures of 
competition within the Community (consistent with the integration aim).
Within the context of Article 308 EC as a whole, the EC Merger Regulation should 
therefore be ‘appropriate* to fulfil the Community objective of maintaining a system 
of undistorted competition within the Community. Thereby, it enshrines the principle 
of subsidiarity, and that principle, together with the principles of proportionality and 
minimum interference, determine that the Merger Regulation should not apply to 
concentrations that do not affect this goal.
708 See eg., Krimphove,(1992) ibid, pp.345-348.
709 Krimphove, (1992) ibid, p.347-8; Schwartz, I  in: Groeben et al., Kommentar, ibid, p.687.
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2.6 The Legal Effect of Article 308 EC as a Legal Base: Obligation or Choice? 
The Court of Justice has stated, obiter dictum, that Article 308 EC allows the 
implementation of an 'appropriate provision’ with regard to the specific Community 
objective. It does not however create a legal obligation where its conditions are 
fulfilled:
‘ (Article 308 EC) ne crée aucune obligation, mais confère au Conseil une faculté dont le non-
71Ûexercice ne saurait affecter la validité d ’une délibération’.
The Court did not however justify its standpoint. It has been widely criticised in the 
literature.7"
In particular, the Court’s statement is criticised as being contrary to the literal 
wording of Article 308 EC. For Article 308 EC explicitly uses the imperative ‘the 
Council...shall take\  rather than the phrase *can take’ that is used in Article 95(1) 
ECSC.710 12 The Treaty distinguishes between provisions that give a competence of the 
institutions to act ( lcan act') and those in which the institutions *acf or * shall act\  
There are numerous cases in which the Court of Justice has found provisions of the 
latter kind to create an obligation to act713
Furthermore, Constantisesco et cd. have pointed to the regrettable consequences that 
the position of the Court of Justice may have: if the conditions for the application of 
Article 308 EC are fulfilled and the implementation of a provision is necessary to 
pursue a legal objective of the Community, should that legal necessity be ignored 
with impunity?714
710 Commission v Council Case 22/70 (1971) ECR 263, paragraph 25.
711 See eg., Schwartz, l in: Groeben et al., Kommentar, ibid, p.682-4 (and particularly, at note 
307); Constantinesco, V. et al., ibid, p.1511; Schwartz, I., EG-Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse, 
insbesondere nach Artikel 235 - ausschliesslich oder konkurrierend?, EuR 1976, Sonderheft 
27-44 at p.29; Dom, D., ibid at pp. 140-1.
But against this, see eg., Geiger, ibid, Article 235 at para. 13; Ehring, Kommentar, p.762.
712 Thus, Constantinesco, V. et al., ibid, p.1511; Groeben et al, ibid, at p.683; Hallstein, W., 
Die Europaeische Gesellschaft, 5. ed., Duesseldorf/Wien 1979, p.391; Dom, ibid pp. 448-9 
and 140-1; Grabitz, ibid, Artikel 235 paragraphs 72-5; Schwartz, ibid, p.29.
But against this, see eg., Geiger, Art. 235 EC, Rn 13.
713 See on this, Schwartz, I., ibid, p.29-30 and at notes 14-15. Also, Schwartz, l  in: Groeben et 
al., ibid at p.683
Examples include: Article 43(2) EC - Kramer, Case 6/76 1976, 1279 (at p.1310 paragraph 24); 
Articles 49 and 51 EC - Commission/Republic o f  France Case 167/73 1974 359 (371, 
paragraph 33); Article 103(1) EC (‘must’ provision) and Article 103(2) EC (‘can’ provision) - 
Balkan Case 5/73 1973 1091 (1108 paragraph 13).
714 Constantinesco, V. et al., ibid, p.1511.
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The majority opinion of the literature is persuasive. The Commission has also stated 
that it considers that Article 308 EC contains an obligation to act where its conditions 
are fulfilled.715 Hence, the discretion of the Commission and the Council lies only in 
determining whether the conditions of Article 308 EC are fulfilled. If they decide that 
the conditions are fulfilled, they must implement the appropriate provision in order to 
fulfil the relevant Community objective.716
D SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LEGAL BASES 
ARTICLE 83 AND ARTICLE 308 FOR THE DETERMINATION OF 
AN APPROPRIATE JURISDICTIONAL TRIGGER FOR THE 
MERGER REGULATION
According to the legal base of Article 83 EC (in conjunction with the principle of 
subsidiarity), the appropriate jurisdictional trigger for the EC Merger Regulation is 
the interstate trade criterion. It is not possible to materially expand the scope of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC. Nor, traditionally, is it possible to restrict the principles laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 EC. There is however some suggestion, drawing upon 
experience in other areas of competition law and in specific recognition that the 
principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC in their entirety may be unsuitable, that the 
interstate trade criterion might in some way be refocused with regard to specific types 
of transaction. Thereby, for example, a de minimis - or, ‘appreciability’ - provision 
based upon Article 83 EC with specific regard to merger transactions might be 
regarded as both appropriate and legitimate.
Under the legal base of Article 308 EC, which was used for the EC Merger 
Regulation to the extent that concentrations according to Article 3 MR do not fall 
within the scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC, the Regulation should apply in such a way 
that is ‘appropriate* to help fulfil the Community objective of maintaining a system of 
undistorted competition within the Community. There may be other objectives for 
which it was invoked on the basis of Article 308 EC, but it certainly requires that the 
EC Merger Regulation should apply generally to concentrations that might distort 
competition structures within the Community. Thereby, it operates consistently with 
Article 83 EC that was invoked within the context of the same Community objective:
715 Commission Reply No, 406/75 to Mr Maigaard, OJ 285/27 (28) of 13th December 1975.
716 Schwartz, /  in: Groeben et al., Kommentar, ibid pp.683-4.
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any jurisdictional trigger that is appropriate for the legal base of Article 308 EC will 
be compatible (if not exhaustively consistent) with the jurisdictional trigger that is 
required according to Article 83 EC (that is, the interstate trade criterion, to the extent 
that it might be adapted in its specific application to concentrations).
It is pertinent at this point to recall that the Merger Regulation adopted a formalistic 
jurisdictional criterion based upon the turnover of the undertakings concerned and the 
location where the turnover is achieved. Questionable is whether this jurisdictional 
trigger of the Merger Regulation operates consistently with the legal bases upon 
which it was implemented.
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VIII EVALUATION OF THE OPERATION OF THE 
JURISDICTIONAL TRIGGER OF THE EC MERGER 
REGULATION WITH REGARD TO THE 
INTERSTATE TRADE CRITERION
A THE ISSUE
It was determined above that the use of Article 83 EC as a legal base for the Merger 
Regulation (in conjunction with the principle of subsidiarity) provides that, to the 
extent the Merger Regulation applies to the same transactions as Articles 81 and 82 
EC, those material principles laid down in the two Articles may not be expanded or 
restricted. Upon analysis however, some qualification was made. Thereby, there was 
some evidence that their application might be ‘re-focussed’ to the extent that they 
apply to specific sui generis transactions. That adaptation does not of course extend 
to the use of a completely different jurisdictional criterion. The interstate trade 
criterion - as laid down within the text of the Treaty of Rome - must be regarded as 
inviolable. Nevertheless, its specific interpretation and application might be limited in 
scope specifically for transactions such as concentrations that require a different 
approach than the more traditional conduct and agreements falling for assessment 
under Articles 81 and 82 EC.
On the other hand, Article 308 EC (that incorporates the principle of subsidiarity) 
provides that the Merger Regulation should apply in such a way that is ‘appropriate* 
to help fulfil the objective of maintaining a system of undistorted competition within 
the Community. It is clear from the analysis undertaken above that the application of 
the interstate criterion ensures that all transactions that have a potential to distort 
Community competition structures are caught by the substantive provision. Hence, 
while it does not explicitly prescribe the use of such a criterion, Article 308 EC 
requires a jurisdictional trigger that is at least compatible with the operation of the 
interstate trade criterion.
Both of the legal bases of the EC Merger Regulation therefore provided that its 
jurisdictional trigger should at the very least be compatible with the operation of the 
interstate trade crtierion, even if there is some suggestion that it might be applied 
differently for concentrations. It becomes necessary to analyse the operation of the
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jurisdictional trigger of the EC Merger Regulation in relation to the interstate trade 
criterion.
If we initially ignore the suggestion that Article 83 EC allows some adaptation of the 
application of the interstate trade criterion initially, two conditions must be fulfilled if 
there is to be absolute consistency between the jurisdictional trigger of the EC Merger 
Regulation and the operation of the interstate trade criterion:
First, the jurisdictional trigger must operate to ensure that all concentrations falling 
within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation (as having a ‘Community Dimension’) 
also have an actual or potential effect on interstate trade.
Secondly, it must operate to ensure that there are no concentrations carried out within 
the Community having an actual or potential effect on interstate trade but not falling 
within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation (as having no ‘Community 
Dimension’).
B THE FIRST CONDITION: CONCENTRATIONS WITH A
COMMUNITY DIMENSION ACCORDING TO THE MERGER 
REGULATION THAT DO NOT AFFECT INTERSTATE TRADE
As stated above,717 there is a de facto presumption that concentrations will fulfil the 
interstate trade criterion where interstate trade is affected directly or indirectly, 
actually or potentially on any of the markets on which the undertakings are involved 
or are active (or on any directly dependent markets). Only where all the relevant 
markets on which the undertakings involved are active (and their dependent markets) 
are localised, exclusively national and isolated from interstate trade, may it be stated 
with any certainty that the criterion is not fulfilled.718
Analysis of the merger decisions taken under the Merger Regulation since its 
implementation reveals that all concentrations that achieve the very high turnover 
thresholds laid down in Article 1 MR have an effect on interstate trade. Even where 
concentrations were carried out between undertakings which concerned a national and 
localised relevant geographic market, interstate trade was affected on a directly
717 See above, pp 128-130.
718 See above, pp128-130.
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dependent m arket (either upstream or downstream).719 To this extent, therefore, the 
turnover thresholds appear to  operate coherently with the legal competence o f the 
Commission to  assess mergers according to the legal bases o f the Merger Regulation. 
This is the case even though they are formalistic and quantitative, and do not conform 
to the effects-based model o f the interstate trade criterion.
Questionable is whether this result is achieved solely as a consequence o f the high 
level at which the turnover thresholds are currently set for the M erger Regulation in 
Article 1(2) M R, or whether it is the ‘fine-tuning’ jurisdictional provisions the 
M erger Regulation includes that provides this coherent result. The ‘fine-tuning’ 
provisions that are relevant to this question are Article 9 M R and the Two-Thirds 
rule.720 It is necessary to consider the operation o f these provisions because the 
Commission stated at the adoption o f  the Regulation that the turnover thresholds 
should be lowered in the future:
‘the main (i.e. world) turnover threshold should be reduced from 5,000 to 2,000 million ECU 
at the end of the initial stage of implementation and that the Community turnover threshold of 
250 million ECU should also be revised in the light of experience and the trend of the main 
threshold. If the same proportionate reduction is made as for the main threshold, this implies a 
threshold of 100 million ECU instead o f250 million ECU.’721
719 The concentrations involving national supermarkets provide good examples of these, where 
the relevant geographical markets have always been localised or national.
More generally, a dynamic can be detected in these cases. The relevant geographical markets 
for such concentrations was originally held to be localised (regarding demand structures). See 
eg., Promodes/DIRSA Case IV/M027 of 17/12/1990, OJ 1990 C321; Promodes/BRMC Case 
IV/M242 of 13/07/1992 in OJ 1992 C232; DelhaizefPG Case IV/M471 of 22/08/1994, OJ 
1994 C239, at p.3. Later however, more attention was paid to centralised planning at a national 
level for supermarket chains, and the relevant geographical markets were more often held to be 
national. See eg., Kesko/Tuko Case IV/M784 of 20.11.1996 OJ 1996 LI 10/53. In Tesco/ABF 
Case IV/M914 of 5/05/1997, OJ 1997 CI62 p.3, the Commission stated: 7n a situation where 
several retail chains separate networks o f  stores on a national scale, the important parameters 
o f competition are generally determinate on a national scale, and therefore what from the 
viewpoint o f the catchment area may be a local ora regional market may be aggregated into a 
national market. In such circumstances, it is more appropriate to treat the retail markets at a 
national or regional level’.
720 Note that Article 21 (3) MR provides that certain ‘legitimate interests’ are still the 
prerogative of the Member States. It is not, however, necessary to analyse this more politically 
orientated provision in any detail for the purpose of this thesis.
721 Commission Report to Council on the Implementation of the Merger Regulation, COM (93) 
385, Brussels 28 July 1993, at p.lb.
Note that the European Parliament has supported lower thresholds in its Resolution of the 
Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy, Point 26.
Similarly, the Economic and Social Committee at Point 1.3.2 of the Opinion on the Twenty 
First Report on Competition Policy, 25th November 1992.
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This opinion is also expressed by Community business and industry during the year 
2000 Review of the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation.722
Questionable is whether, if the turnover thresholds in Article 1(2) MR were lowered 
considerably, the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation would still operate 
coherently with the first condition - would they continue to ensure that no mergers 
that do not affect interstate trade fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation? It 
should be noted that, specifically, the Commission envisaged an expansion of the use 
of the Article 9 MR provision in order to compensate for the effect of lower turnover 
thresholds.
1 Referral of a Concentration to a Member State - Article 9 MR
1.1 Origin
Article 9 MR was introduced into the substantive text of the EC Merger Regulation 
largely at the behest of Germany (and has become known as the ‘German clause’). It 
was prompted by the fear that the two-thirds rule would fail to remove some mergers 
of purely national concern from the scope of the Merger Regulation, and that mergers 
which may be acceptable when assessed under Article 2 MR (in terms of their effect 
on the Community market) may have a significant anti-competitive effect at a national 
level.723
How does Article 9 MR complement the legal structure of the Merger Regulation 
and, above all, does it provide the required flexibility to the jurisdictional trigger that 
enables it to operate coherently with the operation of the interstate trade criterion?
There is general consensus amongst commentators that the present thresholds are too high. The 
majority suggest however that a reduction o f the thresholds will restore the validity of the 
Regulation according to economic theory, see eg. Krimphove, 1992, ibid, at pp. 223-237. They 
do not consider the question o f the legitimacy of the turnover thresholds themselves however.
722 See Report, ibid at paragraphs 54-63.
723 Note that Germany has the most strict system of competition law in Europe. The inclusion 
of the Article was extremely important to the overall successful implementation of the Merger 
Regulation. See above at p i48.
For a useful and clear summary of the procedure under Article 9, see Johnson, N., 'The EEC 
Merger Control Regulation - Referral to Member States under Article 9 ’, World Competition, 
1999, pp.105-133.
i
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1.2 The Substantive Provision 
According to Article 9(2) MR:724
‘Within three weeks of the date of receipt of the copy of the notification a Member State may 
inform the Commission, which shall inform the undertakings concerned, that:
(a) a concentration threatens to create or to strengthen a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded on a market, within that Member State, 
which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market,
(b) a concentration affects competition on a market within that Member State, which presents 
all the characteristics of a distinct market and which does not constitute a substantial part of the 
common market.*
As a result of such a notice, the Commission will assess the concentration with regard 
to Article 9(3) MR:
‘If the Commission considers that, having regard to the market for the products or services in 
question and the geographical reference market within the meaning of paragraph 7725, there is 
such a distinct market and that such a threat exists, either:
(a) it shall itself deal with the case in order to maintain or restore effective competition on the 
market concerned; or
(b) it shall refer the whole or part of the case to the competent authorities of the Member State 
concerned with a view to the application of that State’s national competition law. In cases 
where a Member State informs the Commission that a concentration affects competition in a 
distinct market within its territory that does not form a substantial part of the common market, 
the Commission shall refer the whole or part of the case relating to the distinct market 
concerned, if it considers that such a distinct market is affected.
724 As amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 o f 30 June 1997, OJ L 180/1 (1997).
725 'The geographical reference market shall consist o f the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand o f products or services, in which the 
conditions o f competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas because, in particular, conditions o f competition are appreciably different 
in those areas. This assessment should take into account in particular the nature and 
characteristics o f  the products or services concerned, o f the existence o f entry barriers or o f  
consumer preferences, o f appreciable differences o f the undertakings ’ market shares between 
the area concerned and neighbouring areas or o f substantial price differences
The geographical reference market within the meaning of Article 9 MR is not materially 
different from the general definition of the relevant geographical market.
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If, however, the Commission considers that such a distinct market or threat does not exist it 
shall adopt a decision to that effect which it shall address to the Member States concerned/
Therefore, where the request concerns a distinct market within a Member State that 
constitutes ‘a  substantial part o f  the common m a rke t\  the Commission has a 
discretion to refer. Where however the request concerns a distinct market within a 
Member State that does not constitute *a substantial pa rt o f  the common market \  the 
Commission m ust make a referral of the whole or part of the case relating to the 
distinct market concerned. This correlates with the condition for the prohibition of 
mergers under Article 2(2) and (3) of the Merger Regulation: competition must be 
significantly impeded in the common market ‘or in a  substantial part o f  i t ’.
13  General Approach
As a jurisdictional device, Article 9 MR is therefore different from the turnover 
thresholds. It refers to the effect of the merger on competition. However, there is still 
a quantitative element Whether or not the Commission has a discretion to refer a 
concentration involving a distinct market within a Member State depends upon the 
size  of that distinct market. Only if the distinct market constitutes a 'substantial part 
of the common market' is the Commission obliged  to refer.
Is the operation of Article 9 MR, in spite of its differences in operation, compatible 
with the application of an interstate trade criterion? This depends, first, upon the way 
in which the Commission exercises its discretion and, secondly, upon its procedural 
structure.
1.4 Interpretation of the Provision
The *distinct m arket ’ is defined as a separate product market within the territory of a 
Member State.726 It therefore requires a definition of the relevant product market and 
the relevant geographical market.727 The latter must be within  a single Member State 
(although it appears that this may comprise the entire national market).728
726 See eg.. Cook and Kerse, ibid, p.234-5; Downes and Ellison, ibid, at p.80-1; Bos et al, ibid, 
p.363.
727 The analysis required a determination o f the relevant geographical market is set down in 
Article 9(7) MR.
728 See eg., Commission Decision of 12.02.92, Steetley/Tarmac.
See in agreement on this point, Jones and Gonzalez-Diaz, ibid, p.39. But cf.t Miersch, ibid, at 
p.140. He argues that a national market is a substantial part of the Common Market within the 
meaning of Article 9 MR, and therefore the Commission has jurisdiction according to the text 
of Article 2(2) and (3) MR and no referral can be made. The fact that a distinct market is a
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Having determined that a concentration concerns a distinct market within a Member 
State, it is necessary to determine whether that distinct market constitutes a 
substantial part of the Community.
1.4.1 Distinct Market is not a Substantial Part of the Community 
If a concentration affects competition on a distinct market that is not a substantial part 
of the Community, the Commission must make a reference to the relevant Member 
State of the whole or part of the case relating to the distinct market concerned. 
Questionable is whether a distinct market within a Member State that is not a 
substantial part of the Community covers those concentrations which do not have an 
effect on interstate trade (and for which the Commission does not have a legal 
competence to assess).
The approach of the Commission to the interpretation of ‘a substantial part’ of the 
Common Market has already been considered with reference to the application of 
Article 82 EC.729 As detailed above, the condition requires a quantitative analysis not 
just of the geographical extent of the market, but also of the product market within 
that geographical area, considering the economic importance of the market in 
absolute terms in relation to the Common Market as a whole.730 This includes an 
assessment of the pattern and volume of production and consumption of the product 
concerned, the habits and economic opportunities of sellers and purchasers and the 
density of population.731
The notion has been interpreted very widely by the Commission. Even markets which 
are of a local scope from the viewpoint of the individual consumer could be 
aggregated to form larger markets for competition analysis purposes.732
substantial part of the Common Market does not however automatically prevent a referral 
according to Article 9 MR. It is therefore fallacious to maintain that because the concentration 
concerns a relevant market that constitutes a substantial part of the Common Market, it does 
not concern a ‘distinct market* within the meaning of Article 9 MR.
729 See above, pp.67-69.
730 See above, pp.67-69.
731 Coöperatieve Verenigung ‘Suiker Unie’ UA and others v Commission Case 40-48/73, 
50/73, 54-6/73,113-114/73, (1975) ECR 1663,1976-7, (1976) 1 CMLR 295.
732 See eg., Kesko/Tuko Commission Decision (1996) OJ LÍ 10/53, p.56; Rewe/Billa, 
Commission Decision EEC Merger Control Reporter, B461; Blokker/Toys “R" US 
Commission Decision (1998) OJ L316/1.
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Clearly, in order for the distinct market within the territory of a Member State to be 
found to be not a substantial part of the Common Market, it must be strictly 
localised.733 However, the condition has been found to have been fulfilled by single 
ports and airports where the services or goods in question are of considerable 
economic importance within the Common Market.734
In practice, it may be argued that the condition of a ‘substantial part' of the Common 
Market reflects the operation of the interstate trade criterion. The cases where 
localised markets have been found to be a ‘substantial part’ have always concerned 
ports or airports that have a significant amount of international trade. However, the 
assessments required in the application of the interstate trade criterion and the 
‘substantial part’ condition of Article 9 MR are substantially different. The interstate 
trade criterion requires an actual or potential effect on the patterns of interstate trade 
within the Common Market. The ‘substantial part’ condition however requires 
product market to be of sufficient economic size and importance within the Common 
Market. It is a quantitative condition as opposed to the purely effects-based interstate 
trade criterion.
Furthermore, even if the operation of Article 9(2)b MR in practice has some 
rationalising effect on the operation of the turnover thresholds, its ability to refocus 
the operation of the turnover thresholds so that the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger 
Regulation as a whole is in line with legal realities is significantly hindered by its 
procedural structure.735
733 See eg., Commission Decisions: SEHB/V1AG/PE-BEWAG, Commission XXVIIth 
Competition Report 1997, paragraph 179; Holdercim/Cedest, Commission XXIVth Report 
1994, paragraph 332.
734 Commission Decision Porto di Genova, (1997), OJ L301, where the port of Genoa sufficed, 
given its importance with regard to all maritime import and export activities throughout Italy. 
Similarly, the port of Rodby in Denmark (see Report on Competition Policy 1994, Vol XXIV 
point 226), the port of Holyhead in the UK (Report on Competition Policy 1993, Vol XXIII, 
point 234) and the airport o f Zaventem near Brussels (British Midland/Regie des voies 
aeriennes, June 28, 1995, Report on Competition Policy 1995, Vol XXV, point 120) have all 
been found to constitute ‘a substantial part’ on similar principles.
On the other hand, with regard to all the facts, Humberside ports in the UK and the North of 
England have been found not to be sufficient (see, respectively, Felixstowe Docks and 
Railways Board v British Transport Docks Board (decision of the English Court of Appeal) 
(1976) 2 CMLR 655; Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns (decision of the English High Court QB) 
1986, 1 WLR 558). Similarly, County Kerry in Ireland (Cadbury Ltd v Kerry Co-op 1982, 
ILRM 77).
735 See below pp.204-205.
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1.4.2 Distinct Market is a Substantial Part of the Common Market 
Where the condition ‘a substantial part of the Common Market1 is fulfilled, the 
Commission has a discretion whether or not to make a referral to the relevant 
Member State. Questionable is how that discretion is exercised: does it depend upon 
the question whether the concentration affects (or could affect) interstate trade? 
Generally, Article 9 requests are considered by the Commission according to the 
concerns of regulatory efficiency - the principles of one-stop-shop and legal 
certainty.736 Where proceedings had already been initiated in the Member States 
concerned, the Commission was more likely to grant the request, having regard to the 
cost in time and money to the undertakings of having to submit their arguments to a 
new jurisdiction.737 Furthermore, the Commission will consider whether the Member 
State concerned may be better placed than the Commission to handle a case that has 
local or purely national aspects, where the national authority benefits from a more 
detailed knowledge of local markets and wider resources.738 This will however not be 
the case if more than one Member State jurisdiction is applicable to the concentration. 
Another issue of administrative efficiency is the capacity to conduct an enquiry: if a 
transaction with a national dimension involves foreign third parties, the Community 
probably has more efficient investigation instruments.739
Furthermore however, the Commission will not make a referral where the transaction 
raises important legal, economic and policy issues; in short, the concentration is of a 
Community interest.740 The notion of Community interest includes the issue of the 
effect on interstate trade that a concentration may have: concentrations may be 
referred where they do not affect interstate trade, as long as other Community 
interests are preserved. The notion however includes other factors, for example those 
instances where the Member State may have a conflict of interest in assessing a 
concentration (for example, when it has a significant stake in the capital of one of the 
parties).
736 Internal Commission Document.
737 This is what distinguishes the two sets of cases in the above note. See also in particular, 
McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann, Case IV/M330 of 29/10/1993.
738 See eg, Metsaelitto/Vapo Case M2234 of 8/2/2001, Press Release EP/01/183, where the 
Commission granted a referral, stressing that the Finish Competition Authority was best placed 
to carry out the investigation, especially since it had only recently concluded an investigation 
into the alleged dominant position of Vapo on one of the relevant markets.
Similarly, C3D/Rhone Capital LLC/Go-Ahead Group Pic of 20/10/2000, Case M2154 Press 
Release IP/00/U95; Interbrew/Bass Case M2044of 22/08/2000, Press Release IP/00/940.
739 Internal Commission Document.
740 Internal Commission Document.
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The Commission’s approach in exercising its discretion is not therefore coherent with 
the operation of the interstate trade criterion. Furthermore, any potential to fulfil such 
a role is further limited by its procedural structure.
1.5 The Procedural Structure741
In any consideration of a request by a Member State for referral under Article 9, the 
Community has already assumed jurisdiction in such a case (according to the turnover 
thresholds). It lies within the Commission’s discretion to determine whether the 
distinct market constitutes a substantial part of the Common Market (and it has a 
discretion to refer) or not (and it is ‘obliged’ to refer).
Article 9(9) of the Regulation does expressly give the Court of Justice the right to 
review Commission decisions under Article 9 MR:
‘In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty, any Member State may appeal to the 
Court of Justice, and in particular request the application o f Article 186742, for the purpose of 
applying its national competition law.’
Hereby, the Member State whose request under Article 9 MR has been refused may 
appeal to the Court of Justice for interim relief. Other Member States (or the 
Council) have a right to appeal on the basis of Article 230(1) EC. Natural and legal 
persons may also make an appeal when the decision is of direct and individual 
concern to them on the basis of Article 230(3) EC (thereby allowing the parties to the 
concentration a right to appeal.743 Nevertheless, no such appeal against a Commission 
decision on the basis of Article 9 MR has yet been made. On balance, the controversy 
and inefficiency of making such an appeal before the Court of Justice is so great that 
it is only likely in the most extreme cases. On the whole, the Commission is 
unrestrained in the exercise of its broad discretion.
Furthermore, the application of Article 9 MR as a fine-tuning mechanism depends 
upon the Member State initially requesting a referral of a concentration. There is no 
guarantee that Member States will always request referrals based upon legal realities.
741 For a detailed description o f the procedure, see eg., Johnson, N., ibid, at pp. 107-109.
742 Now Article 243 EC.
743 For more detail, see Hirsbrunner, S., (1999) ibid, at pp.377-8.
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Rather, the final decision is much more likely to be a political one. Member States 
may prefer to leave politically controversial cases with the Commission.
1.6 Summary of the Operation of Article 9 MR
Article 9(2)b MR may be invoked for concentrations that have a Community 
Dimension and fall within the scope of Article 1(2) MR but affect interstate trade. 
Thereby, it could prima facie be a rationalising provision to fine-tune the operation of 
the turnover thresholds so that the jurisdictional trigger as a whole fulfils the first 
condition - that no concentrations that do not have an effect on interstate trade fall 
within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the procedural structure of 
Article 9 MR provides that it is dependent upon a Member State initially making a 
request to the Commission.
An amendment to its text could conceivably provide for a ‘voluntary referral 
mechanism*. Thereby, referrals could be made by the Commission (with the 
acquiescence of the relevant Member State) without the need for a specific request. 
The referral would however still depend either upon the quantitative condition (‘a 
substantial part of the Community’) and thereby upon the exercise of a broad 
discretion rather than the jurisdictional reality. The discretion of the Commission 
according to Article 9(2)a MR has not been exercised to determine jurisdiction 
according to legal competence of the Commission to assess mergers according to the 
legal bases of the Merger Regulation. Rather, it determines jurisdiction according to 
the factors which are more usually concerned with the enforcement interest of the 
Community (the ‘Community interest*744).
In practice, the Commission has invoked the provision sparingly, in recognition of the 
dangers its procedure represents to the principle of a one-stop-shop on which the 
Regulation is based. The Council and Commission issued a joint statement regarding 
Regulation 4064/89:
‘...when a specific market represents a substantial part of the Common Market the referral 
procedure provided for in Article 9 should only be applied in exceptional cases. There are 
indeed grounds for taking as a basis the principle that a concentration which creates or 
reinforces a dominant position in a substantial part of the Common Market must be declared
744 As used consistently in the Commission’s White Paper on modernisation of the rules 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 (81 and 82) of the EC Treaty, OJ h* C l32,1999/05/12.
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incompatible with the Common Market. The Council and the Commission consider that such 
an application of Article 9 should be confined to cases in which the interests in respect of 
competition of the Member State concerned could not be adequately protected in any other 
way.*745
This extremely restrictive interpretation of the scope of Article 9 had the consequence 
that of the early requests made for a referral, few were granted. Thus, in the period 
from 1991 until the end of 1995, of nine requests, only three referrals were made.746 
More recently this dynamic has been changing: from 1996 until July 1999, of twenty 
three requests, eighteen were granted.747 Nevertheless, the criteria upon which the 
decision to refer is based remains a poor reflection of the jurisdictional issue.
Above all therefore, if the turnover thresholds were lowered significantly, the 
application and operation of the procedure for referrals under Article 9 MR would not 
ensure that all concentrations falling within the scope of the Merger Regulation 
according to Article 1(2) MR affect interstate trade.
There is however a further ‘fine-tuning’ provision that may ensure this result.
745 Notes on Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89, cited in Appendix 6, Jones and Gonzalez- 
Diaz, ibid.
746 Tarmac/Steetley Case M l80 24/01/1992 (partial referral);
McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann Case M 330 29/10/1993 (full referral);
Holdercim/Cedest Case M460 6/07/1994 (partial referral).
747 Gehe/Lloyds Chemists Case M716 22/03/1996 (full referral); Bayemwerk/lsarwerke Case
M808 25/11/1996 (full referral); RWE/Thyssengas Case M713 25/11/1996 (full referral); 
Rheinmetall/British Aerospace/STN Atlas Case M894 24/04/1997 (partial referral);
Sehb/Viag/PE-Bewag Case M932 25/07/1997 (full referral); Promodes/Casino Case M991 
30/10/1997 (partial referral); Preussag/Hapag-Uoyd Case M1001 10/11/1997 (partial 
referral); Preussag/TUI Case M1019 10/11/1997 (partial referral); Compagnie Nationale de 
Navigation/Sogelfa-CIM Case M1021 1/12/1997 (partial referral); Lafarge/Redlartd Case 
M l030 16/12/1997 (partial referral); Promodes/S21/Gruppo gs Case M l086 10/03/1998 
(partial referral); Vendex/Bijenkorf Case M1060 26/05/1998 (partial referral);
Krauss/Maffei/Wegmann Case M l 153 19/06/1998 (partial referral); Alliance
Unichem/Unifarma Case M1220 23/07/1998 (full referral); Total/Petrofina (II) Case M1464 
26/03/1999 (partial referral); Rabobank-Beeck/Homann Case M1461 6/04/1999 (full referral); 
CSME/MSCA/Rock Case M1522 11/06/1999 (full referral).
Between July 1999 and July 2001, a further eight Article 9 requests have been granted 
Heineken/Cruzcampo Case M1555 of 17.08.99 (partial referral); Anglo American/Tarmac Case 
M l779 of 1/12/1999 (full referral); Carrefour/Promodes Case M l684 of ll/12/1999(partial 
referral to the Spanish and French authorities); Hanson/Pioneer Case M l827 of 18/02/2000 
(full referral); Interbrew/Bass Case M2044 of 22/08/2000(partial referral); C3D/Rhone Capital 
LLC/Go-Ahead Group Pic Case M2154 o f 20/10/2000(partial referral); Enel/Infostrada SpA 
Case M2216 o f 19/01/2001 (partial referral); Metsaelitto/Vapo Case M2234 o f 8/2/2001 
(partial referral).
No figures are currently available for the total amount of requests made during this period.
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2 The Operation of the ‘Two-Thirds’ Rule
2.1 The Substantive Provision
Where a concentration meets either of the thresholds under Article 1 of the Merger 
Regulation, it shall have a Community Dimension unless:
‘...each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate
>748Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.’
2.2 Evaluation
According to the ‘two-thirds’ rule, where a merger is above the turnover thresholds it 
may still be assessed by an individual Member State according to its national law if 
each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. The rationale 
behind this rule is that mergers whose effects are predominantly limited to a single 
Member State are best dealt with by the competent authorities of that Member State 
according to their own national law.
Questionable is whether the application of the two-thirds rule is responsible for the 
fact that the formalistic jurisdictional criterion of the Merger Regulation operates 
coherently with the operation of the interstate trade criterion. That is, whether it is 
this provision that ensures that all concentrations falling within the scope of the 
Merger Regulation affect interstate trade.
•\v, •
The first point to make in consideration of this question is that the two-thirds rule is 
not effects-based like the interstate trade criterion: the application of the two-thirds 
rule does not involve consideration of whether the relevant concentration has any 
effect beyond the borders of the individual Member State, but rather depends upon 
the location of the parties to the transaction (according to the size of the activities 
continued inside and outside a particular Member State). 748
748 The condition is used in the original threshold and the threshold as amended by the 1997 
revisions (see above), see Articles l(2)b and I(3)d MR.
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Nevertheless, the breadth of the two-thirds exception ensures that it covers those 
concentrations that do not affect interstate trade. As shown above, the interstate trade 
criterion is itself extremely broad: any agreement or specific conduct by one or more 
firms fulfils the interstate trade criterion where it actually or potentially, directly or 
indirectly affects interstate trade on the relevant market (or a directly dependent 
market).749 Therefore, only a concentration that is truly national and localised, 
involving no actual or potential cross-border trade whatsoever, will not fulfil the 
criterion. Such a concentration must inevitably involve undertakings present and 
trading in a single Member State, and will therefore fall into the two-thirds exception 
and escape the attentions of the EC Merger Regulation.
3 Conclusion on the First Condition
The analysis of the ‘fine-tuning’ provisions undertaken above shows that while 
Article 9 MR is of limited potential to provide that concentrations not affecting 
interstate trade are not brought within the scope of the Regulation, the breadth of the 
two-thirds exception does ensure that this condition is fulfilled. Even were the 
turnover thresholds to be lowered significantly, the two-thirds rule would operate to 
ensure that concentrations not affecting interstate trade did not fall within the scope 
of the EC Merger Regulation.
To this extent therefore, the jurisdictional trigger of the EC Merger Regulation 
operates perfectly consistently with its legal bases and also the legal mandate of the 
subsidiarity principle.
That broad scope of the two-thirds rule may however have significant implications for 
the second condition that must be fulfilled for the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger 
Regulation to be coherent with its legal bases.
749 See above, at pp 128-130
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C THE SECOND CONDITION: CONCENTRATIONS THAT AFFECT 
INTERSTATE TRADE AND DO NOT HAVE A COMMUNITY 
DIMENSION UNDER THE MERGER REGULATION
1 The Issue
The Commission has stated that:
‘...below (the thresholds’) levels a concentration would not normally significantly affect trade 
between Member States’.750
Ignoring the possibility that the interstate trade criterion might be applied differently 
for concentrations on the basis of Article 83 EC, we are concerned to analyse the 
validity of the Commission’s statement by comparing the operation of the 
jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation with the interstate trade criterion as it 
is applied to standard transactions falling within the scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC. 
The thesis examines merger decisions adopted under the national systems of three 
Member States, the UK, Germany and Italy in 1999 (following the amendments 
introduced by Council Regulation (EC) 1310/97 that came into effect in March 
1998751). Questionable is whether concentrations falling under national assessment in 
each of these jurisdictions affected interstate trade in spite of being outside the 
jurisdictional scope of the Merger Regulation.
Recall the analysis carried out above: horizontal, vertical or conglomerate mergers 
fulfil the interstate trade criterion where they actually or potentially, directly or 
indirectly affect interstate trade on the relevant market (or a directly dependent 
market).752
750 Annexed to Merger Regulation, at ‘Re Article 22’.
Similarly, although not so specifically, Recital 9 of the Merger Regulation states that:
\,.the Regulation should apply to significant structural changes the impact o f which on the 
market goes beyond the national borders o f  any one Member State \
751 Council Regulation (EC) 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 (OJ L I80,9 July 1997 at 1). For details 
of the jurisdictional amendments, see above.
752 See above, at pp 125-127.
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The analysis above of the application of the interstate trade criterion determined that 
there is a de facto presumption of an effect on interstate trade where there is conduct 
involving undertakings that are active on markets that actually or potentially involve 
interstate trade (or there are markets dependent upon these relevant markets that 
actually or potentially involve interstate trade). It is sufficient for the purpose of the 
thesis to list mergers between undertakings that are directly and actually involved on 
markets that involve actual or potential interstate trade.753
2 Merger Decisions in the UK taken during 1999 that Affect Interstate 
Trade
2.1 The Jurisdictional Threshold under UK Merger Law - The Fair Trading Act 
1973
The system of merger control under the Fair Trading Act 1973 is essentially benign, 
and predisposed in favour of mergers. There is no duty to notify mergers.
Any merger (within the meaning of section 64 FTA) can be referred to the 
Competition Commission754 by the Secretary of State according to his discretion 
(where he is advised by the Directorate General of Fair Trading).
In practice, very few mergers are referred to the MMC.755 Where a reference is made, 
the MMC makes an investigation and decides - according to a two-thirds majority - 
whether or not the merger should be prohibited. Where the MMC prohibits a merger, 
the Secretary of State still has the discretion not to prohibit the merger.
An examination of the fourteen Reports made by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission and the Competition Commission during 1999 reveals that six clearly 
involved mergers that affect actual interstate trade.
753 The actual breadth of the interstate trade criterion extends to include indirect effect on 
interstate trade on markets that are dependent upon the relevant product markets (see above).
754 Section 45 of the Competition Act 1998 dissolved the Monopolies and Merger Commission 
and replaced it with the Competition Commission.
755 See Whish, (1993) ibid at pp.687-8.
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2.2 Reports made under the FT A 1973 involving Mergers that Affected 
Interstate Trade756
Rockwool Ltd/Owens-Coming Building Products (UK) Ltd
The Report concerned the proposed acquisition of the stone wool manufacturing 
business of Owens-Coming Building Products (UK) Ltd (OCBP) by Rockwool Ltd 
(Rockwool).
Rockwool was the UK subsidiary of Rockwool International A/S, a Danish company. 
OCBP was a subsidiary of a US company, Owens Cornell, and had a stone wool 
factory located in the UK.
The Competition Commission investigated the UK stone wool market. It found that 
stone wool is an internationally traded product and that imports were made into the 
UK from overseas (without specifying the countries of origin). It may be deduced that 
interstate trade either takes place or could take place on the relevant market and the 
acquisition fulfils the interstate trade criterion.
British Airways PlcyCitvflver Express Limited
The Report concerned the proposed acquisition of CityFlyer Express Limited 
(CityFlyer) by British Airways Pic (BA).
Both undertakings were airlines and the merger clearly affected interstate trade since 
the provision of flights is carried out at a global level by international airlines.
Universal Foods Corporation/Pointines Holdings Ltd
The Report concerned the acquisition of Universal Foods Corporation (UFC) by 
Pointing Holdings Ltd (Pointing).
The Competition Commission determined that the companies overlapped within the 
UK in the manufacture and distribution of flavours and colours. Interstate trade was 
clearly affected by the merger since UFC had manufacturing plants in the UK, the 
Netherlands and Italy. The main competitors of the combined entity on the UK 
market included firms located outside the UK, in particular in Italy (Fiorio Colori 
SpA). The suitability for import and export of the product was stressed, according to 
the high value to weight ratio of the raw material.
756 Reports are available at the following website: 
http://www. mmc.gov. uk/inqu iries/mergerre/89-now.htm
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Alanod Aluminium-Veredlung GmbH & Co/ Metalloxvd Ano-Coil Ltd
The Report concerns the acquisition of Metalloxyd Ano-Coil Ltd (Ano-Coil) by
Alanod Aluminium-Veredlung GmbH & Co (Alanod).
The UK authority investigated the UK market for the production and sale of 
aluminium coil. The merger clearly affected interstate trade since Alanod sold 
aluminium coil produced in Germany globally and, in particular, in the UK.
CHC Helicopter Corporation/Helicopter Services Group ASA
The Report concerns the acquisition by CHC Helicopter Corporation (CHC) of
Helicopter Services Group ASA (HSG).
CHC was a Canadian supplier of helicopter services. HSG was a Norwegian supplier 
of helicopter services. Both were active internationally and sold their services 
throughout the Community. The merger therefore clearly affected interstate trade.
Vivendi SA/British Sky Broadcasting Group Pic
The Report concerned the acquisition by Vivendi SA (Vivendi) of a shareholding in 
British Sky Broadcasting Group Pic (BSkyB).
Both undertakings were active in the provision of pay-TV services. Vivendi was 
active in France ‘and a number of other EC countries’. BSkyB was active in the UK. 
The merger therefore clearly affected interstate trade.
3 Mergers Assessed in Germany during 1999 that Affect Interstate Trade - 
GWB 1998757
'i
3.1 The Jurisdictional Test under GWB 1998 
Mergers must be notified where:
The aggregate worldwide turnover of all undertakings exceeds 1 billion DM and at 
least one had a turnover of at least 50 million DM in Germany, unless one party is an 
independent company with a worldwide turnover of less than 20 million DM, or the 
relevant market (in existence for at least 5 years) had a total annual value of less than 
30 million DM.758
757 GWB 1998 of 26/08/98, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p2546.
758 Article 23 GWB 1958.
213
In 1999, fifteen decisions from a total of forty made by the Bundeskartellamt can be 
seen to have clearly affected interstate trade.
3.2 Decisions made under GWB 1998 involving Mergers that Affected 
Interstate Trade759
Deutsche Babcock Aktiengesellschaft/Steinmueller Verwaltunes GmbH
The decision concerned the acquisition of 74.9 % of the shares of Steinmueller
Verwaltungs GmbH (Steinmueller) by Deutsche Babcock AG (DB).
The merger did not fall under the scope of the European Merger Regulation since 
each of the parties achieved more than two thirds of their Community-wide turnover 
in Germany.
The activities of the parties overlapped in the area of constructing plants for 
environmental and energy technology.
In the area of energy particularly, the Bundeskartellamt highlighted the importance of 
foreign (and European) competition, and the merger therefore clearly affected 
interstate trade.
MG Bautechnik GmbH Beteiligungsgesellschaft fuer Bau- und 
Gebaeudetechnik/HOESCH Dach- und Fassadentechnik GmbH 
The decision concerned the acquisition of all the shares of HOESCH Dach- und 
Fassadentechnik (HOESCH) by MG Bautechnik Beteiligungsgesellschaft fuer Bau- 
und Gebaeudetechnik (MG).
The relevant product market was the market for ‘Halbzeug’. HOESCH was present 
on this market in Germany only as an importer, in particular for Italian (and 
American) producers. The Bundeskartellamt even states:
‘Es ist zu erwarten, dass diese (the present foreign suppliers of HOESCH) ihr Halbzeug nach 
dem Zusammenschluss ueber andere Vertriebswege im Inland absetzen werden)’.
The Dow Chemical Comnanv/Shell Nederland Chemie B.V7 Shell Chimie S.A.
The decision concerned the proposed acquisition by The Dow Chemical Company 
(Dow) of Shell Nederland Chemie B.V. and Shell Chimie S.A. (Shell).
759 Decisions available at the following website: 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/fiision_1999.html
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The relevant product market was synthetic rubber. The Bundeskartellamt determined 
that the consumers of the relevant product in Germany were supplied by suppliers all 
over Europe.760 The merger therefore clearly affected interstate trade.
Hapag Touristik Union GmbH/ First Reisebuero Management GmbH & Co. KG 
The decision concerned the proposed acquisition of First Reisebuero Management 
GmbH & Co. KG (FRM) by Hapag Touristik Union GmbH (HTU).
The relevant market was the provision of tourist and business travel. The 
Bundeskartellamt determined that:
‘Grossuntemehmen versuchen auch zunehmend, mit Reisemittlem eine europa- bzw. weltweite 
Betreuung ihrer Niederlassungen bzw. Tochterunternehmen zu vereinbaren'.761
Therefore, the merger clearly affected interstate trade.
Comet GmbH Pyrotechnik-Apparatebau/ Pieoenbrock Pyrotechnik GmbH
The decision concerned the acquisition of essential parts of Piepenbrock Pyrotechnik
GmbH (PP) by Comet GmbH Pyrotechnik-Apparatebau (CP).
The merger fell under the ‘two-thirds’ rule of the European Merger Regulation and 
therefore did not fall under its scope.
The relevant product market was the market for pyrotechnical articles. Although the 
Bundeskartellamt found the geographical market to be national, it highlighted the 
importance of foreign competition from inside and outside the Community in 
sanctioning the merger. Therefore, the merger clearly had an effect on interstate trade.
Barilla/ Wasa
The decision concerned the acquisition of Wasabroed Holding AB, Wasa GmbH 
(Wasa) by Barilla G.e.R. F.lli S.p.A. (Barilla).
Barilla was an Italian undertaking active in the production of food-stuffs selling most 
of its products in the UK and Germany.
Wasa was a Swedish undertaking with subsidiaries in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and 
Poland.
The merger clearly affected interstate trade.
760
761
At paragraph 21-2.
At p. 6.
'W
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Emmet S.A./Elkem Manean KS/Elkem Metals Company LP/Cogema S. A.
The decision analysed the proposed acquisition of the production sites of Elkem 
Mangan KS (EM) and Elkem Metals Company (EMC) by a joint venture created 
between Eramet S.A (Eramet) and Cogema S.A. (Cogema).
Eramet and Cogema were both French undertakings. EM was a Norwegian 
undertaking and EMC was an American undertaking.
The relevant product market was manganese alloys. All the parties exported and the 
Bundeskartellamt noted that there was no production in Germany; all manganese 
alloys were imported from the parties or their competitors.
The merger clearly affected interstate trade.
Coming Inc./BICC Pic.
The decision concerned the acquisition by Coming International Corporation 
(Coming) of the telecommunications cable business of BICC Pic. (BICC).
The merger involved the market for the production and distribution of standard glass 
fibre cables to the providers or constructors of telecommunication networks. Trade in 
this market was carried out internationally by firms across the Community and world­
wide.
The merger clearly affected interstate trade.
PPG Industries Lackfabrik GmbH/ ICI Lacke Farben GmbH
The decision concerned the acquisition of the ‘paints for commercial vehicles’ 
business of ICI Lacke Farben GmbH (ICI) by PPG Industries Lackfabrik GmbH 
(PPG).
The Bundeskartellamt stressed the low transport costs of the relevant product and the 
fact that the producers tended to have production sites in only one or two Member 
States and to export to the whole of Europe.
The merger clearly affected interstate trade.
Texas Instruments Incorporated/ Integrated Sensor Solutions Incorporated
The decision concerned the acquisition by Texas Instruments Incorporated (TI) of
Integrated Sensor Solutions Incorporated (ISS).
The merger concerned in particular the market for high pressure sensors for use in the 
diesel injection systems of traditional common rail. The Bundeskartellamt found that 
the market for such products extended to the world market (including other
Community-based market players) on account of the low weight in relation to value 
ratio.
The merger clearly affected interstate trade.
Checkpoint Systems Inc./ Meto AG
The decision concerned the acquisition of Meto AG (Meto) by Checkpoint Systems 
Inc. (CS).
The relevant product market was the production and distribution of systems for the 
electronic protection of articles. The market was characterised by the fact that all the 
main suppliers of the relevant product had their production sites outside Germany 
(including in other Member States).
Emerson Electric Co./ Krautkraemer GmbH & Co. oHG/ NUKEM Nutronik GmbH 
The decision concerned the acquisition of NUKEM Nutronik GmbH (NN) by 
Krautkraemer GmbH & Co. oHG (K) and Emerson Electric Co. (EE).
The relevant market concerned the production and distribution of ultra-sound 
technology. The Bundeskartellamt, in its consideration of the geographical market, 
determined that interstate trade in the relevant product took place between the 
Member States.
Therefore the merger affected interstate trade.
Norddeutsche Affinerie AG/ Huettenwerke Kavser AG
The decision concerned the acquisition of Huettenwerke Kayser AG (HK) by 
Norddeutsche Affinerie AG (NA).
The relevant product markets were the procuring of copper scrap and the production 
of copper cathodes, base metals (gold, silver, platinum).
The Bundeskartellamt noted that 44 % of the domestic consumption of copper was 
made up of imports. Clearly the merger therefore affected interstate trade.
Xerox Corporation/ Tektronix Inc.
The decision concerned the proposed acquisition by Xerox Corporation (X) of the 
colour printer business of Tektronix Inc (T).
The market for colour printers was described as extending beyond the domestic 
market and therefore the merger clearly affected interstate trade.
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4 Merger Decisions in Italy taken during 1999 that Affected Interstate 
Trade
4.1 The Jurisdictional Test under Law No. 287 of October 10 1990 
Mergers must be notified where:
i
‘Turnover by all undertakings exceeds 710 billion lire in Italy, or turnover of the target on the 
Italian market exceeds 71 billion lire*.
!
!
The notification of mergers required according to Law No. 287 of October 10 1990 is 
l mandatory where the jurisdictional threshold is reached. The threshold is lower than
I that used under German law and consequently many more mergers are notified and
I assessed by the L’Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato.
| Upon analysis, many of the mergers that were the subject of decisions during 1999
I affected interstate trade. The thesis details these decisions for the first six months of
I 1999 below. A list of the decisions of the remaining six months are contained in
I Annex 2.
i
I 4.2 Decisions made under Law No.287 of October 10 1990 involving Mergers
. ( that Affect Interstate Trade762
Biochemie/HOECHST Marion Roussel Deutschland (C32601763
The decision concerned the acquisition by Biochemie GmbH by HOECHST M.R.
The relevant market was the production and distribution of pharmaceutical goods for 
the production of antibiotics. The Antitrust Authority stressed the low transport costs 
of the relevant product and the fact that pricing was the same in different Member 
States.
This constitutes strong evidence that the merger affected interstate trade.
ELF Atochem Vlissigen/TH Goldschmidt764
762 All decisions are available at the following website: http://www.agcm.it/tema0111.htm
763 Provvedimento n. 6768 (C3260), 8th gennaio 1999 in Bollettino n .l del 25 gennaio 1999, 
p.13.
764 Provvedimento n. 6773 (C3346) 14 gennaio 1999, Bollettino n .l del 25 gennaio 1999, p. 
26. ■—
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The decision concerned the acquisition by ELF Atochem Vlissigen Bv (ELF) of TH 
Goldschmidt AG (G).
The relevant product market was found to be the production of chemicals for the 
coating of glass. The Authority found that the product was traded between the 
Member States of the Community by several firms. Therefore, the merger clearly 
affected interstate trade.
Solvav/Winnofil Division (C3379)765
The decision concerned the acquisition by Solvay SA of Winnofil Division, a 
subsidiary of the undertaking Zeneca Ltd.
The relevant product market was the market for calcium carbonate. The product has 
low transport costs with regard to pricing and it was traded internationally and 
between Member States.
Therefore the merger affected interstate trade.
Dow Benelux-Dow France/ Shell (C3404>766
The decision concerned the acquisition by Dow of business areas of Shell.
The relevant product market was the production and distribution of two particular 
types of rubber (PBR and SBR).
It was found that there was significant interstate trade within the Community in the 
relevant product. Therefore, the merger would clearly affect interstate trade.
Textron/ Breed Italian Interiors (C3407)767
The decision concerned the acquisition of Breed Italian Interiors Sri by Textron Inc. 
The relevant product market consisted of the production, transformation, processing 
and distribution of plastic products and technical articles for equipping motor 
vehicles.
The Authority noted that car manufacturers located in the Community bought the 
relevant product from producers all over Europe. The merger therefore clearly 
affected interstate trade.
Davco Europe/ Lombardini F.IM. (C3416V768
765 Provvedimento n. 6835 (C3379) 28 gennaio 1999, Bollettino n.4 del 15 febbraio 1999, p. 
47.
766 Provvedimento n. 6908 (C3404) 18 febbraio 1999, Bollettino n. 7 of 8 March 1999, p.8.
767 Provvedimento n. 6911 (C3407) 18 febbraio 1999, Bollettino n. 7 of 8 March 1999, p.18.
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The decision concerned the acquisition of Lombardini F.I.M. Spa by Dayco Europe 
Spa.
The relevant product market was the production and distribution of diesel engines and 
pistol engines of low power.
The Authority noted that motors were sold by the parties all over Europe (and on at a 
global level). Therefore, the merger clearly affected interstate trade.
Wacker Chemie/ Huels Silicone-Sivento Chemie Rheinfelden (C3366V768 69 
The decision concerned the acquisition of parts of the business of Wacker Chemie 
GmbH by Huels Silicone GmbH, subsidiary of Sivento Chemie Rheinfelden GmbH. 
The relevant product market was the production and sale of different types of 
silicone.
The relevant product was produced by various multinational companies based in 
different Member States or outside the Community. The merger clearly affected 
interstate trade.
Fabbrica Italiana Accumulator! Motocarri Montecchio/ Uranio (C3422V770
The decision concerned the acquisition of parts of Fabbrica Italiana Accumulator!
Motocarri Montecchio Spa (FIAMM) by Uranio.
The relevant product was the production and distribution of lead batteries. The 
specific market for lead traction batteries involved supply and demand across the 
borders of the Member States. Therefore the merger clearly affected interstate trade.
Sparta/ Zucchini (C34491771
The decision concerned the acquisition of Zucchini Spa by Sparta Spa.
The relevant product market was the production and sale of electric lines. The 
Authority noted that there were significant exports and imports of the relevant 
product within Europe and therefore the merger clearly affected interstate trade.
Atotech Italia/Technoriv (C3444V772
The decision concerned the acquisition by Atotech Italia Arl of Tecnoriv Sas.
768 Provvedimento n. 6934 (C3416) 25 febbraio 1999, Bollettino n. 8 of 15 March 1999,
p.121.
769 Provvedimento n. 6951 (C3449) 26 marzo 1999, Bollettino n.9 o f 22 March 1999.
770 Provvedimento n.6966, Bollettino n.10 of 29 March 1999.
775 Provvedimento n. 7022 (C3449) 26 marzo 1999, Bollettino n.12 of 12 Aprii 1999.
772 Provvedimento n. 7018 , Bollettino n.12 of 12 Aprii 1999. «*■
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The relevant product market was the market for the sale of galvanised products 
destined for industrial use in refining metals.
The Authority noted that demand for the product did not have any geographic 
limitations but was based upon the factors of price and quality. There were low 
transport costs and no technical or natural barriers to imports. The merger therefore 
affected interstate trade.
BASF/ DSM ASP fC34591m
The decision concerned the acquisition by BASF AG of DSM ASP BV.
The relevant product market was the production and distribution of thermoplastics. 
The Authority noted that the market was characterised by consistent inter-state trade 
within the Community and with third countries in the Orient. The merger therefore 
clearly affected interstate trade.
Kev Foggini Europe/ Gruppo Foggini (C347P73 74
The decision concerned the acquisition of control of Gruppo Foggini by Key Foggini 
Europe S.a.r.l.
The relevant product was the production, transformation, processing and sale of 
plastic products and technical articles for equipping motor vehicles. The Authority 
found that the products were produced in various Member States by firms that sold 
throughout Europe. The merger clearly affected interstate trade.
AB Electrolux/ McCulloch Italiana (C3466V775
The decision concerned the acquisition by AB Electrolux of McCulloch corporation. 
The relevant product market was the production and sale of portable equipment used 
in electric motors or thermics for the ‘Do It Yourself market. The Authority noted a 
strong interstate trade between the Member States in the relevant product. Therefore 
the merger clearly affected interstate trade.
Comau/ Renault Automation (C3479V776
The decision concerned the acquisition of Renault Automation Spa by COMAU Spa. 
The relevant product market is the planning, realisation and sale of working 
mechanical systems and their assembly for the motor vehicle industry. There was
773 Provvedimento n.7053 (C3459) 9 aprile 1999, Bollettino n. 13-14 of 26 April 1999, p.50.
774 Provvedimento n.7089 (C3471) 15 aprile 1999, Bollettino n. 15 of 3 May 1999, p.45.
775 Provvedimento n.7087 (C3466) 15 aprile 1999, Bollettino n. 15 of 3 May 1999, p.39.
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significant sale and acquisition of the systems within the Community and the merger 
therefore affected interstate trade.
British Elevators/ IMI Marston (C3478)76 77
The decision concerned the acquisition by British Elevators Ltd of IMI Marston Ltd. 
The relevant product market was the production of products for use in space flight. 
The Authority determined that the relevant product was traded across Western 
Europe, if not wider. Therefore the merger affected interstate trade.
ACE/INA (C3468V778
The decision concerned the acquisition of INA Corporation by ACE Ltd.
The relevant product market was the insurance sector. In particular the market for 
maritime and aeronautics was found to be international, including companies 
throughout the Community and outside the Community. The merger therefore 
affected interstate trade.
Clariant International/ Songwon Color Co. (C3510V779
The decision concerned the acquisition by Clariant International AG of Songwon 
Color Co. Ltd.
The relevant product market was the production and trade of pigments. The 
Authority noted that the imports into Italy of the relevant product during 1998 
consisted of more than 90 % of domestic demand. Therefore the merger clearly 
affected interstate trade.
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours/ Duconti (C3538)780
The decision concerned the acquisition by E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. of 
Duconti Sri.
The relevant product market was the production of nylon. The Authority noted that 
there was significant interstate trade within Europe. Therefore the merger affected 
interstate trade.
BASF Italia/ Dohmen Italia (C3537Y781
776 Provvedimento n.7124 (, Bollettino n.16 of 10 May 1999.
777 Provvedimento n.7123, Bollettino n. 16 of 10 May 1999.
778 Provvedimento n.7174, Bollettino n.18 of 24 May 1999.
779 Provvedimento n.7231, Bollettino n.21 of 14 June 1999.
780 Provvedimento n.7296 (C3538) 17 giugno 1999, Bollettino n. 24 of 5 July 1999, p.21.
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The decision concerned the acquisition of Dohmen Italia Sri. by BASF.
The relevant product market was the production of chemicals for the curing industry. 
The market was characterised by large multinational producers. The Authority noted 
that some sales were made by the merging companies in other Member States. 
Therefore the merger affected interstate trade.
5 Evaluation
The analysis of the merger decisions taken in 1999 in three Member States has 
determined that there are many concentrations that affect interstate trade and that do 
not have a ‘Community Dimension’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) MR. It is 
reasonable to assume that this is reflected throughout the other Member States of the 
Community.
The above analysis also revealed the problems inherent to the two-thirds rule. While 
the rule effectively provides that concentrations that do not affect interstate trade do 
not fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation, it is set much too wide and allows 
for concentrations that do affect interstate trade to escape the application of the 
Merger Regulation.781 82 The proviso it sets for the application of the Merger Regulation 
to a concentration - that the parties should be mainly active in more than one Member 
State (that is, at least one third or more of the undertakings’ turnover made outside a 
single Member State) - means that concentrations between very large nationally- 
based undertakings that affect competition structures in more than one Member State 
will not fall within the scope of the Merger. Yet transactions involving undertakings 
whose activities are exclusively based in one Member State can effect interstate 
trade.783 The Commission highlighted this problem in its 1993 Report to the Council 
on the Review of the Merger Regulation. It noted that of 20 operations that had fallen 
within the two-thirds exclusion rule,784 eleven involved relevant geographical markets
781 Provvedimento n.7295, Bollettino n.24 of 5 July 1999, p.18.
782 See from the above examples the German decisions: Deutsche Babcock/Steinmueller 
Verwaltungs/Philipp Holzmann/VEW; Comet/Piepenbrock Pyrotechnik (See note 759).
783 See above, p. 112.
The Commission itself has described two ways in which cross-border effect can be achieved by 
such transactions in its Green Paper on the Review o f the Merger Regulation 1996, ibid, 
paragraph 25. It stated that there is an effect where:
(i) the activities within a single Member State have significant competitive repercussions in 
other parts o f the Community; or
(ii) where the entrenchment o f a national position has spillover effects in the rest o f the E.C.
784 During the time period from the implementation of the Merger Regulation until the writing 
of the Report.
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much wider than the relevant Member State for which the two-thirds rule applied. 
These cases usually concerned niche sectors such as steel, textiles, automobile 
components, machine tools and electric equipment for railways.785 Summarising the 
problem that the two-thirds rule represented, the Commission stated:
‘...large groups o f companies such as Siemens or Daimler Benz come frequently under the two- 
thirds rule, given their strong home markets and considerable exports to countries outside the 
EC, although the mergers where they are involved have frequently substantial repercussions 
across the Community’.786
Once again, in its Report in the year 2000, the Commission noted that a significant 
number (two hundred and thirty eight) of concentrations having significant cross- 
border impacts fell outside the scope of the Merger Regulation as a result of the 
operation of the two-thirds rule.787 Indeed, transactions that are fundamentally similar 
may fall within the scope of different jurisdictions due to the anomaly of the two- 
thirds rule. The Commission highlights the recent mergers of VEBA/VIAG and 
RWE/VEW  in the German electricity market. In both cases, the impact would mainly 
be felt in Germany. However, a significant impact on the electricity markets in 
neighbouring countries was also likely to occur. In spite of this, only VEBA/VIAG fell 
to be considered under the Merger Regulation. In the RWE/VEW  case, each of the 
parties achieved more than two thirds of their aggregate turnover in Germany.788 In 
the VEBA/VIAG  case, the Commission opened a full investigation of the merger under 
Article 6(1 )c MR to determine its effect on competition structures within the 
Community. In the event the Commission only allowed the transaction to take place 
subject to strict undertakings taken from the merging entities.789 The 
Bundeskartellamt assessed the RWE/VEW  merger for its effect on competition within
785 Commission Report to the Council on the Merger Regulation, 1993, ibid at Paragraph 6.
786 Commission Report to the Council on the Merger Regulation, 1993, ibid at Paragraph 6.
787 Commission Review of the Merger Regulation, 2000, ibid Paragraphs 27 and 28. The 
Commission gives as an example the merger between Chase Manhattan Corporation and 
Robert Flemmings Holdings Ltd that had a ‘significant cross-border impact’ since both 
undertakings were international financial companies managing assets that are in hundreds of 
billions USD and are active in 40-50 countries worldwide. Nevertheless, the transaction fell 
within the 2/3 exception rule.
A full list of mergers involving multiple filings during the period January 1999-December 1999 
may be found at the following website:
http://europa. eu. int/comm/competition/m ergers/review/m ultiple _filings_1999.htm.
788 See Commission Review of the Merger Regulation, 2000, ibid Paragraph 28.
789 See VEBA/VIAG, Case M1673 Press Releases 1P/00/114 of 04/02/2000 and IP/OQ/613 of 
13.06.2000.
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Germany (according to Article 24(1) GWB 1998790). It allowed the transaction, but 
only subject to equally strict undertakings that were however only aimed at ensuring 
competition was not distorted within Germany rather than throughout the Community 
as a whole.791
In its 1993 Report, the Commission investigated the likely effects of, first, removing 
it altogether and, secondly, of reducing it to a three-quarters rule.792
To remove the two-thirds rule altogether would be to remove its valid role in 
providing that concentrations that do not affect interstate trade do not fall within the 
scope of the Regulation (although it may be submitted that most concentrations 
meeting the present high turnover threshold will automatically affect interstate trade). 
The Commission considered whether a widened application of Article 9 could solve 
any problems created by the removal of the two-thirds rule. Not only is Article 9 an 
unsuitable provision (in both its formulation and procedure) to act as an effective 
filter for concentrations that do not affect interstate trade, but the Commission rightly 
stated that an increased reliance on that provision would create too much 
jurisdictional uncertainty.
The Commission was more convinced by the idea of replacing the two-thirds rule 
with a three-quarters rule. It noted that in such event, seven of the eleven cases that 
had previously fallen within the two-thirds rule while having Community-wide effects 
would have fallen within the scope of the Regulation. By 1996, however, the 
Commission had changed its mind. It regarded a three-quarters rule as being too 
narrow, and likely to include concentrations with only national implications within 
the scope of the Merger Regulation. It stated that on balance the two-thirds rule is 
consistent with the subsidiarity principle.793
790 According to this provision, a merger must be prohibited if it can be expected to result in the 
creation or strengthening of a market dominant position, unless the transaction would also lead 
to improvements in the competitive structure of one or more of the markets and if such 
improvements outweigh the negative effects of market dominance (an exception that is difficult 
to prove in practice, see Rowley and Baker, International Mergers and the Antitrust Process, 
1996 at p.634).
791 RWEAZEW Case B8-309/99 of 03/07/2000. The whole decision can be found at the
following website: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/B8-309-99.pdf
792 Commission Report to the Council on the Merger Regulation, 1993, ibid, at Paragraphs 4-
6.
793 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation 1996, at Paragraph 66.
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The Economic and Social Committee, on the other hand, in their response to the 
Commission’s 1996 Green Paper, noted that 'the fact that a large part o f turnover is 
derived in one country does not necessarily mean that a merger is not o f Community 
significance’. The Committee does not however push this observation to its logical 
conclusion. It states that national authorities are best placed to assess the impact of 
such mergers on market structure, so national competence can indeed be justified 
under the subsidiarity principle (and further, abolition of the rule would mean an 
increased workload for the Commission in the face of an already strained capacity). 
Yet if the subsidiarity principle is applied, the relevant Community objective is surely 
not ‘sufficiently achieved’ within the meaning of Article 5 EC if national authorities 
are able to assess concentrations having a *Community significance’ (and therefore 
affecting that Community objective) at the national level according to national 
objectives.
Neven et al. suggest a different reform of the provision. They suggest that rather than 
depending upon the size of the activities of the firms outside of the Member State 
where the merger takes place as a proportion to those taking place inside the Member 
State, the condition should depend upon the absolute size of those activities taking 
place outside the Member State, based upon a quantitative threshold. They have 
recourse to the idea of ‘international spillovers \  whereby a certain quantitative 
threshold of such spillovers would determine Community jurisdiction. This, it should 
be recalled, would correspond to the considerations of the Commission in its 1996 
Green Paper with regard to the most appropriate definition of ‘Community 
Dimension’, even though it determined in the final analysis that the turnover 
thresholds should be retained.794
Prima facie, this solution makes sense. Concentrations may, for example, fall into the 
two-thirds condition and yet involve very large undertakings, whereby the turnover 
that is made outside the relevant Member State (that is, less than one third of the 
total) is actually very high (and affects significantly specific niche markets at the 
Community level). Nevertheless, the solution fails to confront the legal problems 
inherent to the existing jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation. It is still 
reliant upon a set formalistic and quantitative criterion. A threshold of turnover made 
outside the Member State where the concentration takes place would necessarily have 
to be set at an arbitrary level with regard to the actual effect the concentration may
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have upon interstate trade. It would not therefore be coherent with the legal bases of 
the Regulation.
If the two-thirds rule - or an amended version - does not provide the means to 
rationalise the operation of the turnover thresholds of the Merger Regulation so that 
they are coherent with the legal bases upon which the Regulation was implemented, it 
is necessary to consider whether there are any other further ‘fine-tuning’ provisions 
which may be interpreted to carry out this role. It is necessary, first, to identify the 
relevant provisions, secondly, to consider why they presently allow concentrations 
that affect interstate trade to escape the scope of the Merger Regulation and, thirdly, 
to consider whether they may be interpreted in the future to avoid this anomaly.
6 Referral of a Concentration to the Commission • Article 22(3) MR
6.1 Origin
In parity with Article 9 of the Merger Regulation, Article 22(3) was also included in 
order to compromise the Regulation to satisfy the demands of a Member State, in this 
case Holland.794 95 This concession allowed a Member State to refer a concentration 
below the Community Dimension thresholds to the Commission.
The intention behind the inclusion of this provision was to appease several of the 
smaller Member States that had been in favour of a wider scope of application of the 
Merger Regulation because they themselves had no national system of merger 
control. The provision therefore allows them to pass concentrations which were of 
concern to them to the Commission for assessment, where the conditions of Article 
22(3) MR are fulfilled.
In spite of the rather different intention of the implementation of Article 22(3) MR, 
questionable is why the provision does not operate in practice to ensure that all 
mergers affecting interstate trade fall under the scope of the Merger Regulation.
6.2 The Substantive Provision of Article 22(3) MR
794 See above, pp. 153-156.
795 At the time of the implementation o f the Merger Regulation, Holland did not have a national 
system of merger control.
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‘If the Commission finds, at the request of a Member State or at the joint request of two or 
more Member States, that a concentration as defined in Article 3 that has no Community 
dimension within the meaning of Article 1 creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result 
of which effective competition would be significantly impeded within the territory of the 
Member State or States making a joint request, it may, insofar as that concentration affects 
trade between Member States, adopt the decisions provided for in Article 8(2), second 
subparagraph, (3) and (4).’
The literal text of the provision is an effects-based condition. It includes the explicit 
condition that a concentration that is referred to the Commission must ‘affect 
interstate trade \ 796
Nevertheless, it does not cover all concentrations which have or may have an effect 
on interstate trade. It only covers those concentrations which do affect interstate trade 
and which create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which competition 
in the territory of the relevant Member State or States is significantly impeded.
The condition therefore incorporates a substantive assessment of the concentration for 
its effect on competition structures at the national level. In spite of this, the 
Commission has shown that it regards Article 22(3) MR as a provision that 
determines jurisdiction and not just enforcement interest. In the first of the Holland 
Media cases,797 the Commission showed that it would initiate the substantive 
assessment of the merger from the very beginning and was not bound by the 
preliminary findings of the Member State authority. The Commission justified this 
approach by referring to the operation of Article 9, which allows the Commission to 
refer specific products and services back to Member States for investigation.798 The 
approach was upheld by the Court of First Instance.799 However, it does not take 
jurisdiction in the conventional sense since the test still concerns the effect of the 
concentration on competition structures in the relevant Member State or States and 
not in the Common Market
796 In British Airways/Dan Air the Commission held that the concentration fulfilled this 
condition because the acquisition 'has effects on air transport between Belgium and the United 
Kingdom ’, Case IV/M278 OJ (1993) C68/5 at paragraph 7.
797 RTUVeronica/Endemol Case M553, OJ (1996) L134/32.
798 RTUVeronica/Endemol Case M553, OJ (1996) L I34/32, paragraphs 18 and 19.
799 Endemol Entertainment Holding BV  v Commission o f  the EC Case T-221/95 ECR (1999) at 
paragraph 40.
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Clearly, the provision’s appropriateness to rationalise the operation of the turnover 
thresholds is limited since it only applies to a proportion of concentrations that 
actually or potentially affect interstate trade (that is, those that restrict competition 
within a Member State). The fundamental inability of Article 22(3) MR to provide 
that the second condition is fulfilled by the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger 
Regulation - that all concentrations affecting interstate trade fall within the scope of 
the Merger Regulation - is however the result of its procedural structure.
6 3  The Procedural Structure800
Concentrations may be referred to the Commission under Article 22(3) MR only at 
the discretion of the Member State or States. There is no legal obligation to refer such 
concentrations, even though it is highly likely that they actually affect legal 
Community objectives (since they affect interstate trade and impede competition 
significantly).
Thus, the potential rationalising function of the provision depends first upon the 
Member State detecting such a condition. This is usually only the case if there is a 
system of prior notification in the relevant Member State801 802or the transaction has to 
be made public. Secondly, the Member State must have the will to pass it to the 
Commission for assessment under Community law.
Analysis of the limited circumstances in which the Article has been invoked reveals 
that the Member States have only made referrals on the basis of Article 22(3) MR for 
the purposes for which the provision was originally intended: concentrations which 
affect the competition structures on national markets which the relevant Member 
State cannot control due to a lack of appropriate legal mechanisms.
To date, only five decisions were successfully referred to the Commission: British 
A irways/Dan-A ir; the two ‘Holland Media Cases V Kesko/Tuko; Blokker Toys 7?' 
Us.m
800 For a detailed description of the procedure under Article 22(3) MR, see eg., Cook and 
Kerse, ibid, pp245-8; Miersch, ibid, pp.188-192; Downes and Ellison, ibid, pp. 63-65.
801 The UK, France and Luxembourg do not have mandatory notification procedures for 
mergers. See Annex 1.
802 British Airways/Dan Air, Case IV/M278, OJ (1993) C 68/5; The Holland Media Cases 
(RTUVeronica/Endemol) Case M553, OJ (1996) L I34/32 and OJ (1996) L294/14; Kesko/Tuko 
Case M784 OJ (1997) LI 10/53; Blokker Toys 7?’ Us (11) Case M890 OJ (1998) L316/1.
i
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Three of the successful referrals were made by Holland. The first decision of the 
Holland Media Group concerned three Dutch language pay TV networks operating in 
Holland and the largest independent producer of Dutch language television 
programmes.803 The Commission accepted the referral request. In the second, the 
Commission accepted a request from the Dutch Government to initiate proceedings 
under the Regulation for the operation RTL/Veronica/Endemol, concerning the 
(separate) markets for TV advertising, TV broadcasting and independently produced 
Dutch TV programmes in Holland.804
In Blokker Toys ‘R ’ Us (1993), the Commission again accepted the referral, and 
finding that the proposed merger would strengthen the dominant position of Blokker 
in the Dutch specialist toy outlets market
The third instance of a referral of a merger case from a Member State being accepted 
by the Commission was in 1996 in Kesko/Tuko. This case concerned an acquisition 
by Kesko of Tuko, both Finnish retail trading groups, which had already been carried 
out The Commission accepted a referral from the Finnish authorities.805
A fourth referral was made by the Belgium Government in 1992 in British 
Airways/Dan Air, concerning the effect on competition in the territory of Belgium in 
connection with air routes between London and Brussels.
All of the referrals involved Member States which at the time of the referral did not 
have a system of merger control. Holland only implemented a system of merger 
control in 1997.806 Finland amended its existing legislation to include concentration 
control in 1998.807 Belgium implemented a law on mergers in 1991, which did not 
however enter force until April 1993.808
Since the implementation of a system of merger law in each of these two Member 
States, neither has referred a concentration to the Commission under the Article 22(3) 
MR procedure. This is not a surprising statistic. There is no reason to believe that 
national authorities of the larger Member States will willingly give up control over
803 RTL/Veronica/Endemol Case M553, OJ (1996) LI34/32.
804 RTL/Veronica/Endemol, Case M553, OJ (1996) L294/14.
805 Hutchings, M., ‘The Lessons of the Kesko/Tuko Case’, 2 ECLR 75 (1997).
806 Competition Act, Statute Book 1997,242.
807 Act on Restrictions on Competition (480/92), as amended.
808 Law on the Protection of Economic Competition of 5 August 1991 (as amended by the laws 
of April 26 1999).
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mergers which are significant in terms of their national markets, especially given the 
inherent sovereignty issues involved in Community control of mergers.809
6.4 Summary
Article 22(3) MR is limited in its literal text as a provision that could ensure that all 
concentrations affecting interstate trade are assessed under the Merger Regulation.
Furthermore, the Article is also restricted by the fact that it may be invoked at the sole 
discretion of the relevant Member State or States. History has shown that this 
discretion is not exercised in a way that allows the provision to fulfil the second 
condition. It depends upon whether a Member State has an adequate legal mechanism 
to assess concentrations at the national level. Now that all Member States have a 
system of merger control, Article 22(3) MR may well lose its significance. It is 
however possible that it could be invoked for other reasons, for example where a 
Member State wishes to avoid shouldering the responsibility for prohibiting a merger 
for political reasons, whether domestic or international.
It is further necessary to consider whether the amendments made to Article 1MR that 
were implemented in 1998 operate to rationalise the operation of the turnover 
thresholds to be absolutely consistent with the operation of the interstate trade 
criterion.
7 The Amendments to Article 1 MR and Multiple Jurisdictions
Recall that the Commission has consistently stated that ideally, with regard to the 
objectives of the Single Market and the principle of a one-stop-shop, all 
concentrations with a cross-border effect should be assessed at the Community 
level.810 Within this context, in its Green Paper on the Review of the Regulation in 
1996, the Commission expressed concern about the high level of multiple filings 
taking place in the Community.811 The Commission’s proposals for an amendment to 
Article 1 MR in its 1996 Green Paper were directed specifically at rectifying this
809 See above.
810 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, ibid, at para’s 31-2. 
See also statement by Commission in Commission XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 1993 
(1994, OOPEC, Luxembourg), paragraph 43.
811 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, at Paragraphs 
87-88.
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situation. Thereby, however, its suggestion was substantially modified before 
implementation by the Council. Direct reference to multiple filing was lost, and 
recourse was made to turnover thresholds, albeit at a lower level and throughout at 
least three Member States.812 According to the amendment to Article 1 MR, 
concentrations must also be notified to the Commission when:
a) the undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate world-wide turnover of 
more than ECU 2,500 million; b) in each of at least three Member States, the 
combined aggregate turnover of all undertakings concerned is more than ECU 100 
million; c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose of point b, 
the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more 
than ECU 25 million and d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at 
least two of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 100 million, 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than 2/3’s of its aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State’.813
In practice, the amendment to Article 1 MR has certainly operated to refine the 
operation of the jurisdictional trigger to cover concentrations that affect interstate 
trade. Of the 39 concentrations that fell under the revised thresholds up to January 
2000, only five have clearly involved only national geographic markets for all the 
relevant products, and all of these decisions affected more than one national 
market.814 The majority of decisions concerning concentrations falling within the 
revised thresholds involved geographic markets that were at least Community-wide.815
812 For a more detailed history, see above, pp. 150-156.
813 Note that Article 1(4) MR, as amended by Council Regulation 13010/97, requires the 
Commission to report to the council before 1 July 2000 on the operation of the threshold 
criteria set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.
814 ICI/Williams, Case Comp/M.1567, OJ C101 of 03/04/1998; Vedior/Select Appointments, 
Case Comp/M.1702, OJ C272 of 25/09/1999; AKZO Nobel/Hoechst Roussel Vet, Case 
Comp/M.1681 OJ 294 of 14/10/1999; Johnson and Johnson/Depuy, Case Comp/M.1286, 
C294 of 23/09/1998 and GetronicsAVang, Comp/M.1561, OJ C143 of 21/05/1998.
815 Eight cases affected geographic markets that were at least the EU as a whole: 
Lucchini/Ascometal, Case Comp/M.1567, OJ C146 of 21/05/1999; GetronicsAVang, Case 
Comp/M.1561, OJ C143 of 21/05/1998; Newell/Rubbermaid, Case Comp/M1355, OJ C387 of 
12.12.1998; Voest Alpine Stahl/VosslohMAE Comp/M1259, OJ C283 of 12/09/1998; 
Siebe/Eurotherm, Case Comp/M1195, OJ C148 of 14.05.1998; UPM-Kymmene/April, Case 
Comp/M1006, OJ C88 of 24/03/1998; Hyundai Electronics/LG Semicon, Case Comp/M1492, 
OJ C151 of 29/05/1998; Huhtamaki Oyj/Packaging Industries Van Leer, Case Comp/M1656, 
OJ C248 of 01.09.1999.
Ten cases involved geographic markets at least EEA-wide: Lucent Technologies/Ascend 
Communications Comp/M1440, OJ C64 of 06/03/1999; Dana/Glacier Vandervell, Case 
Comp/M1335, OJ C353 of 19/11/1998; Constructor/Dexion, Case Comp/M1318, OJ C308 of 
08/10/1998; ELF Atochem/Atohaas, Case Comp/M1158, -0J 141 of 06/05/1998;
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Nevertheless, it is severely restricted in its ability to bring concentrations that affect 
interstate trade comprehensively within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation.
First, it is clear that the provision is only of very limited application, applying only to 
la rg e  mergers (with a combined aggregate turnover of ECU 2,500 million ) in a t lea s t  
th ree  Member States. Secondly, it retains the anomalous 2/3 rule.816 Thirdly, and 
above all, turnover remains the relevant criterion: the operation of the criterion cannot 
pertain to cover all mergers having an effect on cross-border trade since it employs a 
condition of size rather than effect. It does not even require the related - although 
different - condition of multiple filing having actually taken place.817
There is further some doubt whether the amendment is serving its regulatory 
efficiency goal adequately. European industry and business have been seen to 
complain about the complexity of the rule and the resultant costs and time required, 
and have even proposed that it should be repealed in the face of a straightforward 
lowering of the thresholds in Article 1(2) MR.818
8 Conclusion on the Second Condition
The analysis undertaken above has revealed that the second condition is not fulfilled: 
the jurisdictional trigger does not bring all concentrations that affect interstate trade 
within the scope of the Merger Regulation.
Thereby, Article 22(3) MR in its present application does not operate to redress this 
problem. Even if it may be interpreted to perform this role, its procedural structure
Ispat/Unimetal, Case Comp/M1509, OJ C151 of 29/05/1999; Norsk Hydro/SAGA Case 
Comp/M1573, OJ C162 of 09/06/1999; Suez Lyonnaise/Nalco Case Comp/M1631, OJ C215 of 
28/07/1999; Dupont/Sabanci, Case Comp/M1538, OJ C311 of 29/10/1999; Dupont/Teijin, 
Case Comp/M1599, OJ C309 of 28/10/1999; Solutia/Viking Resins, Case Comp/M1763, OJ 
C339 of 26/11/1999.
One case had a relevant geographic market that was world-wide: Solvay/BASF, Case 
Comp/M1469, OJ C125 of 06/05/1999.
816 See above, pp .222-226.
817 The Review of the jurisdictional trigger carried out in 2000 by the Commission determined 
that a significant number of multiple notifications were still taking place in spite of the 
amended Article 1 MR. Of a total of 4,303 mergers undertaken between March 1998 and the 
end of 1999,294 cases were notified to two national competition authorities rather than to the 
Commission because they did not meet the turnover thresholds. Another 31 cases were notified 
in three Member States and 39 in more than three Member States.
See Commission Report 2000, ibid, paragraphs 34-48.
818 See Commission Report 2000, ibid, paragraphs 59-61.
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would prevent it from fulfilling it adequately. The amendments to Article 1 MR were 
implemented in 1998 address the problem of multiple filing directly. For this purpose, 
they have performed a satisfactorily, if far from perfectly. However, a provision that 
renders all concentrations with turnovers above a certain threshold in at least three 
Member States (and maintaining the two-thirds rule) clearly will not bring all 
concentrations having an actual or potential effect on interstate trade within the scope 
of the Merger Regulation. Therefore, the specific multiple filing rule does not and 
cannot act to ‘re-tune* the operation of the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger 
Regulation so that it is absolutely consistent with the operation of the interstate trade 
criterion.
D CONCLUSION - THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE JURISDICTIONAL 
TRIGGER OF THE MERGER REGULATION WITH THE 
OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE TRADE CRITERION
The Merger Regulation was implemented according to specific legal bases of the 
Treaty - Articles 83 and 308 EC.
According to the legal base of Article 83 EC, the principles laid down in Articles 81 
and 82 EC are transferred to the Merger Regulation to the extent that they are 
applicable to concentrations. Thereby, the Merger Regulation should apply to all such 
concentrations that affect interstate trade. The scope of this criterion should not be 
materially extended or restricted, although there is some possibility that they might be 
legitimately 'refocused' for certain types of agreement or conduct.
According to Article 308 EC, the Regulation should at least be appropriate to help 
fulfil the objective of maintaining a system of undistorted competition within the 
internal market.
The jurisdictional trigger of the EC Merger Regulation depends upon the structural 
location of the undertakings concerned, together with a quantitative threshold. The 
system of exceptions and referral procedures have resulted in a patchwork criterion 
that remains dependent upon formalistic provisions.819 Where the turnover thresholds
819 Note that in general economic terms, Ehrlich and Posner have demonstrated the superiority 
of functionalistic rules over formalistic rules where the rule is to pertain to a complex 
condition. Ehrlich and Posner describe such complex realities in conduct as ‘heterogeneous
«wwwirtinrrrarnrnrifywwinna
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are high, they operate in combination with the fine-tuning provisions to ensure that 
concentrations not affecting interstate trade do not fall within the scope of the Merger 
Regulation. This is however at the expense of many concentrations that do affect 
interstate trade falling outside the scope of the Regulation.
In sum, the formalistic jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation is not 
absolutely consistent with the operation of the interstate trade criterion. If the 
turnover thresholds were lowered (as is proposed by the Commission), the two-thirds 
provision would continue to ensure that mergers that do not affect interstate trade do 
not fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. Articles 22(3) MR and Article 1 
MR (as amended) cannot however provide that all concentrations affecting interstate 
trade would fall within the Regulation’s scope.
This fact raises two important issues.
First, it is questionable what the implications of this fact are for the legitimacy of the 
Merger Regulation as a whole. It is necessary to examine the nature of the legal 
obligation that arises according to the legal bases of Article 83 EC and Article 308 
EC with regard to the EC Merger Regulation specifically.
Secondly, it will be necessary to consider what the implications of this fact are with 
regard to Community competition policy and the reason for the implementation of the 
European Merger Regulation.
conduct’, and consider that if such conduct is subject to formalistic rules, there will be 
‘allocative inefficiency’ because of the imperfect fit between coverage of a rule and the conduct 
sought to be regulated - it results in ‘underinclusion’and ‘overinclusion’ in the condition. See 
Ehrlich and Posner, ibid, at p.268.
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IX THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
INCONSISTENCY OF THE JURISDICTIONAL 
TRIGGER OF THE MERGER REGULATION WITH 
THE INTERSTATE TRADE CRITERION
A THE ISSUE
As shown above, the operation of the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation 
is not absolutely consistent with the application of the interstate trade criterion. 
Questionable is the legal implications of this. The answer clearly depends upon the 
nature of the actual legal obligation deriving from the legal bases of Articles 83 and 
308 EC with specific regard to the EC Merger Regulation. Do they determine that all 
mergers that actually or potentially affect interstate trade (directly or indirectly) 
should fall within its scope?
J
B THE LEGAL BASE OF ARTICLE 308 EC
According to the literal text of Article 308 EC, a provision implemented on this legal 
base must be ‘appropriate* to fulfil the relevant objective of the Community.820 
Furthermore, it was shown above that Article 308 EC invokes the principle of 
proportionality with regard to the Community objective pursued in the application of 
the provision.821 The relevant Community objective was shown above to be the 
maintenance of undistorted competition within the internal market.
It is necessary to analyse in detail the legal obligation that the condition ‘appropriate’ 
and the principle of proportionality create within the context of the implementation of 
the Merger Regulation. Do they require that all concentrations that may distort 
competition in the internal market should fall within the scope of the Merger 
Regulation?
820 See above, pp. 190-191.
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1 The Legal Obligation According to Article 308 EC
1.1 The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality requires that:
‘Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective 
of this Treaty’821 22
Thereby, any hardship caused by the provision must not be disproportionate to the 
benefits accruing from the attainment of the objective.823 The relevant Treaty 
objective has been shown above to be the maintenance of undistorted competition 
within the internal market. Since all the concentrations that fall within Article 1 MR 
were shown to have (actually or potentially) affected interstate trade, they have also 
(actually or potentially) distorted competition in the internal market.824 Therefore the 
jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation does not offend the principle of 
proportionality. Furthermore, those concentrations that do fall within the scope of the 
Regulation are not subject to automatic prohibition, but are assessed for their actual 
(future) effect upon competition.
1 ¿2 An * Appropriate’ Provision
As detailed above, the majority opinion of the literature and the opinion of the 
Commission is to be preferred that Article 308 EC contains an obligation to act where 
its conditions are fulfilled.825 Hence, the discretion of the Commission and the 
Council lies only in determining whether the conditions of Article 308 EC are 
fulfilled. If they decide that the conditions are fulfilled, they must implement the 
appropriate provision in order to fulfil the relevant Community objective.826
As shown above, there is a need to control concentrations at the Community level in 
order to maintain undistorted competition within the internal market. Therefore, there 
was an obligation to implement the Merger Regulation. Questionable however is 
whether there was a legal obligation to bring all concentrations within the scope of
821 See above, p i84. See also, eg. Dom, ibid, p.50.
822 Article 5 EC, third paragraph
823 Hartley, T.C., The Foundations o f  EC Law, 1988 (4th ed.) Oxford University Press at
p.106.
824 See above, pp. 116-122.
825 Commission Reply No. 406/75 to Mr Maigaard, OJ 285/27 (28) of 13th December 1975.
826 Schwartz, 1 in: Groeben et al., Kommentar, ibid pp.683-4.
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the Merger Regulation that affected interstate trade (and therefore potentially 
hindered integration).
Turning to the literal wording of the provision, it is clear that the answer is no. A 
provision based upon Article 308 EC is not required to fulfil the relevant Community 
objective exhaustively (which are mostly very vague and broad), but only to be 
‘appropriate” in the general aim of its fulfilment. This mirrors the subsidiarity 
principle under Article 5 EC. The Merger Regulation certainly falls within the broad 
terms of this condition since all concentrations that reach the jurisdictional thresholds 
will or may distort competition within the internal market. The Merger Regulation 
will assess such concentrations for their actual future effect upon competition within 
the Community, whereby those that create or strengthen a dominant position and 
thereby significantly distort competition within the Community will be prohibited.
C THE LEGAL BASE OF ARTICLE 83 EC
As detailed above, the Merger Regulation is partly based upon Article 83 EC, 
whereby it becomes the implementing Regulation for the principles laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 EC where they apply to mergers. Thereby, the Merger Regulation 
may not materially extend or restrict the interstate trade criterion with regard to 
transactions that fall within the scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC.827
Nevertheless, the analysis of Article 83 EC carried out above suggested that, by 
analogy in particular with the developments in the use of Article 89 EC as a legal 
base, Article 83 EC may nonetheless allow a more refined interpretation of Articles 
81 and 82 EC for certain types of sui generis transactions, or even sectors of the 
economy (within the context of the overriding goal of Community competition policy 
- Single Market integration). Recall that the de minimis Regulation for state aid 
applies only to those types of aid that do not include export aid or aid favouring 
domestic over imported products.828
With this hypothesis in mind, the particular characteristics of the regulation of 
mergers within the Community should be considered. Mergers may have both positive
827 See above, pp.174-179
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and negative effects on the integration paradigm, whereby the Community has held a 
long-term belief that some deserve to be encouraged (in terms, particularly, of 
‘external integration’ as well as the rescue of a failing firm) as opposed to prohibited. 
Added to this is the particular need for certainty and speed of decision-making that 
mergers require. Further, their regulation at the Community level involves political 
and national sensitivities which, if not the same, are akin to those engendered by the 
regulation of state aid. In short, the regulation of merger transactions is different.82 29 It 
is these differences that determine that the rules enacted for the implementation of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC are ill-adapted for their control, which lies outside the defining 
purpose of these provisions.830 831We have seen above how the technical principles of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC were strained to an almost artificial degree in order to cover 
some types of mergers.
By analogy with the experience within the realm of state aid control, it is not 
unreasonable therefore to consider that the specific requirements inherent to the 
control of concentrations allow the use of the legal base of Article 83 EC to re-define 
the principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC in a way that is different and more suitable for 
that role. This would not of course allow a replacement of the literal text of Articles 
81 and 82 EC, nor a material extension of their scope. It may however allow a re­
interpretation within the context of a particular type of sui generis transaction - the 
concentration. Hence, with specific regard to the jurisdictional issue, a more restricted 
application of the interstate trade criterion might be both more appropriate and 
legitimate.
Recall the Commission's claim that:
‘...below (the thresholds’) levels a concentration would not normally significantly affect trade
831between Member States’.
828 Council Regulation 69/2001 OJ (2001) L010/30, Preamble Paragraph 4. This is in line with 
the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (OJ 
(1994) L336/I56).
829 See above, pp.33-41
830 See above, Part IV of the thesis.
831 Annexed to Merger Regulation, at ‘Re Article 22’.
Similarly, although not so specifically, Recital 9 of the Merger Regulation states that:
‘...the Regulation should apply to significant structural changes the impact o f  which on the 
market goes beyond the national borders o f  any one Member State*.
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We know of course that within the context of the standard application of the interstate 
trade criterion for Articles 81 and 82 EC, this statement is not correct: there is a 
significant number of concentrations that do not fall under the scope of the Merger 
Regulation, and yet affect interstate trade in the traditional sense.832 However, where 
the Article 1 MR is considered to be a specific interpretation of the interstate trade 
criterion for (and only for) concentrations (as defined by Article 3 MR and to which 
Articles 81 and 82 EC apply) within the context of a provision implemented on the 
basis of Article 83 EC, the Commission’s statement does not seem so eccentric. It 
assumes that there is a different ‘apprec ¡ability’ criterion for concentrations that is 
necessary because of the different implications they may have for the objectives of 
the Community.
The significance of this argument cannot be underestimated. It points to a automatic 
legitimacy of the Merger Regulation as a whole with regard to its legal base of Article 
83. It should not be forgotten that the turnover thresholds do not represent the only 
‘amendment’ of the principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC (as they apply to mergers) by 
the EC Merger Regulation: it also incorporates different substantive analyses and 
procedural rules.
However persuasive this argument appears, it may however be maintained that, in 
theoretical terms, the interstate trade criterion may not be ‘re-defined’ for 
concentrations: if we argue for example that an analogy between the regulation of 
conduct under Articles 81 and 82 EC and under the provisions for state aid cannot be 
made833; if we argue that certain types of state aid presents a particular area of 
regulation that raises issues that the regulation of mergers does not; if we argue 
(against most of the evidence presented in the thesis) that ‘concentrations’ do not 
represent sui-generis transactions within the context of the overriding goal of 
Community competition policy; or if we even maintain that the Council’s action in 
the implementation of regulations on the basis of Article 89 EC has been as 
illegitimate as would be the use of Article 83 EC in a similar way.
These arguments might have serious consequences for the legitimacy of the Merger 
Regulation as a whole by virtue of its jurisdictional trigger that is of much narrower
832 See analysis above, pp.210-222.
833 By implication, this is the position of Schroeter, who considers that Article 1 MR was 
contrary to Article 83 EC, Schroeter, H .t in: Thiesing/Groeben/Ehlermann, ibid p907.
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application than is the interstate trade criterion (aside from the substantive assessment 
issue that is undertaken under Article 2 MR). Furthermore, it should not be forgotten 
that Articles 81 and 82 EC create private rights and obligations that are justiciable 
before national courts:834 there might further be a constitutional issue.
Two questions must thereby be considered:
First, to what extent does it purport to apply to types of concentrations for which 
Articles 81 and 82 EC are also applicable?
Secondly, to what extent does it allow the continued application of Articles 81 and 82 
EC to such of these concentrations that affect interstate trade but do not fall within 
the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation?835
1 The Interface between Articles 81 and 82 EC and the Merger Regulation 
in their Application to ‘Concentrations’
1.1 The Issue
Initially it is necessary to determine the extent to which the Merger Regulation 
applies to the types of concentration that fall within the scope of Articles 81 and 82 
EC (ignoring for the moment the issue of whether or not they have a Community 
Dimension).
1.2 "Concentration’ within the Meaning of the Mereer Regulation - Article 3 MR
Recital 23 of the Regulation describes concentrations as operations ‘bringing about a 
lasting change in the structure o f the undertakings concerned’. t
Article 3(1) MR provides the legal conditions which constitute such a lasting change 
in the structure of undertakings:
*(a) two or more previously independent undertakings merge, or
834 BRT v SABAM  Case 127/73 (1974) ECR 51, (1974) 2 CMLR 238.
835 Note that the issue raises further questions concerning substantive assessment - to what 
extent does the substantive assessment under the Merger Regulation for mergers for which 
Articles 81 and 82 EC are applicable reflect the substantive assessment under these two 
Articles. This is of particular significance with regard to Article 81 EC, since according to the 
Philip Morris doctrine the implementation of a concentration itself is prohibited, without the 
need to assess whether a strengthening of a dominant position has taken place (cf. Article 2 
MR).
The thesis however is only concerned with an appropriate scope for the Merger Regulation, and 
therefore will not address this issue directly.
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(b) one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more 
undertakings acquire, whether by purchase of securities of assets, by contract or by any other 
means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings’.
A concentration is therefore the result, either of a merger between independent 
undertakings, or the acquisition o f control by one or more undertakings in one or 
more other undertakings.
1.2.1 Merger (Article 3(D(aV)
There is no further explanation in the Merger Regulation determining when two (or 
more) previously independent undertakings are deemed to have ‘merged’. In practical 
terms with regard to the scope of the Regulation, the condition is in any case 
unnecessary, since even in its narrowest sense (taken to mean the total fusion of 
previously independent undertakings), it is a condition which falls within the scope of 
the condition of Article 3(1 )(b) (the acquisition of control).836
1.2.2 Acquisition of Control (Article 3(D(b))
Article 3(3) MR defines ‘control’:
‘For the purposes of this Regulation, control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any 
other means which, either separately or in combination and having regard to the considerations 
of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an 
undertaking, in particular by:
(a) ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking;
(b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions 
of the organs of an undertaking*.
It is not necessary to analyse the definition of ‘acquisition of control’ exhaustively in 
the abstract for the purposes of the thesis. We are interested in how the scope of 
Article 3 MR relates specifically to the scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC to apply to 
concentrations, more specifically: to what extent the definition of ‘concentration’ 
under Article 3 MR covers concentrations which fall within the scope of Articles 81 
and 82 EC.
836 The paragraph of the Article does however have some procedural relevance. A 
concentration according to Article 3(1 )a must be notified jointly (Article 4(2) MR).
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Thereby» it is practical consider Articles 81 and 82 EC separately.
13  The Application of Article 82 EC to Concentrations and the Definition of 
‘Concentration’ under Article 3 MR
As demonstrated above, according to the Continental Can doctrine Article 82 EC 
prohibits any concentration involving an undertaking in a position of single or joint 
dominance that distorts the normal progress of competition on the relevant market 
(that is, the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or 
the growth of that competition).
The doctrine was not dependent upon the specific type of agreement by which the 
concentration is effected. It was a more general prohibition based upon the objectives 
of the Community. Recall that the Court of Justice stated:
‘Abuse may...occur if an undertaking in a dominant position strengthens such position in such a 
way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition, ie, that only 
undertakings remain in the market whose behaviour depends on the dominant one.’837
Therefore, any strengthening of the position of an undertaking on a market on which 
it is already in a dominant position qualifies for prohibition under the Continental 
Can doctrine. This condition is clearly embraced by Article 3 MR, that extends the 
scope of the Merger Regulation to all transactions effecting total merger or the 
acquisition of control.838
The Merger Regulation according to Article 3 MR therefore applies to all the types of 
concentration to which Article 82 EC is applicable (apart from the exceptions for 
credit and financial institutions and insurance companies within Article 3(5) MR).
837 ibid at 245.
838 Thereby, it prohibits such concentration that create or strengthen a dominant position, as a 
result of which competition will be significantly impeded on the common market or in a 
substantial part of it. The concept of dominant position is the same as that used under Article 
82 EC, see eg., Whish, (1993) ibid at pp717-9; Faull and Nickpay, ibid, at points 4.141. 
Furthermore, the Court of Justice has confirmed the Commission’s findings that the Merger 
Regulation may be applied to oligopolistic markets, see French Republic and Société 
commerciale des potasses et de l ’azote (SPCA) and Entreprise minière et chiique (EMC) v 
Commission Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 (1998) ECR1-1375.
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1.4 The Application of Article 81 EC to Concentrations and the Definition of 
‘Concentration* under Article 3 MR
1.4.1 The Issue
The analysis carried out above into the applicability of Article 81 EC to 
concentrations revealed that the scope of Article 81 EC extends to some types of 
concentration. It is necessary to consider the extent to which the Merger Regulation 
applies to the same types of concentration according to Article 3 MR.
First, the interface between the application of the Merger Regulation and the 
application of Article 81 EC to concentrations in general may be considered. 
Secondly, the issue of joint ventures falls to be considered. This is a result of more 
recent developments, whereby transactions that would previously have been treated as 
co-operative and exclusively of relevance to Article 81 EC are now treated as 
concentrations falling within the scope of Article 3 MR.
1.4.2 Concentrations In General
It has been demonstrated above that the Philip Morris case established that horizontal 
concentrations would be prohibited according to Article 81(1) EC where they are 
undertaken by previously independent undertakings according to a direct agreement 
or a friendly public take-over. Vertical and conglomerate mergers undertaken by 
previously independent undertakings according to a direct agreement or a friendly 
public take-over are also prohibited where they have as an object or effect a 
restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC. Specifically, there 
is always required some form of agreement or concerted practice (within the meaning 
of Article 81 EC) between the parties to the concentration. The scope of the principle 
extends from the acquisition of control to total merger.
The condition under Article 3 MR for a ‘concentration’ within the meaning of the 
Merger Regulation is not restricted to the implementation of concentrations by 
agreement alone, but extends to the implementation of a concentration per se. It also 
extends to vertical and conglomerate mergers, regardless of whether they have as an 
object or effect a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC.
The analysis used to establish oligopoly under the Merger Regulation is the same as is 
employed in the application of Article 82 EC, see Gencor v Commission, Case ibid.
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According to Article 3(1) MR, the definition of concentration extends from the 
acquisition of control to total merger.
The definition of ‘concentration’ according to Article 3 MR is therefore broader. It is 
not restricted to the legal form in which the concentration was implemented. It covers 
vertical and conglomerate mergers regardless of their effect on competition. Some 
further qualification may however be necessary with regard to the definition of 
control according to the Merger Regulation in comparison with the definition used 
under the Philip Morris doctrine. Is the acquisition of control which establishes a 
‘concentration’ according to the Philip Morris doctrine the same as the acquisition of 
control within the meaning of Article 3(1) MR?
The Regulation gives some guidance for the definition of an acquisition of control in 
Article 3(3) MR. The condition depends upon the exercise of a ‘decisive influence’. 
The prohibition under the Philip Morris doctrine is however aimed at acquisitions by 
one undertaking in another which can serve as an instrument 'for influencing the 
commercial conduct o f the companies in question so as to restrict or distort 
competition...whereby the acquisition of control is given as an example of such a 
distortion.839 This is therefore a less strict condition than that according to Article 3 
MR; there is no specific degree of control required.
Therefore scope of the definition of ‘concentration’ according to the Merger 
Regulation under Article 3 MR does not cover the Philip Morris doctrine to its 
fullest extent. It covers transactions falling within Article 81 EC that constitute full 
mergers or the acquisition of a ‘decisive’ influence (rather than just an influence on 
the commercial conduct of the undertakings).840
1.4.3 Joint Control according to Article 3 MR and the Application of Article 81 EC 
to Joint Ventures
Joint ventures are formed by an agreement by two or more independent undertakings 
to create a new company between themselves. The joint venture is jointly controlled 
by those undertakings, which remain independent of each other, but at least in part
839 See Case, ibid, at paragraphs 37-38.
840 Note that the thesis is concerned with the legal validity of the turnover thresholds according 
to the legal base of Article 83 EC. It does not consider the legal validity of the more restrictive 
applicability of the Merger Regulation in comparison with the Philip Morris doctrine on 
account of the more restrictive definition of ‘control’ under Article 3 MR.
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may have effected a structural change. They are therefore hybrids from the 
perspective of the distinction adopted by the Commission between co-operative and 
concentrative behaviour.
In its 1966 Memorandum, the Commission had made it clear that it did not consider 
Article 81 EC applicable to concentrations.841 It considered that the different issues 
presented by concentrations required a different system of control to that used for 
cartels. Thereby, it expressly treated joint ventures as concentrations involving 
‘changes of ownership* or structural changes.
In practice however, and in the face of continued resistance from the Council for the 
implementation of a Merger Regulation,842 the Commission was also determined that 
co-operative-type agreements would not avoid scrutiny under Article 81 EC where a 
concentrative joint venture was, or appeared to be, involved. Early Commission 
practice adhered to the dual standard principle as expressed in the Memorandum. 
Joint ventures involving permanent structural changes in the ownership of the 
participating undertakings were excluded.843 84 Soon however the Commission’s 
approach could be seen to be changing. In S.H.V. Chevron844 the Commission stated 
that the necessary permanent modification of structures which denote a concentration 
(as emphasised in the 1966 Memorandum) were, according to the Commission, 
founded upon two grounds. The first depended upon the intention of the parties and 
the length of the agreements. The second was a realisation of the permanent 
structural change. Unlike in its Memorandum however, the Commission in this case 
stated that structural change did not relate to a permanent change in the internal 
structure o f the companies. Instead, emphasis should be placed on a permanent 
change in the market structure.845 The Commission stated that the creation of the joint 
venture between Chevron and SHV was concentrative (and therefore outside Article 
81 (1)EC) because:
841 See Commission Memorandum of 1966, ibid, p.24, paragraph 14. For the reasons, see 
above at pp.78-85.
842 See above at pp. 140-148.
843 See eg., Cobelaz Commission Decision, of 6th November 1968, OJ L276 of 14th 
November 1968.
844 Commission Decision of 20th December 1974, OJ (1975), L  38 pl4.
845 Goldman and Lyon-Caen, 4th ed., ibid, no 618; Vogel, L. ibid, p.276
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‘Chevron has no industrial or commercial interest which could imaginably lead it to compete 
with its own 50 %-owned subsidiaries, and..,SHV disappeared completely as an independent 
wholesaler on the petroleum market, with no likelihood o f ever returning.'*46
In order to fulfil the condition of ‘irreversibility’ (and therefore avoid the application 
of Article 81 EC), it was not therefore sufficient that there should be a modification 
of the ownership links between the undertakings; rather, the re-entry of any parent 
company onto the market on which the joint venture was active should be impossible; 
that is, none of the parent companies should be actual or potential competitors on that 
market. This was echoed in the Commission’s Sixth Report on Competition policy, 
where the Commission stated that one or another of the parent companies must:
‘completely and irreversibly abandon business in the area covered by the joint venture...’846 47
Thereby, the Commission had introduced a conceptual distinction between co­
operative joint ventures (subject to scrutiny under Article 81 EC) and concentrative 
joint ventures that became known as the partial merger theory.
The Commission however restricted the conceptual scope of concentrative ‘partial 
mergers’ by interpreting potential competition in a very broad and often unrealistic 
manner, specifically in an attempt to also bring vertical and conglomerate joint 
ventures within its jurisdiction.848 Broadly, the Commission would consider a joint 
venture to be a partial merger in the very limited circumstances that two companies 
created a jointly owned company and:
- both of the parents completely and irreversibly abandoned the markets in which the 
joint venture was active, and
- the markets in which the joint venture was active were sufficiently remote from 
those on which the parents remained to ensure that no anti-competitive spill-over 
effect occurs on the parent’s conduct due to their co-operation in the joint venture’s 
market.849
846 Commmission Decision, ibid at p. 15 (author’s emphasis).
847 Commission Sixth Report on Competition Policy, Point 55.
848 Pathak, A.S., ibid, at p.177.
849 See Commission Sixth Report on Competition Policy (1976) at Paragraph 178.
See eg., SHV/Chevron Commission Decision of 20th December 1974, OJ (1975), L 38 pl4; De 
Laval/Sork, Commission Decision 25th July 1977, OJ (1977) L215, p . l l ;  ENI/Montedison, 
Commission Decision of December 4th 1986, OJ (1987)L5/13. ■<*=*
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The condition was notoriously difficult to apply, and in reality few joint ventures 
escaped scrutiny under Article 81(1) EC because they were held to be 
concentrative.850
The implementation of the Merger Regulation, while not rendering the distinction any 
clearer, did however change the thrust of the Community’s approach towards joint 
ventures. Article 3(2) MR provided that:
‘An operation, including the creation o f a joint venture, which has as its object or effect the co­
ordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings which remain independent shall not 
constitute a concentration...The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the 
functions of an autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to co-ordination of the 
competitive behaviour of the parties amongst themselves or between them and the joint 
venture, shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of the Regulation’.
Therefore, in order to qualify as a concentration (and to fall within the less strict 
regime of the Merger Regulation) a transaction had to fulfil a positive condition 
(performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity) 
and a negative condition (not giving rise to the co-ordination of competitive conduct). 
For a joint venture to be concentrative (and to fall under the Merger Regulation rather 
than Article 81 EC) there was however apparently no longer any need for an 
irreversible market exit by both the parents.
See in detail, eg., Banks, K., Mergers and Partial Mergers under EEC Law, in 1987 Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute (1988), p.373; Jones, C , Scope and Application o f the Merger Control 
Regulation, Fordham International Law Journal (1990-1), 14, p.359; Vogel, L., ibid, pp.276- 
282; Goldman, B. and Lyon-Caen, A., ibid, pp.682-91; Pathak, A.S., ibid at pp. 174-5.
850 The Commission indicated certain specific questions that would be considered in 
determining whether there was potential competition in its Thirteenth Report on Competition 
Policy (1984), p.51.
Its definition in practice however was extremely wide and often inconsistent. See eg., Vogel, 
ibid, p.279, comparing SHV Chevron (where the length of agreements was a factor determining 
irreversibility) with the later Commission Decision Kewa (where the length of agreements was 
only a factor under Article 81(3) as a condition indispensible to the success of the transaction). 
See also, eg, De Laval-Stork (Commission Decision, ibid), where the fact that the parties 
continue their activities on neighbouring markets to that of the joint venture was held to 
determine 'irreversibility'. The same fact was ignored in SHV Chevron (Commission Decision, 
ibid).
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Subsequently, and in order to give more procedural certainty and to reduce the 
analysis of substantive matters for jurisdictional purpose as much as possible, 
amendments were introduced to the scope of the Regulation in 1998.851 These 
amendments redrew the limits of its application to joint ventures in a much more 
defined manner. They also broadened the definition of ‘concentrative’ joint venture 
considerably. According to Article 3(2) MR as amended, the Merger Regulation now 
applies to all full function joint ventures. Article 3(2) MR defines full function joint 
ventures as ‘the creation o f a joint venture petforming on a lasting basis all the 
functions o f an autonomous economic entity\
According to the amendment, the condition of ‘concentrative* now depends solely 
upon a specific internal structural change in the participating undertakings, requiring 
simply that the joint venture has a long term presence on a market independently of 
its parents. It refers to the joint venture’s resources and commercial independence. 
Accordingly, the joint venture must: have a presence and carry out a recognised 
activity on a market; be self-sufficient or largely self-sufficient in terms of resources; 
have sufficient commercial independence and identity of its own that it is not simply 
operating as an auxiliary or service company for its shareholders.852 Therefore, even if 
the joint venture also involves co-ordination of competitive conduct, the creation of 
the joint venture itself would now fall under the scope of the Merger Regulation.
The amendments of 1998 also effected a further expansion of the definition of 
‘concentrative’, or at least restricted the conduct to which Article 81 EC might be 
applied in lieu of the Merger Regulation. According to Article 2(4) MR, co-ordinative 
conduct of the combined entity remains to be considered under Article 81 EC:
‘To the extent that the creation o f a joint venture constituting a concentration pursuant to article 
3 has as its object or effect the co-ordination of the competitive behaviour o f undertakings that 
remain independent such co-ordination shall be appraised in accordance with the criteria of
See also, eg., Hawk, B., United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: 
Comparative Guide, 2nd ed. 1985 at p.247; Venit, J., Private Investors Abroad, ibid at pp.22- 
23.
851 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending Regulation (EEC) 
No.4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ No. L I80/1, 9.7.97, 
ppl-6.
On the justification for the amendments, see Green Paper on the Review of the Merger 
Regulation, COM(96) 19.
852 Cook and Kerse, ibid, p.50.
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Artide 81(1) and (3) of the Treaty, with a view to establishing whether or not the operation is 
compatible with the common market*.
The second part of Article 2(4) MR states that, in appraising the coordination under 
Article 81 EC, the Commission shall take into account in particular:
‘whether two or more parent companies retain to a significant extent activities in the same 
market as the joint venture or in a market which is down-stream or upstream from that of the 
joint venture or in a neighbouring market closely related in this market (i.e. the risk of spill 
over between the parents); and
‘whether the co-ordination which is the direct consequence of the creation of the joint venture 
affords the undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products or services in question [i.e. the risk of eliminating competition 
(see Article 81(3) EC fourth element)]*.
The terms of this amendment express concretely a development of Commission 
practice that had been detected in its distinction between concentrative and co­
operative joint ventures post-implementation of the Merger Regulation. Thereby, 
focus had shifted, emphasising the risk of co-ordination between the parents rather 
than the risk between one parent and the joint venture: the definition of ‘co-operative* 
had effectively become more restricted (with a consequential widening of the 
definition of ‘concentrative’).853 It was a development that had in fact been embodied 
in still wider terms within the text of the 1994 Notice(paragraph 17)854:
‘Co-ordination between the parents and the joint venture will only make a joint venture co­
operative insofar as that co-ordination is an instrument for producing or reinforcing co­
ordination between the parents’.
This definition is noticeably much narrower than previously expressed in the 
Commission’s 1990 Notice (paragraph 33)855:
853 See eg., Sibree, W. ibid at pp.100-103; Zonnekeyn, G., ibid, pp.419-20.
854 Commission Notice on the Distinction between Concentrative and Co-operative Joint 
Ventures under Council Regulation (EC) No. 4064/89 of December 21,1989, OJ C358/1.
855 Commission Notice on the Distinction between Concentrative and Co-operative Joint 
Ventures under Council Regulation (EC) No. 4064/89 of December 21,1989, OJ C203/I0.
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‘where the parent companies, or one o f them, remain active on the JV’s market or remain 
potential competitors o f the JV, a co-ordination of competitive behaviour...must be 
presumed’.856 ,
On the basis of this earlier approach, the Commission had tended to treat joint 
ventures as concentrative even if the parent remained a significant competitor in the 
same market as the joint venture, on the condition that the non-existing parent 
assumed a ‘leading role* in the management of the joint venture.857 The 1994 Notice 
abandoned the opportunity for the Commission to apply this ‘industrial leadership* 
approach, but in fact allowed the same result, and indeed went further. The 
relationship between one parent and the joint venture was now only a factor in 
considering possible co-ordination between the parent undertakings. Hence it was 
now possible for a joint venture to be concentrative (and to avoid the application of 
Article 81(1) EC) where one parent remained active in the joint venture’s market, 
whether or not it is the industrial leader. While Article 2(4) MR is not exclusively 
focused upon co-ordination between the parents, it is only concerned with co­
ordination between two or more o f the parent companies and the joint venture, rather 
than also including co-ordination between one parent company and the joint venture.
The net result is that there has been -  on the one hand, through the extension of 
Article 3 MR to include all full function joint ventures, on the other hand through the 
restriction of the definition of ‘co-operative conduct’ of a joint venture that might fall 
within the scope of Article 81(1) EC - a clear expansion of the scope of the EC 
Merger Regulation to apply to concentrative agreements that previously would have 
fallen within Article 81(1) EC.
1.4.4 Summary of the Interface between Articles 81 and 82 EC and the Merger 
Regulation in their Application to ‘Concentrations*
The Merger Regulation, according to Article 3 MR, therefore applies to all the types 
of concentrations for which Article 82 EC was applicable (apart from the exceptions 
for credit and financial institutions and insurance companies within Article 3(5) MR).
856 Author’s emphasis.
857 See eg., Thoms on/Pi Iking ton, Case IV/M.086 of October 23,1991.
See eg., Burnside, A. and Mackenzie Stuart, J., ibid, at p.138 and p.141-2; Zonnekeyn, G.A., 
ibid at p.419-20.
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The Merger Regulation, according to Article 3 MR, also applies to the types of 
concentrations falling within Article 81(1) EC that constitute full mergers or the 
acquisition of a ‘decisive’ influence (rather than just an influence on the commercial 
conduct of the undertakings).858 Furthermore, the practice of the Commission has 
been to expand the concept of ‘concentrative joint venture’, thereby bringing joint 
ventures that would have previously been held to fall within the scope of Article 81 
EC within the exclusive control of the Merger Regulation.
The analysis above determines that the Merger Regulation covers some types of 
concentrations to which Articles 81 and 82 EC are applicable, but only to the extent 
that they have a ‘Community Dimension’ according to Article 1 MR. Questionable is 
whether - according to the terms of the Merger Regulation - the principles of Articles 
81 and 82 EC remain applicable to these same types of concentrations where they 
affect interstate trade but do not have a Community Dimension. We have already 
highlighted the fact that any Regulation implemented according to the basis of Article 
83 EC may not alter the material principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC;859 the terms of 
the Merger Regulation should allow Articles 81 and 82 EC to remain applicable for 
such concentrations.
2 The Residual Application of Articles 81 and 82 EC to Concentrations 
without a Community Dimension
2.1 The Issue
As stated above, the Regulation’s legitimacy depends upon whether its provisions 
allow Articles 81 and 82 EC to remain applicable to concentrations within the 
meaning of Article 3 MR that do not have a Community Dimension within the 
meaning of Article 1(2) MR.
In the analysis of the purported legal effect of the Merger Regulation on its own 
terms, two Articles are significant:
858 Note that the thesis is concerned with the legal validity of the turnover thresholds according 
to the legal base of Article 83 EC. It does not consider the legality of Article 3 MR, whose 
definition of ’control’ is more restrictive than under the Philip Morris doctrine.
859 See above, pp. 174-179.
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First, Article 22 (1) MR provides that ‘concentrations’ within the meaning of Article 
3 MR shall only be assessed under the Regulation (therefore including those below 
the turnover thresholds in Article 1(2) MR). ;
Secondly, Article 22 (2) MR disapplies Regulations 17/62, 1017/68, 4056/86 and 
3975/87 for all ‘concentrations* within the meaning of Article 3 MR (therefore 
including those below the turnover thresholds in Article 1(2) MR). These regulations 
are the implementing regulations for Articles 81 and 82 EC according to Article 83 
EC. Where they are disapplied, the Commission loses its power to grant negative 
clearances860, to adopt interim measures861, to exercise its various powers of 
investigation862 and to order the termination of infringements863, the divestiture of 
assets or the imposition of fines864 for these concentrations.
In order to determine the scope of the residual application of Articles 81 and 82 EC 
that the Merger Regulation purports to allow, the legal effect and validity of both 
provisions must be determined.
2.2 The Legal Effect of Article 22 (1) MR
Article 22 (1) MR purports to exclude the application of any law other than the 
Regulation itself to ‘concentrations* within the meaning of Article 3 MR; such 
transactions shall only be assessed under the Merger Regulation.
Article 21 (2) MR however states that no Member State shall apply its national 
competition law provisions to any concentration that has a Community Dimension. 
Implicitly therefore, na: n a l  law may be applied to concentrations without a 
Community Dimension.865 Hence, in order to be coherent with Article 21 (2) MR, 
Article 22 (1) MR must only refer to Community law; it purports to exclude the 
applicability of other Community law to concentrations within the meaning of Article 
3 MR.866
860 Council Regulation 17/62, Article 2.
861 Council Regulation 17/62, Article 3(1).
862 Council Regulation 17/62, Articles 11 and 14.
863 Council Regulation 17/62, Article 3.
864 Council Regulation 17/62, Articles 15 and 16.
865 This was expressly stated by the Commission in Arjomari/Wiggins IP (90) 1003 of 
11.12.1990.
866 Further, paragraphs 27 and 29 o f the Preamble to the Regulation refer explicitly to the 
continued applicability o f national provisions to concentrations falling outside the scope of the 
Merger Regulation.
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As established above, the other Community provisions which may be applicable to 
concentrations within the meaning of Article 3 MR are Articles 81 and 82 EC.867 
These are provisions of primary Community law. Secondary Community law can not 
directly disapply provisions of primary Community law. It would appear therefore 
that Article 22(1) MR is ultra vires.*6*
In defence of the provision, it has been suggested that Article 22 (1) MR may be 
implicitly interpreted as meaning that Articles 81 and 82 EC must not be applied by 
national courts to any kind of concentration within the meaning of Article 3 MR.869 
According to this argument, the legitimacy of Article 22(1) MR arises from the 
Regulation’s legal base of Article 83 EC. That base enables the Council to adopt 
regulations to implement the principles set out in Articles 81 and 82 EC, and in 
particular ‘define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, the scope o f the 
provisions o f Articles 85 and 86( now Articles 81 and 82 EC)’870, and ‘... determine 
the relationship between national laws and the provisions...adopted pursuant to this 
article\ 871 According to this argument therefore, Article 22 (1) MR is simply a 
provision that determines the scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC and the relationship 
between the remedies available under national law according to the Treaty’s 
competition rules and Regulation 4064/89. With regard to the literal text of Article 22 
(1) MR, this interpretation is at best extremely artificial.
Downes and Ellison have further suggested that the effect of Article 22 (1) MR is that 
the Council was explicitly stating that Articles 81 and 82 EC were never applicable to 
concentrations. It is submitted however that this would be to deny clear evidence to 
the contrary. Not only has the ECJ stated explicitly that this was so872, but the Council 
Minutes accompanying the Merger Regulation also acknowledge the position: ‘the
867 See above, Part IV of the thesis.
868 As submitted by eg., Krimpenhove, ibid, p.353.
869 Downes and Ellison, ibid, afp.185.
870 Article 83(2)c EC.
871 Article 83(2)e EC.
872 See above, eg. Continental Can, ibid. Also obiter in the Philip Morris case, ibid above. 
Further, the Commission has applied Article 82 in several decisions, see eg., Metaleurop, 
Commission Decision of 26/06/1990, (1990) OJ L179/41 at p.41, paragraph 17; Tetra Pak 1, 
Commission Decision of 26/07/1988, (1988) OJ L272/1 at pp.39-40.
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Commission does not normally intend to apply Articles 85 and 86 (Articles 81 and 82 
EC)’ to concentrations outside the scope of the Merger Regulation.873
The better interpretation of Article 22(1) MR is that in legal terms it is to be read in 
conjunction with the limitation provided by Article 22(2) MR.874
23  The Legal Effect of Article 22 (2) MR
The legal effect of Article 22(2) MR on the applicability of Articles 81 and 82 EC to 
some types of concentrations must be considered.
As stated above, Article 22 (2) MR provides that Regulations 17/62, 1017/68, 
4056/86 and 3975/87 are not to apply to ‘concentrations’ as defined in Article 3 MR.
In the disapplication of these regulations on the basis of Article 83 EC, the Merger 
Regulation becomes the implementing Regulation (within the meaning of Article 83 
EC) for Articles 81 and 82 EC for the assessment of concentrations within the 
meaning of Article 3 MR with a Community Dimension according to Article 1 MR.875
Questionable is whether, according to the terms of the Regulation, there remains an 
implementing Regulation for Articles 81 and 82 EC for concentrations falling within 
their scope and within the meaning of Article 3 MR that do not have a Community 
Dimension. Before considering this question however, it is necessary to consider the 
thesis that the Merger Regulation represents an implementing Regulation on the basis 
of Article 83 EC for all concentrations within the meaning of Article 3 MR, 
regardless of whether or not they have a Community Dimension within the meaning 
of Article 1 MR. This is a vital point. If this hypothesis holds, then the Regulation 
illegitimately purports to exclude the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC to 
concentrations falling below the thresholds.
873 The Council Minutes accompanying the Merger Regulation (1990) 4 CMLR (Antitrust) 
314 at 357.
874 Immenga, U., in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid at p.1084; Miersch, Kommentar zur Eer-VO 
Nr. 4064/89 ueber die Kontrolle von Unternehmenszusammenschluessen, 1991, Hermann, 
Luchterhand Verlag, Neuwied and Frankfurt at p.188.
Note that Bright considers that the Article might have prospective effect, preventing any future 
and subordinate legislation from extending to concentrations. This is however not coherent 
with the literal text and he himself doubts that the Council can bind itself by such a provision in 
a Regulation. Bright, ibid at p.193.
875 See above, pp. 170-171.
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The hypothesis was maintained by the UK Court of Appeal in the Dan Air case.876 Its 
reasoning was based upon the fact that it was open to the Member States to refer 
concentrations without a Community Dimension to the Commission for assessment 
under the Merger Regulation according to Article 22(3) MR. That possibility alone 
served to show that the Merger Regulation is an implementing Regulation according 
to Article 83 EC for all concentrations falling within the meaning of Article 3 MR, 
regardless of whether or not they had a Community Dimension.
This conclusion appears to be coherent with the literal text of Article 22(3) MR, 
which refers explicitly to those concentrations that affect interstate trade.877 On the 
other hand, Article 22(3) MR referrals are made at the sole discretion of the Member 
States where, in the opinion of a particular Member State authority, the proposed 
merger may lead to the strengthening or the creation of a dominant position that could 
impede competition within the territoiy of that Member State.878 The application of 
the principles under Articles 81 and 82 EC do not however depend upon the 
discretion of the Member State authorities. The Articles are per se applicable 
whenever the concentration actually or potentially affects interstate trade. 879 
Therefore, the Regulation does not fulfil the task of implementing the principles of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC as an implementing Regulation according to Article 83 EC 
where these two Articles are applicable to concentrations. It does not cover all 
concentrations to which Articles 81 and 82 EC apply that fall within the scope of 
Article 3 MR (as ‘concentrations’) but do not have a Community Dimension 
according to Article 1 MR.
r  -I
v  *v ■
Thereby, for concentrations not falling within the Regulation’s jurisdictional scope 
yet falling within the scope of Article 3 MR (as ‘concentrations’), it appears that there 
is no implementing Regulation according to Article 83 EC for Articles 81 and 82. 
This is analogous to the situation existing before the implementation of Regulation 
17/62. Even though there was at that time no implementing regulation, the
876 R  v Secretary o f  State fo r  Trade and Industry, ex parte Airlines o f  Britain Holdings pic and 
Another, The Times, 10 December 1992.
877 See above, p.227.
878 See above, p.227.
879 Note that, aside from the constitutional implications with regard to the pre-existing 
application of Articles 81 and 82 to concentrations, a regulation enacted on the basis of Article 
83 does not have to comprehensively cover the whole scope of Articles 81 and 82, see 
Republic o f  Italy v Council, Case 32/65 1966, ECR 563.
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competition rules were however still valid and applicable. There were two Treaty 
provisions which were included to ensure this.
2.3.1 Article 85 EC
First, Article 85 EC empowered the Commission to ensure the application of the 
principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC. It is a specific expression in this area 
of the general supervisory role conferred upon the Commission by Article 155 EC. It 
was intended as a transitional provision, operational until the Council had 
implemented the appropriate procedures. It does not however contain any direct 
reference to this transitional character and this has prompted some commentators to 
claim that it does not cease in applicability even after the introduction of 
implementing regulations under Article 83 EC; it may therefore be applied in parallel 
to the Merger Regulation.880 This interpretation is based upon the fact that Articles 11 
and 14 of Regulation 17/62 explicitly refer to the continued applicability of Article 85 
EC
Against this it is however submitted that the corresponding Articles in the Merger 
Regulation (Articles 11 and 13 MR) do not contain any reference to the continued 
applicability of Article 85 EC after the implementation of the Merger Regulation.881 
The better interpretation is to follow the fundamental purpose of Article 85 EC, 
which was to ensure the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC where effective 
procedures are not in place. Where there are such effective procedures on the basis of 
Article 83 EC, Article 85 EC ceases to be applicable. Where the effective procedures 
are not in place, or alternatively cease to apply, Article 85 EC is once more valid.
2.3.2 Article 84 EC
Secondly, Article 84 EC empowered the Member State authorities to apply Articles 
81 and 82 'until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of Article 
83’.
Some commentators have raised the issue that Article 84 EC had an inherently 
transitional character and can not be re-invoked.882 Such an interpretation would
880 See eg., Schroeter, in: Groeben/Thiesing/Ehlermann, ibid, at paragraph 9 at Art. 85.
881 See eg., Immenga, U., in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid, p.1084; Staudenmayer, D., Das 
Verhaeltnis derArt. 85, 86 EWGV zur EG-Fusionskontrollverordnung, WuW 6/1992,475-482 
atp.481.
882 See eg., Bos et al, ibid at p.373-4; Niemeyer, H.-J., Die Anwendbarkeit derArt. 85 und 86 
EWG-Vertrag auf Untemehmenszusammenschluesse nach Inkrafttreten der EG- 
Fusionskontrollverordnung, RIW (1991) Heft 1,448-453 at pp.450-1.
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however be at odds with the fundamental purpose of Article 84 EC, which was to 
ensure as far as possible the effective application of Articles 81 and 82 EC in the 
absence of appropriate implementing provisions.883 Furthermore, Article 9(3) of 
Regulation 17/62 clearly envisages the continued validity of Article 84 EC itself, even 
where an implementing regulation has been enacted. It provides that as long as the 
Commission has not initiated any procedure the authorities of the Member States 
remain competent to apply Articles 81(1) and 82 EC in accordance with Article 84 
EC.884 Therefore, although not mentioned in the Merger Regulation, it is clear that its 
validity has not been entirely extinguished with the enactment of the implementing 
regulation on the basis of Article 83 EC. It is held in reserve for instances where no 
such effective procedure exists.
Prima facie, the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 is (where appropriate) once more 
based upon Article 84 and 85 procedures for concentrations within the meaning of 
Article 3 MR which do not have a Community Dimension within the meaning of 
Article 1 MR.885 This is indeed the position stated in the Council Minutes to the EC 
Merger Regulation, which expressly reserved the right of the Commission to take 
action under Article 85 EC against concentrations without a Community 
Dimension.886
In legal terms therefore the terms of the Merger Regulation do not affect the general 
applicability of Articles 81 and 82 EC to concentrations without a Community 
Dimension according to Article 1(2) MR. To this extent the EC Merger Regulation, 
incorporating the jurisdictional thresholds based upon turnover, is legitimate. It is
883 Bourgeois and Langeheine, ibid, p.405.
884 See Kerse, who considers whether there remains an obligation on the Member State 
authorities to enforce Articles 81 and 82 where an implementing regulation (under Article 
83EC) is in place, in: Kerse, C , 'Enforcing Community Competition Policy under Articles 84 
and 85 o f  the EC  Treaty - New Powers fo r  UK Competition Authorities', (1997) 1 ECLR 17- 
23.
885 Ministère public v. Asjes, Cases 209-213/84,1986 ECR 1425 at 52: ‘in the absence o f rules 
as referred to in Article 83 o f  the Treaty, Articles 84 and 85 continue to apply'.
In agreement, see eg., Soames, T., ibid at p.224; Deimel, 143-172; Schroeter in: Groeben et al., 
Kommentar ibid, p.2515; Bourgoeis, J. and Langeheine, B., ibid, p.404-6; Venit, J., Private 
Investors Abroad, ibid, pp.17-18; Kerse, C., ibid; Downes and Ellison, ibid, pp. 182-188; 
Immenga, U., in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid, pp.I084-1086; Fine, F., ( (1994) ibid at pp.249- 
253.
cf. Bos et al., ibid, who consider that Article 84 EC is no longer applicable since (unlike Article 
85 EC) it is transitional provision which has been exhausted, at pp.373-374. But see reasoning 
in text above.
cf., in the minority, Miersch, who suggests that Article 85 EC may not be applicable after the 
implementation of the Merger Regulation, ibid p.192-3.
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however pertinent to consider the effectiveness of these procedures in practical 
terms. ■?
2.4 The Practical Effect of Article 22(2) MR - the Effectivess of Proceedings 
under Articles 84 and 85 EC
2.4.1 Effectiveness of Article 85 Proceedings
Under the terms of Article 85 EC, where the Commission finds that there has been an 
infringement, ‘if shall propose appropriate measures to bring it to an end ,887 Where 
the Commission does not have the power to take those measures itself, it may, under 
paragraph 2 of Article 85 EC, ‘publish its decision and authorise Member States to 
take measures, the conditions and details o f which it shall determine, needed to 
remedy the situation. *
The Commission expressly reserved the possibility to apply Article 85 EC to 
concentrations within the meaning of Article 3 MR.86 788 Nevertheless, it stated that:
‘it does not intend to take action in respect of concentrations with a worldwide turnover of less 
than ECU 2,000 million or below a minimum Community turnover level of ECU 100 million 
on the grounds that below such levels a concentration would not normally significantly affect 
trade between Member States’.889
This level was the same as those previously proposed as the thresholds for 
Community dimension, and which the Commission at that time hoped would be 
implemented under the 1993 review required under Article 1(3) MR.890
As has been demonstrated above, a formalistic threshold such as this one is unable to 
pertain to the actual and potential effect on interstate trade of concentrations.891 That 
effect does not depend upon the actual size of the undertakings involved. While there
886 Council Minutes to the EC Merger Regulation, see CMLR (Antitrust) (1990) 4 314 at 357.
887 See eg.. Sterling Airways, Xth Report on Competition Policy, European Commission at 
points 1336-138.
888 Council Minutes accompanying the EC Merger Regulation on Article 22 MR, see CMLR 
(Antitrust) (1990) 4 314.
889 Council Minutes accompanying the EC Merger Regulation on Article 22 MR, see CMLR 
(Antitrust) (1990) 4 314.
890 Immenga, U., in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid, p.1085.
891 In agreement, see eg., Deimel, ibid, pp. 153-7; Immenga, U., in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, 
ibid, p.1085. Against this, only Bourgeois and Langeheine, ibid, p.405~
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is the structurally-based de minimis threshold, this is actually much lower than the 
figures proposed above, and further, is not legally binding.892
To the extent that this statement might bind the Commission's future conduct, it 
would constitute a legal limitation on the application of Article 85 to concentrations. 
A Commission statement can not however restrict the application of primary law and, 
furthermore, the majority of commentators highlight the fact that the statement was 
not officially published.893
Nevertheless, with regard to the Commission's express statement that it reserves the 
possibility to use Article 85 EC proceedings per se, it has been suggested that this 
does not represent a serious intention of the Commission in practice. It may simply 
have been a means to exert political pressure upon the Council to reduce the 
thresholds.894 It may simply have been an acknowledgement by the Commission of 
the continued applicability of Articles 81 and 82 EC (in the face of the invalidity of 
the literal terms of Article 22(1) MR), and an attempt to avoid any actions against it 
before the Court of Justice for a refusal to act under Article 175 EC proceedings.895 
Backing up the conclusion that the Commission will not resort to Article 85 EC 
proceedings for concentrations without a Community Dimension in practice is the 
fact that it has not always been consistent in its statements concerning this issue. The 
then competition Commissioner, Lord Leon Brittan, stressed that, with regard to 
assessing concentrations:
‘As a matter of policy, I do not intend to seek the application o f the EEC Treaty rules in 
Articles 85 and 86896 by any means. I believe that the Council Regulation is the proper means 
of implementing the principles of Articles 85 and 86 to mergers.'897
He continued that even though he recognised that the thresholds of the Merger 
Regulation were so high that there was a risk that cases with an impact on the 
Community market did not fall within its scope, he did not intend to invoke Treaty
892 See above, pp.30-37.
893 Deimel, ibid, pp. 158-162; Immenga, U., in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid, p.1085; Pechstein, 
EuR 1990,253.
Against this, only Niemeyer RIW 1991,450, based on the principle of legitimate expectations.
894 Fine, F., ibid, at p. 250; Immenga, U., in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid p.1085; Downes and 
Ellison, ibid, p. 188.
895 Downes and Ellison, ibid, at p.187.
896 Now Articles 81 and 82 EC, pursuant to Article 12 Treaty of Amsterdam.
897 Brittan, L., 'The Law and Policy o f  Merger Control in the EEC \ ELR 15 (1990), at p.357
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Articles to counter this. Rather, he would rely upon the Member States to ‘ensure that 
competition principles are applied thoroughly throughout the Community'.
As well as the improbability of any proceedings taking place under Article 85 EC in 
these circumstances, analysis reveals that a procedure under Article 85 EC itself 
raises great practical difficulties.
Commission investigations under Article 85 EC may not be undertaken except upon 
the ‘application by a Member State or (the Commission) on its own initiative\  In 
practice this does not constitute a legal obligation of the Commission to initiate 
proceedings, since although a Member State may bring an action under Article 175 
proceedings before the Court of Justice if its application is refused, such a step is 
extremely unlikely due to the availability of the Article 22 (3) MR procedure under 
the Merger Regulation.898 Effectively, therefore, the EC Commission has sole 
discretion to decide whether to initiate proceedings under Article 85 EC. Admittedly, 
this situation is comparable with the situation under Regulation 17/62, Article 3.899 
Nevertheless, a significant difference is that competitors and third parties with a 
legitimate interest in the concentration do not have the right under Article 85 EC to 
make complaints to the Commission about allegedly anti-competitive conduct.900 This 
right is available according to Regulation 17/62, Article 3(2)b. It must be stressed 
however that although this right does not exist under Article 85 EC proceedings, it 
has not been illegitimately lost. The implementation of the Merger Regulation may 
amend Regulation 17/62. Indeed, as described above, the Merger Regulation 
displaces the application of Regulation 17/62 for concentrations within the meaning 
of Article 3 MR with a Community Dimension according to Article 1(2) MR.901
What about the efficacy of the procedure for enforcing pre-existing legal obligations 
of primary Community law deriving from Articles 81 and 82 EC on the basis of 
Article 85 EC?
898 See eg., Deimel, ibid, p. 163; Fine, F., (1994) ibid at p.240.
899 See Deimel, ibid, p.162-3; Koch in Grabitz, Kommentar ibid, Art. 83, VO Nr. 17 (Art.3), 
paragraph 15; Gleiss/Hirsch, Kommentar Art. 3 VO Nr.17 para.5.
900 It is clear law that where they might in any case request an initiation of Article 85 EC 
proceedings by the Commission, they may not successfully bring an action before the Court of 
Justice for a failure to act according to Article 175 EC.
Lord Bethell, Case 246/81, (1982), ECR 2277 at 2290.
901 According to the legal base of Article 83 EC, see pp. 170-171.
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As a procedure to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC to concentrations falling outside the 
ambit of the Merger Regulation, Article 85 EC is extremely limited. It is even less 
suited to the control of mergers, which requires above all speed of decision-making 
and legal certainty.902 Indeed, Jones and Gonzalez-Diaz have described the Article 85 
EC procedure as Wholly inappropriate to merger control.’903 This is for several 
reasons.
First, the Commission has no independent investigatory powers; investigations must 
take place in co-operation with competent Member State authorities, which are 
obliged to give their assistance.904
Secondly, if the Commission finds an infringement exists (that has not been brought 
to an end), it must record that infringement in a reasoned decision, and may authorise 
Member States to take measures to remedy the situation. The Commission cannot 
itself order undertakings directly to end acts of infringement or impose fines.905 
Therefore, it is completely dependent upon co-operation from the Member State 
concerned. The Commission may if necessary compel a Member State to co­
operate906, but that procedure is slow and lacking in adequate sanctions.
Article 85 EC proceedings have thus far only been used in the air transport sector, 
either before the implementing Regulation 3975/87 was in place, or with regard to air 
transport between the Community and third countries, to which Regulation 3975/89 
does not apply.907 Article 85 EC has not been used for concentrations within the 
meaning of Article 3 MR that do not have a Community Dimension under Article 1 
MR. Indeed, in A rjomari/Wiggins, the Commission referred to the lack of Community 
Dimension of the proposed transaction under Article 1(2) MR, but considered
902 See above.
903 Gonzalez-Diaz, ibid, at p.85. See also eg., Bos and Styuck, ibid, p.376.
904 Article 85 EC, second sentence.
905 Article 85 EC, third sentence.
906 Article 169 EC proceedings.
907 Commission Decisions: Sterling Airways/SA, Tenth Report on Competition Policy 1980, 
para’s 136-138 and a Commission action against 10 airlines, cited in European Commission, 
Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy 1986 at para. 36; British Airways/USAir Agence 
Europe 08/01/98; KLM/NorthWest Agence Europe 08/01/98; Air France/Delta 
Airlines/Continental Airlines Agence Europe 08/01/98; British Airways/American Airlines 
(1996) OJ C289/4; Lufthansa/SAS/United Airlines, Agence Europe 09/07/98; Sabena/Austria 
Airlines/ Delta Agence Europe 08/07/98; A ir France/Delta Airlines/United Airlines Agence 
Europe 08/07/98.
Note that the Council is presently considering a Commission proposal to revise the present 
exclusion of this sector, see OJ L165,31.05.1997, p.13-14.
f
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national law to be applicable without even mentioning the possibility of Article 85 I
EC proceedings.908 I
Bos points to the potential effectiveness of the threat of Article 85 EC proceedings to I
effect informal settlements between merging parties.909 That threat is however a ^
somewhat hollow one where the parties will be aware that the Commission does not 
have an efficient procedure of enforcement.
Admittedly, the possibility still exists for the application of Article 82 EC pursuant to 
Regulation 17/62 to any present or future behaviour of the new concern that would be 
severable from the concentration operation itself. Further, any ancillary restrictions as 
defined by Article 8 (2) Regulation 17/62, second sentence, may be assessed under 
Article 81 EC. This may act as some deterrent to the initiation of a merger in the first 
place (where its conduct may potentially be so restricted under Article 82 EC that 
there would not be a rational reason to carry it out). However it does not constitute a 
direct protection of those pre-existing rights and obligations which are at issue.
2.4.2 Effectiveness of Article 84 EC Proceedings
There remain inherent difficulties with the procedure that would deter the plaintiff 
from such actions.
The national authorities apply Articles 81 and 82 EC on the basis of Article 84 EC 
according to their own national rules of procedure.910 Thereby, the plaintiff is reliant 
upon national powers of discovery. Thus, relevant information may lie outside the 
jurisdiction of the national authority that has initiated proceedings. Article 84 EC 
proceedings also raise the spectre of multiple and conflicting decisions by Member 
State authorities.911
Above all, national authorities are unlikely to apply Community law where they have 
an opportunity (in practical terms, ignoring the primacy of Community law) to apply 
their own national law, with which they are more familiar.912 Whether or not this fact
b a s wi » ^ — f f  J, M
908 Arjomari/Wiggins IP (90) 1003 o f 11.12.1990.
909 Bos et al., ibid, p.376.
9,0 Bilger v Jehle. Case 43/69 (1970) ECR 127,136.
911 Venit, J., Private Investors Abroad, ibid, at pp,17-l$.
912 In agreement, see eg., Immenga, U,, in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid, p.1086; Fine, 
F.,(1994) ibid, p.251; Cook and Kerse, ibid, p.19.
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lay behind the formal reasoning of the Court of Appeal in the UK, the Court firmly 
expressed its opinion that only national law applies to concentrations without a 
Community Dimension in Dan Air.913 National authorities can not be obliged to 
initiate proceedings by private parties.914
The validity of these procedural difficulties and obstacles in the use of Article 84 EC 
is borne out by the infrequency with which it has been invoked.915
2.5 Summary of the Legal and Practical Effect of Article 22(2) MR on
the Application of Articles 81 and 82 to Mergers 
In legal terms, Article 1 MR may be approached as a legal expression of the 
‘appreciability’ criterion of Articles 81 and 82 EC with specific regard to merger-type 
transactions (by analogy with the operation of Article 89 EC).916 Even where this 
reasoning is not accepted however, with regard to the jurisdictional criterion of the 
EC Merger Regulation at least917 the purported effect of Article 22 MR is not 
illegitimate. Articles 81 and 82 EC remain applicable to concentrations falling within 
their scope that do not have a Community Dimension under Article 1 MR.
In practical terms however, the effect of the implementation of the Merger 
Regulation is effectively to exclude the continued application of Articles 81 and 82 
EC to concentrations (where they applied) without a Community Dimension 
(according to Article 1(2) MR). This is due to the procedural inefficiencies of Article 
84 and 85 EC procedures. Such concentrations will therefore be subject only to 
national provisions of competition law.
National authorities have shown a reluctance to initiate procedures according to Article 84 EC. 
A rare example in the UK was BA/American Airlines. This is the case in spite of the fact that 
action by Member State’s authorities has recently been encouraged by the Commission’s 
Notice on co-operation between national competition authorities and the Commission 011997 
C313/1.
913 See above, p. 171.
914 See eg., English Court of Appeal decision, R v Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry ex 
parte Airlines o f  Britain Holdings, 4th December 1992 (unpublished).
The Commission would have little interest in pressing Article 169 EC proceedings.
915 See Deimel, ibid, p.169; Gleiss/Hirsch, Kommentar ibid, Article 84, Paragraph 1.
916 See analysis above, pp.176-178.
917 It is however questionable whether the substantive assessment of mergers under Article 2 
MR faithfully transfers the principles established under Articles 81 and 82 EC where they 
apply to mergers.
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A further consideration is however necessary. Recall that Articles 81 and 82 EC have 
direct effect.918 They create rights and obligations that are enforceable against and in 
favour of private individuals before national courts. There is therefore a constitutional 
element to the legitimacy of the Merger Regulation. Article 22(2) MR may not 
purport to restrict or alter in any way the pursuance of such rights deriving from 
Articles 81 and 82 EC before national courts.
3 The Constitutional Legitimacy of the Merger Regulation according to its 
Legal Base of Article 83 EC - Private Rights and the Application of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC to Concentrations without a Community 
Dimension
3.1 The Issue
Articles 81 and 82 EC have direct effect and create rights for private individuals 
before national courts.919 The Articles may be directly used by third parties with a 
sufficiently close interest to attack concentrations920 and by target companies to 
defend against take-overs921 falling within the scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC.
Where a concentration has a Community Dimension according to Article I MR, it 
may be assumed that these rights and obligations are protected, since the participating 
undertakings are obliged to notify the Commission and the concentration will be 
assessed under Article 2 MR.922 Questionable however is whether the rights and 
obligations of the individual are adequately safeguarded (according to the terms of the 
Merger Regulation) with regard to concentrations without a Community Dimension, 
where Article 22(2) MR has disapplied the implementing Regulations of Articles 81 
and 82 EC.
918 BRT  v SABAM  Case 127/73 (1974) ECR 51, (1974) 2 CMLR 238, at para. 16.
919 BRT  v SABAM  Case 127/73 (1974) ECR 51, (1974) 2 CMLR 238, at para. 16.
On the general existing difficulties for national courts enforcing EC antitrust law, see eg., 
Riley, ‘More Radicalism P l e a s e ECLR (1993) 91; Goh, ‘Enforcing EC Competition Law in 
Member States’ ECLR (1993) 114; Van Beal, ‘The Role o f  National Courts’ ECLR (1994) 3; 
Whish, R., ‘The Enforcement o f  EC Competition Law in Domestic Courts o f  the Member 
States’ ECLR (1994) 60; Hutchings and Levitt, ‘Concurrent Jurisdiction’, ECLR (1994) 119.
920 See eg., the bid for an interim edict before a Scottish court by the Argyle Group, Argyle 
Group p ic  and Others v The Distillers Co, (decision of Scottish Outer House of the Court of 
Session) (1986) 1 CMLR 764.
921 See eg., Action brought before English Court by Plessey Co. pic against GEC and Siemens 
in December of 1988
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The Court of Justice has directly considered the existence of private rights deriving 
from Articles 81 and 82 EC where there is no implementing Regulation in the air 
transport sector.92 23 The reasoning and general principles it espoused are equally 
applicable to the situation where Regulation 17/62 no longer applies.
3J2 Article 81 EC
In Nouvelles Frontieres924, the Court of Justice held that where there were no 
implementing rules, national courts do not have jurisdiction to find conduct contrary 
to Article 81 EC; in order to invoke private rights arising from the application of 
these Articles, there must have first been a negative decision or an exemption 
according to Article 81(3) EC by the national authority (pursuant to Article 84 EC) or 
a negative decision by the Commission925 (pursuant to Article 85 EC). The reasoning 
behind this decision was the principle of legal certainty. The national court does not 
have the power to grant an exemption under Article 81(3) EC. A national court should 
not be able to prohibit agreements and to render them void (pursuant to Article 81(2) 
EC) when they might be subject to a legal exemption.926
3 3  Article 82 EC
This reasoning is not however valid for Article 82 EC, where no such exemption 
procedure exists. In Ahmed Saeed927, (again in the transport sector) therefore, the 
ECJ distinguished between Articles 81 and 82 EC, finding that Article 82 EC remains 
directly applicable by national courts.
922 Note that the thesis does not intend to compare the substantive assessment carried out under 
Articles 81 and 82 and the Merger Regulation for their legitimacy with regard to Article 83 EC.
923 This situation changed with the introductions of Regulation 3975/87, OJ L374/1 
31.12.1987, p .l, as amended by Regulation 1284/91 OJ L I22 17.05.1991, p.2 and Regulation 
2410/92 L240 24.08.1992 p.18.
The implementing regulation does not however cover air transport between the Community and 
third countries. Note that the Commission Proposal for a new implementing Regulation for 
Articles 81 and 82 EC leaves this exception untouched, see Commission Proposal COM (2000) 
582.
924 Ministère Public v Asjes, Cases 209-213/84 (1986) ECR 1425; (1986) 3 CMLR 173. The 
decision is based upon the so-called Bosc/i-doctrine, in: Case 13/61, (1962) ECR 45; (1962) 
CMLR 1.
See also, eg., Ministère Public v Lucas Asjes and others Joined Cases 209 - 213/84 (1986) 
ECR 1425; Brasserie deHaecht, Case 48/72 (1973) ECR 77; (1973) CMLR 287.
925 The Commission does not have a power under Article 85 EC to grant an exemption 
according to Article 81 (3) EC, Ministère Public v Asjes, ibid at ground 62.
926 Note that with the envisaged changes in the enforcement of Article 81 EC, and the 
decentralised power to apply Article 81(3) EC, there will be no reason to treat Article 81 EC 
differently from Article 82 EC, and Nouvelles Frontières may be overturned.
927 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v Zentrale zur Bekaempfung (Jnlauteren Wettbewerbs Case 66/86 
(1989) ECR 803, (1990) 4 CMLR 102.
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3.4 Summary of the Constitutionality of the Merger Regulation 
The purported effect of Article 22(2) MR is therefore to deny private individuals the 
right to actively pursue claims on the basis of Article 81 EC directly before national 
courts. Such proceedings require a preceding decision by either the Commission or 
the national authorities according to. respectively, Articles 85 or 84 EC. The private 
litigant however has no legal right to oblige the Commission or the national authority 
to initiate such proceedings.928 Thereby, the legal right to invoke Article 81 EC before 
national courts with regard to concentrations falling within its scope has been lost.929
The consequence is regrettable, particularly since recent dynamics in the field of 
antitrust law have been to attempt to promote private enforcement of Articles 81 and 
82 EC through national courts.930 Is it however legitimate? Does it create the risk that 
an undertaking affected by a prohibition under the Merger Regulation (or even by a 
sanctioning of a merger under the Merger Regulation) could challenge the authority 
of the Commission’s decision by claiming the unconstitutionality of the Merger 
Regulation?931
The actual effect of decisions such as Nouvelles Frontières932 is that the Court of 
Justice has fundamentally restricted the principle of direct applicability of the
928 See below regarding Article 85 EC proceedings. The initiation of proceedings according to 
Article 84 EC depends upon national rules of procedure. It is however accepted that national 
authorities would have a tendency to apply their own national competition law provisions 
rather than to initiate an Article 84 EC procedure (see below regarding the Dan Air case).
929 See eg., Jones and Gonzalez-Diaz, ibid, at p.86; Bos et al., ibid p. 374; Fine, F., Mergers 
and Joint Ventures in Europe, ibid, pp.251-2; Downes and Ellison, ibid, p. 183; Cook and 
Kerse, ibid, p. 15; Soames, T., ‘The Community Dimension in the EEC Merger Regulation*, 
(1990) 5 ECLR at p.224; Bourgeois, J. and Langeheine, ibid; Miersch, ibid at p.188; Immenga, 
U., in: Immenga/Mestmaecker, ibid, p.1086-7; Venit, J., Private Investors Abroad, ibid at p.15; 
Niemeyer, H.-J., ibid at p.451.
930 Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC, COM(2000) 582 atp.4
931 It is not inconceivable that a third party with sufficient interest in the operation or a target 
company could challenge a decision by the Commission under the Merger Regulation 
sanctioning a concentration on the basis o f the unconstitutionality of the provision.
An example of a third party challenging the validity of a Council Regulation (No. 3331/74) is 
SpA Eridania-Zuccherifici Nazionali and SpA Societa Italiana per Vlndustria degli Zuccheri v 
Minister o f  Agriculture a n d  Forestry, Case 230/78 (1979) ECR 2749.
While it is less likely that the parties to a concentration might challenge a positive decision of 
the Commission, some risk of this exists.
932 Ministère Public v Asjes, Cases 209-213/84 (1986) ECR 1425; (1986) 3 CMLR 173. The 
decision is based upon the so-called BojcA-doctrine, in: Case 13/61, (1962) ECR 45; (1962) 
CMLR 1.
See also, eg., Ministère Public v Lucas Asjes and others Joined Cases 209 - 213/84 (1986) 
ECR 1425; Brasserie de Haecht, Case 48/72 (1973) ECR 77, (1973) CMLR 287.
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prohibition enshrined in Article 81 EC. That direct applicability is inherent to Articles
81 and 82 EC.933 Nevertheless, the effect of the Court of Justice’s approach has been 
to require an implementing provision on the basis of Article 83 EC to ‘trigger’ the 
direct applicability of Article 81(1) EC before national courts (unless there has been a 
negative decision or an exemption according to Article 81(3) EC by the national 
authority (pursuant to Article 84 EC) or a negative decision by the Commission 
(pursuant to Article 85 EC)).
This approach of the Court of Justice was justified upon the principle of legal 
certainty, as detailed above. The continued significance of this argument is 
questionable, whereby it is considered that there is now sufficient body of case-law to 
enable national judges to make consistent decisions in the application of Article 81(1) 
EC.934 Nevertheless, where it is still valid, it refers the issue of the legitimacy of the 
effect of Article 22(2) EC to the legal effect of Article 83 EC (since the Council may 
amend or even revoke regulation 17/62 at any time):935 does Article 83 EC require the 
Council to maintain an implementing regulation for the principles of Articles 81 and
82 EC that gives effect to their direct applicability before national courts?
Within the context analysis of Article 83 EC carried out above, we have seen that 
there is an obligation to implement Regulations that are suitable to implement the 
principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC. We must therefore turn again to the definition of 
‘principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC’. Do the ‘principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC* 
within the context of Article 83 EC include their direct applicability before national 
courts? Recourse to the analysis carried out above with regard to the limitations of 
Article 83 EC as a legal base for the Merger Regulation (and the consequential need 
for Article 308 EC) determines that they do not: ‘principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC’ 
refers only to the material provisions of those Articles.936 It does not extend to the 
broader principles of Community law outside the specific text of Articles 81 and 82
¡V  U .
933 See eg., Estee Lauder, Case 37/79 (1980) CLR 2481 at 2500; B RTI  Case 127/73 (1974) 
CLR 51 at 62; Asies, Cases 209-213/84 (1986) 1425 at 1463.
934 See eg., Schroeter, H., in: Groeben/Thiesing/Ehlermann, ibid p903; Salzmann, lAT A, 
Airline Rate-Fixing and the EEC Competition Rules, ELR (1977) p409, at p413; Dagtoglou, 
Air Transport and the EC, ELR (1981) p335 at p352.
935 See analysis above, whereby the Merger Regulation became the implementing regulation 
equivalent to Regulation 17/62 for Articles 81 and 82 EC to the extent that they apply to 
mergers.
936 See above, pp. 174-175
---------------------------------------------------------------— -----------
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EC (although it might incorporate the redefinition of those terms for specific types of 
transaction).937
The thesis cannot therefore be supported that the Council is obliged to maintain a 
regulation according to Article 83 EC that provides for the direct applicability of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC before national courts. The operation of Article 22(2) MR is 
not therefore unconstitutional.
It is worth noting further that constitutionality issue that arises from the operation of 
Article 22(2) MR may be rendered insignificant in the future if the recent White 
Paper by the European Commission on the Modernisation of the Rules Implementing 
Articles 85 and 86 EC (now Articles 81 and 82 EC) is implemented. The White Paper 
recommends that national courts (and authorities outside the procedure on the basis of 
Article 84 EC) should be given the uninhibited right to apply Article 81(3) EC.938
D SUMMARY OP THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
INCONSISTENCY OF THE JURISDICTIONAL TRIGGER OF THE 
MERGER REGULATION WITH THE INTERSTATE TRADE 
CRITERION
In legal terms, the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation satisfies the 
condition of its legal base of Article 308 EC.
According to the legal base of Article 83 EC, the Merger Regulation becomes the 
implementing Regulation for Articles 81 and 82 EC where they apply to 
concentrations where they fall within the scope of the Article 3 MR (‘concentration’) 
and Article 1 (‘Community Dimension’). Thereby, by analogy with the operation of 
Article 89 EC - and apparently consistent with the Commission’s own view - Article 
1 MR may represent a specific ‘appreciability’ criterion for the application of the 
principles of Articles 81 and 82 EC to mergers, implemented upon the basis of Article 
83 EC. On the other hand, where this argument is not accepted, we are faced with the 
situation that, according to Article 22(2) MR, there is no implementing Regulation for 
Articles 81 and 82 EC where they apply to concentrations that fall within the scope of 
Article 3 MR and do not have a Community Dimension according to Article 1 MR.
937 See analysis above, pp. 174-175.
938 Commission’s White Paper, ibid.
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This in itself does not render the EC Merger Regulation illegitimate, for the 
procedures under Articles 84 and 85 EC remain to apply the principles of Articles 81 
and 82 EC, even if the inherent inadequacies of procedures under Articles 84 and 85 
EC for merger control mean that in practice this is extremely unlikely. However, the 
consequence is that the Merger Regulation thereby purports to extinguish existing 
private rights and obligations deriving from Article 81 EC before national courts. 
This marks a regrettable consequence of the operation of the turnover thresholds, 
although it cannot be found to be unconstitutional.
Aside from legal implications of the inconsistency of the jurisdictional trigger of the 
Merger Regulation with its legal bases of the Treaty it is also necessary to consider 
the policy implications.
270
-1
yr:
i
!
(
it
I
Ì
(
1
271
X THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
INCONSISTENCY OF THE JURISDICTIONAL 
TRIGGER OF THE MERGER REGULATION WITH 
THE INTERSTATE TRADE CRITERION
A THE ISSUE
In its Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation of 1996,539 the 
Commission carried out an assessment of the operation of the turnover thresholds 
with regard to Community competition policy. As we have already shown, the 
overriding policy for the Community within the realm of competition law is the 
protection and promotion of Single Market integration. The Commission therefore 
considered whether the Merger Regulation was fulfilling the aims for which it was 
implemented, prohibiting concentrations that harm this process. The Commission 
discovered that a considerable number of concentrations having significant cross- 
border effects - and therefore potentially harmful to the process of Single Market 
integration - fell below the current thresholds. This concern was repeated in its 2000 
Review.93 40 As stated above, this condition of ‘cross-border effects’ is synonymous 
with the application of the interstate trade criterion, where the Commission defined it 
as an impact on the structure of competition extending over a geographic area 
exceeding the borders of a single Member State.941 The Commission’s findings 
therefore mirror the findings of the thesis.942
It is necessary to consider in detail the implications of this fact for the policies for 
which the Merger Regulation was originally implemented.
939 See note 9 above.
940 See note 10 above.
941 See above, pp. 153-154. In its 1996 Review, the Commission considered that the fact that so 
many concentrations with significant cross-border effects fell below the current thresholds was 
due to the size and characteristics of the sectors concerned and to the size of the companies 
involved. The Commission determined that this would particularly be the case where the 
acquirer and/or the target companies are smaller specialized companies that are active in 
specialised but economically important markets such as mechanical engineering, electrical and 
electronic engineering, computer manufacturing, textiles, manufacture of food products and 
beverages, metal products, computer and related services, hotels and catering. These reasons 
are still valid after the changes implemented in 1998, as recognised by the statistical Review in 
2000.
See paragraphs 37-38.
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B THE PRINCIPLE OF A ONE-STOP-SHOP
We have already identified that the idea of a one-stop-shop was one of the key 
principles upon which the Merger Regulation was based.942 43
Considering the operation of the existing jurisdictional thresholds in its Green Paper 
of 1996, the Commission emphasised the problem of multiple national filings of 
concentrations that did not fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation.944 At 
present, all fifteen of the Member States have some form of national merger 
control.945 The Commission noted that the fact that not all national laws involve 
mandatory filing was not a significant factor because many companies felt the need to 
notify even if notification was voluntary for reasons of legal certainty.946
The lack of a one-stop-shop for such concentrations creates unwelcome delay, 
expense and legal uncertainty for business.947 The concerns of the Commission led to 
the proposal for an amendment to the Merger Regulation to deal with some of these 
cases948 (a variation of the proposal was adopted in 1998949). This did not however 
cover all such cases of multiple filings, but was limited to multiple filings in at least 
three Member States according to specific turnover thresholds.
Clearly, this undesirable state of affairs is not directly related to the fact that the 
turnover thresholds presently used do not bring all the concentrations having an effect 
on interstate trade within the scope of the Merger Regulation. The application of the 
national merger laws depend upon an individual and separate jurisdictional 
criterion.950 Even if the interstate trade criterion was used as the jurisdictional trigger 
for the Merger Regulation, this would not guarantee that some multiple filings might 
occur. Nevertheless, given the breadth of the interstate trade criterion in its 
application, it may be stated with some confidence that such instances of multiple 
filings would be rare if it were applied for the EC Merger Regulation.
942 See above, pp.193-194.
943 See above at p. 139.
944 ibid, p. 153.
945 See Annex 1.
946 EC Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, ibid at 
paragraph 57.
947 For more detail, see above at pp. 139-140 and 152-153.
948 ibid, pp.154-156.
949 See above, pl56.
950 For a complete list, see Annex 1.
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C THE SINGLE MARKET INTEGRATION OBJECTIVE
As described above, the Merger Regulation was primarily implemented upon the legal 
bases of Article 83 and Article 308 EC in order to further the Community aim of 
maintaining undistorted competition within the internal market. This is consistent 
with the overriding goal of Community competition policy - Single Market 
integration.
The substantive assessment of mergers under Article 2 MR conforms to the policy 
reasons for which a system of Community concentration control was implemented. It 
assesses concentrations for their effect on competition only, prohibiting those that 
‘create or strengthen a dominant position, the result o f which competition will be 
significantly impeded in the Community or in a substantial part thereof.951 Thus, it 
prohibits concentrations that distort significantly competition in the Community, and 
that thereby hinder the process of Single Market integration.
The operation of the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation has however been 
shown not to extend the application of the Regulation to all mergers that may distort 
competition significantly within the Community. Instead, many of such mergers are 
subject only to assessment at the national level (if at all).952 Questionable is the effect 
this situation may have upon the integration paradigm (that is based upon undistorted 
structures of competition within the Community).
1 Assessment of Mergers a t a National Level that Affect Interstate Trade
Assessment of a merger that affects interstate trade at the national level concerns only 
the effect of the merger on the national market. The situation may adversely affect the 
integration process in two ways: first, the substantive test in the national merger law
951 Other issues may be taken into account, but only in so far that they do not provide an 
obstacle to competition, Article 2(1 )b MR.
952 It is beyond the scope of the thesis to analyse in detail the compatibility between the 
definition of ‘concentration’ under the national Member States provisions of merger control 
and the definition of ‘concentration’ under Article 3 MR. It is however conceivable that some 
concentrations within the meaning o f Article 3 MR that effect interstate trade might fall outside 
the scope o f national law because they do not constitute ‘concentrations’ according to those 
provisions.
L
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provision may not be exclusively directed to the effect of the merger on competition; 
secondly, any assessment of the effect on competition of a merger that affects 
interstate trade carried out at the national level may not reflect the effect that the 
merger may have on competition structures at the Community level.
1*1 Assessing Mergers at the National Level According to Non-Competition 
Criteria
An assessment of mergers at the national level and according to national law may not 
exclusively concern the impact of the merger upon competition within the national 
territory. Rather, national competition authorities might base their decisions upon 
issues of strictly national concern, for example national industrial and social policies. 
This may be a result of the procedural structure of assessment under the relevant law, 
or the result of the wording of the substantive assessment itself.
Analysis of the systems of merger control in thirteen of the Member States provides 
that this concern is a valid one.
Austria
Mergers are controlled under Austrian law according to the Cartel Act 1988. The 
Cartel Court enforces the rules, determining whether the merger creates or 
strengthens a dominant position in the relevant market. Other non-competition issues 
may however sanction the merger even where this condition is fulfilled, including the 
international competitiveness of the undertakings involved and national economic 
issues.
Belgium
Mergers are controlled under Belgian law according to the Law of 5 August 1991 on 
the Protection of Economic Competition. The Competition Service investigates 
concentrations falling within the scope of the Act and prepares a report for the 
Competition Council, which makes a final decision. Concentrations are assessed to 
determine whether they create or reinforce a dominant position that restricts 
competition on the Belgian market or a substantial part of it to an appreciable extent. 
However even if this condition is fulfilled, concentrations may be cleared if they 
contribute to matters of general economic interest, which includes the 
competitiveness of economic sectors and the level of employment.
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Denmark
Denmark introduced a system of merger control on 1 October 2000.953 954Concentrations 
falling within the scope of the Statute are assessed by the Competition Council to 
determine whether the merger creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of 
which effective competition would be effectively impeded. The substantive 
assessment of mergers under the Danish system of control therefore mirrors the 
European Merger Regulation.
Finland
Under the Act on Competition Restrictions 480/1992,954 the Competition Council may 
ban or order a concentration to be dissolved or attach conditions on the 
implementation of a concentration if, as a result of it, a dominant position shall arise 
or be strengthened which significantly impedes competition in the Finnish markets or 
a substantial part thereof.955 However, upon application, the Finnish Competition 
Authority may lift a condition attached to the implementation of a concentration or 
mitigate it, due to an appreciable change in market conditions or ‘another substantial 
cause’.
France
Merger control in France is also basically an administrative process controlled by the 
Minister of the Economy, Finance and Budget. He is assisted by the Competition 
Council, which is a consultative body. According to the Ordinance No.86-1242 o f 
December 1, 1986 and the Implementing Decree No.86-1309 of December 29 1986 
(as amended by Decree 95-916 of August 9 1995), the Minister assesses mergers to 
determine whether they create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the relevant market in 
France. If the test is met, the Minister will determine whether the transaction’s 
contribution to economic progress outweighs the adverse effect on competition. 
Thereby, issues such as employment or purely political issues such as the promotion 
of commercial relationships with certain countries may be considered.
Germany
953 Statute No.416 of 31 May 2000, amending Statute No.384 o f 10 June 1997.
954 As amended by Act 303/1998.
955 There is a specific test for concentrations on the electricity markets, see Article 1 ld(2).
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Mergers under German law are assessed under the Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen 7995. The law is mainly enforced by the Federal Cartel 
Office. Mergers are prohibited where they will lead to the creation or strengthening of 
a ‘market-dominating position*, unless the parties prove that the merger will also 
result in an improvement of conditions which outweigh the disadvantages of market 
domination.
Non-competition issues are not relevant in the substantive assessment by the Federal 
Cartel Office. However, the Federal Cartel Office’s decision to prohibit a merger may 
be overruled by the Federal Minister of Economics for political reasons.
Greece
The relevant legislation in Greece is Law 703/77 on the Control o f Monopolies and 
Oligopolies and Protection o f Free Competition, as amended by Law 2296/95, which 
came into effect on February 24 1995.
The procedure of assessment of concentrations under this law is also politicised. The 
Competition Commission investigates mergers falling within the scope of the law to 
determine whether they create or reinforce a dominant position. Where the 
Commission finds that this is the case and prohibits the merger, the Minister of 
National Economy and Development may approve the concentration on the grounds 
of general economic interest, where this overrides the restriction on competition. 
Factors may include the attraction of investment, the modernisation of production, the 
strengthening of competitive position in the EU and international markets and job 
creation.
Ireland
Merger control in Ireland is governed by the Mergers, Take-Overs and Monopolies 
(Control) Act 1978 as amended by Part IV of the Competition Act 1991. It is also a 
highly politicised procedure.
Those mergers falling under the scope of the Act are notified to the Minister for 
Enterprise and Employment. He may opt to refer the merger to the Competition 
Authority which will assess the merger by reference to ‘the exigencies of the common 
good*.
These include its effect on competition and its effect on employment, efficiency and 
regional development. A report is made to the Minister, who will then has the 
exclusive authority to decide whether to prohibit the merger according to the same 
criterion: ‘the exigencies of the common good’.
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Italy
The Italian system of merger control is less politicised, but nevertheless it allows the 
consideration of factors other than competition in the assessment of mergers under 
Law No. 287 o f October 10 1990. Section 6 provides six specific factors for the 
Authority to consider in determining whether a concentration would create or 
strengthen a dominant position (as a result of which competition is eliminated or 
substantially reduced on the Italian market), the fourth of which is ‘the competitive 
situation of the national industry*. Furthermore, the Authority considers this list to be 
merely illustrative and not exhaustive of the factors that may be taken into 
consideration in evaluating a given concentration.956 Therefore, its discretion is not 
limited to competition factors in the same way as is the Commission’s under the 
Merger Regulation.
Exceptionally, a concentration prohibited by the Competition Authority may be 
authorised by the government for reasons connected with the general interests of the 
national economy (although this is yet to have occurred).
U;
Luxembourg
Luxembourg also has a politicised system of merger control. According to the Law of 
June 171970 (Mémorial A 1970, p.892), as amended on April 20, 1989 (Mémorial A 
1989, p.504) and on September 2 1993 (Mémorial A 1993, p.1450), the public 
prosecutor enforces a prohibition decision made by the Minister of National 
Economy. Investigations are launched either by the Public Prosecutor requesting the 
Minister of National Economic to refer a merger to the Commission des Pratiques 
Commerciales Restrictives (following a complaint from the public) or the Minister of 
National Economy itself deciding to proceed with an investigation (whereby there is a 
discretion to ask the opinion of the Commission des Pratiques Commerciales 
Restrictives). If consulted, the Commission produces an advisory report. The test for 
clearance (under Article 1) is whether the transaction and/or merger limits or distorts 
competition against the general interest and/or abuses a dominant position against the 
general interest. Non-competition issues are only taken into account if they weaken 
the position of the consumer. However, the provisions of Article 1 are broad and there 
is certainly scope for some political influence in the decision-making since the final 
decision whether or not to prohibit rests exclusively with the Minister.
956 Saja, F., L ’Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato: prime esperienze e 
prospettive di applicatone della legge, Giurisprudenza Commerciale, 1991, p.459.
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The Netherlands
Mergers in the Netherlands are controlled according to the Dutch Competition Act o f 
May 22 1997. The Competition Authority is charged with the enforcement of the Act, 
under the responsibility of the Minister of Economic Affairs. The Competition 
Authority determines whether the mergers would lead to the creation or strengthening 
of a dominant position that would significantly impede competition on the Dutch 
market or a part thereof. The Minister of Economic Affairs may however overrule the 
Competition Authority’s decision to refuse a licence if in his opinion reasons of 
general interest prevail, including factors such as structural unemployment.
Portugal
Mergers in Portugal are assessed under the Decree-Law No. 371/93 o f 29 October 
1993. According to the law, the Commission des Pratiques Commerciales Restrictives 
conducts an investigation into mergers falling within the scope of the law. Mergers 
are assessed to determine whether they create or reinforce a dominant position in the 
national market, or in a substantial part thereof, and may thereby prevent, distort or 
restrict competition. They may however be authorised if the international 
competitiveness of the participating undertakings is significantly increased. The 
assessment of the Commission des Pratiques Commerciales Restrictives is passed to 
the Minister in charge of trade matters, who has the authority to issue a decision (with 
a discretion to consult the opinion of the Competition Council).
Spain
Spanish law on merger control is contained in Law 16/1989 on the Defence o f 
Competition (as amended in June 1996). The procedure for merger control under the 
Act is highly politicised. The Minister of the Economy and Finance may challenge a 
merger where it falls within the scope of the Act, according to section 14. Thereby, 
the Minister may refer the merger to the Antitrust Court for its opinion on whether the 
merger or take-over is likely to ‘hinder the maintenance of effective competition in 
the market place* under section 15. The opinion of the Court is however purely 
advisory and it is the government that decides whether the transaction may proceed.
Sweden
Under the Competition Act that came into force on July 1, 1993, the Competition 
Authority determines whether the merger would create or reinforce a dominant
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position on the market which would significantly impede, or be liable to impede, the 
existence or development of effective competition on the Swedish market as a whole 
or in a substantial part thereof. Such creation or strengthening would occur in a 
manner detrimental to the public interest. This second condition involves 
consideration of factors such as industry restructuring, rationalised production, 
beneficial socio-economic effects or the ability to meet international competition.
United Kingdom
The control of mergers in the UK is according to the Fair Trading Act 1973. The 
overall responsibility for merger control lies with the Secretary of State. He decides 
whether to clear a merger or refer it to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and 
also decides on the outcome of a merger following an adverse report by the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission. The Director-General of Fair Trading (head of 
the Office of Fair Trading) also plays a role in the control of mergers, monitoring 
mergers and advising the Secretary of State.
Mergers are assessed under the Fair Trading Act by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission for their effect on ‘public interest’, which is a criterion that embraces 
‘all matters which appear to them in the particular circumstances to be relevant\  
Clearly this is not restricted to the effect on competition alone.
1.1.1 Summary
The systems of merger control of the individual Member States (with the exception 
of the Denmark) clearly- as a result of the substantive assessment, the procedural 
structure or both - leave room for the assessment of mergers according to criteria that 
do not exclusively concern their effect on competition and which may not be 
compatible with the integration goal (for example, national political, industrial and 
social issues). Where national authorities pursue national political, industrial and 
social policies in the assessment of concentrations that have an effect beyond the 
national market, this can directly lead to market partitioning.
It is true that in practice the majority of Member State authorities responsible for 
assessing mergers according to their own systems of national law appear to 
concentrate upon the competition paradigm in their decision-making. Thereby, the 
majority concentrate upon whether the merger creates or strengthens a dominant 
position on the home market. Indeed, within the individual Member States there has 
been a tangible trend of soft harmonisation of national competition laws along the
u r
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lines of Community competition law. Thereby, national authorities are becoming 
more and more familiar with ‘European’ concepts and conditions of assessment in the 
application of national systems of competition law.957
Nevertheless, it should be recognised that - even where European principles and 
concepts are carefully followed - the prohibition on creating or strengthening a 
dominant position remains a functional condition 958 Significant discretion lies in the 
overall assessment of a merger, and thereby often in the hands of political actors. 
Thereby, it is not inconceivable that political and other factors can be taken into 
account in merger decisions that ostensibly make an assessment based upon the effect 
upon competition structures.
A case in point is the UK decision Universal Foods Corporation & Pointings 
Holdings Ltd. Post acquisition, the market share of Universal Foods rose from 51 % 
to 74 % of the UK domestic market. The Mergers and Monopolies Commission 
nevertheless sanctioned the merger on competition grounds (without commitments), 
citing the strength of potential competitors and the significance of buyer power.
The dissenting opinion of Dame Helena Shovelton noted however that there had been 
no entry on the market by a European manufacturer for ten years, that those 
competitors based outside the Community did not have established UK distribution 
channels, that Universal Foods had a significant reputation for quality and range and 
that its strength was such that the other active competitors were price-takers (and one 
even admitted so). All these considerations point to dominant position held by 
Universal Foods in the relevant product in the UK market pre-merger. If the merger 
had been assessed at the Community level, it is difficult to envisage that the 
Commission would have sanctioned a merger that involved Universal Foods taking 
over its only substantial competitor on the UK market.959
957 This harmonisation has been noted as a natural tendency as economic development sets in 
and markets become more globalised. See eg., Jenny, F , in: Ehlermann, C-D and Laudatti, L 
(eds), ibid, 1998, p. 39; Ullrich, H., Harmonisation within the European Union, (1996) 3 
ECLR pp.178-184.
958 Some Member State laws (for example, Germany) do however contain rebuttable 
presumptions of dominance.
59 In Mannesmann/Hosch, the Commission stated that: High market shares represent an 
important factor as evidence o f  a dominant position provided they not only reflect current 
conditions but are also a reliable indicator o f future conditions. I f  no other structural factors 
are identifiable which are liable in due course to change the existing conditions of 
competition, market shares have to be viewed as a reliable indicator o f  future conditions (at 
paragraph 91 of the Decision).
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Even where the assessment of a merger that affects interstate trade by the national 
authority is carried out exclusively according to its actual effect on competition, 
integration may still be adversely affected because of the geographical limits of the
assessment:
1.2 Assessing Mergers for Their Effect on National Competition Structures as 
Opposed to Community Competition Structures 
Where mergers affecting interstate trade are assessed by national authorities for their 
effect on competition in national markets there is a risk that they may be prohibited 
even though they do not significantly distort competition at the Community level (and 
even constitute beneficial restructuring for a firm to achieve a globally competitive 
size). Conversely, mergers may be sanctioned where they distort competition at a 
Community level (where there is no negative effect on competition within the national 
jurisdiction, but the relevant market affected extends beyond the borders of the 
relevant Member State). The mergers assessed during 1999 in the three Member 
States analysed above (Italy, the UK and Germany) that were found to have affected 
interstate trade may be considered in order to assess the extent of this risk.
United Kingdom
Of the mergers that affected interstate trade that were assessed by the UK 
Competition Authority during 1999, a decision that demonstrates the risk that 
assessment at the national level may represent is Rockwool Ltd/Owens-Coming 
Building Products (UK) Ltd. The Mergers and Monopolies Commission assessed the 
merger for its effect on competition (as a matter of the ‘public interest’). The 
combined entity would have had a market share of 96 % in the UK. However, the 
relevant product was identified as being a transportable good (and some imports were 
made into the UK). It is possible therefore that an assessment of the transaction for its 
effect on competition at the Community level would have found a larger geographical 
market than the territory of the UK and it may be that the combined entity would have 
been subject to much more competition on this wider market.
Germany
The German Authority has demonstrated a more rational economic approach in its 
assessment of mergers, determining where necessary that the relevant market extends
282
beyond national boundaries to include even world-wide markets.960 Nevertheless, the 
legal assessment is not concerned with whether the merger strengthens or creates a 
dominant position in the Community, but rather whether such a position is created or 
strengthened at the national level. Thereby, the fallacy that derives from the operation 
of the turnover thresholds of the Merger Regulation is brought into sharp relief. A 
merger that does not fall under the scope of the Regulation may concern a relevant 
market that is Community or even world-wide, yet only be assessed at the national 
level for its effect on national competition structures. Market share, for example, is 
thereby assessed at the national level rather than at the Community level.
The danger that this situation creates is that mergers that may distort the integration 
process because of their effect on competition at the Community level may be 
sanctioned. An example in point could be Barilla/Wasa, The merger concerned an 
acquisition by an Italian undertaking of an undertaking with subsidiaries in Germany, 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Poland. The German Authority found that the market 
share of the combined undertaking in Germany would only be 1 % in Germany. 
Therefore, it did not cause any competition concerns. Nevertheless, no assessment 
was made of the effect the merger may have had on competition at the Community 
level in other geographical markets.
Conversely, there is a danger that the market shares of the participating undertakings 
are artificially high at the national level compared with at the Community level. The 
German Authority has however shown a willingness to consider the effect of foreign- 
based competition on the national market, and this anomaly was avoided in the 
sample of mergers that effected interstate trade during 1999.
M y
Under its merger laws, the Italian Authority must determine whether a merger creates 
or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which competition is eliminated or 
substantially reduced on the Italian market. Nevertheless, examination of the mergers 
assessed during 1999 in Italy that affected interstate trade reveals that the assessment
960 The German decisions involving the assessment of the effect of a merger on markets that 
extend beyond the national territory are: Dow Chemical Company/Shell Nederland 
Chemie/Shell Chimie; Eramet/Elkem Mangan/ Elkem Metals CompanyI Cogema; 
Coming/BICC; PPG Industries Lackfabrik/ICI hacke Farben; Texas Instruments 
Incorporated/lntegrated Sensor Solutions; Checkpoint Systems/Meto/Sensormatic; Emerson 
Electric/Krautkraemer/NUKEM Nutronik; Norddeutsche Affinerie/Huettenwerke Kayser/L 
Possehl & Co; Xerox Corporation/Tekronix (For references, see note^59 above).
by the Competition Authority does not hesitate to consider relevant markets affected 
by a merger that are not limited to the national territory, but extend to include world 
markets.961 An assessment subsequently takes place to determine whether the merger 
creates or strengthens a dominant position on that relevant market.
Since the assessment is not restricted to the effect of the merger upon national 
markets, but may extend to include world-wide markets, it reflects the assessment 
carried out by the Commission under the Merger Regulation and there is no danger of 
mergers that may adversely affect the integration process being sanctioned or 
prohibited by the Italian authorities (except where there may be covert political or 
industrial policy factors involved).
1.2.1 Summary
The UK and German systems of merger control therefore provide examples where the 
national assessment of a merger that affects interstate trade may ignore its effect on 
competition structures at the level of the Community. Thereby, mergers harmful to 
structures of competition at the Community level (and therefore harmful to the 
integration process) may be sanctioned, whereas mergers that are insignificant at a 
Community level (and even beneficial to the integration process) may be prohibited.
961 The merger decisions taken by the Italian Antitrust Authority during 1999 involving mergers 
affecting interstate trade whose effect was assessed on supra-national markets are: 
Biochemi/Hoechst Marion Roussel Deutschland; ELF Atochem Vlissigen/TH Goldschmidt; 
Solvay/Winnofil Division; Dow Benelux-Dow France/Shell; Textron/Breed Italian Interiors', 
Dayco Europe/Lombardini F.I.M.; Sparta/Zucchini; BASF/DSM ASP; Key Foggini 
Europe/Gruppo Foggini; British Elevators/IMI Marston; Comau/Renault Automation; AB  
Electrolux/McCulloch Italiana; Clariant Intemational/Songwon Color Co.; E.L Du Pont De 
Nemours/Duconti; BASF/BP France; Seat Pagine Gialle/Matrix; United Technologies 
Corporation/Sutrak Italia; Baldurion/Novembal; United Technologies 
Corporation/Intemational Comfort Products Corporation; Hamilton Sundstrand 
Holdings/Pneumatic Aircraft Components Europe; Procter & Gamble/IAMS; BASF/Ultraform; 
GE Industrial Products Europe-GE Packaged Power/Thomassen International; Huntsman 
Speciality Chemical/lmperial Chemical Industries; United Technologies Corporation/Great 
Lakes Turbines; FCY Acquisition/Furon; Yamaha Motor Europe-Kayaba Industry/Paioli 
Meccanica; High Voltage Engineering/Ansaldo Sistemi Industriali; Markos/Mefar, Nord- 
Micro Elektronik Feinmechanik/Telair International Electronic Systems; Robert Bosch/Aresi; 
Danieli & C. Officine Meccaniche-Corus Group/Danieli Hoogovens Technical Services; 
Roehm/Polymer Latex; Grupo Mexico/Asarco Incorporated; United Technologies/Cade 
Industries; Cardo/Cardo BSI Rail; 21 Inveslimenti-Sport Investments/Sport Timing; United 
Technologies/Holland Heating Carrier Holding; United Technologies/AB Electrolux (for 
references, see note 762 above).
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Lord Leon Brittan*2 then Competition Commissioner, drew attention to the dangers 
of such a situation. He stated:
‘Action at the Community level is required where national measures would not adequately 
address one of the Community’s fundamental aims, set out in Article 3(f) (Article 3(g) EC) of 
the Treaty, namely the creation and maintenance of a system that ensures that “competition in 
the internal market is not distorted*\..agreements, practices and mergers that have Community­
wide effects require a Community-wide analysis. The focus of this analysis at national level 
would inevitably be limited to the territory of the country concemed...To look at a merger’s 
effects in a single Member State when its effects and true economic context are Community­
wide would lead to incorrect and unreliable decisions’.962 63
In this regard, the approach of the Italian Competition Authority is to be 
recommended. It considers the effect of mergers falling within the scope of its 
national law on relevant markets that extend beyond the territorial boundaries of Italy.
D LEGAL CERTAINTY
As has been consistently stressed throughout the thesis, the principle of legal certainty 
has been given paramount importance in the drafting and subsequent reviews of the 
EC Merger Regulation.
This policy aim for the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation is clearly 
unaffected by the fact that the existing thresholds do not bring all the concentrations 
that may affect interstate trade within the scope of the Regulation. Indeed, the fact 
that the existing jurisdictional trigger is formalistic - and therefore, apparently, certain 
- is one of the key reasons why it does not cover all concentrations that affect 
interstate trade (as well as the high level at which they are maintained).
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to consider whether the operation of the existing 
turnover thresholds do indeed offer a level of certainty that should be given such 
importance in the overall balance of factors competing for prominence in the drafting 
of the jurisdictional criterion.
962 Now, Lord Leon Brittan.
963 Lord Leon Brittan, European Competition Policy - Keeping the Playing Field Level, ibid, 
p.92.
In agreement, see eg,, Bishop, M. and Kay, J., ibid, pp.309-10.
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For experience has in fact taught us that the certainty that is apparently afforded by 
formalistic provisions should not be treated as absolute. Some qualification is 
necessary. It should be considered for example that US businesses were 
overwhelmingly in favour of the introduction of the (functionalist) rule of reason into 
American antitrust law, at the expense of per se (formalistic) rules.964 Therefore, 
formalistic rules must also have their own disadvantages, which should be 
highlighted.
One such problem that is demonstrated by the turnover thresholds of the Merger 
Regulation themselves is that their application is highly technical. To determine 
whether the turnover criteria have been reached is extremely complicated.965 The 
consequence of this is that it may be that the application of the Community dimension 
criterion involves more specialised, costly and time-consuming legal advice than the 
application of the interstate trade criterion.
A further unwelcome characteristic of formalistic criteria is the possibility they lend 
to parties to a merger to mould their behaviour to avoid fulfilling them (or even to fall 
within the scope of the provision, where that provision is regarded as being more 
benign than the alternative966). It may be therefore that merging parties are able to 
adjust the technical characteristics of the merger in order to come within (or below) 
the turnover thresholds, without altering the substantive result or economic effect of 
the merger - that is, to indulge in ‘forum shopping*967.
Furthermore, formalistic rules clearly do not have the flexibility to pertain to non­
static conditions. In theoretical terms, Ehrlich and Posner have emphasised the 
inability of formalistic rules to adapt to changing circumstances for which they are 
applied, considering the costs and benefits over time of precise and formalistic laws 
(‘rules*) and imprecise and functionalistic (‘standards*) laws:
964 Note however that as a rule the Community legal tradition is more ‘rule-orientated’
965 See Broberg, M. 1997 and 1998, ibid; Soames, T., ibid; O ’Keefe, S, ibid; van Mourik, A., 
Five Years o f Community Merger Control in Developments in European Competition Policy.
966 Generally, the Community system is regarded as being more benign and efficient than those 
of the Member States.
967 See Broberg, M, 1998 ibid at pp. 231-243.
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‘Standards968 are relatively unaffected by changes over time in the circumstances in which they 
are applied, since a standard does not specify the circumstances relevant to decision or the 
weight of each circumstance but merely indicates the kinds of circumstance that are 
relevant.'969
On the other hand, in relation to formalistic rules:
‘In general, the more detailed a rule is, the more often it will have to be changed. The greater 
detailedness of a very precise rule is thus also a source of additional costs, the costs of 
changing rules. These include the costs...of producing the new rule plus additional costs arising 
from the fact that change in the law is a source o f uncertainty.*970
As if to prove this point, it should be noted that the formalistic jurisdictional trigger 
of the Merger Regulation has already been reviewed three times within the short 
period of the operation of the Merger Regulation, and a further review is currently 
underway.971
On the other hand, it is established that functionalist legal conditions which regulate 
complex economic realities may, in spite of their vague wording, provide sufficient 
certainty for market players to adjust their conduct accordingly where they are 
interpreted and applied methodologically and consistently, for example using 
economic tools of assessment972. Indeed, formalistic rules may derive from 
functionalist provisions by judicial decisions, where the rule summarises what has 
been learned in prior cases.973
Therefore, the certainty that the turnover thresholds are deemed to afford is certainly 
not absolute and whatever certainty they do bring must be balanced against 
countervailing checks to regulatory efficiency. We are able, at the very least, to 
maintain that the claim for a formalistic and fixed jurisdictional criterion for the
968 Where ‘standards’ taken to be open-ended and imprecise legal rules.
969 Ehrlich, I. and Posner, R., An Economic Analysis o f Legal Rulemaking* 1975, Journal of 
Legal Studies III(l), p.277.
970 Ehrlich, I. and Posner, R., ibid at p.278.
971 See notes 9 and 10 above.
972 See, eg. Ehlermann, C-D and Laudatti, L., who point to the benefits of economic tools for 
the quality and predictability of decisions in competition matters, furthering transparency of 
decisions (while acknowledging that economics is not an entirely neutral science), in: European 
Competition Law Annual 1997: 'Objectives o f Competition Policy ’, Robert Schuman Centre, 
European University Institute, 1998 at p.ix.
973 Ehrlich, I. and Posner, R. A., ibid, at p.266.
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Merger Regulation in the name of certainty and regulatory efficiency cannot be 
unreservedly upheld.
E CONCLUSION ON THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
INCONSISTENCY OF THE JURISDICTIONAL TRIGGER OF THE 
MERGER REGULATION WITH THE INTERSTATE TRADE 
CRITERION
The analysis undertaken above has determined that the existing jurisdictional trigger 
is detrimental to the policy goal for which the EC Merger Regulation was originally 
implemented. This policy goal has been determined to be the prohibition of 
concentrations that may hinder Single Market integration by distorting the undistorted 
structures of competition upon which it is based.
The operation of the jurisdictional trigger of the Merger Regulation determines that 
mergers that may distort competition within the Community (and therefore may 
hinder the integration process) may be prohibited or sanctioned according to specific 
national interests that are not compatible with the integration process. Furthermore, 
national assessment of the effect of such mergers on competition at the national level 
may not always take account of the effect of the merger on competition at a 
Community level, risking the prohibition of mergers that may be pro-competitive at 
the Community level or the sanctioning of mergers that may be anti-competitive at the 
Community level. Thereby, the level-playing field for Community undertakings that 
is necessary for the success of Single Market integration is being denied.
As single market integration progresses, the anomaly of the present high turnover 
thresholds will be rendered more and more pressing. This is because more and more 
specific product markets will become Community-wide and more and more 
commercial transactions - including mergers - will be seen to have an effect upon 
interstate trade.
Furthermore, it has been determined that the certainty that turnover thresholds - as a 
formalistic jurisdictional criterion - lend to the Merger Regulation should not be 
considered absolute. Whatever advantages in certainty formalistic provisions may 
provide relative to more flexible criteria may even be outweighed by other regulatory
2 8 8
inefficiencies deriving from their technical application and their inability to adapt to a 
non-static environment.
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XI CONCLUSION
The diesis has determined that the Reviews of the jurisdictional trigger o f the EC 
Merger Regulation by the Commission (and in the literature) have considered the 
issue only in terms o f policy issues, specifically Community competition policy, 
rational economics, regulatory efficiency and the principle of subisidiarity (that may 
not be applied to the text of the EC Merger Regulation in isolation, but is applicable 
'in spirit' as a desirable policy goal).
The author however considers that it is the legal dynamic o f the debate that should be 
given overriding importance in any discussion o f jurisdiction within the Community. 
The competence of the Community to assess mergers derives from EC Treaty that lays 
down the extent to which its institutions may act Thereby, it is the operation of the 
legal bases in conjunction with the application o f the legal principle o f subsidiarity 
that determine an appropriate jurisdictional trigger for the EC Merger Regulation: the 
interstate trade criterion.
The thesis determines that the operation of Article 1 MR (together with the fine-tuning 
provisions of the Merger Regulation) does not operate absolutely consistently with the 
interstate trade criterion. Further analysis of the operation of the legal bases of the 
Regulation reveals that this fact does not render the EC Merger Regulation 
illegitimate, nor is it unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the legal consequences are that the 
Regulation extinguishes private rights deriving from Article 81 of the Treaty before 
national courts. This is clearly undesirable, particularly in a time when such private 
individual rights are actively being encouraged.974
The policy implications of the operation of the existing jurisdictional trigger are also 
significant, in particular for the aim o f establishing a level playing field o f competition 
regulation for undertakings within the Community. Mergers that may distort 
competition within the Community (and therefore may hinder the integration process) 
may be prohibited or sanctioned according to specific national interests that are not 
compatible with the integration process. Furthermore, national assessment of the 
effect of such mergers on competition at the national level may not always take
974 See Commission’s White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 
86 (81 and 82) o f the EC Treaty, OJ N. C132, 1999/05/12 and Commission Proposalfor a new 
implementing Regulation for Articles 81 and 82 £C, Commission Proposal COM (2000) 582.
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account of the effect of the merger on competition at a Community level. This is a 
deficiency that will become increasingly evident as the Single Market progresses.
The EC Commission determined in its 1996 Review o f the jurisdictional trigger of the 
Merger Regulation that in terms of Community policy (ignoring the legal issues) the 
interstate trade criterion was more appropriate than the existing turnover thresholds in 
Article 1 M R975 The Commission has also stated that it is willing to consider factors 
other than turnover to determine the jurisdictional scope of die Merger Regulation,976 
Nevertheless, die logical step from these two assertions has never been directly 
considered by the Commission since it dropped the interstate trade criterion from its 
first proposal for the EC Merger Regulation.977 In spite of the persuasive legal and 
policy reasons for the use o f the interstate criterion, there are clearly outstanding 
factors that prevent its viability in real terms. Three of these factors are easily 
identifiable:
- First, the implementation of the interstate trade criterion would dramatically increase 
the scope of application of the Merger Regulation (in preference to the national 
systems of control). In spite of increasing harmonisation of national systems of 
competition law according to Community principles and approach and the fact that 
concentrations are assessed for their effect on competition alone under Article 2 
MR978, the national governments remain coy about ceding substantial amounts of 
control to Community-level institutions in this area Recall that the Member States 
were opposed to a reduction o f the turnover thresholds made by the Commission in its
975 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review o f the Merger Regulation 1996, ibid, pp.25-6.
976 Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation 1996, ibid, p. 11.
977 The first Merger Regulation proposal did incorporate the interstate trade criterion, 
combined with a low turnover threshold and a market share threshold Article 1(1)(1) (‘in so far 
as the concentration may affect trade between Member States.*) and Article 1(2) (the aggregate 
turnover o f the participating undertakings had to exceed 200 million units o f  account and the 
goods and services concerned by the concentration had to account for at least 25 %  o f the 
market in at least one Member State).
978 Although there is explicit reference to other criteria in Article 2(l)b MR, these will not be 
taken into account unless they are to  the consumers’ advantage and do not form an obstacle to 
competition. There is therefore no scope for an efficiency defence that could be employed to  
pursue Community industrial policy. In detail, see eg., Camesasca, P., The Explicit Efficiency 
Defence in Merger Control: Does it Make the Difference?, (1999) ECLR ppl4-28.
There is further little evidence that the Commission has covertly pursued industrial policy 
agendas in the practical application o f the Regulation.
Note that The McDougall Report, considering the need for centralised financial regulation, 
highlighted the conditions of: the existence o f economies o f scale, political homogeneity and 
cross-frontier effects. Where the Member States are increasingly assessing concentrations 
solely for their effect on competition, the relevant political homogeneity exists, and the 
argument for centralised regulation is pressing. Commission of the European Communities,
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Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation in 1996, where the end effect 
would have been a threshold set far above that of the interstate trade criterion. It is o f 
course open to debate whether this is a rational - even logical - stance. According to 
the Treaty (Articles 2, 3 and 5 EC) Member States may not pursue policies that might 
contradict a system of undistorted competition within the Community. Therefore, an 
increased scope of the Merger Regulation would not change the fact that the Member 
States are already compelled to concede the right to pursue national policies as far as 
they conflict with the process of Single Market integration (based upon a system of 
undistorted competition). Furthermore, it is important to stress that the loss of this 
right of the Member States does not result in the power o f the Community to re­
regulate in this substantive held. Rather, the national powers just legally ceases to 
exist Member State opposition appears therefore to be based more upon 
‘psychological’ prejudice than any rational analysis. Whether this status quo may 
change in the near future is impossible to predict. At present, however, it is almost 
certain that the required qualified majority vote o f the Member States to implement 
the interstate trade criterion as the jurisdictional trigger for the Merger Regulation 
could not be achieved in the Council of Ministers.979
- Secondly, even if it may be shown that functionalist legal provisions may in their 
application provide enough certainty to remain legitimate - and the use of the 
interstate trade criterion would have the benefit of an established precedent - we 
should not forget the interests of business at the every day level. The interstate trade 
criterion may not provide enough certainty in practical efficiency terms.980 Recall that 
for the regulation of mergers, certainty is especially vital. Uncertain jurisdictional 
scope of the Merger Regulation would mean long delays and expense and the 
optimum moment for a merger may be lost. Firms would be dissuaded from effecting 
potentially efficiency-enhancing mergers in the first place. Furthermore, merger 
control is politically a very contentious area so that an ambiguous jurisdictional 
dividing-line may provoke difficulties between the Commission and the Member 
States. Hence, the Commission expressly rejected the suitability of the interstate trade 
criterion as being too vague in its 1996 Review.
McDougall Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in European Integration 
(1977, OOPEC, Luxembourg).
979 There would also be concerns about the risk of regulatory capture by expanded centralised 
control.
For a classical analysis o f the problems of regulatory capture (with direct reference to 
Community merger control), see Neven et al., ibid at pp. 163-192.
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- Thirdly, the Commission has only limited resources and staff. Schaub, the present 
Director General of DGIV, has expressed concern about the limited resources of the 
Commission in the regulation of competition as a reason to amend die present 
structure o f competences.980 81 It is at present seriously over-worked and it is not 
possible that it could cope with the substantial expansion in the scope of the Merger 
Regulation that the adoption o f the interstate trade criterion as the jurisdictional 
trigger would entail.982
The corollary of this is that the most appropriate jurisdictional criterion for the EC 
Merger Regulation in terms o f its legal bases and Community competition policy is 
not a realistic possibility for reasons of national sovereignty and regulatory efficiency. 
This does not have implications of legitimacy. Private rights have (in theoretical 
terms) not been lost on the basis o f Article 83 EC; the application of subsidiarity does 
not rest upon a basic and exclusive application o f Tiebout, but incorporates other 
efficiency factors as well.983
It remains to be considered however whether there could ever be a ‘perfect fit’. Is 
there a formula for a jurisdictional trigger that would ensure:
• that the legal constitutional issues were comprehensively laid to rest;
- that the Commission’s already stretched resources would not be completely 
exhausted;
- that regulatory efficiency and legal certainty are not undermined;
• that would ensure that any residual national sovereignty issues would be provided 
for; and
- that the overriding policy goal o f competition law would be adequately protected?
Several other solutions to the dilemma have been forwarded and considered by both 
the Commission and in the literature. Both consider these options from the point of 
view o f policy and regulatory efficiency only, ignoring the claims of the legal bases.
980 In agreement, see Broberg, ibid, 1994, p. 99-100; Broberg, ibid, 1997, pp. 107-8.
981 Cited as 500 employees handling 1338 cases in 1997 in: Die Zeit Nr. 26, 18 June 1998 , 
p.19
982 See eg  Riley, ‘The European Cartel Office: A Guardian Without Weapons? * (1997) 1 
ECLR 3 at pp. Î 1-13; Kerse’s annotation on Otto B V v Postbank NV, (1994) 31 CMLR; House 
of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Enforcement of Community 
Competition Rules, Session 1993-4, 1st Report; Forrester and Norall, ‘Competition Law' 
(1990) 10 YEL 407, at p.409.
983 See the individual conditions as laid out above, pl63-I67.
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Even within these limited parameters however, none of the possibilities has been 
deemed adequate:
- Turnover thresholds on a sectoral basis would require a threshold at a necessarily 
arbitrary level with regard to the potential effect on Community competition structures 
and their operation would be very complex where firms were active across a number 
o f sectors.984 985
• Thresholds based upon the size o f the transaction would again require a threshold 
that was entirely arbitrary with regard to the potential effect on Community
« « 085competition structures.
- A market share criterion would also be set at an arbitrary level with regard to the 
potential effect on Community competition structures. The Commission nevertheless 
has considered it to be a more appropriate jurisdictional criterion than the existing 
turnover thresholds.986 It discounts it however on practical grounds as rendering too 
much legal uncertainty in the application for a jurisdictional criterion.987 This position 
of the Commission is widely accepted in the literature 988 It should further noted that 
in order to establish an accurate market definition, it is often necessary to contact the 
main customers and the main companies in the area to consider their views and to 
obtain relevant information. This information may include specific sales figures and 
other data which is usually kept confidential and it is unlikely that a firm which is 
considering participation in a concentration would be able to gain access to sales
984 See, rejecting its use for the latter reason, European Commission Report to the Council on 
the Implementation o f the Merger Regulation, COM (93) 385, Brussels, 28 July 1993, at p. 14. 
In agreement, also Broberg, ibid, 1994, p.100.
985 This solution has been advocated by the American Bar Association, ABA Comments on 
Draft Form Notification, Antitrust Law Journal, 59, (1990), pp.252-4. Also Broberg, ibid, 
1998.
986 Commission Green Paper, ibid, p.30. It discounts it however as rendering too much legal 
uncertainty in application for a jurisdictional criterion, see eg., Commission Report to Council 
on the Implementation o f the Merger Regulation, COM(93) 386, Brussels, 28 July 1993, at p. 
14.
987 Commission Report to Council on the Implementation of the Merger Regulation, COM(93) 
386, Brussels, 28 July 1993 at p. 14.
988 See eg., Cook, C.J. and Kerse, C.S., ibid, at pp. 62-63; Burnside, A , ‘Comment - European 
Merger Control: Department Shopping? ' in: Competition, 1996, 2 at p. 2; Koegel, R., ‘Die 
Angleichung der deutschen an die europaeische Fusionskontrolle \  Nomos 
Veriagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1996 atp.303; Broberg, M.P., 1998 ibid at p.262; Broberg, 
1997 ibid, pp. 107-8.
Against this, only Kassamali, ibid and Morgan, ibid. ~~
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figures of its competitors in order to more accurately calculate its exact market 
share.989
•V/
Another problem that would arise with all these possibilities, just as it would arise 
with the use of the interstate trade criterion, is the limited resources and staff o f the 
Merger Task Force in the Commission. The structure is simply not in place to cope 
with a significantly increased scope of the Merger Regulation, whereby, under the 
present system, its application would remain in the exclusive competence o f the 
Commission.
With this in mind, it is striking that the Commission has not appeared to consider die 
decentralised enforcement of the Merger Regulation (in tandem with an increased 
scope). This is in spite of the existing structure of Articles 81 and 82 EC, and die 
recent proposal by the Commission for a new implementing Regulation for Articles
81 and 82 EC to encourage and to materially expand the (already existing) 
decentralisation of enforcement.990 These recent recommendations for Articles 81 and
82 EC have been equally considered by the Commission to be consistent with the 
conditions deriving from Article 5 EC and the subsidiarity principle within the context 
of the Community objective of preventing the distortion of competition within the 
Community.991
Questionable is why, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission 
represents the most appropriate authority to regulate all mergers that affect interstate 
trade, and yet the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC is most appropriately shared 
between the national and Community levels. Why should the enforcement of the 
Merger Regulation not be entrusted to national authorities?
Clearly, decentralised enforcement at the conception o f the Merger Regulation was 
inconceivable since not all Member States had an effective system of competition law 
in general, never mind a structure in place to assess mergers. Analysis of Annex J
989 SeeBroberg, ibid, 1998 at p.262,
990 See Commission’s White Paper on modernisation o f the rules implementing Articles 85 and 
86 (81 and 82) o f the EC Treaty, QJ N. 032,1999/05/12 and Commission Proposal for a new 
implementing Regulation for Articles 81 and 82 ECt Commission Proposal COM (2000) 582.
Commission Proposal for a new implementing Regulation for Articles 81 and 82 EC, 
Commission Proposal COM (2000) 582, at p.l.
Some authors consider that subsidiarity does not operate in this way for Articles 81 and 82 EC. 
They consider that subsidiarity operates to require a new jurisdictional criterion for these 
Articles that will be more restricted in scope. This has however been refuted above, see 
pp.123.
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however shows us that this is no longer the case, and all fifteen Member States have 
some form of merger control.
The approach of the Commission for merger regulation - with regard to jurisdiction as 
well as enforcement - might be taken to be a straightforward and undiluted application 
of the Tiebout principle: recall that this principle emphasises the importance of spill­
over effect to rebut the presumption of decentralised regulation. Its importance to the 
Commission in its approach to the centralisation issue has been emphasised on 
numerous occasions in its own Reports.992 On the other hand, the Tiebout principle 
appears to be of no importance for die issue of the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 
EC in the Commission’s recent Proposal993 It appears therefore that, with regard to the 
enforcement issue, the principle of subsidiarity affects the area of antitrust in a 
different way than the regulation o f mergers.
Let us however reconsider the operation of the Tiebout principle. According to the 
application of Tiebout for merger control, spill-over effects are determinative in 
rebutting the presumption for decentralisation for two main reasons. First, there is a 
need for a level playing field in the regulation of private conduct This is not 
guaranteed if a national authority may assess conduct having an effect beyond the 
borders of its own jurisdiction with regard to purely domestic concerns.994 Secondly, 
multiple notifications may be expensive politically and in economic terms, and there 
are concomitant informational difficulties.993
It is necessary to consider the specifics of decentralisation as proposed for Articles 81 
and 82 EC with regard to the operation of this presumption. The proposed regulation 
intends the increased o f the scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC on the one hand (whereby 
all agreements or conduct affecting interstate trade will be subject to these Articles), 
and on the other an increased application of Articles 81 and 82 EC at the decentralised 
level (whereby national authorities will also be able to apply Article 81(3) EC). It 
therefore actually champions the idea of decentralised enforcement upon the basis o f 
spillover effects.
Analysis of the terms of the Commission Proposal reveals however that this does not 
in fact, as it first appears, constitute a broad rejection of the Tiebout principle. On the
992 See eg, Padoa Schioppa Report ibid.
993 Commission Proposal, ibid.
994 See above, pp.274-301.
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contrary, a system of checks and formalities exist to counter the problems that 
traditionally rebut the Tiebout presumption. These safeguards act to justify 
decentralisation consistently with the practical fact that the Commission’s resources 
alone are insufficient to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC adequately. Articles 11-13 of the 
Proposal provide for co-operation between the Commission and the national 
authorities and between the national authorities themselves, including exchange of 
information and case allocation provisions.93 *96 Furthermore, Article 16 reiterates the 
Member States* obligation deriving from Article 10 EC, providing that national courts 
and authorities are obliged to make every effort to avoid taking decisions that conflict 
with decisions adopted by the Commission (whereby national courts may also initiate 
Article 234 EC preliminary reference proceedings). There are other safeguards. The 
Commission retains its autonomous power to enforce Articles 81 and 82 EC in the 
individual case upon its own initiative.997 The Commission may adopt and refine 
block exemptions and remove their benefit in the individual case, 998 but a national 
authority may only withdraw the benefit o f a block exemption for its own territory in 
the limited circumstances that it constitutes a distinct relevant market.999 National 
competition authorities must consult the Commission in all decisions aimed at 
terminating or penalising an infringement of Article 81 and 82 EC1000 and, 
furthermore, die Commission retains its existing right to withdraw a case from a 
national competition authority and deal with it itself.1001 National courts will be 
obliged to transmit a copy o f judgments applying Articles 81 and 82 EC to the 
Commission, and the Commission may appear as amicus curiae before national courts 
in any case where it felt that an issue of considerable importance for the consistent 
application of Community competition law is involved.1002
Above all, national authorities and courts will in general only be applying a 
prohibition according to established principles of Community law. They will not be
993 See above, p.272.
996 T he Commission states that detailed rules will be laid down in an implementing
Com m ission regulation according to  A rticle 34 o f  the proposed Regulation, and in a  notice on
co-operation between com petition authorities, see Regulation Proposal, ibid at p. 19.
997 See Article 7 o f the Com m ission Proposal, ibid.
998 See Articles 28-30 o f  the Com m ission Proposal, ibid.
999 See Articles 29(2) o f  the Com m ission Proposal, ibid.
For an interpretation o f  ‘distinct market* w ithin the context o f the EC M erger Regulation 
A rticle 9, see above, pp.200-202.
1000 See A rticle 11(4) o f  the Com m ission Proposal, ibid.
1001 See A rticle 11(6) o f  the Com m ission Proposal, ibid.
This A rticle is the existing A rticle 9(3) o f R egulation 17/63.
1002 See A rticle 15 o f  the Com m ission Proposal, ibid.
A dm ittedly, the right o f  the Com m ission to  appear in national courts is shared w ith the national 
com petition authorities. ~
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able to take ‘positive decisions * - that is, individual exemption-type or non- 
infringement type decisions. Article 10 of the Proposal provides that the Commission 
- and the Commission only • may adopt decisions finding that Article 81 EC is 
inapplicable (either because the conditions of Article 81(1) EC are not fulfilled or the 
conditions of Article 81(3) EC are not satisfied), or that Article 82 EC is not 
applicable. This proposal warrants the end o f the current individual exemption 
procedure followed by the Commission in its application o f Article 81(3) EC, and 
envisages a determination that an individual agreement or conduct does not fall into 
Article 81 EC as a whole. The decisions would be taken ‘in the Community interest* 
in cases that, as envisaged by the White Paper on Modernisation1003 that pre-empted 
the Commission Proposal, are exceptional and raise new questions for which the 
market requires guidance.
The Proposal considers that such decisions will be binding and, in tandem with the 
obligation emphasised in Article 16 of the Proposal, will make an important 
contribution to the uniform application of Community competition law.1004 105In essence, 
however, Article 10 of the Proposal represents a restriction on the activity o f the 
Member States within their new structure o f competencies rather than a specific 
empowerment of the Commission. It would contribute to the uniform application of 
Community competition law in that it prevents Member States from effectively 
renationalising the application o f Articles 81 and 82 EC by granting immunity to 
individual undertakings in their individual acts.1003 An individual competition 
authority (or court) with its own interest in a particular undertaking cannot therefore 
prevent the initiation of Article 81 or 82 EC proceedings by the Commission or 
another national authority through a declaration that those Articles do not apply to the 
relevant agreement or conduct per se. The prohibition remains ‘alive* and may be 
enforced by another authority.
The Proposal for the implementation of a new regulation for the application of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC therefore hopes to avoid the problems that mitigate against 
decentralised regulation according to the Tiebout principle. This it intends to achieve 
by the implementation of a specific structure of co-operation between the national
1003 Commission W hite Paper, ibid.
1004 Commission Proposal, ibid a t p. 19.
1005 Hence, the Proposal em phasises that such decisions can be adopted only at the 
Com mission’s initiative and in the Community public interest to  *...ensure that decisions 
making a finding o f inapplicability cannot be obtained on demand by companies. see 
Com mission Proposal, ibid at p. 19.
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regulators, and a system that ensures that the Commission oversees consistency in the 
application of the principles o f Articles 81 and 82 EC. Fundamentally, it prevents 
national courts and authorities from adopting positive decisions and potentially 
distorting the Community objectives pursued in the application of Articles 81 and 82 
EC. This constitutes a more sophisticated approach to the principle of subsidiarity 
than the basic application o f Tiebout principle that is apparent for the control of 
mergers. It provides that the fourth condition required to justify Community action 
according to the principle o f subsidiarity is not fulfilled: it ensures that action at the 
national level is effective and efficient to achieve the objective of protecting and 
promoting Single Market integration in the application o f Articles 81 and 82 EC.1006
The question is re-posited: why is it not possible - within the context of subsidiarity - 
to provide a similar system and structure o f checks and restrictions to allow the 
decentralised enforcement o f the EC Merger Regulation? Why did the Commission, in 
particular in its reference to the subsidiarity principle, not even consider the 
application of the Merger Regulation on the basis o f the interstate trade criterion and 
in the hands of national competition authorities in its 1996 Review of the Merger 
Regulation (that was after all only three years prior to its White Paper on 
Modernisation o f the Rules Implementing Articles 81 and &2?)1007
With regard to the enforcement of the EC Merger Regulation, there are clearly issues 
and problems involved in the regulation of mergers that continue to render 
decentralisation inappropriate, in spite of the fact that the factors arising from the 
simple application o f the Tiebout model can apparently be effectively addressed. 
These issues lie within the text of the Merger Regulation itself, and within the other 
important principles lying behind its conception as they relate to the specialised nature 
of regulating mergers:
- In the first place, the assessment of mergers under Article 2 MR is by nature exactly 
the expression of positive decision-making that the Commission denied the Member 
States within the terms of its Proposal for a new implementing Regulation for Articles 
81 and 82 EC: the assessment determines definitively in the individual case whether a 
concentration is or is not compatible with the Community objectives.1008 Given the 
particular political and social issues that concentrations may invoke (that may be
1006 See the abstract analysis o f  the application o f  the subsidiarity principle above.
1007 Commission W hite Paper, ibid.
10081 am indebted to  Professor C laus-Dieter Ehlerm ann fo r raising this point.
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approached on a purely national rather than Community basis), it would be clearly 
highly inappropriate for national authorities to be given this scope to exercise their 
discretion. It could even provoke the unravelling of the body of concentration policy 
that the Commission has built up, since concentrations are by their very nature more 
liable to be found to be consistent with Community policy and objectives,1009 giving 
national authorities more cover in allowing concentrations for reasons that are o f 
exclusive concern to themselves.
- In the second place, it is necessary to recall the overriding importance attributed to 
the one-stop-shop principle in the conception (and subsequent reviews) of the EC 
Merger Regulation. We have already established that the regulation of mergers is 
different. Speed and certainty are of paramount importance. It is imperative therefore 
that the undertakings concerned have the opportunity to receive a definitive 
assessment of the proposed concentration before it is implemented to avoid the 
difficult and even impossible consequence that divestment would entail: it would be a 
situation intolerable for business were they required to perform concentrations under 
the constant threat of prohibition with no system of a-priori approval. This entails a 
system of prior notification o f mergers. Thereby, it is extremely desirable that 
notification is made to only one authority in the interests of performing the 
concentration while the optimum conditions last, and of incurring the least amount o f 
expense.
With regard to merger control therefore, the interests o f centralised enforcement are 
pressing. This is however less as a result of an overriding influence o f the Tiebout 
model (that have been shown to be capable of being overridden within the fiamework 
o f the subsidiarity principle) and more to do with the other important principles at the 
heart of the Merger Regulation - legal certainty and a one-stop-shop.
The effect of subsidiarity is therefore to justify the current system of centralised 
enforcement.
Do all these considerations mean that we are bound to the existing regime that relies 
upon a set of quantitative jurisdictional thresholds? Does this mean that we are 
required to accept a Merger Regulation that has (however legitimately) the
1009 See above, pp.39-42.
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undesirable effect o f extinguishing private rights that previously existed in the 
application of Article 81 EC before national courts?
Recent dynamics with regard to the enforcement o f  Article 81 EC suggest that the 
existing problems concerning the legal bases of the Merger Regulation and private 
rights may soon change. The recent White Paper by the European Commission on the 
Modernisation o f the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 EC (now Articles 81 and 
82 EC) recommends that national courts (and authorities outside the procedure on the 
basis o f Article 84 EC) should be given the right to apply Article 81(3) EC.1010 If such 
an amendment comes to fruition, then the constitutional concerns raised by the 
operation of the turnover thresholds will be removed.
The policy problems however remain present and pertinent, and apparently 
irreconcilable. In the face o f the circle of elements (Community competition policy, 
legitimacy, political viability, regulatory efficiency) that seem to act in a centrifugal 
manner, pulling apart any proposal for an appropriate jurisdictional criterion, it 
appears that the search for an appropriate jurisdictional trigger for the EC Merger 
Regulation must necessarily be compromised: it becomes a search for a ‘best fit* 
rather than a ‘perfect fit*.
What is clear is that the present structure o f the jurisdictional trigger is far from 
satisfactory, even if  it is legitimate. It does not satisfy the claims of the overriding 
policy behind die implementation of Community competition law. If it does indeed 
represent a 'refocusing' of the interstate trade criterion according to the legal base of 
Article 83 EC (by analogy with the experience in the area of state aids), it is not 
appropriate. The Commission must continue to press its mandate for lower turnover 
thresholds. Success would at least dilute to a greater extent the fiction that arises 
through the use of a formalistic criterion that can never pertain exactly to the effect 
concentrations may have on interstate trade. Thereby, however, action will be needed 
to ensure that the Commission is able to undertake the role assigned to it. There are 
solutions that may be considered. One might be to simply give greater resources to the 
Merger Task Force to carry out its tasks. A more radical idea might be a system of 
European Commission agencies at the national level. This might allay some of the 
national sovereignty fears, or at least the fears that the interests of national markets are 
overlooked at the centralised level. Above all, however, it is fair to say that the
1010 Com m ission’s W hite Paper, ibid.
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integrity o f Community competition policy should not be compromised for the basic 
reason that practical resources are insufficient.
Barring such developments, it is considered that focus should also be placed upon the 
application of national laws by the national authorities of the Member States. They 
should be encouraged - in tandem with the soft harmonisation of national competition 
laws that has been recognised to have been occurring in recent years - to consider the 
effect of the concentration on competition structures on the true relevant market, even 
if  it extends beyond national boundaries. Thereby, concentrations even at the national 
level would be assessed according to their effect upon the integration paradigm (it 
may be assumed that few concentrations that fall within the scope of no national 
merger law would have an effect upon interstate trade).
O f course, tensions will remain: lower turnover thresholds will never guarantee that 
all concentrations that may affect Community goals will be brought within the remit 
of the Commission; without exclusive Commission control over all mergers that may 
affect interstate trade, there can be no structure of checks in place to ensure that a 
single national authority does not exaggerate its own national interests in assessing 
mergers with cross-border effect. However, such developments would at least 
constitute a ‘best fit* that moves closer to the unattainable ideal.

ANNEX1
Overview of National Merger Control Legislation
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ANNEX 2
Mergers Notified with the Italian Authorities during the Period July 
- December 1999 that affected Interstate Trade
NAME OF DECISION
Ice Holding 1-2/Eco- 
Ecorefrigerazione-Rhoss 
BASF/BP France
Recticel-Greiner Holding« 
Orsa/Orsa Foam 
United Technologies 
Corporation/Sutrak Italia 
Baldurion/Novembal
United Technologies 
Corporation/Intemational 
Comfort Products Corporation 
Hamilton Sundstrand 
Holdings/Pneumatic Aircraft 
Components Europe 
Procter and Gamble/IAMS
BASF/Ultrafonn
GE Industrial Products 
Europe-GE Packaged 
Power/Thomassen 
International 
Deutsche Lufthansa/Air 
Dolomiti
Huntsman Speciality 
Chemical/Imperial Chemical
DATE OF DECISION 
7th July 1999 
16th July 1999 
27th July 1999 
10th August 1999 
10th August 1999 
25th August 1999
8th September 1999
8th September 1999 
23rd September 1999 
7th October 1999
21nd October 1999 
27th October 1999
REFERENCE
Bollettino n.27 of 26th July 
1999
Bollettino n.28 of 2nd August 
1999
Bollettino n.29-30 of 16th 
August 1999
Bollettino n.31-32 of30th 
August 1999
Bollettino n.31-32 o f 30th 
August 1999 
Bollettino n.33-4 o f 13th 
September 1999
Bollettino n.35-6 of 27th 
September 1999
BoUettino n.35-6 of 27th 
September 1999 
Bollettino n.38 of 1 lth 
October 1999 
Bollettino n.40 of25th 
October 1999
Bollettino n.42 of 8th 
November 1999 
Bollettino n.43 of 15th 
November 1999
vili
Industries
United Technologies 27th October 1999 Bollettino n.43 of I5th
Corporation/ Great Lakes November 1999
Turbines
FCY Acquisition/Furon 27th October 1999 Bollettino n.43 o f 15th
Yamaha Motor Europe- 4th November 1999
November 1999 
Bollettino n.44 o f 22nd
Kayaba Industiy/Paioli November 1999
Meccanica 
High Voltage 10th November 1999 Bollettino n.45 of 29th
Engineering/Ansaldo Sistemi November 1999
Industriali
Markos/Mefar 17th November 1999 Bollettino n.46 o f 6th
Nord-Micro Elektronik 17th November 1999
December 1999 
Bollettino n.46 o f 6th
Feinmechanik/T elair December 1999
International Electronic 
Systems
Robert Bosch/ARESI 24th November 1999 Bollettino n.47 o f 13th
Danieli & C. Officine 24th November 1999
December 1999 
Bollettino n.47 o f 13th
Meccanichecorus December 1999
Group/Danieli Hoogovens 
Technical Services 
Roehm/Polymer Latex 2nd December 1999 Bollettino n.48 o f 20th
December 1999
Grupo Mexico/Asarco 2nd December 1999
Incorporated
United Technologies/Cade 7th December 1999
Industries
Cardo/Cardo BSI Rail 16th December 1999
21 Investimenti-Sport 22nd December 1999
Investments/Spoit Timing
United Technologies/Holland 22nd December 1999
Bollettino n.48 o f 20th 
December 1999 
Bollettino n.49 o f 27th 
December
Bollettino n.50 o f 3rd January 
2000
Bollettino n.51-2 of lOth 
January 2000 
Bollettino n.51-2 of lOth
IX
Heating Carrier Holding
United Technologies/AB 22nd December 1999 
Electrolux
January 2000 
Bollettino n.51*2 of 10th 
January 2000
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